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Abstract 
The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, (Ta Mei Wan Pao 大美晚報) was an American 
owned and managed newspaper in China with both English and Chinese language publications. 
It was published from 1929 to 1949 and, during this time, it both witnessed and participated in 
a very significant historical period for China and arguably the most crucial period in the history 
of Chinese journalism. In 1929, C. V. Starr, the American owner, with his ambition of business 
in China created the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury (SEPM) from two existing papers 
and based the paper in the French Concession of pre-war Shanghai, a zone of extraterritoriality. 
Then, the newspaper experienced the gory Isolated Island incident with a terrorist attack and 
assassination, a hard time in the wartime capital Chongqing, the great depression in post-war 
Shanghai and the final closure soon after Shanghai was taken by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). This thesis will make an original contribution to the field by offering the most detailed 
historical account of the SEPM to date. It includes a complete inventory of the newspaper’s 
various editions and activities, which includes the first documented history of the various 
incarnations of the newspaper’s radio station, Ta Mei Radio. In providing this inventory, the 
thesis also enhances our understanding of the historical foundation, motivation and limitations 
of the development of journalism in modern China, with a particular focus on Shanghai. In the 
first place, this thesis offers the most comprehensive historical trajectory of the SEPM 
supported by hitherto unpublished primary sources from a multitude of archives throughout the 
world, and supplemented by a range of secondary sources in both English and Chinese. 
Moreover, a selection of articles (initially published in supplements of the Chinese edition of 
the SEPM from 1932 to 1940) have been translated for the first time and used to document key 
moments of the newspaper’s history.  
The vicissitudes of the SEPM highlight the turbulence of Chinese politics. More importantly, 
they provide a lens to present the professionalisation of Chinese journalism in its critical 
turning point. Journalistic professionalism originally rose in the United States during the late 
19th century in response to the commercialisation of the press. The Missouri School of 
Journalism, the first of its kind, was established in 1908 with the ideal of creating education 
programme to form the norms of professionalism and promote them in practice. The 
professionalisation of American journalism significantly influenced the development of 
xii 
Chinese journalism in the first half of the 20th century. By studying the SEPM’s archives, much 
evidence of both the efforts to professionalise journalism throughout and the devastating effects 
that the conflicts had on the development of professional journalism in this turbulent period 
will be presented in the thesis. Moreover, this period of the SEPM is very much marked by the 
angst-ridden articles that many Chinese journalists felt the need to write (often – for their own 
safety - anonymously) as their activities as journalists began to shift from protecting the public 
interest through objective reporting (a value chiefly derived from the professional prototype of 
American journalism) to activities that became increasingly partisan. These articles are also 
analysed in the thesis. Thirdly, this thesis applies Bourdieu’s field theory to tease out elements 
of the historical outline of the SEPM that are particularly salient to the development of 
professional journalism in China. Struggling to integrate the fearless reporting that was valued 
by the Missouri-trained journalists and the fear of the growing power and ruthlessness of the 
Japanese occupation, journalists relied on their wordsmithing – their social and cultural capital 
– to respond to their predicament. Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of field and habitus establish an
analytical framework through which the course of an individual’s history as well as history as 
it is objectified in social institutions can be re-told through the paradigm of a symbiotic 
relationship that dynamically transforms both entities. Important elements of Bourdieu’s field 
theory (field, habitus, capital, etc.) have been applied to the case of the SEPM in order to better 
articulate aspects of its history and its place within the broader sweep of the history of 
professional journalism in China.  
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Introduction 
Gould, Gould, feel your head, clear your eyes. 
Do you know what this era is? 
Can imperialists continue their fierce and brutal acts in China? 
Can Chinese workers be treated as slaves at your wish? …  
Stubborn imperialistic Gould! 
Remember China has been free from the imperialistic yoke, work must be 
hard but existence must be glorious. 
The Chinese people have become masters of China!1  
 
In 1949, long-time American resident of Shanghai, Randall Gould, was subjected to a 
sustained attack on his character. In Chinese newspapers, he was pilloried as the perfect 
example of American imperialism. On 25 June 1949, the Liberation Daily, Chinese 
Communist Party’s mouthpiece, which had just been established in Shanghai stated: 
Following the liberation of Shanghai on 25 May by the People’s Liberation 
Army through its irresistible force, it was unanimously understood that the 
people who were suppressed by Chiang Kai-shek’s bandit group and the 
bureaucratic capitalists would stand up and become the masters of the 
country. However, Randall Gould, as a stubborn and unreasonable 
imperialist, does not understand this. On the contrary, he ignores the laws 
and regulations of the People’s Government, and vainly attempts to force 
laborers to be his slaves by resorting to his economic power. This is not the 
reality but part of his dream world.2  
 
As the manager and the editor in chief of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury 
(SEPM), Gould had worked in China for nearly 20 years, and was an old hand at Chinese 
affairs. Under his leadership, the SEPM had held a significant leadership role in 
supporting the Chinese cause of resistance against Japan and promoting journalism 
professionalisation. Such great contributions, however, did not prevent the newspaper’s 
fate of being forced into ceasing publication and having the label of imperialism attached 
to it soon after the Chinese Communists occupied Shanghai in May 1949. 3  This 
                                                 
1 Randall Gould, “Shanghai during the Takeover, 1949,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 277, no. 1 (September 1951): 189. 
2 Kangyi Gaoerde Yapo Zhongguo Gongren [Protest against Randall Gould as He Suppressed Chinese Workers] 
Liberation Daily, 25 June 1949. 
3 See Du Ruo, “Suqing Diguozhuyi De Quzhu: Lun Zilinxibao Zaoyao Shijian, Gaoerde Shijian, Mengda Shijian He 
Oulifu Shijian [Clean Borders of Imperialism: Examining the Incident of Spreading Rumours by the North China 
Daily News, and Gould, Manderson and Oliver Incidents],” Shijie Zhishi 1949, no. 5: 3. 
18 
 
Communist takeover marks a significant turning point in Chinese journalism history. 
The press reform was immediately implemented by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
soon after its military victory. It fundamentally subverted the inherent mode and 
landscape of modern journalism which had existed for almost a century in China. These 
reforms led to the closure of many newspapers, while other privately owned newspapers 
became public entities. For journalists, the fundamental purpose of media was changed 
irrevocably. The media became the Party’s voice.4  
Shanghai was known as the ‘Paris of the East,’ a centre of opulence, conspicuous wealth 
and high living. The city was a globally significant centre of modernity, and began to 
enjoy its modern prosperity as a global economic and trade centre from the time it was 
forcedly opened to foreigners in accordance with the Treaty of Nanking signed on the 
29 August 1842: 
At Shanghai, the English, later the International, Settlement was established 
in 1843. The new foreign residents were allowed to rent land in a strip 
alongside the Huangpu river outside the Chinese walled city of Shanghai. 
Regulations governing land use in this settlement were first drawn up by the 
Chinese authorities, and later versions (1854, 1869, 1898) provided the basis 
on which the mainly British Land Renters elected a committee to maintain 
order and construct roads and jetties; in 1854, this became the Shanghai 
Municipal Council (SMC). Also in 1854, these Land Renters established a 
Shanghai Municipal Police Force (SMP) and, in response to the seizure of 
the Chinese city of Shanghai by rebels in 1853, a Shanghai Volunteer Corps 
(SVC).5 
 
Almost a century later, during the Interwar Period, in sharp contrast to Europe that was 
bogged down in depression, Shanghai rapidly expanded and became one of the most 
bustling metropolises in the world. Modernity in Shanghai at the time was not only 
embodied in the neoclassical style of buildings springing up everywhere, but equally in 
                                                 
4 For more details about the process of the Chinese Communist Party realising domination over Chinese journalism 
after its military victory, see Fang Hanqi, Zhongguo Xinwen Shiye Tongshi [A Comprehensive History of Chinese 
Journaism] (Beijing: Renmin University Press, 1996), 2:1154-59; Ma Guangren, Shanghai Dangdai Xinwenshi [A 
Contemporary History of Journalism in Shanghai] (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2001), 1-173; Yang Kuisong, 
“Xin Zhongguo Baokan Tongzhi Jizhi De Xingcheng Jingguo: Yi Jianguo Qianhou Wang Yunsheng De ‘Touxiang’ 
Yu Dagongbao Gaizao Weili [The Formation of the Mechanism of Control over the Press in New China: A Case 
Study of Wang Yunsheng’s collaboration in about the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the 
transformation of Ta Kung Pao],” in Baoren Baoguo: Zhongguo Xinwenshi De Lingyizhong Dufa [To Serve the 
Nation: Journalists as Prisms of Chinese Press History], ed. Lee Chin-Chuan (Hong Kong: The Chinese University 
Press, 2013), 355-401; Zhang Jishun, “Thought Reform and Press Nationalization in Shanghai: The Wenhui 
Newspaper in the Early 1950s,” Twentieth-Century China 35, no. 2 (April 2010): 52-80. 
5 Robert Bickers, “Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity of the British Settler Community in Shanghai 1843-
1937,” Past & Present, no. 159 (May 1998): 166. 
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the flourishing of an urban culture that included sophisticated arts performances, 
conspicuous consumption, and the emergence of a peculiarly feminine urbanity. 6 
Prosperity brought rapid growth in both population and industry with the result that the 
social structure of Shanghai became increasingly complex. Barbara Mittler’s ground-
breaking study of Shanghai’s news media during the late-19th and early-20th centuries 
draws attention to the mythologising of the city and its Chinese residents, which was 
indulged in by the local press through the invention of an essentialised figure, known as 
the Shanghairen (“people of Shanghai”): 
On the pages of Shanghai newspapers, the essentialized Shanghairen 
emerged as an attractive yet frightening, exotic yet necessary model for 
Chinese inside and outside Shanghai. Again, as in the case of women, 
newspapers reflected not the realities found on the streets of modernizing 
China but the realities found in the minds of the modernizers. The 
Shanghairen functioned as a “cultural experimental animal,” on whom the 
often painful transformation of Chinese civilization was performed.7 
 
A large number of industrial workers and educated urban residents shared the same civic 
space and pride of place, fostered by a variety of formal and informal social 
organisations, more or less heterogeneous or homogeneous in their membership; the 
majority of English residents, known as Shanghailanders, being the most exclusive of 
all the nationalities present in Shanghai:8  
These were the small treaty port people, whose fortunes were inextricably 
tied up with the existence of the British concessions and extraterritorial 
privileges in China. They worked in treaty port service occupations 
(administrative, service sector, police), or worked for, or ran, utility 
companies, land investment and real estate firms. […] the British community 
in Shanghai actually provides a clear model of what a settler community 
looks like and how it develops. The nature of its multilayered identities and 
their interaction are also clearly identifiable. Shanghailander identity was 
always British and imperial, but Shanghailanders’ local ‘imagined’ identity, 
so easily and readily dismissed by contemporaries and by historians, was of 
crucial importance to them, and to the Sino-British imbroglio. At different 
times their British, imperial or local identity was more prominent than the 
others, but all three were ever-present. 9 
 
                                                 
6 Liu Jianhui, Mato Shanhai: Nihon Chishikijin no “Kindai” Taiken [Demon and Magic Metropolis Shanghai: The 
"Modern" Experience of Japanese Intellectuals] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2010), 224. 
7 Barbara Mittler, A Newspaper for China?: Power, Identity, and Change in Shanghai’s News Media, 1872-1912 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004), 314. 
8 Kohama Masako, Kindai Shanhai no Kōkyōsei to Kokka [The Public and the State in Modern Shanghai] (Tokyo: 
Kenbun Shuppan, 2000), 43.  
9 Bickers, “Shanghailanders,” 163-64. 
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For some Western adventurers – perhaps consumed by the ennui of everything going 
athwart in their homeland - Shanghai was also the place of dreams and escape.10 In the 
late 1910s, this land where the Sassoon and Kadoorie families achieved their success 
greeted a new American adventurer. Cornelius Vander Starr landed in Shanghai on 19 
December 1919 with his own dream of creating an insurance empire.11 A decade later 
when Starr’s insurance company had taken shape, he began to throw himself into 
Chinese journalism, running the SEPM.  
Figure 1: The Present Situation of the AIA Insurance Buidling in 
Shanghai12 
                                                 
10 Lu Hanchao, Beyond the Neon Lights: Everyday Shanghai in the Early Twentieth Century (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999), 38. 
11 Ronald Kent Shelp and Al Ehrbar, Fallen Giant: The Amazing Story of Hank Greenberg and the History of AIG 
(Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2009), 17. 
12 The North China Daily News and C. V. Starr’s insurance company, the predecessor of AIA insurance company, 
both worked in the building before the Communist takeover. In May 1998, AIA insurance company returned to this 
building. The photo is taken by the author in 2016. 
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Shanghai, as the centre of Chinese journalism, can be traced back to a century before, 
when the city was forced to open up as a treaty port, and the establishment of 
extraterritoriality made foreign settlements in Shanghai become a state within a state in 
the true sense. Qin Shaode demonstrates that besides economic, cultural and geographic 
factors, the existence of foreign settlements was critical in making Shanghai the centre 
of the press and publication in modern China. Protected under foreign settlements, 
reformists’ newspapers gave publicity to their ideals, partisan papers expressed their 
different opinions from those of the government, and the commercial press steadily 
developed.13 As these settlements in reality did not respond to either Chinese authority 
or foreign embassies or consulates, they were managed by the Municipal Council, an 
autonomous administrative institute composed of elected land-owning representatives. 
Foreign settlements in Shanghai became the haven for independent newspapers, such as 
the SEPM (established in the Shanghai French Concession of 1929).14 Curiously, the 
SEPM has not drawn much attention from academics, despite its enormous potential as 
a repository of primary source material for the history of professional journalism in 
China. Extraterritoriality not only enabled foreign colonies and settlements in China to 
possess executive and judicial independence from the Chinese government, but also 
became the fulcrums for Western values and culture to influence Chinese society: 
The Chinese-ness of the foreign settlement, which often surprised Europeans 
arriving there for the first time, must always be borne in mind. 
Shanghailanders constructed their community in the midst of China's most 
populous metropolis.15  
 
More importantly, the principles and practices of journalism management in foreign 
settlements were based on the ideals and principles of their motherland. British, 
American and French liberal ideals of journalism in settlements contrasted sharply with 
Chinese administration controlled areas.16 Some scholars have questioned whether the 
early missionary papers are indeed newspapers. Toh Lam Seng, for example, questioned 
whether the early newspapers established by Western missionaries were genuine modern 
                                                 
13 Qin Shaode, Shanghai Jindai Baokan Shilun [Arguing the Development of the Modern Press in China], 2nd ed. 
(Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2014), 150. 
14 Mittler, A Newspaper for China, 3. 
15 Bickers, “Shanghailanders,” 170. 
16 Qin, Shanghai Jindai Baokan Shilun, 158. 
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newspapers. Toh argues that although these papers introduced a concept of ‘periodical’, 
they cannot be classified as modern papers as their functions were periodical religion 
tracts rather than monthly journals with contents of timely relevance.17 Therefore, he 
divided the origin and early development of modern newspapers in China into two stages: 
religion monthly journals before 1858, and the new pattern of newspapers after 1857. 
These later newspapers provided abundantly relevant news information, designed 
columns by imitating Western newspapers, expressed clear political positions and served 
as a platform for Chinese intellectuals to discuss social affairs.18 According to Toh’s 
definition, a modern press should have two important characteristics: it should be 
periodically published and be concerned with current events.  
By the mid to late 19th century, the professionalisation of journalism had begun in earnest 
in the United States, and it soon spread to China. In the early 20th century, Chinese 
intellectuals and journalists, most clearly represented by Liang Qichao and Huang 
Yuansheng, were committed to improving standards of journalism in China: 
One of the defining characteristics of professional journalism, in China as in 
the West, was the separation of objective (keguan) reporting from subjective 
(zhuguan) commentary. As C.P. Scott, influential editor of the Manchester 
Guardian in the late-nineteenth century, put it: comment is free, but facts are 
sacred.’[…] [In China] there was evidence of the conceptual distinction 
between fact and commentary (or opinion) early in the new century. Liang 
Qichao, a pioneer in so many aspects of Chinese journalism, was the most 
prominent journalist of the day who struggled to resolve the tension between 
fact and opinion.19  
 
Chinese journalists in Shanghai who supported this movement formed informal 
associations throughout the 1920s and the 1930s, and regularly expressed their ideas and 
anxieties about the profession of Chinese journalism in numerous articles published over 
an extensive period in the SEPM: 
In Shanghai a few local journalist associations were formed; however, these 
were more like social clubs than genuine professional organizations. This 
situation reflected the continuing low status of journalists within China’s 
press. Even for journalists working in the most successful commercial 
newspapers, the role of all but the most senior editors was a very limited one. 
                                                 
17 Toh Lam-seng, Zhongguo Jindai Baoye Fazhanshi, 1815-1874 (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2002), 32. 
18 Toh, Zhongguo Jindai Baoye Fazhanshi, 206-10. 
19 Terry Narramore, “Illusions of Autonomy? Journalism, Commerce and the State in Republican China,” in Power 
and Identity in the Chinese World Order: Festschrift in Honour of Professor Wang Gungwu, ed. Billy K. L. So, John 
Fitzgerald, Huang Jianli, and James K. Chin (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), 179. 
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Indeed, in the risky political climate of the warlord period, journalists were, 
in a sense, edited out of newspaper columns. […]. This meant that most 
journalists were a small part of a larger, mechanistic formula for printing 
news.  
The mismatch between professional ideals and practice was to frustrate 
Chinese journalists throughout the 1920s and 1930s.20   
 
Some of the most influential Chinese journalists that ended up working for the SEPM 
had graduated from University of Missouri. The Missouri University journalism 
education model was proposed as a term by Yong Volz and Lee Chin-Chuan to describe 
the professionalisation of Chinese journalism. Lin Muyin understood the term to denote 
the very influential American model of journalism education that flourished in modern 
China. 21  Significantly, the SEPM is a repository of original contributions to the 
dissemination of the main tenets of this early school of professional journalism in so far 
as the newspaper published an extensive series of articles whose themes and topics 
mirror the curriculum and preoccupations of the Missouri model of professional 
journalism. Indeed, at one period, exploring the way for the professionalisation of 
Chinese journalism was one of the highest priorities of a group of Chinese journalists 
working for the SEPM, or associated with journalists writing for the SEPM. They 
contributed to the publication of a series of regular articles known as the Journalist 
Seminar. Lu Yi, one of the main organisers of the column, gives the following account 
of the formation of the Journalist Seminar in the Chinese edition of the SEPM: 
I remember that it was a midsummer evening, and there were some 
professional journalists casually gathered in a small restaurant called 
‘Renaissance’ on the Avenue Joffre (currently Huaihai Road). After chatting 
with each other, they all felt troubled and distressed as they did not have 
sufficient opportunities to study for improving themselves due to hectic and 
stressful lifestyles. Under the background of that time that the successively 
intensifying national crisis, what journalists should do and what attitude they 
should take in their work became an urgent and common issue which had to 
be solved immediately. Therefore, we reached an agreement to gather for 
dinner in the evening of every Sunday and hold discussions on questions of 
common interests. Sometimes, we analysed Chinese or international events, 
and other times, we discussed journalistic theories and practice or criticised 
specific editorials or news reports published in a newspaper. Initially, there 
were just three to five people in the seminar, but later, it became a group 
with ten to twenty people. Finally, approximately thirty people joined in, and 
                                                 
20 Narramore, “Illusions of Autonomy,” 184. 
21 Lin Muyin, Yizhi Yu Liubian: Misuli Daxue Xinwen Jiaoyu Moshi Zai Zhongguo (1921-1952) [The Introduction 
and Adaptation: Journalism Education Model of Missouri University in China: 1921-1952] (Shanghai: Fudan 
University Press, 2013), 5-6. 
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our meeting place was thus changed to a Sichuan restaurant called ‘Beautiful 
Sichuan’ on Hankow Road. We all deemed that we benefited in our daily 
study and work from this seminar. In several months, we felt that it was a 
pity for us to just have a meeting once a week without any document to 
systematically record what we had achieved. Therefore, we decided to open 
a column, ‘Journalist Seminar’, which was published on every Friday in the 
Chinese edition of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury. This column 
had a total of 90 issues, and was finally suspended on 7 May 1936.  
 
He added:  
The main aim of the publication was to study journalism theories and 
practical issues. We hoped to actively learn what we had not gained from 
academic and self-education, to express what we wanted to say directly, and 
be able to criticise the people and their behaviours where it was appropriate. 
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That the professionalisation of Chinese journalism was a long-standing preoccupation 
for a number of Chinese journalists in Shanghai keen to hold firm to their ideals of 
professionalism in the most adverse of circumstances is very much in evidence 
throughout the pages of the SEPM. One of the key arguments of the present study is that 
the largely unpublished history of the SEPM represents a hitherto unexploited mine of 
primary source material for the history of professional journalism in China. Certainly, 
this thesis seeks to demonstrate in its own modest way that the SEPM is deserving of 
further scholarly interest. The current study attempts to provide the groundwork for such 
a history of the SEPM. We have undertaken extensive archival research to uncover 
primary source materials in order to generate the raw materials needed to begin to narrate 
a fully documented history of the newspaper. During this process, it has become 
apparent how further research on the SEPM could add significantly to a more complete 
understanding of the vicissitudes of professional journalism during a turbulent period of 
Chinese history. 
Statement of Primary Materials  
Primary materials in this thesis consist of archival documents, published archives and 
books and journal articles, relevant personages’ diaries and memoirs, newspaper and 
magazine archives, and monographs on Chinese journalism history published during the 
                                                 
22  Lu Yi, “‘Qingji’ De Qianshen: Shanghai Jizhe Zuotan [The Predecessor of the Chinese Youth Journalists 
Association: Journalist Seminar in Shanghai],” Xinwen Yu Chuanbo Yanjiu 1981, no. 2: 26. 
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Republic period. Amongst them, the relevant archives about the SEPM, and the memoirs 
of Randall Gould, are the most valued primary materials for restoring the paper’s 
narrative. Historical factors, particularly the Nationalist Government’s relocation to the 
wartime capital Chongqing during the War of Resistance against Japan, and the 
subsequent retreat to Taiwan in 1949 following defeat in the Chinese Civil War, resulted 
in the well-preserved archives about the newspaper being separated and stored in 
different areas of the world.  
The majority of the archives of the paper (for the period it was published in Shanghai) 
are held at the Shanghai Municipal Archives. In 2011, I visited the Shanghai Municipal 
Archives and began my research. The archives on the SEPM stored there covered the 
historical periods of pre-war Shanghai, the Isolated Island, and post-war Shanghai to the 
Communists’ takeover. Amongst them, the most valuable and well-preserved documents 
were the reports submitted to the Shanghai Communist administration by the newspaper 
management and printing workers, whose standpoints seriously collided, and the 
instructions given by the Communist officials during the newspaper’s final closure in 
1949. These archives have a significant role to play in the restoration of historical facts 
surrounding the newspaper’s closure. Since 2014, the Chinese government began to 
tighten up archival control, and the documents about the newspaper’s closure are no 
longer accessible. Most of the documents concerning the paper’s wartime publication in 
Chongqing from 1943 to 1945 can be found at the Chongqing Municipal Archives. The 
remainder were transported to Taiwan with the Nationalists’ evacuation in 1949, and 
they are now preserved in three institutes: the Academia Historica; the Institute of 
Modern History, Academia Sinica; and the Nationalist Party Archives. In the 1980s, 
collaboration amongst the Central Archives, the Second Historical Archives of China, 
and other local archives, facilitated the publishing of voluminous archives as books and 
journal articles, and a great deal of valuable information and clues are able to be found 
in these materials.  
The Shanghai Municipal Police files are also an indispensable reference in this thesis. 
These files generally consisted of documents of the police office of the Shanghai 
International Settlement. In the spring of 1949, when the troops of the Chinese 
Communist Party were approaching Shanghai, the Sixth Fleet of the U.S. Navy removed 
the Shanghai Municipal Police files after negotiating with Chinese authorities. Although 
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some materials were lost when a typhoon hit during the voyage to Japan, the majority of 
them were ultimately transferred to the United States and housed at the Central 
Intelligence Agency until 1980s when these documents were turned over to the U.S. 
National Archives and Records Administration. 23  These materials are now also 
accessible in the National Library of Australia.  
However, due to external constraints, it has not been possible to use some archives 
relating to the SEPM. They comprise of Gould’s correspondence and letters housed at 
the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and his unpublished document found at 
Leiden University of the Netherlands.24 With the exception of the published archives, 
the Second Historical Archives of China, where most of the archives of the Republican 
period not taken to Taiwan are stored, is still a relatively hidden world and remains 
mostly inaccessible to the public. It is also assumed that there would be further relevant 
documents that are yet to be discovered. Preserved in the Shanghai Municipal Archives, 
the documents of the French Concession, where the SEPM was located before the Attack 
on Pearl Harbour, are not completely available as they might not have been fully 
catalogued.  
In addition, the possibility should not be excluded that some relevant archives might 
have been missing, damaged, or destroyed. War spanned the whole Republican period, 
and institutes for collecting and preserving archives had to contend with the scourge of 
war as well as the geographical relocation of governing bodies. There is reason to believe 
that regimes that perished with the end of war might have systematically destroyed 
relevant archives that may have documented war crimes. After 1949, various political 
factors over a long period also have had adverse effects on archival preservation. Natural 
environmental conditions should not be overlooked. Unfortunately, some surviving 
materials were damaged to varying degrees by worms and, due to inadequate facilities 
for the preservation and restoration of documents, harsh natural conditions, high 
                                                 
23 Marcia R. Ristaino, Guide to Scholarly Resources Microfilm Edition of the Shanghai Municipal Police Files: 1894-
1949 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1984), x. 
24 Yong Z. Volz and Lee Chin-Chuan mentioned Gould’s unpublished document, Three p.m. Shanghai Time: A 
Memoir in Three Parts, which is kept at Leiden University, see Yong Z. Volz and Lee Chin-Chuan, “Semi-
Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere of Influence,” Journalism Studies 12, no. 5 (2011): 569. 
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humidity and damp degraded the condition of others.25  
As the chief editor of the SEPM, Randall Gould seemed to have a strong interest in 
writing. Besides the writings preserved at the Hoover Institute, and the Leiden 
University, his published books and journal articles provide another fundamental basis 
for revealing the history of the SEPM. Out of all of his publications, China in the Sun 
and Shanghai during the Takeover, 1949, have much value as historical records. 
Published in 1946, China in the Sun contains Gould’s journalistic experience in China. 
It includes useful information about the narratives of the SEPM in Shanghai and 
Chongqing until 1945. Shanghai during the Takeover, 1949, is a journal article 
recollecting the whole course of the final closure of the newspaper in 1949 written after 
Gould came back the United States. Gould’s published memoirs and relevant archives 
corroborate and complement each other, and it is doubtless that these help support the 
accuracy of the narrative in relation to historical facts. The SEPM in its twenty years of 
operation published several different editions of newspapers in both English and Chinese. 
Amongst them, the Chinese evening edition is the best preserved and is important 
material for the thesis, but the English edition and other Chinese editions of the paper 
have also been used.  
In addition to SEPM, other relevant materials from the same period have also been used. 
These include the political organs of the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, 
other commercial papers, magazines, memoirs and diaries by prominent politicians and 
journalists during the Republic period, such as Tseng Hsü-pei, Hollington Tong, Hu 
Daojing, H. G. W. Woodhead, John Leighton Stuart and Wang Shih-chieh, which are 
indispensable references in this thesis. The archival study in the thesis faces the 
difficulties that some historical documents may have been destroyed, are missing, or not 
open to the public. By making most of the primary sources available, it is still possible 
to restore a relatively complete and clear picture of the history of the SEPM. 
                                                 
25 About the situation of the preservation and access and management of the archives during the Republican period 
in China, see William C. Kirby and Cheng Linsun, “China’s Wartime History: Notes on International Efforts for 
Preservation and Access,” Modern China 25 no.1 (January 1999); William W. Moss, “Archives in the People’s 
Republic of China,” The American Archivist 45 no. 4 (Fall 1982): 385-409. 
28 
 
Research Methodology 
Microhistory study has been adopted as the main method in the thesis. Microhistory was 
originally proposed in the late 1970s by a group of historians, mostly from Italy. It 
performs on the basis of scaling down the size of observation, microscopic analysis and 
detailed study of documents. 26  In microhistory studies, the scale of research is 
downsized to focus on accurate research objects by nominating specific names of 
individuals and social groups, and those nominations will generate the clues, which 
Ginzberg and Carlo Poni refer to as Ariadne’s thread.27 In view of a common failing of 
insufficient proof in the process of shaping a relatively complete narrative in 
microhistory writing, Carlo Ginzberg proposes a conjectural paradigm.28 This paradigm 
demonstrates that historians are able to arrive at reasonable explanations and conclusions 
when relying on conjecture and fragmentary materials, and thereby solving a common 
contradiction between limited documents around research objects, such as the history of 
specific individuals or social groups, and highly rigorous proof methods of social science. 
Aspects of the microhistory approach have informed the methodology of this thesis in 
the recovery of key historical facts regarding the SEPM. More importantly, the 
microhistory method has helped solve the issue of utilising relatively limited historical 
materials to recover the most complete history possible. On this basis, this present study 
has been able to compile the first relatively clear and comprehensive historical outline 
of the newspaper. Additionally, following the research of Monika Krause, Huang Shun-
Shing and Hsiao Hsu-Chih this thesis also explores the application of Pierre Bourdieu’s 
field theory to the history of the SEPM.29 All of these scholars have utilised field theory 
in their studies of the history of journalism. As Krause states: “Field theory allows us to 
historicize journalistic ideals and analyse their institutional base.” 30 In the final chapter, 
                                                 
26 Giovanni Levi “On Microhistory”, in New Perspectives on Historical Writing, edited by Peter Burke, Cambridge: 
Penn State Press, 99. 
27 Carlo Ginzberg and Carlo Poni, “The Name and the Game: Unequal Exchange and the Historical Marketplace,” in 
Microhistory and the Lost Peoples of Europe, ed. Edward Muir and Guido Ruggiero (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1991), 5-6. 
28 Carlo Ginzburg and Anna Davin, “Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: Clues and Scientific Method,” History 
Workshop, no. 9 (Spring 1980): 6. 
29  See Huang Shun-Shing, “Xinwen De Changyu Fenxi: Zhanhou Taiwan Baoye De Bianqian [Analysing the 
Journalistic Field: The Vicissitudes of the Press in Post-war Taiwan],” Xinwenxue Yanjiu, no. 104 (July 2010): 151-
53; Hsiao Hsu-Chih, “Baoli, Ansha Yu Xingcunzhe De Jiyi: Minguo Shiqi De Xinwen Changyu Chutan [Violence, 
Assassination and Survivors’ Memories: A Tentative Examination on the Journalistic Field during the Republic 
Period],” in Xinwen Meijie De Lishi Mailuo [Historical Trajectory of News Media], ed. Huang Shun-Shing (Taipei: 
Cheng She-Wo Institute for Chinese Journalism, Shih Hsin University, 2014), 24-37. 
30 Monika Krause, “Reporting and the Transformations of the Journalistic Field: US News Media, 1890-2000,” Media 
Culture Society 33, no. 1 (2011): 90. 
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this thesis similarly, but in a more modest way, explores the applicability of Bourdieu’s 
field theory to the history of the SEPM.  
Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter One establishes the grounds for the 
development of modern journalism from the early missionary influence and shows how 
the newly emerging profession of journalism was undergoing a major transformation as 
exemplified by the educational program inaugurated by the Missouri School in 1908. 
China was very ripe for the Missouri influence particularly during the Republican period 
with Chinese graduates of the school returning to China to take up influential positions 
with other influential American figures visiting and working in China thus contributing 
to the development of Chinese journalism. This early history reveals two important 
issues: (1) the debates around the function and practical skills of journalism; and (2) and 
the political and economic conditions required for Chinese journalism to develop, 
particularly regarding extraterritoriality.  
Chapter Two outlines the history of the establishment of the SEPM during a period of 
much turbulence in politics. The SEPM was established as a specifically American voice 
in an overwhelmingly British Shanghai. Expressing a strongly American view, the paper 
made a vigorous stand against the actions taken by the Japanese military, especially the 
atrocities committed against civilians. Censorship started to be imposed and was 
intensified during this period. However, the establishment of the SEPM’s own Chinese 
language radio station became key to avoiding some of the limitations placed on print 
media. The Chinese language supplements Journalist Seminar, Night Light and 
Journalist Weekly published in the SEPM provided a public space for discussions about 
the core values and practices of professional journalism with particular reference to 
activities in Shanghai and the hinterland occupied by the Japanese forces. After 
Shanghai became an ‘isolated island’ in the later part of the 1930s, challenges intensified 
for the SEPM. Journalist Weekly articles were potentially inflammatory and reported 
news unpalatable to all sides. The protection provided by extraterritoriality was essential 
for the operating of the paper in both its English and Chinese versions.  
Chapter Three recounts the impossible situation the journalists and newspaper 
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organisations faced during the second Sino-Japanese War and the Isolated Island Period 
for Shanghai. Newspapers played a crucial role in the War of resistance against Japan; 
chief among the foreign-owned newspapers resisting censorship was the SEPM. 
However, this was not without loss of life among the staff in violent circumstances. The 
SEPM’s editors and owner were very keen to preserve the tradition of the newspaper 
particularly its commitment to professional news reporting. However, through the 
Isolated Island Period and during the Resistance to the Japanese occupation, the SEPM 
editors and journalists found themselves challenged by increasing nationalism and the 
function of journalism changed. Japanese control spelt the extinction of the immunities 
that extraterritoriality had for so long afforded the residents of Shanghai. Although 
Gould and Starr were forced to leave China, Starr’s strategy during the war was to open 
the New York edition, as well as re-opening the paper in the newly re-established capital 
Chongqing. Gould returned, and oversaw a crucial but hitherto poorly documented 
period of the SEPM’s history.  
In the fourth chapter, the difficulties faced by the re-established the SEPM in a newly 
liberated Shanghai are explored. From what has been examined in this chapter, the 
SEPM persisted in its principle of reporting news objectively and in an independent 
manner, even though the general media environment in post-war Shanghai and China in 
general was immersed in political propaganda. When faced with the controlling 
censorship of the Nationalist regime, Gould chose a tactful way to tame the tide of 
trouble and successfully maintained the newspaper’s independence. What Gould had to 
deal with, in order to secure the SEPM’s survival and continue to publish in alignment 
with the core values of professional journalism during such a chaotic period of Chinese 
society, was well and truly far beyond issues limited to the niceties of nuanced reporting. 
After the civil war, sharp and deep contradictions plagued the paper as it tried to balance 
very conflicting objectives – maintenance of the standards and principles of professional 
journalism while avoiding the ire of the Communist regime. The paper closed and Gould 
was forced to leave China.  
Chapter Five explores the potential of a possible future iteration of research on this 
newspaper, namely the application of a theoretical framework that attempts to delineate 
more precisely the underlying forces shaping the development of professional 
journalism in early twentieth century China. This chapter seeks to link the findings of 
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this present study of the SEPM to key elements of Pierre Bourdieu’s (1930 - 2002) 
theoretical approach adopted as the framework of this chapter (as proposed in Outline 
of a Theory of Practice).  
Contribution 
This thesis makes an original contribution to the field by offering the fullest historical 
account of the SEPM to date. In doing so, the thesis also enhances our understanding of 
the historical foundation, motivation and limitations of the development of journalism 
in modern China, with a particular focus on Shanghai. In the first place, this thesis offers 
the most comprehensive historical trajectory of the SEPM supported by hitherto 
unpublished primary sources from a multitude of archives throughout the world, and 
supplemented by a range of secondary sources in both English and Chinese. Moreover, 
a selection of articles (initially published in supplements of the Chinese edition of the 
SEPM from 1932 to 1940) have been translated for the first time and used to document 
key moments of the newspaper’s history. These articles also give us some insight into 
the development of professional journalism in Shanghai during the relevant period.  
This study also provides the most complete inventory of the newspaper’s various 
editions and activities, which includes the first documented history of the various 
incarnations of the newspaper’s radio station, Ta Mei Radio. The SEPM and the scope 
of its operations are summarised in the Table 1 (See Chapter 1).    
From a newspaper in English, it later expanded to include a Chinese edition, a radio, a 
pictorial and overseas edition. As can be seen from the table, the paper was not only 
published in Shanghai but also in Chongqing once the wartime capital moved after the 
war broke out completely with Japan. The Chinese edition at various times had both 
morning and noon editions. The present study also identifies three important Chinese 
supplements published in the SEPM during the 1930s: 
1. Journalist Seminar: 31 August 1934 – 07 May 1936 
2. Journalist Weekly: 12 December 1938 – 27 November 1939 
3. Night Light: February 1938 – 30 August 1939 (under the editorship of Zhu 
Xinggong) 
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To further facilitate future research on the history of this period of Chinese journalism 
in Shanghai, archival research has been undertaken to compile the first complete list in 
English of the almost two hundred titles of every article published in the fifty editions 
of the Journalist Weekly supplement. Another original contribution has been made in 
the form of the first complete list in English of the articles published in the Journalist 
Seminar supplement.31 It is important to note that the influence of the Journalist Seminar 
column still exists as it was the foundation of the Chinese Youth Journalists Association, 
which grew into the current Chinese official journalist organisation: All-China 
Journalists Association.32 At the time, the Journalist Seminar noted their purpose: 
We are trying our best to enrich the column to take part of the responsibility of improving 
journalistic endeavour. These are the materials that we need in accordance with our plan:  
1. Discussion of journalism theories 
2. Information about Chinese and foreign scholars on journalism studies 
3. Studies on practical techniques for the press  
4. Introduction and investigation on the local press 
5. Information about the journalistic cycle, and all theoretical and practical narratives 
based on the view of other subjects about journalism studies and management.33 
 
In addition to these contributions, extensive work has been undertaken to translate a 
selection of twenty-four articles from the supplements. They have been selected to reveal 
the practical skills and ideologies of journalistic professionalism, balanced with 
nationalism under the national crisis, and Chinese images towards Western countries, 
including their political systems and culture. Journalist Seminar has been the focus of 
research by Chinese scholars for a long time due to the relations between Journalist 
Seminar and the later official journalist associations of China. However, scholars have 
not utilised this column combined with the later published Journalism Weekly in order 
to explore the topic of professional journalism. These articles together with those from 
Journalist Seminar and ‘Night Light’ are a unique record of the professionalism ideals 
that Chinese journalists sought to promote and safeguard throughout those years. 
Previous scholarship in the field of the history of Chinese journalism is examined 
                                                 
31 This list is an original translation based on Xu Jizhong’s Masters thesis of Anhui University in 2013, ‘Meijie, Juese 
Yu Xinren: Jize Zuotan Yanjiu [Media, Role and Trust: A Study based on the Journalist Seminar], 87-96. 
32 See Ma Guangren, “Woguo Zaoqi De Xinweniie Tuanti [Earlier Journalism Associations in China],” Xinwen Yu 
Chuanbo Yanjiu 1988, no.1: 69. 
33 Bianjizhe Yan [A Speech of the Editor], Ta Mei Wan Pao, 14 September 1934. 
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specifically to explore the applicability of Bourdieu’s field theory to this aspect of the 
history of Chinese through the prism of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury. 
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Chapter 1: Journalism in China before 1929 
The impact of foreigners in China goes back to the beginning of modern Chinese press. 
The crucial founder of Chinese journalism history studies, Ge Gongzhen, established the 
narrative that the emergence of modern newspapers in China was derived from 
foreigners, it has been a consensus that modern press was not a natural product of the 
development of Chinese society itself but a Western exotic introduced into China.1 The 
roots of modern Chinese journalism to a large extent can be traced to Western Christian 
missionaries who established publication houses in treaty ports on the southeast coast 
from the mid-19th century. The London Missionary Society entered China with the 
explicit aim of publishing rather than proselytising – believing proselytising could not 
occur until after they had met their publishing goal. The society was founded by non-
conformist Christians for whom a familiarity with the Bible was vital for all believers, 
in contrast to Catholicism whereby the clergy acted as intermediaries between the 
faithful and God. Members of the London Missionary Society were sent to China with 
the aim of learning the Chinese language, creating dictionaries and ultimately publishing 
a Chinese language version of the Bible.2 
In 1807 the London Missionary Society sent Robert Morrison to China. He had to travel 
via America, due to the East India Company’s policy of not carrying missionaries.3 He 
spent his time there cultivating relationships with the American consul so that he could 
use the influence of such official connections upon his arrival in China. At the time, 
foreigners could only enter China for commercial purposes as officials had an 
‘unfavorable attitude towards missionaries, believing that they were a threat due to their 
nonconformist ways.’ Entrants were closely interrogated, and if their answers failed to 
satisfy the Chinese authorities, they were obliged to board the next ship bound for 
foreign climes. Morrison faced three key barriers to his aim of publishing a Chinese 
language version of the Bible. Firstly, Chinese subjects were legally prohibited from 
teaching foreigners their language. Secondly, foreigners were only allowed into China 
for trade. Thirdly, Macau’s Roman Catholic Church, set up by the Portuguese 
                                                 
1 Ge Gongzhen, Zhongguo Baoxueshi [A History of Chinese Press] (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1928), 67. 
2 Fang Hanqi, Zhongguo Xinwen Shiye Tongshi [A Comprehensive History of Chinese Journalism] (Beijing: Renmin 
University Press, 1992), 1:247. 
3 Su Ching, “The Printing Presses of the London Missionary Society among the Chinese” (PhD diss., University 
College London, 1996), 35.  
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government, could not relate to or understand Protestants and this resulted in a degree 
of hostility towards them.4 
Morrison arrived in Macau on 4 September 1807, and was promptly expelled by the 
Roman Catholic authorities in Macau. He then went to the American trading post in 
Guangdong. Here, Morrison masqueraded as an American while he surreptitiously 
learned the Chinese language. Due to the Qing Government response to England’s 
attempt to land in Macau as part of their strategy during the Napoleonic Wars (1803–
1815), Morrison, along with other English residents, left Guangzhou for Macau. Having 
gained some mastery of Chinese and desperate to contribute financially towards his 
mission, Morrison accepted a position as translator to the East India Company. This 
appointment meant that he could legitimately return to Guangzhou. He spent time 
between Macau, where his family was based, and Guangzhou. In 1812, he finished his 
first book on Chinese grammar, which was printed in Bengal. He went on to print a tract, 
a catechism and a number of translations of the Bible, which raised the ire of the Roman 
Catholic Church in Macau and of the Chinese Government. Then in 1813, the London 
Missionary Society sent William Milne to help Morrison with his missionary work. 
However, Milne did not have a commercial justification for his presence in China, so he 
was expelled. Thereafter, Milne and the Morrisons moved to Guangzhou.  
Over the years, Morrison travelled between Europe, Malacca, Singapore and Macau. It 
can be seen that his survival and the creation of the early printing presses in China were 
due to his ability to move between, within and outside the areas under the control of the 
court of the Qing Government. Morrison capitalised on the power of the United States 
for protection within Guangzhou and the gaps in the delicate power balance between the 
Chinese and Portuguese Governments and Catholic Church in Macau. Thus, although 
extraterritoriality did not yet exist, its precursors were central to journalism in China 
from its earliest days. The trading zones, with weakened Qing government control and 
Western influences, albeit not yet extraterritorially, created safer zones for translating, 
printing and publishing. 
Other journalists, printers and publishers utilised weakened territoriality to progress their 
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aims – having the economic and social capital to move between countries and capitalise 
on that ambiguous territory was key. For example, the first modern Chinese language 
newspaper, (published by Milne) the Chinese Monthly Magazine, was published in 
Malacca. 5  On 5 August 1815, other newspapers established by capitalising on the 
relative freedom offered by the foreigner controlled areas such as Macau. One important 
example is A Abelha da China, which is recognised as the earliest preserved modern 
newspaper in China. Established on 12 September 1822 in Macau, this Portuguese 
language weekly was established by Paulino da Silva Barbosa, a pro-constitutionalism 
Portuguese officer in Macau, and Dr. José de Almeida. Father António de S. Gonçalo de 
Amarante assumed the role of the editor in chief. 6  A Abelha da China is seen as 
providing a significant break from the restriction of the Chinese court and as a pioneer 
of modern Chinese press. The emergence of the paper is attributed to the autonomy that 
the Portuguese acquired in Macau, and stimulated the British to seek to acquire the same 
privilege in China.7 The case of A Abelha da China demonstrates that the complex 
interaction of Western political developments, their colonial activities in the Far East, 
and attempts at the evangelisation of indigenous populations, all contributed to the 
establishment of what could be termed (perhaps controversially) the modern press in 
China (see below). 
After the establishment of the Chinese Monthly Magazine and other similar missionary 
newspapers outside China, some limited publishing began within China itself, including 
those by the foreign merchants. This occurred despite limitations on the number of 
foreign missionaries and merchants in China and the strict supervision that occurred in 
accordance with the Canton System implemented by the Chinese court.8 The two most 
well-known examples of the period were The Canton Register and The Chinese 
Repository. The Canton Register was established by the British merchant James 
Matheson in November 1827, and is regarded as the first English newspaper in China. 
The Chinese Repository was established in May 1832 by Elijah Coleman Bridgman, an 
American Protestant Christian missionary to China. Morrison provided critical 
assistance in the formation of both The Canton Register and The Chinese Repository. 
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He also contributed to Prussian missionary Karl Gützlaff's Eastern Western Monthly 
Magazine, which aimed to improve relations between the East and the West. Established 
on 1st August 1833 in Guangzhou, this magazine like others, capitalised on 
extraterritoriality by moving to Singapore. Along with missionaries, Chinese converts 
to Christianity were active in publishing, such as Wang Tao, who went on to become a 
prominent journalist and publisher. 
Some debate exists about whether these missionary newspapers could be recognised as 
modern newspapers. There are legitimate arguments that Protestant missionaries, along 
with the Chinese elite, failed to achieve modern journalism’s core values and concepts 
that are essential to the free press, such as the Fourth Estate. There are also legitimate, 
albeit technical arguments that these missionary newspapers did not constitute examples 
of a modern press because, although they published regularly, the average time for each 
publication was one month. Further to this, much of the content expounded on Christian 
doctrines with only very limited space devoted to news and editorials. However, 
according to a study by Zhang Xiantao, the atmosphere of cooperation between the 
missionaries and the Chinese intelligentsia was critical to the growth of journalism that 
occurred later.9 Zhang proposes that the perennial issue of the freedom of the press in 
China can be traced back to the influences and heritage of the missionary press in the 
second half of the 19th century.10 Zhang argues that Protestant missionaries and the 
Chinese elites did not promote the values and concepts essential to the existence or 
flourishing of a free press. On the contrary, the journalism model of the missionaries was 
finally adopted and remoulded to fit the Confucian political system to serve the interests 
of the Qing Empire.11 
However, in many ways, the missionary press was very progressive when compared 
with the traditional Chinese Imperial Gazette. The Qing Imperial Court published a style 
of government gazette, including details of the emperor’s activities, the emperor’s orders 
and the chancellors’ reports.12 The Imperial Gazette had existed for an incredibly long 
time. Extant copies of two pieces of Dunhuang’s Liaison Gazette of the year 878 and 
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887 (collected separately in the National Library of France and the British Library) 
support the argument that the world’s very first newspapers appeared in China.13 This 
standpoint has been widely inherited and continually strengthened in the later research 
although there are distinct perspectives to explain the development of modern Chinese 
journalism. Tseng Hsü-pei, a leading scholar on Chinese journalism history studies, 
criticised that traditional Chinese gazettes in their more than one-thousand-year history 
under the leashed mind of serving political elites represented by scholar-officials were 
not able to exert influence on both the majority of people’s daily life and the progress of 
national politics, and he proposed that this situation was not changed until Western 
modern newspaper ideology was introduced into China around the First Opium War.14 
However, these papers lacked many of the essential elements of modern journalism. 
Barbara Mittler’s magisterial study demonstrates that in reality public opinion was 
overwhelmingly dominated by the court and that there existed less space for the 
expression of independent opinion. The Imperial Gazette, in Mittler’s view, was just a 
means to disseminate the court’s views as the most powerful voice in the country and 
she therefore deemed that a free press did not exist before Western missionaries and 
merchants founded their newspapers in China.15 Mittler demonstrates the progressive 
nature of the missionary press and explores how it challenged the Chinese court’s long-
held monopoly on “public” speech. 
The development of journalism in China was sluggish until the outbreak of the First 
Opium War (1839–42). Before the breakout of war, the majority of newspapers in China 
were published in foreign languages. In comparison with the plentiful seventeen foreign 
language newspapers published in China, there were only six Chinese language 
newspapers, including three from South-East Asia. Along with being relatively scarce, 
Chinese language newspapers were also short lived. Unlike foreign language 
newspapers, which often sustained publishing for more than a decade – with some even 
publishing for about two decades – the longest running Chinese language newspaper 
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was in print for only six years, while three other Chinese newspapers operated for less 
than one.16  
Treaty Ports and Extraterritoriality 
This situation fundamentally changed after the outbreak of the First Opium War. The 
war, and the resulting Treaty of Nanking, radically changed Chinese feudalism and the 
regime of absolute monarchy that had continued for nearly two millennia. However, as 
stated at the beginning of this chapter, “[…] it is clear that when the Qing government 
tried to accommodate Western demands of extraterritorial rights and involvement in 
legal affairs, it did so with very clear precedents in mind.”17 These events triggered the 
start of a new era in which the Western powers, by means of a series of signed treaties 
following military victories, forced the Qing government to agree to the establishment 
of treaty ports and colonies with extraterritoriality: 
It is fairly well established in Western historiography on China that the 
early treaty port system in general and extraterritoriality in particular 
were not simply forced on China by the Western powers, but rather were 
a product of joint efforts to establish a new modus vivendi.18 
 
With the signing of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, Hong Kong Island was ceded to the 
British as a colony, and five coastal cities opened as treaty ports: Guangzhou, Xiamen, 
Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai. The British quickly established a settlement in Shanghai 
along the banks of the Whangpoo River to further their commercial interests. With the 
Treaty of the Bogue in 1843 the specific details of the Treaty of Nanking were 
established and extraterritorial control of the settlement was explicitly included. The 
American and French Government sought a similar deal to the Treaty of Nanking, with 
the Americans brokering their treaty (which included extraterritoriality), the Treaty of 
Wanghia, in 1845 and the French theirs (which did not include extraterritoriality), the 
Treaty of Whampoa, in 1849. Thus Shanghai’s French and American Concessions 
opened, and – with further treaties – expanded. Other nations levered treaties with the 
weakened Qing government, but these tended not to affect Shanghai. In 1854, Britain, 
United States of America and France combined as the Shanghai Municipal Council, with 
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the French withdrawing in 1862, and in 1863 the British and American settlements 
united to become the Shanghai International Settlement. 19  During this period, in 
exchange for assistance in quelling the Small Sword Society uprising, the Qing ruler 
ceded extra-territoriality to the international concessions: 
In the West’s legal encounter with the states of Asia, for example, the 
practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction emerged as a key technology of a 
kind of non-territorial imperialism, in effect, a colonialism without 
colonies as such. In the nineteenth century, international legal discourse 
justified the practice of extraterritoriality explicitly on civilizational 
grounds, just as it justified colonialism more generally. However, 
international law did not divide the world simply into fully sovereign 
“civilized” states and “savages” whose lands were either terra nullius 
only waiting to be “discovered” or won through colonial conquest. In 
certain circumstances, a less-than-civilized - whether “semi-civilized” or 
“semi-barbaric” or even outright “barbaric” - state might have some 
degree of sovereignty, but it could not impose its laws on civilized men 
even when they entered that state’s territory. Over time, such an 
exemption from local law became established as the right of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, often (though not always) formalized in 
(more or less imposed) treaties.20  
 
Crucially, too, over many years “extra-settlement roads” outside the French Concession 
were added (compare Maps 1 and 2). In the dying days of the Qing government, the 
Chinese government agreed to French police powers and taxation over these roads in 
exchange for France evicting Chinese revolutionaries from the French Concession. The 
Government refused these rights to the International Settlement.  
The emergence of treaty ports with extraterritoriality resulting from the phenomenon of 
semi-colonialism in China led to increased opportunities for missionaries to carry out 
their activities. The symbiosis of very limited colonised areas and the overwhelming 
majority of Chinese territory effectively controlled by the Chinese regime is often known 
as semi-colony, which is understood to be a product of Marx’s Historical 
Materialism. 21 Li Hongyan examined and narrated in detail the complex historical 
evolution of both the meaning and political position of the term ‘semi-colony.’ His 
account starts from when it was coined by Vladimir Lenin to describe the circumstances 
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of countries divided amongst Western powers (such as Persia, Turkey and China) and 
progresses to the time when the Chinese Communist Party finally adopted ‘semi-colony, 
semi-feudalism’ as the official rhetoric to describe the social condition of modern 
Chinese history.  
Figure 2: Map of Shanghai and the British settlement in 185522 
 
 
Currently this concept is being widely accepted by Western scholars to describe and 
interpret the state of Chinese society in modern history. According to Yong Volz and 
Lee Chin-Chuan, “in the study of modern China, “semi-colonialism” is a widely used 
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but seldom defined concept.”23 They propose a tripartite definition as applied to the 
situation in China: (1) as the term suggests, semi-colonialism is an intermediate state 
between imperialism and colonialism; (2) semi-colonialism assured the indigenous 
population a greater degree of “autonomy from Western domination”; and (3) an absence 
of a single, all-dominating foreign, colonising power – this situation fostered a “dynamic 
process of constant negotiation and contestation among various Western powers” 
present in specific geographical zones, or “spheres of influence” within China. From this 
it can be seen that the term ‘semi-colonial’ reflects an important distinction. Although 
China suffered successive military failures and humiliations at the hands of external 
powers, it was never absolutely occupied as a colony by any of them.24 According to 
Volz and Lee: 
In the China case, although the Western powers had achieved a great 
level of socio-economic penetration and implanted several foreign 
concessions in the treaty port cities, they did not acquire a full-range 
formal settlement and territorial conquest (as in India) […]. Though 
enjoying extra-territorial privileges, foreign powers had to acknowledge 
Chinese sovereignty and negotiate with the Chinese government. 
Foreign newspapers were subjected to Chinese censorship.25 
 
In the treaty ports foreigners could now have wider and more effective contact with local 
Chinese people while at the same time suffering less interference from the Chinese court: 
[…] in all aspects of their lives and work Shanghailanders relied 
absolutely on Chinese labour, talent, know-how and understanding. As 
servants, workers, business partners, financial backers, middlemen or 
managers, Chinese were vital to the Shanghailander world.26 
 
Missionary activities previously targeted the indigenous populations in Malacca and 
other Southeast Asian cities. Missionaries were now spurred to move to Hong Kong and 
the five treaty ports. Thus numerous missionaries’ newspapers emerged thereafter.27 In 
Hong Kong 1853, British missionary Walter Henry Medhurst founded the Chinese 
Serial, a Chinese language monthly with distinctive British colonialism standpoints in 
                                                 
23 Yong Z. Volz and Lee Chin-Chuan, “Semi-colonialism and Journalistic Sphere of Influence: British-American 
Press Competition in Early Twentieth-century China,” Journalism Studies 12, no. 5, (2011): 561. 
24 Leo Ou-fan Lee, Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 309. 
25 Volz and Lee, “Semi-colonialism and Journalistic Sphere,” 561. 
26 Bickers, “Shanghailanders,” 185. 
27 Toh Lam Seng, Zhongguo Jindai Baoye Fazhanshi, 1815-1874 [The Beginnings and Development of modern 
Chinese Newspapers, 1815-1874] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2002), 2. 
44 
 
its contents. It was the first Chinese publication after the Treaty of Nanking, and for this 
reason was endowed with special importance.28 In addition to the missionaries, Western 
merchants flowed into treaty ports and, with the aid of an auspicious social environment, 
engaged in endeavours to pioneer a modern press in Chinese territory. In Shanghai in 
1850, the seventh year after Shanghai was forced to open and trade with foreigners, 
British merchant Henry Shearman founded the North China Herald (precursor of the 
North China Daily News) an English language newspaper that continued until the 
Communist victory in Shanghai in 1949: 
For a number of reasons, the treaty port system attained its most 
sophisticated form in the prosperous Shanghai area, where Britain, the 
United States, and France established settlements in the mid-1840s. The 
treaties that followed the Opium Wars only gave foreigners the right to 
reside in the newly opened ports and said nothing about separate foreign 
settlements.29 
 
In 1857, Alexander Wylie, a British missionary, established the first modern Chinese 
language newspaper, known as the Shanghae Serial.30 The outcomes of the First Opium 
War were not tranquillity and political stability, but rather increased unrest. The Second 
Opium War (1857 – 1860) between China and the British and French empires concluded 
with the creation of Tianjin as a trade port, the ceding of the District of Kowloon to 
Britain and a guarantee of freedom of religion in China: 
The treaties of 1858–60 provided the framework for the so-called “treaty 
port system,” the essential elements of which were the opening of coastal 
ports for foreign trade, extraterritorial rights to Westerners residing in 
the treaty ports, and fixed tariffs in the Sino-foreign trade. All treaties 
included a “most favored nation” clause, which meant that privileges 
granted to one power would automatically be granted to everybody else 
and made it necessary for all treaty parties to be updated on the other 
treaties in order to safeguard their “rights.” There were no permanent 
structures for handling legal cases involving both foreigners and Qing 
subjects, and it appears that treaty clauses on extraterritoriality and 
jurisdiction were originally intended to be applied on an ad hoc basis by 
making use of consular courts and local Qing courts of law. This is also 
what happened in most of the newly opened treaty ports in China.31 
 
Later on, the Chinese were also embroiled, with disastrous consequences, in wars and 
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disputes with Japan, Russia, Germany and France. Internal unrest fed on external 
influences and failures: civilian unrest such as the Taiping Rebellion was triggered in 
large part by famine while taking on features of Christian millenarianism; and the Boxer 
Rebellion had its origins in deeply felt dissatisfaction with the concessions given to the 
West, amongst many other factors. Thus economic and social factors, driven by both 
internal and external impetus, created a period of uncertainty and political fragility. 
With the boom in newspapers arising from the strengthening of the powers of western 
missionaries and merchants, there was an upsurge of Chinese willing to run newspapers 
within colonies and treaty ports. Yung Wing, the first known Chinese student to graduate 
from an American university (Yale), founded Huibao on 16 June 1874 in Shanghai. 
Huibao is the first-known Chinese language daily that was run by Chinese citizens in 
Shanghai. 32  However, the most influential and representative Chinese-founded 
newspaper at this period was the Universal Circulating Herald, which was established 
in Hong Kong on 4 February 1874 by Wang Tao.33 Wang Tao had worked for the 
London Missionary Society Printing House in Shanghai, and later purchased their Hong 
Kong press to found the General Chinese Printing House.34 The Universal Circulating 
Herald pioneered a political editorial style for the Chinese press which distinguishes it 
both from the ancient Chinese Imperial Gazettes (limited to the circulation of decrees of 
the Imperial Court) and Western missionary and merchant papers that were established 
for disseminating religious propaganda and doctrine and providing business and 
commercial information. It opened the newspaper up to political commentary based on 
the interests of the nation-state in China. The Universal Circulating Herald contained 
large amounts of editorials with unequivocal positions regarding controversial issues of 
the time, such as the Taiping Rebellion, political reform and the Qing Government’s 
relationship with Western powers.35 
The marked success of the Universal Circulating Herald achieved not only wide 
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recognition for the newspaper, but also for Wang Tao himself who was highly regarded 
for his special contribution to the development of modern Chinese journalism, and has 
been referred to as the father of Chinese journalists.36 The most basic reason for the 
success of the Universal Circulating Herald, would undoubtedly be attributed to its 
place of publication. Chinese scholars recognise that Hong Kong, as it existed under the 
British administration, with the rule of the Qing Government no longer implemented, 
provided a relatively free space for Chinese to run the press.37 Such freedom also existed 
in Shanghai. Both the International Settlement and the French Concession had been de 
facto independent states representing different interest groups since the 1860s: 
Qing officials were indeed familiar with concepts of extraterritoriality 
when they negotiated treaties with the West and created institutions to 
deal with the ensuing problems. Once it was clear to the Qing authorities 
that they had to grant extraterritorial privileges to the foreign powers, 
they did it in a way with which they were familiar. […] there are clear 
traces of Qing legal thinking in the Chinese texts of the treaties and other 
legal documents, most important of which is a preference for reciprocity 
and joint consultation in mixed [legal] cases. Although the Qing 
authorities were familiar with the problems of granting extraterritorial 
privileges, they could not have predicted subsequent developments. In 
the final analysis, it was not the treaties as such that made them unequal, 
but the unequal power relationship that supported them.38 
 
This situation was the result of a range of political manoeuvrings amongst each 
interested power after the first Opium War eventuating in a relatively stable political 
structure.39 Therefore, there was not any single country that could exercise its influence 
upon journalism activities in Shanghai.40 
Chinese intellectuals, represented by Kang Youwei and Lang Qichao, faced an 
unprecedented national crisis after the crushing defeat of the Qing Government in the 
war with Japan in 1895, so they proposed a range of significant reform in an attempt to 
strengthen the country. The Qing government, along with the court’s reform-minded 
supporters attempted to respond to the massive civil unrest during a period known as the 
“Hundred Days' Reform” in 1898. The Imperial Court, under the Guangxu Emperor, 
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attempted major reforms to address deep community concerns and unrest by a number 
of wide-ranging reforms such as moving from absolute monarchy to a democratic 
constitutional monarchy and introducing manufacturing, commerce, and capitalism. 
During the Hundred Days Reform, reformers initially conceived that Beijing was the 
political pivot to realise change, and the focus of their press work was therefore in 
Beijing. However, negative conditions doomed their plan. Beijing, as the political centre 
of the Qing Government was not only home of the numerous powerful conservative 
bureaucrats, but was the strongest area of their rule. The hierarchy could effortlessly 
shatter the reformers’ attempts, including their attempts at running the press. 
Newspapers founded by reformers only existed for about half a year, and were then 
closed down by the court. Reformers at this point began to feel obliged to move to 
Shanghai.41 In Shanghai, they ran the press with a greater degree of success by relying 
on the extraterritoriality of the foreign concession, the position of the city as the junction 
of the interchange between China and the outside world, and the support from pro-
reform officials. The influence of their newspapers was not limited to Shanghai, but 
spread towards the surrounding areas and even abroad.42  
As the movement strongly challenged conservative Manchu nobilities and bureaucrats 
of the Qing Government, reforms ultimately failed after an opportunist coup d'état was 
staged by the conservatives, army commander Yuan Shikai and Empress Dowager Cixi. 
However, the experiences within the Hundred Days Reform ultimately strengthened 
Shanghai as the home of professional journalism within China. For example, some years 
later (in 1905) the famous Chinese journalist, scholar and reformist Liang Qichao, who 
was a central figure in the Hundred Days Reform, worked with Di Baoxian to establish 
a newspaper in the Shanghai foreign settlements on the instruction of Kang Youwei. The 
paper they established, Shibao, was what Liang called a factional newspaper or dangbao. 
According to Judge, Liang only started to think this way about newspapers after being 
exiled to Japan.43 Before this time, Liang had published two essays on newspapers, one 
of these anonymously. At first, he argued for newspapers as the ‘eyes ears and 
mouthpiece of society’. In his essay in 1896, however, he argued that papers should 
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work towards national strengthening and popular enlightenment. Judge argues that it 
was only after he was forced to flee to Japan that he started to think about newspapers 
as a tool of political struggle against the dynasty from without. It was in his essay “A 
Warning to my Colleagues’ in 1902 that he said that newspapers should warn against 
abuses by the government and act as a watchdog. Liang’s writings on journalism served 
the needs of Chinese intellectuals in their pursuit of national modernisation. This 
journalism ideal became dominant.44 
Liang Qichao’s position as one of the key figures in the development of new journalism 
at the end of the 19th century has been questioned by Vittinghoff.45 She argues that 
earlier assessments of Liang as the most influential journalist were inaccurate as they 
did not take into account the evidence but rather relied on Liang’s own assessments. For 
Vittinghoff, the changes in the press market during the Reform Movement of 1898 came 
about because of broad political changes as well as changes in journalism itself. Crucial 
to these changes was the growing tension between the press and the government.  
At the end of the 19th century, the press can be thought of as being made up of groups 
focusing on three different types of society, says Vittinghoff. The reform press which 
began in the treaty ports then moved to the hinterland and this resulted in changes to 
how people thought about the role of the press in society and politics. The court began 
to consider laws governing the press and established a large scale governmental 
newspaper system.46 In the commercial and private sphere, magazines, literary papers 
and newspapers aimed at political commentary were established. Shanghai was a key 
location. After the failure of the reforms of 1898, a ruling was issued which banned the 
private editing of newspapers. Journalists were also called the ‘dregs of the literary 
classes’ by the Empress Cixi.47 In the last decade of the Qing government, there were 
many developments in the journalism sphere, with developments in layout, reporting 
and education. More and more people were reading papers.48 Tabloid papers started 
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publishing during this period. The first one, Fun (youxibao) was published in 1897 and 
a deluge of tabloids followed. Forty-one tabloids were published in Shanghai in the years 
between 1897 and 1911.49 
Journalists felt that they needed to defend the profession. It is in this context that Liang 
Qichao aimed to change the nature of journalism and the status of journalists. Liang 
thought that previous papers and editors were deserving of this insulting name but that 
a political journalism such as the approach he was taking would be more modern and 
progressive. Vittinghoff points out that the history of newspapers in China which 
dismisses 19th century newspapers as backward is a story developed by Liang Qichao 
and taken up by many others since. During the reform period, Liang Qichao called for 
newspapers to print information in the categories of world news, new government policy, 
and information on Sino-foreign policies.50 However, during this time there were many 
discussions about the formation of journalist clubs and associations, even dating back to 
1905. 51  Despite the fact that none of these were able to be successfully realised, 
Vittinghoff argues that this era prepared the way for the political and professionalisation 
of journalism which occurred later. 
After Empress Dowager Cixi’s victory, Liang Qichao fled to Japan.52 Even this victory 
could not hold back political reform in China, with the monarchy attempting to 
strengthen its hold, quell rebellion and survive the economic and political humiliations 
of the unequal treaties meted out by the West and Japan, such as the Boxer Protocol by 
introducing strategic limited reforms such as the New Policies (also referred to as New 
Administration and Late Qing Reform). In the dying days of the Qing Government, 
Chinese intellectuals utilised the press - perhaps not so much as in a new way to 
participate in politics, but rather it was more of the case that they used the press in a 
more intense way to engage in the public expression of divergent political views. By 
doing so, intellectuals – both constitutional monarchists and republican – sought to 
construct a consultation mechanism to propel constitutional reform. The intellectuals 
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used this press to identify themselves as an intermediary channel for the communication 
between the ruling class and the grassroots people. This was an essential step for the 
later revolution for republic reform in China: its influence on, and beyond, Chinese 
journalism was far reaching. It gave impetus to the formation of a new space in China 
for expressing ideas, which later bolstered the demand for journalism to exist as an 
independent profession with its own rules and standards. In addition, it represented a 
space where journalistic activities became subordinate to politics. The constitutional 
monarchists used this press to lobby for reforms to follow a British model, while the 
republicans used the press to lobby for reforms to follow a French model. 
The Subao Case of Shanghai in 1903 demonstrates the key role Shanghai played in 
setting the scene for the later development of the professionalisation of journalism 
within China. The case is fundamental to an analysis of the complexity of the 
jurisprudential arrangements of extraterritoriality (for further information, see The 
Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China, Peking, September 16, 1926, 
Being the report to the governments of the commission appointed in pursuant to 
Resolution V of the Conference on the Limitation Armaments, together with a brief 
summary thereof. Commission on Extraterritoriality in China, Washington, Government 
Print Office, 1926). The newspaper, Subao, published articles that were anti-Qing and 
pro-revolutionary in nature, which irritated the Qing government. The Qing government 
desired to arrest the relevant people but, as the paper was based within the International 
Settlement of Shanghai, the Qing government had to negotiate with the settlement 
administration regarding the case. The Qing Government was at a disadvantage in 
competing with the Shanghai International Settlement for dominance in deciding the 
outcome of the Subao Case and finally had to accept the British style legal process due 
to the tough stand made by the Shanghai settlement administration: 
In 1903, two Chinese nationalists, Zhang Binglin and Zou Rong, had 
published a number of articles in the journal Subao, in which they reviled 
the Guangxu Emperor and called for the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. 
According to the treaties, their case was subject to Qing jurisdiction and 
under the Qing code the two could be tried for lèse-majesté, a crime 
punishable by death by slowslicing (lingchi). However, the two activists 
were in the custody of the foreign controlled police force of the 
International Settlement and they were able to use the publicity of the 
case in order to avoid extradition to Qing authorities. The case had 
important diplomatic repercussions and it was even debated in the House 
of Commons. In the end it became politically impossible for the 
authorities in the International Settlement to extradite Zhang and Zou to 
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a certain death, and the Mixed Court sentenced them to a quite light 
prison sentence and expulsion from the International Settlement. The 
case had important implications since it established foreign jurisdiction 
in political cases that had little or nothing to do with the interests of the 
foreign community.53 
 
The Qing government retained a British lawyer for the trial and mobilised its diplomatic 
resources. In the face of substantial pressure on the part of the Qing government, the 
British administration compromised with the Qing government to some degree. The 
Qing government did not show unquestionable proof that the main people accused, 
Zhang Binglin and Zou Rong, did in fact engage in subverting the government. Arguably, 
both should have been released yet they received sentences of three and two year’s 
imprisonment respectively. The Qing government expected to extradite the pair or force 
the International Settlement court to hand down very heavy sentences but the relatively 
lighter sentences given shows there was a large gap between the result sought by the 
Qing government and the final legal judgement.54   
The Subao Case demonstrated the power, albeit far from complete, that the Western 
powers had within the foreign concessions and treaty ports to protect press freedom. As 
a result, during 1902 and 1903, such papers began to diffuse into surrounding regions 
such Shantou, Guangzhou and the rural areas of Shanghai:  
Indeed the tragedy of the unequal treaties was not that the Qing Empire 
was inadequately prepared for the (re-)introduction of extraterritoriality, 
but that the policy makers of the Empire were too familiar with the 
concept to understand what acceptance of the treaties would imply for 
the future of their dynasty.55 
 
The first batch of newspapers with revolutionary leanings to come out in some hinterland 
cities, such as Changsha and Chongqing, began to print in 1904. Unfortunately, these 
areas, being outside the foreign concessions, were under the control of the Qing 
Government, which resulted in these newspapers being promptly banned.56A brief civil 
war ended with a political compromise between the military commander who had 
thwarted the Hundred Days' Reform, Yuan Shikai, and Tongmenghui (United League) 
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leader, Sun Yat-sen. So, on December 29 1911, Sun Yat-sen was elected as the first 
provisional president of the Republic of China. During late 1911 and early 1912, a series 
of complicated accommodations were negotiated around the role of the Emperor and the 
limits of his power, including interventions and lobbying by foreign powers and leading 
political and military figures. Finally Sun Yat-sen agreed to a deal whereby he ceded the 
presidency to Yuan Shikai in exchange for the abdication of the Emperor, and with it, 
the end to the Chinese monarchy on 12 February 1912. Sent to cover the Boxer Rebellion 
and remaining to report on the Chinese Rebellion, American journalist, Thomas Millard 
decided to set up an American newspaper to rival the British colonial North China Daily 
News. His paper, China Press (Ta Lu Pao) was established in the first week of the 
Chinese Republic and was part funded by Sun Yat-sen. Born in Missouri and educated 
at the University of Missouri, Millard was in close contact with Missouri journalists, and 
turned to Walter Williams, dean of the newly established Missouri School of journalism, 
for support.  
Figure 3: Extension of the foreign concession in Shanghai 1846-191457 
 
Missouri School of Journalism 
On 14 November 1908, the death of the Guangxu Emperor was formally announced to 
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the public. On the next day, the Empress Dowager Cixi, the most powerful woman who 
had dominated China for nearly half a century, passed away as well. They left Puyi, the 
heir to the throne who was less than 3 years old, a great empire which had been tottering 
and would soon collapse. Outside the high walls of the Forbidden City, royalists, 
represented by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, and revolutionaries, led by Sun Yat-
sen, Wang Ching-wei and Hu Hanmin, through the use of their newspapers, were 
engaging in heated debate.58 This debate was the continuation of the deep political 
division since the late 19th century within the circles of Chinese political elites and 
intellectuals on whether to take the path of moderate reform under the pre-condition of 
retaining the monarchy or that of radical revolution to establish a new republic system 
in the future of China. 
When the contents of the Chinese press was glutted with politics and partisan struggling 
as the core subjects, journalism on the other side of the Pacific Ocean was experiencing 
a significant and watershed transformation. This transformation, with a tottering 
beginning late in the nineteenth century in the form of educational efforts by press 
associations, evolved into a professionalised modern mass media and climaxed with the 
creation of journalism as a professionalised vocation requiring formalised journalistic 
training at university level.59 
The Missouri School of Journalism was established in 1908 for the purpose of promoting 
professional education for journalism.60 This was a milestone in both the development 
and continuity of professionalism in American journalism history, which can be traced 
back to the highly successful commercialisation of the press in the 1830s. As Thomas F. 
Remington states: 
The Western ideal of journalistic objectivity, influenced by liberal 
principles of the ruler’s accountability to the ruled and the empirical 
scepticism of science, developed as an occupational response by 
journalists to marketplace competition among commercially or 
politically motivated suppliers of information and came to define the 
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journalist’s professional ethic of impartiality and independence.61 
 
‘Objectivity’ emerged and was crystallised in American journalism with the value of 
struggling against the press to be controlled and dominated by political parties. 62 
Objective reporting initially developed based on the commercialisation of American 
journalism, and subsequently this idea became an important component in the ideology 
and practical guide of professional journalism.63 Objectivity, in the educational ideals of 
the Missouri School of Journalism, is reflected as journalists’ independent position and 
reporting the truth by heart.64 
On 3 September 1833, Benjamin H. Day published a new paper, The Sun, in New York, 
which is regarded as the beginning of a new epoch in journalism. The newspaper 
achieved remarkable success due to its affordability and outstanding skills in writing 
‘human-interest’ news that attracted a wide audience and resulted in substantial profits 
from advertisement.65 The penny press, represented by The Sun in the 1830s, challenged 
the dominance of party papers in the United States, having a far-reaching influence on 
the professionalisation of journalism. As an example of this professionalisation, before 
the penny press, nearly all works of a newspaper, such as printing, advertisement, 
interview and editing, were arranged by one person. With the penny press, the first 
specialist reporters were employed.66  
The Penny Press revolution, attributed to the expansion of democracy and the market, 
brought about a victory of news and facts that overrode editorial and more subjective 
opinion, and finally promoted the adoption of objectivity as a key journalistic value.67 
The boom of the Penny Press formed the basis of journalism as a profession. Prevailing 
conditions led to a consensus that journalism should be further improved through 
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education, with the establishment of the Missouri School of Journalism by Walter 
Williams being praised as an academic training solution with wisdom and foresight.68 
Although chairs in journalism had been housed before 1908 at some American 
universities, such as Cornell, Pennsylvania and Kansas, they solely recognised 
professorships in journalism studies, and did not significantly contribute to professional 
journalism studies and training on campus. 69  The real beginning of professional 
journalism education started in the Missouri School of Journalism. Thus, Albert Ross 
Hill as the president of the school proudly demonstrated: 
The University of Missouri is the first in America to establish and 
organise a School of Journalism. I believe it is possible for this School 
to give dignity to the profession of journalism, to anticipate to some 
extent the difficulties that journalism must meet and to prepare its 
graduates to overcome them; to give prospective journalists a 
professional spirit and high ideals of service; to discover those with real 
talent for the work in the profession, and to discourage those who are 
likely to prove failures in the profession, and to give the State better 
newspapers and a better citizenship.70   
 
The Missouri School of Journalism contributed to the journalism education style of 
placing emphasis on training students’ professional skills. Walter Williams believed that 
a school of journalism should, much like the schools of law, medicine and agriculture, 
train their students with practical skills in scientific experimental research techniques. 
He spoke to the state convention:  
The School of Journalism, as established by the board of curators of the 
University of Missouri, is a distinct advance in education. It seeks to do 
for journalism what schools of law, medicine, agriculture, engineering 
and normal schools have done for these vocations. A half century ago 
there were no law schools worthy the name, thirty years ago there were 
no modern medical schools. Schools of engineering and of agriculture 
and schools and colleges for the training of teachers are of even later 
development. Previous to the existence of these schools training in law, 
medicine, agriculture, et cetera, was obtainable only in the lawyer’s 
office, the doctor’s office, on the farm, or, of a teacher, in the school 
room practicing upon the pupils. With the increase of demands upon the 
time and thought of professional men, it has been supplemented by actual 
practical work. In medicine the hospital gives bedside instruction, in 
teachers’ college the model school affords demonstration, in the law 
school the practice court, in agriculture the farm and the experiment 
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station. All these are directed by experienced men and in these doing is 
learned by doing. The Missouri University School of Journalism is to be 
conducted upon this plan.71 
 
Implementing this ideal, Williams fought opposition and provided a real sense of 
commercial journalism through the use of the newspaper, the Daily Missourian, as the 
laboratory for his students.72 The aim was to provide training in professional skills based 
on the commercial mode of the press as a public service. In 1904, Williams put forward 
‘The Journalist’s Creed’ based on his ideals and belief regarding a public service model 
of journalism that according to him was morally bound to strive to be fundamentally 
disinterested. In the creed he emphasised his strong belief that the profession of 
journalism had as its core responsibility to uphold and protect the public interest – in 
other words, he exhorted his students to take on the sacred trust of disinterested public 
service.73  
The Journalist's Creed 
I believe in the profession of journalism. 
I believe that the public journal is a public trust; that all connected with 
it are, to the full measure of their responsibility, trustees for the public; 
that acceptance of a lesser service than the public service is betrayal of 
this trust. 
I believe that clear thinking and clear statement, accuracy and fairness 
are fundamental to good journalism. 
I believe that a journalist should write only what he holds in his heart to 
be true. 
I believe that suppression of the news, for any consideration other than 
the welfare of society, is indefensible. 
I believe that no one should write as a journalist what he would not say 
as a gentleman; that bribery by one’s own pocketbook is as much to be 
avoided as bribery by the pocketbook of another; that individual 
responsibility may not be escaped by pleading another’s instructions or 
another’s dividends. 
I believe that advertising, news and editorial columns should alike serve 
the best interests of readers; that a single standard of helpful truth and 
cleanness should prevail for all; that the supreme test of good journalism 
is the measure of its public service. 
I believe that the journalism which succeeds best — and best deserves 
success — fears God and honors Man; is stoutly independent, unmoved 
by pride of opinion or greed of power, constructive, tolerant but never 
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careless, self-controlled, patient, always respectful of its readers but 
always unafraid, is quickly indignant at injustice; is unswayed by the 
appeal of privilege or the clamor of the mob; seeks to give every man a 
chance and, as far as law and honest wage and recognition of human 
brotherhood can make it so, an equal chance; is profoundly patriotic 
while sincerely promoting international good will and cementing world-
comradeship; is a journalism of humanity, of and for today’s world. 
 
Henry J. Haskell, editor of the Kansas City Star, praised Williams’ contribution to 
training the next generation of professional journalists and inspiring them with ideals of 
an active engagement with public service. As he said: 
[…] his (Williams’) great contribution in sending out into the world 
young men and women trained in his ideals, inspired by his spirit of 
disinterested public service. No one could come in contact with Dean 
Williams without being permanently enriched from that abounding 
personality.74 
 
Public service was, indeed, a core value of journalistic professionalism as it originated 
in the Missouri School of Journalism. The key values of journalism today, central to its 
professionalisation, came from those identified in the Missouri School Creed, which 
were keeping public trust and public service, clarity, accuracy, fairness, truthfulness, no 
suppression of the news (except for public welfare), independence, serving the readers’ 
interests, egalitarian, constructive, tolerant, self-controlled, patient, fearless, patriotic 
and promoting of international good will.  
The history of journalism history and its principles were established as the most 
fundamental and crucial subjects that students completed in the Missouri School 
syllabus as designed by Williams. His aim was to present the objectives and principles 
of journalism by providing an understanding of history.75 Up to the early twentieth 
century in the United States, journalism history had been a well-established 
specialisation in journalism studies aimed at providing professional orientation as it 
effectively filled in the gap between practical skills and relevant theories and regulations. 
Journalism school students could learn both positive and negative role models through 
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historical examples based on the theories and principles for journalism staff. A core issue 
of journalism studies was the improvement of the profession. This included the process 
of the freedom achieved by the press from censorship, partisan influence and 
government control. Historical narratives were used to understand and elaborate on both 
practical developments and social understanding.76  
In the 1920s when the Chinese press was propelled towards professionalism, the 
prologue of research on Chinese journalism history unfolded. Published in New York in 
May 1924, The Rise of the Chinese Native Press by Y.P. Wang is recognised as the first 
scholarly work on Chinese journalism history. This represented application of the 
Missouri School’s principles of valuing the study of journalism history – Y. P. Wang 
himself was a former Chinese student at the Missouri School. Unfortunately, the Rise of 
the Chinese Native Press had limited circulation, in large part because it was written in 
English, rather than Chinese which was more widely used by scholars of China. Within 
the next few years, other scholarly works were published that were more successful in 
terms of the diversity of primary sources and the completeness of structure, such A 
History of the Chinese Press by Ge Gongzhen and by Roswell Sessoms Britton.77 
With a major part of the Journalists’ creed being the promotion of international good 
will, Walter Williams actively advocated international exchange, and his approach 
transformed the Missouri School of Journalism into an important vehicle for transmitting 
American journalism ideologies into Asia. While Millard’s overture to Williams was 
seen as the beginning of the importance of the Missouri School in China, in fact, the 
Missouri School’s first student intake included Wong Hin (Huang Xianzhao), the first 
Chinese student (who went on to work for Millard’s Weekly Review and later was a 
Missouri School Director). Hollington Tong (who became a prominent journalist and 
politician and was a key figure in the Shanghai and Evening Post’s relocation to 
Chongqing) soon followed. From 1917, the Missouri School of Journalism became 
directly involved in journalism education within China itself. Walter Williams visited 
China five times, sparing no effort to introduce the ideals of Missouri. His efforts yielded 
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substantial results through collaboration between the Missouri School of Journalism and 
the Chinese press. The Journalism department of St. John’s University in Shanghai and 
Yenching University (with the Missouri School founding student Huang Xianzhao later 
serving as the Director) in Peiping were set up with reference to the Missouri syllabus 
and teaching system. In addition, the Missouri School established a five-year programme 
for exchange for students and academic staff with Yenching University.78 
Graduates of Missouri were central figures in Chinese journalism. Don D. Patterson, 
Maurice E. Votaw and Vernon Nash, three early graduates of the school, became the 
directors of journalism departments at St. John’s University and Yenching University.79 
As the first international student of the Missouri School of Journalism, Wong Hin took 
charge of the journalism department of the Yenching University. As mentioned, Thomas 
Millard was a famous Alumni. Along with John Powell he established and managed the 
Millard's Review of the Far East, which later became the well-known China Weekly 
Review.80 Hollington Tong obtained his bachelor degree from Missouri – as mentioned, 
as a founding student – and later held the critical position of a specialist administrator, 
taking charge of journalism and publicity in the Nationalist Government of China. Tong 
became pivotal in the leadership of propaganda to Western countries during the War of 
Resistance against Japan.81 The list of people who graduated from Missouri and were 
active in the Chinese press during the Republic period also included Samuel Chang, Carl 
Crow and Woo Kyatang, all of whom later made a great contribution to the Shanghai 
Evening Post and Mercury. 
Chinese social conditions for developing Chinese professional journalism made 
adoption of the American journalism education, in particular the Missouri model, very 
attractive. Chinese journalism in the early 20th century marks the beginning of the move 
towards the American model, with American standards being widely used in Chinese 
universities for journalism education. This move towards the American model broke the 
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dominant position of the long-term British influence on the press in China. The 
American journalism educational model was highly regarded in China, as it met the 
needs of the unique environment that existed in China at that time. Chinese reformists, 
with ideals of emancipating China from a semi-colonial fate, needed to establish socially 
responsible media. At the same time, the New Culture Movement, in which democracy 
and science were advocated, provided an advantageous social atmosphere to adopt 
Western journalism values and systems. With its emphasis on journalism education, the 
Missouri system was consistent with reformists’ ideals of nation building and cultural 
transformation.82 
The New Culture Movement of the 1910s and 1920s was a social movement triggered 
by academics’ rejection of classical education for the creation of a new Chinese culture 
with western standards, especially democracy and science. At this time, the Chinese 
language was modernised and democratic and egalitarian values, such as feminisim, 
were advocated, leading up to the May Fourth Movement – a political movement. The 
term, ‘profession’ itself, originated in this period in accordance with Sun Huei-min’s 
textual criticism. Introduced into China from the Japanese language, Yoneda Shōtarō, in 
a range of articles published from April to March of 1919 in the Osaka Mainichi 
Shimbun, defined professionals as modern intellectuals, and further divided 
professionals into two classes: independent professionals, and those relying on a salary 
from government and public organisations or private businesses. These articles were 
soon after translated into Chinese. Subsequently, ‘profession’ became a term in Chinese 
language and began to be widely adopted. However, there was no definite or stable 
semantic boundary to define the term at that time, and as a result, people used it 
according to their own subjective definition. 83  In early 1931, journalists, lawyers, 
doctors and accountants were collectively formally recognised as “professional” entities 
in the Implementation Regulations of the Election Laws for National Conference 
Representatives, and this was deemed the end of a chaotic understanding of the 
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definition of ‘profession’ since it was introduced in China.84 
The ability of China to adapt the American journalism education was generated as a 
result of balancing different colonial powers’ forces in China. The American neo-
colonial ideology of upholding democratic values and open-door policy was a critical 
factor contributing to the popularisation of its journalism ideology in China.85 However, 
the Americans’ intentions to spread their journalism ideologies clashed with Chinese 
vigilance. Timothy Weston characterises the professionalisation of Chinese journalism, 
ranging from the late 1910s to the early 1920s, as a transnational movement of 
journalism reform, in which the United States, by means of power imbalances in the 
international environment that gave it political and economic advantage and cultural 
confidence, exported its professional journalism ideologies into China. Examining the 
Press Congress of 1921 in Hawaii, Weston criticises Westerners who utilised their 
superior position to overwhelmingly influence Chinese journalists. He believed that the 
congress made Chinese journalists feel that American journalistic norms were being 
imposed with Western arrogance. Weston argues that this exerted a certain negative 
influence on the willingness of Chinese to adopt Western journalistic values.86 
There are some similarities for the emergence of journalism objectivity in the United 
States and China. As has been mentioned in the thesis, newspapers were treated as 
political tools in the late 19th century and performed a very important role in the process 
of fermenting the Revolution of 1911 which finally terminated the Qing Empire. After 
experiencing the role playing for a political mouthpiece from the end of the 19th century 
to the early 20th century, commercial newspapers realised growth up to the 1920s. 
Although this trend remained in conflict with journalism intellectuals’ ideals, the 
commercialisation of newspaper at that time, as Weston argues, at least gave rise to the 
press becoming more independent and less reliant on political parties.87 Meanwhile, Xu 
Baohuang published the first Chinese language textbook on journalism, firstly proposing 
the concept of objectivity in China.88 Although the norm of objectivity that Xu proposed 
                                                 
84 Sun, Zhidu Yizhi, 17-18. 
85 Volz and Lee, “American Pragmatism,” 726. 
86 Timothy B. Weston, “China, Professional Journalism, and Liberal Internationalism in the Era of the First World 
War,” Pacific Affairs 83, no. 2 (June 2010): 346-47. 
87 Timothy B. Weston, “Minding the Newspaper Business: The Theory and Practice of Journalism in 1920s China,” 
Twentieth-Century China 31, no. 2 (2006): 31. 
88 Steven Maras and Joyce Y. M. Nip, “The Travelling Objectivity Norm” Journalism Studies 16, no. 3 (2015): 327. 
62 
 
is with the element of impartiality, reporting truth and separation of news reporting and 
editorial, objectivity is not treated as a professional ideal. Thus it does not fall short of 
American scholars’ standards, it at least made a contribution to building a set of rules 
related to objectivity for shaping both journalistic definition and practice, thus people 
can imagine how the norm of objectivity can work.89 
However, at the same time a younger generation of intellectuals who were deeply 
influenced by the Russian Revolution and the May Fourth Movement – which came out 
of the New Culture Movement and was triggered by the loss of the German treaty ports 
to the Japanese – began to support Marxism-Leninism. They adopted a revolutionary 
agenda to mobilise workers and peasants against the failed Chinese State. This 
blossoming of the Chinese intelligentsia, in large part, can be traced back to the Hundred 
Days’ Reform, especially the central planks of the move from Imperial examinations, 
the rejection of Confucian education and the adoption of a modern western-style 
education system.  
With this social and political background, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was 
established in 1921 by intellectuals who identified with Communist ideas. One of the 
CCP’s major power-bases was – unsurprisingly – the French Concessions of Shanghai. 
The newly established republican regime to a certain degree became a new but weak 
mainstay for Chinese journalism, and the Chinese pattern that heavily relied on the 
balance between nationalism and semi-colonialism did not change fundamentally. The 
republican administration established after the Revolution of 1911 was, to a certain 
degree, helpful in forging a favourable social context for a boom in journalism, but it 
was limited by the failure to develop a robust republican political system. Political 
realities were still not able to completely meet the basic requirements for the flourishing 
of the free press and professionalism. 
An interesting paradox emerged – journalism was introduced to China with the attempts 
of Western powers to colonise (or convert) the Middle Kingdom. Colonialist activities 
within China clearly stimulated nationalism, as demonstrated by the May Fourth 
movement. Nationalism was a main driving power of anti-colonialism by upholding the 
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cause of national independence and self-reliance. However, at the same time that anti-
colonialism was stimulating nationalism, semi-colonialism helped to form modern 
Chinese urban culture, the rising middle classes and the intelligentsia, as people became 
exposed to, and to a certain degree came to accept Western culture, ways of life and even 
political ideology. In China’s urban culture, one can see the conflict created by 
colonialism and the benefits that came from it working together as a major force in the 
modernisation of Chinese journalism. In Shanghai, one can also measure to some degree 
the limits of this fulcrum of cultural exchange, which seems to have often been almost 
entirely one-sided: 
Shanghailanders defined their identity against a range of others - Britons 
at home, China hands, their neighbours the French, missionaries - but in 
the broadest possible sense the Shanghailander position, like the British 
position in China generally, was underpinned by prevailing notions of 
‘Orientals’, and Chinese, as ‘racially’ different, and ‘racially’ unequal. 
These ideas were widely believed and propagated, and there was a large 
literature on such topics which sold well and was widely respected. In 
print, bar talk, letters and books, Britons exchanged their experiences and 
prejudices about the Chinese ‘mind’, Chinese society, politics, culture 
and government. And when the Chinese were not different and inferior, 
they were different and exotic.90 
 
Given the geographically, politically and ideologically divided nature of the Republican 
Government, it is unsurprising that journalism history in this period contained many 
contradictions and biased narratives. Research based on Northern experiences, led by 
Tseng Hsü-pei, summed up journalism in this period as being dominated by warlords in 
the northern areas of China, which devastated local public freedom of expression and 
the development of the development. By contrast, journalism in the south – specifically 
Shanghai – saw multitudinous newspapers published, strengthened by the protection 
offered by extraterritoriality. That said, authorities of the International Settlement and 
the French Concession were planning to enforce laws and regulations to restrain freedom 
of speech because they feared newspapers with unfettered freedom would again lead to 
the formation of anti-imperialist social movements. 91  The inherently different 
perspectives and interpretations of the North and South is exemplified by Kao Yu-ya’s 
exploration of the attitudes towards the Northern Expedition of two Northern Chinese 
newspapers, Ta Kun Pao and Chenbao. Kao Yu-ya used the reporting in these papers to 
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establish that public opinion expressed in North China challenged the existing common 
understanding of the Northern Expedition, basing her critique on the view that Southern-
based analysis omitted to consider the stand in northern areas of China, but instead 
viewed it solely from a southern perspective.92 
It can be argued that the development of Chinese journalism during the Beiyang period 
(1912-1927) marked the fastest and the most dynamic progress and the least restrained 
environment for journalism in China even though it reached the peak of its historical 
development during the following Nanjing Decade. The press of the Beiyang period, 
with the background of weak central governance, attained a new height unparalleled in 
both its development of diversity and integrity. More importantly, journalists in this 
period had a more profound understanding and insight into the profession in which they 
were engaged.93 The period saw the upsurge of private newspapers, the persecution of 
progressive journalists and papers by the Beiyang Government, the continuity of the 
influence of imperialism in Chinese journalism, and the development of radio, 
photography, film and education.94 In 1927, Zhongguo Baoxueshi (A History of Chinese 
Newspapers), written by Ge Gongzhen, was published in Shanghai. This is the first 
Chinese academic monograph on Chinese journalism history. In the following year, the 
Central Broadcasting System as the official radio station of the Nationalist Party was 
established in Nanjing with the call sign of XKM. 
Shanghai professionals and their associations were fundamentally different from groups 
and guilds that arose before the Republic, in part due to their existence as part of the 
new, burgeoning middle class that had not existed before reforms such as the Hundred 
Days Reform, and in part because they reflected the urbanisation that occurred in the 
treaty ports and foreign concessions. It is possible to view journalism’s progress towards 
professionalisation and its exponents’ transition from traditional Chinese literati to 
professional journalists as a process whereby Chinese elites moved from passively 
engaging in the press, mostly just for survival, to being actively involved in this 
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profession for the purpose of realising their specific aims in journalism.95 This transition 
can be divided into three stages: 
(i) initially adopting the press as a tool for resisting Western aggression; 
(ii) being the political parties’ mouthpiece around the time of the Revolution of 
1911; 
(iii) finally adopting Western professionalism in the 1920s.  
 
Professionalisation of Chinese Journalism: Previous Scholarship 
Research on professionalisation in modern China is derived from, and has benefitted 
from, Western sociological studies. Xu Xiaoqun rates the process model for 
understanding professionalisation as a great progress on the attribute model, whereby 
professionalism is imbued with some static properties, such as professional knowledge, 
moral ethics and self-governance realised by relevant standards for access into the 
profession. While the process model incorporates the attribute model, it constitutes 
theoretical progress to the degree that it conceives of professionalisation as a dynamic 
historical process, rather than just a series of static attributes. Furthermore, Xu also 
points out a limitation of the process model. Based on recent research on 
professionalisation in Continental Europe, he found the process model was too narrowly 
based on the Anglo-American experience, which was an impediment to a more precise 
comprehension of the professionalisation process as it had played out in other countries. 
Therefore, he refined the model so that its concepts could more readily account for the 
specificities of the professionalisation of journalism in Chinese cases through the 
examination of the interaction between professionals and the state during the Republic 
period. 96  As one of numerous professions Xu discussed, the professionalisation of 
journalism in the republic period of China was concisely generalised as journalists in the 
process of transition from traditional literati to modern professionals actively engaged 
in forming the identity of their profession, which included successive demands for 
freedom of the press and public expression.97  
Since the 1920s, a group of founders of Chinese journalism studies sprang up, such as 
Xu Baohuang, Ren Baitao, Huang Tianpeng and Zhang Jinglu, with the publication of 
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their monographs on journalism studies. In the monographs, journalism theories, 
practical skills and the division of staff based on specialisation, and moral principles 
were expounded and discussed with much detail referring to the examples of journalism 
in Britain, France and America. In these monographs, ‘profession’ as a term had not 
been frequently used, especially in books published before 1930. However, details 
regarding the core values of professionalism ideals, to a certain degree, were widely 
discussed in these monographs.  
Ren Baitao reviewed and compared the development of journalism in Britain, France 
and America, and this was the only instance in his book where he used the term 
‘profession.’ He claimed that the French newspapers were not professional compared 
with the newspapers in Britain and America as, he argued, newspapers in France were 
too politicised, and were usually utilised as tools to express political opinions and assail 
political opponents.98 It can be seen that ‘professional’ in Ren’s opinion meant that 
journalism and journalist should be independent from all partisanship. Zhang Jinglu 
proposed journalism as a profession, and specifically expounded the characteristics and 
values of the profession. He emphasised that the profession of the journalist required 
greater effort compared with other professions due to the fact that – in his opinion – a 
journalist had the heavy responsibility of fulfilling the onerous duties of faithful public 
service.99 In fact, public service was commonly described in this batch of monographs. 
Ren Baitao deemed the primary function of the journalist was as a public agent who 
served the interests of the majority, while maintaining a stance of independence, 
objectivity and unwavering faith to facts and the truth.100 Xu Baohuang proposed that 
journalism should represent public opinions, thus journalists should speak for the 
majority, and not willingly become the mouthpieces of partisan views.101  
Commercialisation of the press was another focus in these monographs. These authors 
supported commercialisation, but it had to be on the basis of respecting public interests. 
Xu Baohuang was active in publishing advertisements in newspapers. Referencing 
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American examples, he proposed that advertisements constituted ‘commercial’ news so 
long as they did not contain salacious and misleading information, and that they were 
welcomed by the public.102 Huang Tianpeng deemed that newspapers should be run and 
managed independently, and if the managers understood that newspapers should serve 
the public, then their newspapers would enjoy the support of the public. Thus, circulation 
would be enhanced and it would bring in more income from advertising.103 
Due to scholars’ consistent rethinking and exploration, knowledge of the context and the 
historical limitations of the professionalisation of journalism in China can both be 
expanded from various angles today. We have already seen that Natascha Vittinghoff’s 
recent research has nuanced our understanding by questioning long-held views 
concerning Liang Qichao’s role in the development of new journalism at the end of the 
19th century.104 Earlier assessments of his role have been found rather wanting in so far 
as they have not properly taken into account the bias inherent in Liang’s own (self)-
assessments.  
Stephen MacKinnon in accordance with his observation of journalism in 1930s China 
proposes that some new features catalysed by means of capital together with 
technological innovation had been emerging in the Chinese press, which was centred in 
Shanghai, and these innovations were spread nationwide. According to MacKinnon, the 
press up to the 1930s had realised a transformation from a heavy reliance on political 
patrons in the early 20th century to a commercial model with Chinese features: ownership, 
to a certain degree, was monopolised by oligarchs, and journalistic practice were 
inextricably bound up with Western peers. Under this development, he argued that the 
emergence of such elements as discussions around objectivity, professional division and 
the establishment of increasing numbers of journalism schools, symbolised that Western 
professionalism had been adopted in China.105  
Terry Narramore amplified the focus from the 1930s to a wider timeframe. By reviewing 
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and examining the professionalisation of journalism from the establishment of the 
Republic regime to the outbreak of the war against Japan, a trajectory of professional 
journalism development in China was presented. In his opinion, journalists placed hopes 
on the professional ideals to offer them a peaceful space from the dangerous 
environment of factional fighting, but their practice encountered difficulties. Soon after 
Chinese newspapers stepped into commercialisation, professional journalists (as 
members embedded in the system of newspaper magnates) increasingly felt they were 
not able to avoid the constraints derived from the priorities of commercial profits. On 
the level of governance and control of journalism, more serious pressure rapidly 
followed the rise of the Nationalist Government and patriotism under the on-going 
Japanese threat and direct invasion.106  
Timothy Weston has further examined the emergence and development of 
commercialisation. He argues that though commercial dailies had existed in the Late 
Qing period, the New Culture Movement should be considered the watershed event of 
the commercialisation of the press. He does this without denigrating the contribution 
that earlier pre-1911 newspapers had made to the development of journalism in China:  
Advancing beyond an earlier generation of scholarship that largely 
overlooked Chinese newspapers of the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s because 
they were thought to have been of little importance to the forces driving 
historical change, recent research has convincingly established that 
newspapers of the pre-1911 Revolution period in fact contributed much 
to the shaping of Chinese culture and politics, especially in Shanghai. 
Newspapers of that era experimented with novel forms of expression, 
created space for new types of people to comment on subjects of “public” 
concern and introduced readers to non-Chinese currents of thought and 
forms of political and social organization.107 
 
Within the formation of professional journalism through the efforts of the intellectuals 
who participated in the movement, newspapers had been circulated as products of mass 
consumption since the 1920s. However, he pointed out that commercial practices did 
not meet expectations. Driven by profit, commercial papers became cautious with 
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regards to political agendas, and concentrated their main efforts on local social news, 
which easily attracted readers. According to Weston’s research, the commercial press in 
the 1920s did make newspapers more independent from political parties, but this also 
meant that the newspapers had an increased burden of catering to the tastes and interests 
of a much wider public. This invariably limited their ability to meet the expectations of 
intellectuals who hoped to serve the public interest.108 
Yong Volz and Lee Chin-Chuan’s study on Chinese professional journalism focuses on 
the social conditions at the time American journalism education, in particular, the 
Missouri model was being adopted in China. They characterise Chinese journalism in 
the early 20th century as the beginning of the move towards the American model, with 
American standards being widely used in Chinese universities for journalism education. 
This move towards the American model broke the dominant position of the long-term 
British influence on the press in China - the degree of admiration that American 
journalism educational model won in China, in Volz and Lee’s opinion, was very high. 
This phenomenon was thought of as meeting the needs of the unique environment that 
existed in China at that time. Chinese reformists with ideals of a China finally 
emancipated from a semi-colonial fate, needed to establish socially responsible media, 
and the New Culture Movement, in which democracy and science were advocated, 
provided an advantageous social atmosphere for adopting Western journalism values 
and systems. Journalism education as the most effective means to promote the press, 
which promoted reformists’ ideals of nation building and cultural transformation, was 
therefore suitably justified in following the Missouri system.109According to Volz and 
Lee, American neo-colonial ideology of upholding democratic values and open-door 
policy was a critical factor contributing to the popularisation of its journalism ideology 
in China.110 However, the Americans’ intentions to spread their journalism ideologies 
had the potential to clash with Chinese vigilance.  
Weston characterises the professionalisation of Chinese journalism, ranging from the 
late 1910s to the early 1920s, as a transnational movement of journalism reform, in 
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which the United States, due to the power imbalance on the international scene and 
relying on its political and economic advantages and cultural confidence, was able to 
export its model of professional journalism into China: 
The movement to professionalize Chinese journalism must be 
understood in the context of a trans-Pacific conversation on journalism 
that radiated out from the United States and which was connected to a 
broader early twentieth century American movement to export middle-
class ideas around the world. The impulse to export American values 
reflected the self-confident, racist and evangelical side of American 
progressivism after 1898, the belief among Americans that the United 
States stood at the forefront of Western civilization and that they had a 
right and duty to steer other societies towards the American way.111 
 
Examining the Press Congress of 1921 in Hawaii, Weston criticises Westerners who 
utilised their superior position to overwhelmingly influence Chinese journalists. He 
believed that being the congress in Hawaii making Chinese journalists feel that 
American journalistic norms were being imposed with “Western” arrogance. Weston 
argues that this exerted negative influence on the willingness of Chinese to adopt 
Western journalistic values: 
[…] owing to the radically asymmetrical power relations that underlay 
it, the attempt to transfer Western knowledge about professional 
journalism to China, tied as it was to Western ideas about what modern 
societies should look like and how they should function, and 
underwritten by American cultural arrogance born of the rising economic 
and political power of the United States, was a fraught process. It 
establishes that even at the height of American confidence in the value 
of journalistic professionalism grounded in scientific objectivity, at the 
very moment when Americans were working assiduously to transfer 
Western journalistic norms and practices to China, the Western press 
itself was anything but professional or objective in its coverage of 
foreign societies, and that it was Westernized intellectuals from 
politically and economically weak countries, such as the Chinese who 
took part in the Press Congress of the World meeting in Hawai'i in 1921, 
who were in the best position to analyze this state of affairs. 112 
 
Fan Yaping’s research approaches the subject from the perspective of Chinese domestic 
centralism. He examines the transition of Chinese traditional literati to professional 
journalists from the time when Western missionaries introduced modern newspapers 
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into China to the beginning of the Nanjing Decade. This transition is summarised as a 
process whereby Chinese elites moved from passively engaging in the press, mostly just 
for survival, to being actively involved in this profession for the purpose of realising 
their specific aims in journalism. The author deems that Chinese journalists’ awareness 
in this transition experienced a big leap which can be divided into three stages: (i) 
initially adopting the press as a tool for resisting Western aggression; (ii) being the 
political parties’ mouthpiece around the time of the Revolution of 1911; (iii) finally 
adopting Western professionalism in the 1920s. Multiple social elements, such as 
Chinese economic and cultural conditions, openness to social change for modernity, 
social acceptance and general evolution of the press, in addition to the growth of the 
Chinese press itself, together formed the external influences that promoted professional 
identity. However, as the development of these elements were haphazard, often even 
hysterical, and with all kinds of difficulties during the process of Chinese social 
modernity, the course of either the professionalisation of Chinese journalism or the 
formation of professional identity involved a process that was complex and fluctuating 
in its pace.113 
Lin Muyin focuses on the localisation and influence of the ‘Missouri University 
journalism education model’, which she describes as the “American model of journalism 
education” in China from 1921 to 1952. She states that the Missouri model was 
originally introduced into China in the 1920s. After that time, it was widely adopted as 
the model to guide and direct the establishment and development of the Chinese 
journalism education system up until the early 1950s when the American model was 
fully replaced by the Communist model of the Soviet Union during the Chinese 
Communist Party’s process of transforming Chinese universities.114 However, Lin omits 
that the formation of the Missouri model is a consequent product of the 
professionalisation of journalism in the United States. As a result, she only considers the 
Missouri model as an educational model rather than a professionalism model of 
journalism (i.e., practices of journalism). In this sense, her research is limited to a degree 
to the analysis of the characteristics of the adoption and adaptation of the Missouri 
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journalism education model in China during the republican period. Lin deems that the 
corporation and exchange mechanism of journalism studies and education between 
China and the United States did not exist for nearly 30 years post 1949, yet there was 
still a submerged platform, in which the American model represented by Missouri was 
still rooted in the heart of Chinese journalists.  
By reviewing this scholarship, it can be seen that studies on the professionalisation of 
Chinese journalism that have emerged are based on a variety of perspectives, but all 
have as their main focus the period before the late 1930s, while largely ignoring the 
decade from the late 1930s to the late 1940s. In contrast to the research above that 
examined the professionalisation of Chinese journalism in a macroscopic view with a 
focus on the years before 1930, Hung Chang-tai shifts the focus to a specific journalist, 
Fan Changjiang, to observe his journalistic activities and writing style around the period 
of the outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japan. By documenting the historical 
details of an individual journalist, Hung concretely presents how the professionalisation 
of journalism in China suffered politicisation during the war. Hung demonstrates that 
Fan Changjiang made a significant contribution to first-hand reporting and that his 
innovative writing style stemmed from his belief in an ideal of journalist professionalism. 
However, when the war between China and Japan broke out, Fan was moved by his 
patriotic emotion to help Chinese resistance. 115  Hung demonstrates how the war 
politicised Fan Changjiang’s professional journalism career. In his war-front report work, 
Fan experienced many unsatisfactory policies and behaviours of the Nationalist Party, 
such as strict censorship and a lack of discipline amongst the troops. These impelled 
Fang to join the CCP in May 1939, and it marked the turning point in his career from a 
professional reporter to a political advocate.116 Hung reveals that under the national war 
of Japanese invasion, journalists’ patriotic emotions and the harsh control over 
journalism exercised by both the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party together 
led to the politicisation of professional journalism.  
During the Nanjing Nationalist Government period, the press was able to enjoy the 
relatively free environment from the Beiyang period as the government was not all 
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powerful. This was especially the case in Shanghai as the foreign settlements maintained 
their independence and prosperity. Thus, as argued in Chapter 1, extraterritoriality was 
a necessary condition for the developing modernisation of Chinese journalism. 
Extraterritoriality existed in the coastal cities due to economic prosperity, convenient 
transportation and infrastructure as well as better education. This sharply contrasted with 
the enormously underdeveloped nature of other areas in China, particularly the 
hinterland. As a result, the Chinese journalism boom of the 1920s and 1930s can only 
be said to exist in a very limited number of China’s metropolises. However, this 
excessive reliance on extraterritoriality emerged as a congenital problem as it led to 
Chinese journalism during this boom period becoming unbalanced, discordant and 
unsustainable. It was during this period that the SEPM was established in Shanghai. The 
newspaper provides a useful focus point to explore the strengths and weaknesses of 
extraterritoriality and the development of a modern and professional Chinese journalism. 
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Table 1: The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury publications and radio inventory 
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Chapter 2: The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury 
For a Clear Picture of World Events Read the Shanghai Evening 
Post and Mercury 
China this year is passing through one of the most vital stages of her 
long history. Never before has it been so important that residents in 
China keep abreast of world events, because day by day this great 
country is coming into closer contact with all the nations of the world.  
No better medium than the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury can 
be obtained through which to keep pace with the world developments 
which are exerting such tremendous influence upon the China of today 
and the China of tomorrow. 
Through its special United Press cable service from America and the 
three great European news services, this paper is able to present a daily 
picture of happenings throughout the world, much of it 15 hours ahead 
of any other Shanghai newspaper.1 
 
In 1929, the Shanghai Evening Post was established by Cornelius Van Starr, the founder 
of the American International Group.2 Its predecessor was the Shanghai Gazette, which 
was started in 1918 by Eugene Chen, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Nationalist 
Government. After changing ownership several times between American and Chinese 
owners, it was renamed the Shanghai Evening News.3  
The American Newspaper Company purchased the paper for $2500 and renamed it the 
Shanghai Evening Post. 4 The first edition was published in April 1929 with the company 
making the paper’s purpose clear: 
A company organised for the purpose of acquiring the newspaper and 
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1928, the earliest newspaper that the author can find was published in November 1929. As no archival document or 
memoir that shows the exact day has been located, the author accepts April 1929 as the establishment of SEPM in 
this thesis. 
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establishing it as an independent journal, with no special purpose of 
propaganda or policy to serve except that of giving correct, unbiased 
information and confining its expressions of opinion to the editorial 
page.5 
 
In the practical management of the newspaper, C. V. Starr, the owner of the American 
Newspaper Company, respected the position of the profession of journalism. He 
remained detached from the Shanghai Evening Post and handed over responsibility to the 
editor, Theodore Olin (T. O. or Ted) Thackrey.6 It could speculate that C. V. Starr 
appreciated the social cachet of being a newspaper proprietor. It has been said: 
As Starr expanded his publishing activities, he began to cut quite a 
swath through Shanghai society. The January 1935 issue of Fortune 
magazine, founded five years earlier by Luce, features an article titled 
“Men of Shanghai,” with brief profiles of six expatriates and Chinese 
movers and shakers. Luce’s friend got great treatment—Starr’s is the 
first profile in the package, and the longest.7 
 
Thackrey was an experienced editor with Scripps-Howard newspapers in the United 
States and a youthful newcomer to Shanghai. He was known for his open-mindedness 
and applied this to the Open Letter section of the newspaper.8 This interesting character 
went on to work for the New York Post, where he married the owner. He later 
characterised his political views as "non-communist Left".9 Even after leaving the post 
of editor, he contributed articles to the paper. Thackrey described the paper thus: 
Its viewpoint is to be tolerant, kindly, but firm on matters involving 
Sino-American relations; seeking for the ultimate abolition of any false 
and unnatural barriers toward the friendly intercourse between the two 
nations; to print the truth as it sees the truth, without fear or favour, and 
without intolerance for any viewpoint which may be totally at variance 
with its own.  
Its columns are to be open at all times to the intelligent presentation of 
opinion, both in agreement with and at total variance with its own 
expressed view upon any given problem, or every problem affecting 
the welfare of the community in which it is published. 
It recognises its position as a guest in China, and conducts itself as a 
guest; not deviating in any matter of principle; but not nagging, or 
indulging in petty scolding.”10 
 
                                                 
5 Thomas Ming-Heng Chao, The Foreign Press in China (Shanghai: China Institute of Pacific Relations, 1931), 65. 
6 Chao, Foreign Press in China, 65. 
7 Shelp and Ehrbar, Fallen Giant, 42. 
8 Chao, Foreign Press in China, 67-69. 
9 NY Daily Compass: Millionairess to Start Paper, The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 May, 1949. 
10 Chao, Foreign Press in China, 66. 
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In 1930, the Shanghai Evening Post purchased the rival British-owned Mercury for 
$10 000, and the paper’s name was changed to the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury 
(SEPM).11 
C. V. Starr “had to promise the Mercury’s editor H. G. W. (Henry George Wandesforde) 
Woodhead to create a column for him, called ‘As a Briton Sees It’.”12 Woodhead, a 
British journalist who once worked for the North China Daily News, made the decision 
to move to Shanghai from Tianjin in the hope of finding a more lucrative post as his 
financial situation had deteriorated and the economy had fluctuated so the cost of living 
was not viable in Tientsin. When he arrived in Shanghai, the Shanghai Evening Post 
was in the process of merging with Shanghai Mercury. He accepted C. V. Starr’s offer 
to write a daily column, which attracted a high salary and freedom to express his views.13 
Soon after, Woodhead was given a title of “diehard” and created a sensation by reporting 
Chinese opium activities in Shanghai and exposing suppliers in his column of the SEPM. 
He even displayed hundreds of packets of opium to prove its availability. For this, he 
was disliked by many Chinese readers, who reacted by withdrawing their advertisements 
in the newspaper for fear of being connected to a foreign anti-Chinese journalist.14 Wang 
Boheng, in an article published in 1930, specifically expressed his resentment and 
detestation of the British journalist. He described Woodhead as a crazy and stupid person 
who was inherently anti-China.15 
The founding editor of the newly formed the SEPM was Carl Crow, a Missouri-born 
newspaper man and ad-man, who started his newspaper career as night editor of the 
China Press – China’s first American newspaper. 16  Crow had originally gone to 
Shanghai as an agent for the U.S. wartime propaganda agency, the Committee on Public 
Information, and went on to work in advertising. As a journalist, Crow experienced some 
                                                 
11 Shelp and Ehrbar, Fallen Giant, 40. 
12 Volz, Yong Z., and Lee Chin-Chuan. “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere of Influence.” Journalism Studies 
12, no. 5 (2011): 565. 
13 H. G. W. Woodhead, A journalist in China (London, Hurst & Blackett, Led., 1934), 242. 
14 Chao, Foreign Press in China, 66-67. 
15 Wang Bohen, “Zhongguo Zhi Xizibao [Western Languages Newspapers in China],” in Xinwenxuekan Quanji, ed. 
Huang Tianpeng, 1930, cited in Yong Z. Volz, “Yi ‘Zhenxiang’ De Mingyi: Liuxue Zhishi Fenzi Dui Xifang Baodao 
De Pipan Jidui Xinwen Jiancha De Xuandao [By the Excuses of the ‘Truth’: criticism towards Western media report 
and defence for Chinese censorship by Chinese intellectuals who had oversea study experience],” in Baoren Baoguo: 
Zhongguo Xinwenshi De Lingyizhong Dufa [To Serve the Nation: Journalists as Prisms of Chinese Press History], 
ed. Lee Chin-Chuan ( Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2013), 296. 
16 James McGregor, “Review of Carl Crow - A Tough Old China Hand: The Life, Times, and Adventures of an 
American in Shanghai,” Far Eastern Economic Review 170, no, 1: 66-68.   
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conflict with the English journalists who were dominant in Shanghai at the time. He ‘and 
his fellow Missourian were soon dubbed "cowboy correspondents" because of their 
hayseed origins and penchant for chasing real news.’17 This colourful character was of 
some renown before becoming editor – including his role in negotiating the release of 
foreign hostages of a warlord who derailed a new Shanghai-Beijing express train near 
the Jiangsu-Shandong border. 
From the outset the SEPM “was strongly pro-Chinese though it looked thoroughly 
American and included ‘agony aunt’ advice column Dorothy Dix, crossword puzzles, 
Ripley’s “Believe It or Not” and columns from half a dozen news syndicates.”18 
After a brief stint as editor, Crow recruited his old friend Randall Gould as editor who 
later became the editor in chief of the newspaper and held a significant role in Chinese 
journalism history: 
He got to know Gould when the bulky Minnesotan had arrived in 
Beijing as a UP correspondent, Gould was a friend of many of the 
Missouri News Colony. He had worked as a news editor on the Japan 
Times in Tokyo in 1923–24 before becoming UP’s roving bureau 
manager in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Manila in the late 1920s, as 
well as news editor of the Peking Daily News. Gould was hired in 1931 
and stayed as editor of the paper for a decade as well as being a China 
correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor.19 
 
Gould was an eccentric with liberal views in his writing and was friendly with some of 
the Nationalist leaders such as Eugene Chen, and Kung Hsiang-Hsi (H. H. Kung). 
During his work for the United Press his strong views caused controversy with the 
American officials; his transfer to Manila ceased and he returned to China in 1929 upon 
the newly appointed American Minister to China.20  
Starr characterised Crow as a brilliant and capable individual, but a “rather poor 
businessman” so replaced him as manager after only a short stint. “Starr believed Crow 
was an excellent choice to establish the newspaper but wasn’t best suited to the longer 
term management of the business.”21 However, Crow continued to contribute articles to 
                                                 
17 McGregor, “Review of Carl Crow,” 66-68. 
18 French, Carl Crow, 172. 
19 French, Carl Crow, 172. 
20 Chao, Foreign Press in China, 83-84. 
21 French, Carl Crow, 174. 
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the SEPM. 
Figure 4: C. V. Starr (left) and Randall Gould (right) 
 
The growth and popularity of the SEPM increased rapidly since it was established. 
Beginning with a daily circulation of 300, after two years this figure had grown to a net 
paid daily circulation of 4000 and had reached 4800 in 1931. By around 1935, they had 
a daily circulation of 7000 copies.22 Around 2000 of these were destined for overseas 
customers.23 
Three key readership groups of English-language newspapers during this time were: 
foreign residents of very diverse backgrounds; the Chinese elite; and foreign audiences 
outside China. 24  The SEPM was the only English language evening newspaper in 
Shanghai and prior to that up until the 1930s it had been the second largest foreign 
                                                 
22 Ma Liang, ‘‘A Survey of the Foreign Press in Shanghai by the 2nd Department of the General Staff Headquarters’’, 
in An Archival Collection on the History of the Republic of China, ed. China’s No. 2 Archive Institute (Nanjing: 
Jiangsu Guji), 5:131-49, cited in Volz and Lee, “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere,” 562. 
23 Chen Tzu-Hsiang The English Language Daily Press in China (Peking: The Synodal Collectanea Commission, 
1937), cited in Volz and Lee, “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere,” 563. 
24 Volz and Lee, “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere,” 565. 
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newspaper.25 The majority of the SEPM readers (90%) came from the Shanghai area 
including the International Settlement, the French Concession and Greater Shanghai. 
The paper also had readers in Nanking and reached as far south as Hong Kong and as 
far north as Mukden.26  
The SEPM drew on a proud American heritage. The American press expanded within 
China in this period, in large part as a reaction to the British dominance.  
It was observed that American news in the local Chinese-language 
newspapers was mainly translated from European news agencies, 
particularly Reuters. ‘‘This Europeanized American news was 
confined largely to the seamy side of American life,’’ Norwood 
Allman (1943, p. 250), a prominent American lawyer in Shanghai, 
argued, “as most of the agencies had national axes and were only too 
happy to blackguard and belittle Americans”.27 
 
The SEPM managing editor, Carl Crow, stated: ‘‘It was rather irritating and puzzling to 
us expatriate Americans to see all news from home published as London date line, even 
the returns of American elections.’’ 28  The news editor, Gould, was irritated by 
Woodhead’s British presence at the SEPM, saying ‘I conscientiously altered his British 
spellings… I felt a bit grumpy as the Post suddenly picked up popularity with the 
Shanghai British community’.”29 A second reason for this American expansion was “the 
rapid expansion of the American community both in number and power in Chinese major treaty 
port cities, which provided a broader social context for the growth of the American press. 
According to the China Year Book (1913, p. 594; 1927, p. 30), the American population in China 
multiplied from 3470 in 1911 to 8817 by 1924”.30 
The expanding American press was also part of America’s shift from 
“noninterventionism to a new political ideology of America as Empire.”31 However, 
“altruistically and morally intended, the Progressive ideology promoted the doctrines of 
                                                 
25 Chao, Foreign Press in China, 69. 
26 Chao, Foreign Press in China, 67. 
27 Volz and Lee, “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere,” 564. 
28 Carl Crow, China Takes Her Place (New York: Harper & Brothers), 5, cited in Volz and Lee, “Semi-Colonialism 
and Journalistic Sphere,” 564. 
29 Randall Gould, ‘‘Three p.m. Shanghai Time: a memoir in three parts’’, unpublished manuscript in Sinologisch 
Instituut, Universiteit Leiden, Netherlands, cited in Volz and Lee, “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere,” 565. 
30 Volz and Lee, “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic,” 564. 
31 Ralph Raico, “American Foreign Policy: the turning point, 1898 – 1919”, Freedom Daily, February - July, cited in 
Volz and Lee, “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere,” 565.  
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American imperialism.”32 
The SEPM also attracted American journalists and therefore fostered within its ranks 
professional journalistic skills and experience. Tillman Durdin was one such journalist 
drawn to Shanghai at that time. Arriving in the port of Shanghai as a workaway on an 
American ship, he landed a job with the SEPM as a real estate editor. Learning his trade 
in Shanghai, Durdin became the premier correspondent in for the New York Times in the 
mid-1940s. 33  Jack Belden, is another prominent American journalist, a war 
correspondent, who started his early career working for the SEPM during the 1930s. He 
was also present in Peking during the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937. He later went 
on to pen the influential book China Shakes the World.34 
Political Tensions and Censorship: Challenges for the Press 
The SEPM in its early period was not all plain sailing. From the beginning, the SEPM 
had significant conflict with the Nationalist Government around news reporting issues. 
As far back as 2 November 1929, it was recognised that Shanghai local government 
made a decision to retain copies of the SEPM. 35  Newspapers within the foreign 
settlements were immune for censorship within the settlements but were barred from 
mail outside the settlements.36 
The story of the SEPM’s censorship, along with that of other papers made international 
news, for example, in an article in the Australian Cairns Post ‘Press Muzzled Chinese 
Way, Government Critics’: 
Consistent with its policy of withholding postal privileges from 
newspapers which criticise the Government, the Tianjin branch of the 
Kuomintang [Nationalist Party] has banned the 'Peking and Tientsin 
Times', the most influential British paper in North China. The 'Times' 
recently attacked the Chinese Government's apathy in connection with 
the murders of foreign missionaries in the interior. Banning foreign 
newspapers from the mails has recently become a popular 
Governmental pastime. The 'North China Daily News,' published to 
Shanghai, was banned for months last year, and the Shanghai 'Evening 
                                                 
32 Volz and Lee, “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere,” 566. 
33 Stephen R. Mackinnon and Oris Friesen, China Reporting: An Oral History of American Journalism in the 1930s 
and 1940s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 32-33. 
34 Mackinnon and Friesen, China Reporting, 34. 
35 Kouliu Damei Wanbao [Detain the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury], Central Daily News, 3 November 1929. 
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Post,' the only American daily in Shanghai, has now passed the ninety-
fifth day of its banishment from the mails, without any official 
explanation having been offered. The ban in this case is believed to 
have been due to criticism of the administration of the Chinese military 
commander at Shanghai.37 
 
As this article published on 10 February 1930 that the paper was experiencing its 95th 
day of banishment, this indeed refers to the paper’s ban of November 1929. The reason 
for the ban was never officially explained, however the SEPM speculate that ban was 
because they criticised the Chinese Commissioner of Public Safety in Shanghai for not 
arresting “strike-breaking delivery coolies” and for arresting “several loyal employees 
who refused to join the strike”.38 So, there is a history of industrial discord in the earliest 
days of the SEPM – a theme that reappears at its close some twenty years later.  
This is a very significant period for journalism, with the issuing of the 1930 Publication 
Law by the Nationalist Government, which made it an offence to undermine the 
Nationalist Party or its principles. Likewise the publication of information that destroyed 
public order was not allowed. To police this, publications could not be released without 
a permit by the Nationalist Government’s publicity office.39 
Shortly after the enactment of the 1930 Publication Law, in early 1931, Implementation 
Regulations of the Election Laws for National Conference Representatives were created. 
These regulations formally recognised journalists, lawyers, doctors and accountants as 
“professional” entities, which was deemed the end of a chaotic understanding of the 
definition of ‘profession’ since its introduction in China.40 This can be regarded as a sign 
of progress in the professionalisation of Chinese journalism, and gave impetus to further 
the professionalism improvement of journalism, nonetheless progress was still limited. 
The core values of the professionalism ideal - such as objectivity and neutrality in news 
reporting in public services - were rarely discussed and recognised in the legal document. 
This situation, to some extent, might reflect the gap between the Chinese journalists’ 
expectations regarding the ideals and practical works in professionalisation, as well as 
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the government’s acceptance of the development of a new understanding of professions. 
Politically, this was a very turbulent period. Manchuria became the focus of the conflicts 
with Japan’s invasion of North East China in the Mukden Incident in 1931. This 
triggered the later Japanese occupation over Manchuria. Japan then on 28 January 1932 
utilised the conflicts between Japanese citizens in Shanghai and local Chinese to take an 
aggressive military action against the local Chinese armies, and it is known as the 
Shanghai Incident. 41  Japan’s behaviour in Manchuria caused the SEPM owner to 
intervene with his staff and dictate the direction of the paper: “C.V. Starr… told his 
editor Thackrey: ‘up to now I’ve never tried to lay down specific policy for the Post, but 
on the Manchuria thing – I must. We are against it!”42 However, the SEPM was still open 
to a wide range of views and the people that contributed to its columns reflected the 
diversity of the newspaper.’ 
The Mukden incident was later used by the SEPM in 1939 as an example of the 
legitimacy of shifting from the newly emerged professional journalism to partisan 
journalism at times of national crisis: 
First, wartime journalism management should be united rather than 
permissive. The external aim of wartime journalism management and 
control is to strive for strengthening our country and crumbling 
enemies, and the internal aim is for avoiding leakage of military secrets, 
reinforcing people’s consciousness to fight and promoting the civil-
military cooperation nationwide. At the early stage of the war in 
Europe, the third bureau of German general staff established wartime 
journalism bureau, which has been the most powerful machinery 
during the war. Except for censoring newspapers nationwide, the 
bureau is also in charge of issuing German wartime news in their 
military occupied areas. Japan after the Mukden Incident immediately 
reinforced the journalism bureau of the Army Ministry. By re-
organising Rengo and Dentsu, Domei News Agency as the core of 
Japanese journalism management and control, was established. 
Journalism in the Far East has been generally monopolised by Japanese 
warlords. These are good examples to illustrate the importance of 
wartime journalism management and control. Even in the Britain and 
America where people highly believe in freedom during the wartime, 
such as war in Europe and American Civil War, journalism is strictly 
controlled by government.43 
 
                                                 
41 See Chang Yu-fa, Zhonghua Minguo Shigao [A History of the Republic of China], 2nd ed. (Taipei: Linking 
Publishing Company, Ltd., 2001), 250-58. 
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While the SEPM was against the Japanese actions, the paper was not pro-Communist 
despite Thackrey’s left leanings. The SEPM reporter Hsaio Fung-soh’s musings on the 
manipulative and dishonest Communists was picked up by the international press: 
A Chinese contributor to the Shanghai Evening Post, Hsaio Fung-soh, 
advises us that the most effective weapon of the Communists among 
the Chinese has been their exploitation of mass psychology and 
manipulation of popular, movements, notably those of the students, the 
labourers, and the peasants.  
It was through such movements that they surreptitiously manoeuvred 
their way to the commanding positions in various Kuomintang organs, 
and Mr. Hsaio proceeds: "The Student Movement was systematically 
organised until, it gradually spread all over the country and its stand 
regarding contemporary national affairs respected by both the public 
and the officials. "In the meantime class-room studies were abandoned 
and text books replaced by numerous. Communist pamphlets 
especially prepared for their consumption.  
“Obsessed with mistaken ideas of radicalism and incoherent theories 
of Bolshevised Marxianism (sic), a spirit of revolt drove them into acts 
of anarchy." The exploitation of the workers by the Communists, we 
read then, met with even greater success. For the first time in the 
history of the nation labour unions were organised for political 
purposes, strikes called to attain political demands; and it is further 
declared that: "To impress the workers with their own importance, the 
Communists, caused frequent 'labour congresses' of various unions to 
be called, during which political issues were made to appear 
inseparably bound up with various labour problems. "The 
indiscriminating workers soon came to assure an air of exaggerated 
self-importance without realising at the same time that the only result 
of their sacrifices had been beneficial only to the agitators themselves." 
But the exploitation of the peasants, this contributor to the Shanghai 
Evening Post avers, has been the most outstanding feature of 
Communist activity, among the masses. Following the example of the 
Bolsheviks, he claims, the Chinese Communist party 'advocated an 
agrarian revolution: "Peasant revolts are by no means uncommon; but 
an agrarian revolution , such as that advocated by the Chinese 
Communist party was not only unnecessary but also impossible, as has 
been proved more than once in Kwangtung and other places.  
The slogans employed by the Communists stressed the necessity of 
uprooting the evils which where the cause of the indescribably 
wretched conditions under which the peasants were living, and also the 
necessity of raising their living standards. Whether the plight of the 
Chinese' peasants is as terrible as the Communists would have us 
believe is a matter for investigation, though it is interesting to note in 
this connection that foreign travellers to the interior have declared that 
the average Chinese farmer lives more comfortably than, and certainly 
does not appear so destitute as peasants in certain parts of Europe to-
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day.44 
During this period, the Chinese Communists were experiencing some success. On 7 
November, 1931, the Chinese Communist Party announced the establishment of the 
Chinese Soviet Republic in Ruijin, a remote area in Jiangxi Province, in opposition to 
the Nationalist Government although this regime was not widely recognised. The media 
played a key role in the Communist de facto controlled areas. On the same day of the 
establishment of the regime, the Red China News Agency, Red China newspaper, 
Chinese Soviet Radio with the call sign of CSR all began operation as official news 
institutes.45 These institutes were not only the vehicles of propaganda but were in the 
front line of putting across the Party’s policies to its local sections. In the early of the 
year, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a guideline of 
journalism, emphasising that the editorials published on the Parties’ organ papers must 
be the significant policies for local sections to discuss and implement.46  
Control over the press differed between communist and nationalist controlled areas. The 
Communist areas had tight control over censorship of publications, however the 
newspapers and journals in the Nationalist Party controlled regions were not consistently 
managed but rather erratic in the censorship methods. In the foreign concession ports, 
the situation was particularly difficult.47 
The SEPM had a longstanding targeted view against the Japanese invasion. Randall 
Gould, when he was dealing with the Mukden Incident and the Shanghai Incident in 
1932, took pride in their brave stance and said that “… in our paper we dealt with Japan 
and her policies realistically and without pulling punches. No other Shanghai newspaper 
hit the Japanese so hard”.48 However, Gould claimed that the anti-Japanese position 
taken by the SEPM at that time did not stem from nationalism but rather a professional 
commitment to reporting. As Gould recalled, “We never hit below the belt” and “… if 
we felt the Japanese were wrong we threw the dictionary at them. But if they were right 
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about anything we gave them due credit.”49  
In fact, the American main editors of the SEPM, such as Thackrey and Gould had 
opinions that contradicted Woodhead in that they believed Japan was being aggressive 
in China. Some Americans held the same view as the newspaper, but with the British in 
Shanghai outnumbering the five thousand Americans by more than double, the opposing 
view was stronger. Thackrey firstly proposed the contentious idea of writing an article 
to strongly criticise the Japanese aggressive action and Gould immediately agreed with 
it despite the danger that publishing such an article posed for the SEPM. At this critical 
time, Starr gave the most important support. He approved for Gould and Thackrey to 
publish whatever they thought, and gave them the freedom to ignore what people might 
think. Thus, an editorial which condemned the Japanese as a negative power was 
published on the front page of the SEPM.50 The article describes the intensity of rage in 
Shanghai as follows: 
Japanese military forces and gunmen have not only lost their 
usefulness as a part of Shanghai’s defence scheme; they have forfeited 
their right to remain on International Settlement soil.Today we are no 
more concerned with the technicalities of the Japanese position than 
the Japanese have thus far been concerned with the rights, property, 
and lives of the rest of us.  
The plain fact is that Japan is waging war against China – and is most 
improperly using the International Settlement’s neutral soil as a base 
for such war. Not only has she jeopardised the whole future status of 
the Settlement by such activity but she also has taken over police power 
from Settlement authorities in a way which we consider undesirable in 
the extreme, she has extended the power to an area never before 
contemplated by others at the outset, and she has misused that power 
in a variety of acts, including arson and murderous attacks upon 
helpless prisoners. Without delay International Settlement authorities 
should publicly disassociate themselves from these excesses.51   
 
The result of the article was a business loss but credit for the newspaper from the readers. 
Many advertising contracts with the SEPM were cancelled despite the increase in copies 
being sold.52 During the Shanghai incident the demand for the SEPM almost doubled.53 
Moreover, this article irritated the Foreign Settlement administration of Shanghai as it 
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revealed their lack ability to solve the Japanese aggressive action. As Gould recalled: 
By the time the Settlement authorities, the Foreign Defense Force 
officers, and the foreign consuls had read that far, they were apoplectic 
with rage – not rage at the Japanese, but at the Post and everybody 
connected with the Post.  
What we had done, they felt, was not so much to attack the Japanese 
as to throw squarely in their faces the shortcomings of the foreign 
administrators, who were mainly Britons and Americans.54  
At this time, all kinds of rumours about SEPM circulated. In Gould’s 
recollection, these rumours included:  
There was a move in the American Consulate General to shut down the 
Post permanently. Censorship was to be imposed […] for the first time 
on all local publications by authorities of the International Settlement 
and the French Concession […]. Legal action might be taken in the U. 
S. Court for China against the Messrs. Starr, Thackrey, and Gould on 
charges of disturbing the peace – this at a time when Japanese bombs 
were doing a pretty good job of that in their own way.55   
In the end, the foreign authorities did nothing. No legal action was taken by the U.S. 
Court in China. 
Thackrey wrote of the Shanghai Incident in vivid detail while, at the same time, never 
contradicting the official Japanese story. His searing words are even more effective as 
his tone is moderate and conciliatory with the Japanese forces present in Shanghai at the 
time. His story was titled “Japanese savagery in Shanghai – what happens daily in 
Shanghai. What an American editor saw and described” and was published across the 
world: 
GRUESOME SIGHTS MARK RACE TRACK CORPSES 
SWEETEN GROUND WHERE CHILDREN ONCE ROMPED 
AT PLAY 
I visited Kiangwan, Race Course today. I shall never be able to return, 
without a shudder. My previous visits, to see the, crowds of happy 
Shanghailanders on a Race Day outing1, betting on their favorite 
horses; gentlemen jockeys coursing under a brilliant sun. This morning 
is just such a day overhead; but underneath, nothing but horror. The 
entrances to my favorite stand are blocked, with corpses, fresh corpses, 
newly made before my eyes. Perhaps, as the official military 
communiques; from Japanese headquarters say, these corpses once had 
been snipers, or even perhaps spies. I make no challenge, I just detail 
what I see.  
                                                 
54 Gould, China in the Sun, 311. 
55 Gould, China in the Sun, 312. 
88 
 
There are women, and children among them; women shot through the 
back, their padded coats run through with military sabres; children 
whose bodies are riddled with bullets; men, garbed as peasant farmers 
heaped grotesquely about, their wounds soaking the ground. They are 
not garbed as soldiers – not even the women and the children – so I 
suppose they must have been snipers––officially. I suppose so because 
my very dear friends at headquarter and the Japanese legation assure 
me –are at pains to point out to me – that the Japanese army and navy 
are not making war on civilians, nor upon Chinese peasants –or upon 
the Chinese government, nor upon Government troops – but merely 
the 19th Route Army from Canton. 
So I suppose that these people who seemed so innocent to the casual 
eye must have been machine gunners) and riflemen from the 19th 
Route Army, disguised as simple peasants. It is difficult to ask them 
now. The houses are burned; I saw them burned, with neat precision, 
not a wasted match, nor an extra piece of kindling. And they? Their 
corpses sweeten the ground beneath the judges stand; one whose body 
was soaked in oil and now lies charred beneath the officials' tower will 
till no crops, again; they lie in little heaps along the grass before this 
stands, where, on that Race Day recently, the children played and 
chased elusive butterflies. 
And as I walk the top rail, scuffling through the glass which crashed 
from rifle butt attack upon the office tier, a tragedy of Peace –for 
remember this is not a war – unfolds beneath my eyes. An Infantry 
company, just preparing for its duty in the hand to hand fighting on 
ahead in Kiangwanchen, pauses to watch the drama with me; I above 
and they be low. The flames from burning farmhuts throw a curtain of 
red behind, new captive groups of those who fled the fire. An officer 
turns one of the peasant garbed group away, to face the sun. His shining 
sabre flashes, up to its hilt in the human sheath; the body falls, a second 
takes its place, and once again the sabre finds its pulsing scabbard.  
And now, a diversion; the next, a tall and likely lad, is flung unbound 
face down, upon the two who clutch the panting earth in death; and as 
he falls, a volley from six officers' revolver makes a minor outline 'On 
his back and courses up his spine. The volley dies, the pistols now are 
empty, the jerking figure on the ground now still and another takes his 
turn. I leave, for fear is on me now; the sunshine gone, my feet are lead. 
The company of infantry in tasting death by proxy; and it is ready for 
the front.56 
 
However, not all the SEPM reporters were anti-Japanese. The British columnist, 
Woodhead, was seen as a pro-Japanese journalist. When the outbreak of fighting 
between Chinese and Japanese troops in Shanghai occurred – the Shanghai Incident – 
his pro-Japanese opinion incurred condemnation from nationalists of China. The SEPM 
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provided him with a platform to express his opinions, but the articles from the 
correspondence columns of the paper criticised him. As Woodhead recalled: 
I had not been long in the port when I became the target for many 
Chinese contributors to English-language periodicals, as well as for 
scathing attacks in the correspondence columns of the Evening Post. At 
one period – during the Sino-Japanese conflicts in Shanghai – hardly a 
day passed that I did not receive anonymous threats of assassination. 
And this was due, not to the fact that I condoned Japan’s actions – 
many of which I denounced –but because I declined to subscribe to the 
view that Japan’s intervention had been unprovoked, and made no 
secret of my belief that it would not cease until the Chinese military 
forces had been withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Shanghai.57 
 
Woodhead, however, was not uncritically pro-Japanese: he altered his views based on 
the outcry or his editor’s and owner’s leanings. In 1933, he reported with an open mind 
and detached judgment that official Japanese statements about Manchuria (or 
Manchukuo) were inaccurate. This analysis was provided in a subdued and bland tone: 
According to an official Japanese statement, the new Government of 
Manchukuo, "achieved a marked and healthy progress, and the 
restoration of law and order" within a year of its inauguration.  
H. G. W. Woodhead, editor of the China Year Book… published in a 
series of articles in the “SEPM”… While he apparently kept an open 
mind and detached judgment, the picture given by Mr. Woodhead by 
no means substantiates the Japanese statement. On the contrary, he 
adduces much evidence of disorder and lawlessness which seriously 
militate against' the country's stability and progress.58 
 
Woodhead’s views were more representative of the British attitude towards these 
events. The British understanding on the Japanese action was to see Japan’s actions as 
part of their effort to pursue the trend of international society with full scale of 
ideology of imperialism. Colonel Amery said in London that “I confess that I see no 
reason why, whether in act, or in word, or in sympathy, we should go individually or 
internationally against Japan in this matter […] Who is there among us to case the first 
stone and to say that Japan ought not to have acted with the object of creating peace 
and order in Manchuria and defending herself against the continuous aggression of a 
vigorous Chinese nationalism? Our policy in India, our whole policy in Egypt, stands 
condemned if we condemn Japan.”59 
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Reporting on the atrocities by the SEPM was questioned by some and seen as evidence 
of Chinese government funding. As Gould recollected, “Both Thackrey and I had gone 
out and seen atrocities and had reported on them, but most of the club-bar and bridge-
table devotees were not prepared to believe that such gentlemen as the Japanese Army, 
Navy, and Marines could ever forget their much-advertised code of bushido.” Gould 
went on to say that to those in Shanghai’s business community “the Post must no 
doubt be subsidised by the Chinese Government, else it would not say such things.”60 
 
In 1933, the SEPM, which had initially been limited to an English edition, added a 
Chinese edition– Ta Mei Wan Pao. The advertisement read: 
Please Read Ta Mei Wan Pao 
Fast news delivery: we publish the news collected by our contributing 
journalists and world influential news agents in both China and the 
world, and specialise in the financial and commercial news. 
Neutral position: our newspaper does not belong to any political party 
or group. We insist on this axiom, and do not give publicity to anyone. 
Abundant contents: besides news, we also deliver information about 
films, sports, women and other interesting and useful topics for our 
readers.61 
 
After the establishment of the Chinese edition of the SEPM, true censorship from local 
administration began to be imposed the newspaper as its self-evident influence to 
Chinese society. This is what foreign language was not able to reach. The establishment 
of the Chinese edition marked the importance of the SEPM as fundamentally different 
with other foreign newspapers in Chinese journalism history. As Gould recalled: 
Whereas ten thousand was a big circulation for an English-language 
paper in Shanghai, there ought (so we felt) to be almost no ceiling 
whatever on circulation for a Chinese- language paper. In literate Japan 
newspaper circulations ran up to three million or so, China was less 
literate but had more people. Moreover a lot of our big ramshackle 
four-story brick building was going to waste. Originally the ground 
floor had been a saloon, the second floor a dance hall, the third floor a 
gambling den, and the fourth floor was divided into tiny little rooms 
each just big enough to hold a bed. Ted (Theodore Thackrey) and I 
reasoned that the first floor was all right for business offices, and print 
shop, the second floor for Post editorial and other offices, and that even 
if we virtually wasted the top floor on prosaic and unremunerative 
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newspaper files, there was very little excuse for not using the 
remaining third floor in getting out a Chinese edition, using our name 
in Chinese – Ta Mei Wan Pao, or literally Great American Evening 
Paper. So the thing was done.62 
 
Organising and managing both English and Chinese newspaper was not easy work. 
Gould recalled a situation in Peking where a newspaper run by the late B. Lenox 
Simpson and divided by half English and half Chinese had developed an editorial with 
opposing policies. Thus, Gould tried to avoid this problem by employing Chinese 
translator-secretaries to make the Chinese edition of the SEPM staff translate the English 
edition of the paper into Chinese language. Another difficulty that Gould met was 
Chinese readers demanded a richer content than the English edition could offer as 
Chinese had been spoiled by numerous tabloids in Shanghai. Although Gould decided, 
in a certain degree, to meet the need of these Chinese readers, he still emphasised to the 
editors of the Chinese edition that the importance of the paper to present the American 
features. As Gould recalled: 
In the first place, it’s a tough job to run a newspaper in a language one 
reads very imperfectly, as was my (Gould) case. Years before in 
Peking I had watched the late B. Lenox Simpson operate a bilingual 
daily half English, half Chinese. One morning he woke up to the fact 
that the two sections were pursuing not only different but diametrically 
opposite editorial policies. In the case of Ta Mei I sought to escape this 
fate by various means, including the employment of successive 
Chinese translator-secretaries and efforts to make the Ta Mei staff 
translate the Post into Chinese. They argued that their Chinese readers 
had been corrupted by the influence of Shanghai’s “mosquito” press, 
so that their customers demanded an even spicier diet than the by no 
means flavorless Post provided. These “mosquito” papers were so 
called because they stung, fluttered about, and despite diligent police 
search couldn’t be tracked down as to offices of origin. Therefore Ta 
Mei had to provide scandal, gossip, and (despite our insistence that it 
was an American paper in Chinese) patriotic service to China 
whenever the editors thought they could get away with it.63 
 
Delivering news at first time was an advantage of the SEPM in the competition in 
Shanghai. Gould recollected it as following:  
As Shanghai is located almost precisely on the opposite side of the 
world from New York, our afternoon paper went to press at an hour 
when American and British people had gone to sleep and their day’s 
doings had been fully radioed out to the Far East. Until the Post rose 
to prominence in its field of four English-language papers, the other 
three papers – all morning publications – could hold this news for hours 
and then give it to their readers simultaneously. We argued, with 
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justice, that the Post was so favoured by the construction of the globe 
that virtually everything arriving by telegraph from America and 
Europe could be read in our paper the evening before our competitors 
printed it.64 
 
This advantage was maintained and continued, and it benefited the Chinese edition of 
the SEPM. Hu Daojing in his memoir mentioned that a distinct advantage of the SEPM 
in the press of Shanghai was its exclusive rights to use the dispatches of the International 
News Service.65 If there were any special news item, the Chinese edition of the SEPM 
was thus able to translate this material from English into Chinese.66 
Reporting news: conflict with the Nationalist government 
Conflict with the authorities continued to be a hallmark of the SEPM as a key practice of 
professional journalism was seen as holding powers to account for their action. It 
certainly came to a head when reporting on the activities of the group called the Blue 
Shirts. The SEPM, on 20 July 1933, published a document detailing the names of fifty-
five Chinese leaders to be assassinated. This document was handed to the newspaper by 
Harold Issacs who had a political bias which was pro-communist and he exposed the 
origin of the document as being from the Communist central press agency.67 
Wu Tieh-cheng condemned the SEPM on 20 July 1933 with the claim that it had 
fabricated the assassination plan. This was reported in the Central Daily News of 21 July 
1933, with Wu pointing out that this message was maliciously reprinted from the China 
Forum, which was regarded as an anti-Nationalist Government and pro-Communist 
agency. He claimed that the purpose was to alienate the relations between political and 
military leaders, and between central and local administrations. Wu claimed the article 
had exerted a dreadful effect to the society. Based on Wu’s comment, the Central Daily 
News further claimed that the Nationalist Government had ordered the Shanghai 
municipal government to warn the newspaper and force the paper to rectify the 
information as it had seriously discredited Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist 
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Government, and had provoked outrage from the Nationalist Government.68 
The Blue Shirts was an undercover political group of officers who were disillusioned 
and looking for a way to strengthen nationalism in support of Chiang Kai-shek. Many 
writers used this as evidence that Chiang had a tendency towards fascism as this group 
believed that could use whatever means, including assassination to achieve their aims.69 
It was a secret faction within the Nationalist Part run on Italian fascist lines and largely 
funded by the Party Book Shop, a publishing house for Nationalist party-political 
propaganda. On the same day when the SEPM published the news about the Blue Shirt’s 
assassination plan, a telegram was sent to Chiang Kai-shek, reporting that: 
[…] the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury as an English newspaper 
in Shanghai based on the information from anti-Nationalist 
Government Guangzhou News Agency and pro-Communist China 
Forum published your [Chiang Kai-shek’s] secret order to the Blue 
Shirts about assassinating 55 opposition leaders with great detail. The 
newspaper appeared to deliberately use propaganda tactics against the 
government, and the news would generate a negative impact on society. 
We must demand the mayor of Shanghai to issue a warning to the 
Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, and ask them to rectify its 
report.70 
 
Chiang Kai-shek responded with the instruction by asking the newspaper to rectify its 
story.71 There is a view that the assassination list was likely to be created by Zhou Enlai’s 
office with propaganda intentions.72 However, the telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, which 
has been cited above, shows that the authenticity is very likely to be confirmed through 
Chiang’s own order. To the Nationalist Government in pre-war period, it was not easy 
to control a newspaper which was located in Shanghai foreign concession area. As Jay 
Taylor said, compared with the Communist areas where there was a tight control over 
censorship of publications, the newspapers and journals in the Nationalist Party 
controlled regions were not consistently managed but rather erratic in the censorship 
methods. In the foreign concession ports, the situation was particularly difficult.73  
The difficulty for the Nationalist Government in dealing with the Blue Shirt 
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assassination report by the SEPM was reflected. The government, as it did not have 
jurisdiction over the Shanghai foreign concession area, was not able to directly 
participate in dealing with the event, but asked foreign administration for assistance. On 
the 21st of the month, Wu Tieh-cheng sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, indicating that 
he had arranged to formally protest to the newspaper and the American Consulate about 
the release of this damaging news and its impact on the Nationalist Government. At the 
end of July, the American Consulate finally replied to Wu Tieh-cheng that they had 
consulted with the SEPM, and proposed that they adopt a more prudent attitude when 
choosing news sources.74 On 29 September of the same year, the SEPM again provoked 
the Nationalist Government with its news report by publishing a story that Chiang Kai-
shek, Wang Ching-wei (one of Chiang’s key competitors within the Party) and Soong 
Tse-ven (at that time, the Minister of Finance) would propose to resign. On the following 
day, the Central Daily News promptly clarified that none of them were planning to resign, 
and condemned the SEPM as being libellous and violating the law.75  
These cases reflected the conflicts around news reporting between the Nationalist 
Government and the SEPM. However, the Nationalist Government in pre-war Shanghai 
did not have administrative bodies to enforce their policies inside the foreign settlements; 
as a result they were obliged to resort to a foreign institute such as the American 
Consulate when they had disputes with news providers. Their sphere of influence was 
outside the foreign settlement and therefore the SEPM was not adversely affected, despite 
its position taken. 
By 1934, an imbalance within the world of journalism was clearly developing. The basic 
situation of the Chinese press in 1934 was one of inertia with a continued over-reliance 
on colonies and foreign treaty ports and little development outside these areas. These 
circulation figures clearly show the areas in which newspaper circulation was limited as 
well as drawing attention to the importance of areas such as Hong Kong, Henan, 
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Shanghai and Guangdong. 76 
In the table, Hong Kong under the British administration and Kwantung Leased 
Territory under the Japanese administration reached 5393 and 4000 in the column of 
‘Readers per 10,000 People’ respectively, apparently higher than other areas in China. 
Shanghai and Tianjin belonged to the provinces of Jiangsu and Hebei respectively; 
therefore they have not been shown independently on the table. The fact that there were 
foreign concessions in these cities accounts for the visibly higher index of readers. 
Japanese aggression was growing in Shanghai. The former Editor, Carol Crow, noted 
numerous anecdotes about excessive Japanese militaristic responses to minor incidents, 
such as the persecution of a cabaret club owner whose patron’s pear accidently hit a 
member of the Japanese naval patrol77, the humiliation of a Persian boy and his parents 
when the boy thumbed his nose at the Japanese and a soap manufacturer who insulted 
the Japanese Emperor by including a picture of an umbrella on his packaging.78 
                                                 
76 The Kwantung Leased Territory, located in the southernmost part of the Liaodong Peninsula in the south of 
Manchuria, existed from 1898 to 1945. It mainly consisted of Dalian and Lüshun. This area should have been forced 
to cede to Japan in accordance with the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, but Japan soon after gave up this territorial 
claim under the strong pressure imposed on it by Russia, Germany and France. Subsequently, the Russian Navy 
entered the seaport of Lüshun in December 1897, renamed the place as Port Arthur, and thereafter formally acquired 
a 25-year tenancy over land under the Russia-Qing Convention, signed by the Qing Empire and the Russian Empire 
on 27 March 1898. Russia started its effective control over the land, and their troops were dispatched to quarter, but 
this situation was not maintained over the next decade. Japan, as the victor of the Russo-Japanese War, replaced 
Russia to take over and govern the area in accordance with the Treaty of Portsmouth signed on 5 September 1905. 
After the Revolution of 1911, the Beiyang Government under Yuan Shikai’s administration signed the Twenty-One 
Demands with Japan, in which Japanese tenancy of the Kwantung Leased Territory was lengthened to 99 years. 
Manchukuo was established in 1932, and it replaced the Republic of China to become the nominal owner of the 
Kwantung Leased Territory. The Manchukuo government maintained recognition of Japan’s lease of the land, and 
this arrangement continued until the end of the Second World War. For more details, see Kobayashi Hideo, Manshū" 
no Rekishi [A History of Manchuria] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2008), 21-34; Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, The Making of 
Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Centre, 2001), 187-98. 
Manchuria became the place where Russia and Japan competed to enlarge their respective influence and dominance 
following the First Sino-Japanese War. After the Revolution of 1911, Zhang Zuolin, a native Manchurian, gradually 
took control over Manchuria. In the later part of Zhang’s rule, Manchuria was highly independent from the Chinese 
central authority. Manchuria experienced relatively fast development during this period of rivalry amongst Zhang 
Zuolin, the Soviet Union, and Japan. In the 1920s the conflict for the dominance over Manchuria successively 
intensified, finally leading to the Huanggutun Incident in which Zhang Zuolin was assassinated. The Japanese 
Kwantung Army successfully plotted and executed the bombing of Zhang’s special train as it crossed a bridge close 
to Huanggutun railway station. The Huanggutun Incident dramatically changed the status quo of the relative power 
balance in Manchuria. Zhang Xueliang soon after inherited his father’s rule of Manchuria, and declared his acceptance 
of Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership. This decision finally incurred the aggressive response from Japan with the Mukden 
Incident and subsequent Japanese military occupation of Manchuria. A state of Manchuria, known as Manchukuo, 
was declared in 1932 and Aisin-Gioro Puyi, the last emperor of the Qing Empire, propped up as Emperor of 
Manchukuo. For more details, see Kobayashi, Manshū" no Rekishi, 56-72; Matsusaka, Making of Japanese Manchuria, 
258-62, 304-87. 
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Table 2: Situation of Newspapers’ Circulation and Readership in each Area of China in 
193479 
Areas and Provinces Circulation Population Readers per 10,000 People 
Anhui 23,532 19,832,665 11 
Zhejiang 103,242 22,043,300 46 
Kwantung Leased 
Territory (Dalian) 
120,050 300,000 4,000 
Fujian 50,395 13,157,791 45 
Henan 36,120 307,831,909 11 
Hong Kong 276,700 513,000 5,393 
Hebei incl. Tianjin 520,400 34,186,711 152 
Hunan 52,300 28,443,279 18 
Hubei 114,600 27,167,244 41 
Gansu 2,945 5,927,997 4 
Jiangxi 37,300 24,466,800 15 
Jiangsu incl. Shanghai 1,139,080 33,786,064 337 
Guangxi 14,100 12,258,335 11 
Guangdong 260,800 37,167,701 20 
Guizhou 3,400 11,114,951 3 
Macau 11,200 78,000 140 
Manchuria 118,100 20,000,000 95 
Shaanxi 122,500 11,030,827 20 
Shandong 27,700 30,803,245 39 
Shanxi 27,700 9,465,558 29 
Suiyuan 5,600 1,900,000 29 
Sichuan 97,700 40,982,810 19 
 
 
                                                 
79 The data is originally from a survey published on the column of ‘Jize Zuotan’ [Journalists Seminar] of Ta Mei Wan 
Pao (the Chinese edition of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury) on 7 December 1934. The table is drawn by 
referencing Chin Sei-Jeong’s reorganisation. See Ta Mei Wan Pao, 7 December 1934; Chin Sei-Jeong, “Print 
Capitalism, War, and the Remaking of the Mass Media in 1930s China,” Modern China 40, no. 4 (2014): 399. 
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C. V. Starr approved an editorial by Gould and Thackrey which condemned the Japanese 
as a negative power.80 The article describes the intensity of this rage as follows: 
Japanese military forces and gunmen have not only lost their 
usefulness as a part of Shanghai’s defence scheme; they have forfeited 
their right to remain on International Settlement soil. . 
TToday we are no more concerned with the technicalities of the 
Japanese position than the Japanese have thus far been concerned with 
the rights, property, and lives of the rest of us. 
The plain fact is that Japan is waging war against China – and is most 
improperly using the International Settlement’s neutral soil as a base 
for such war. 
Not only has she jeopardised the whole future status of the Settlement 
by such activity but she also has taken over police power from 
Settlement authorities in a way which we consider undesirable in the 
extreme, she has extended the power to an area never before 
contemplated by others at the outset, and she has misused that power 
in a variety of acts, including arson and murderous attacks upon 
helpless prisoners. 
Without delay International Settlement authorities should publicly 
disassociate themselves from these excesses.81   
 
This stimulated criticism towards the Foreign Settlement administration which was seen 
to be lacking the ability to solve the Japanese aggressive action. The American Consulate 
General also used threats and pressure to potentially close down the newspaper 
permanently but the foreign authorities in the end did nothing. The result was that many 
advertising contracts were cancelled even though a lot of newspapers were sold. 82 
During the Shanghai incident the demand for the SEPM almost doubled.83 It was in this 
newspaper environment – on 31 August 1934 – that the Journalist Seminar column 
commenced in the Chinese language version of the SEPM.84 It is through the work of the 
influential Journalist Seminar that the state of journalism in China at this time can be 
analysed. 
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Journalist Seminar: a milestone in Chinese journalism 
From 1934, the SEPM’s Chinese edition the Ta Mei Pao published a supplement called 
Journalist Seminar. As this complete table of translated article titles indicates, the 
supplement was focused on a number of issues such as news related to the journalism 
field, issues faced by journalists at various locations, foreign journalism and the press, 
technology and development, technical skills such as interviewing, theoretical issues 
such as free speech and the use of language.85  
It is important to note that the journalists who participated in the seminar held distinct 
and different opinions, but held in common ideals regarding journalistic professionalism 
and the important aim of gathering together Chinese journalism professionals. In 
accordance with Yuan Shu’s recollection, the political spectrum of the people who 
attended the seminar was diverse, containing left wing, centre, right wing, and some of 
them were objectivists. The main organisers and authors of the Journalist Seminar were 
Yun Yiqun, Yuan Shu, Lu Yi, and Liu Zucheng.86 
Yuan Shu specifically mentioned three members of the seminar: Lu Yi; Wu Bannong; 
and Hang Shijun. He said that Lu Yi at that time was just a simple democrat, Wu 
Bannong held middle course, and Hang Shijun had strong background of being in the 
Green Gang and the Nationalist Party.87 Although Yuan Shu had been a member of the 
Chinese Communist Party when he engaged in the Journalist Seminar, he clarified that 
this seminar did not have any connections with both the Chinese Communist Party and 
the pro-Communist League of the Left-Wing Writers. Yuan even misunderstood that he 
was the only member of the Chinese Communist Party in the groups of people of the 
Journalist Seminar.88 He obviously did not know that Yun Yiqun, another activist in the 
seminar, had joined the Party in 1926.89 
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Although some key figures were CCP members, this was not a problem for these 
members or the Party in terms of limiting discussions or affecting the goal of developing 
professional journalism. The party itself was established by intellectuals and from within 
intellectual circles. In the early period of the Party’s history, party members were, in the 
main, intellectuals who relied on their occupations, such as writers, editors, lawyers, 
journalists and university professors for a living. They were not paid by the Party for 
their participation in revolution, and they were motivated to work for the cause by doing 
their profession well - their professional income was crucial to their political activities 
and aims. 90  So, although later, in movements such as the Yan’an Rectification 
Movement, Communist Party membership required an orthodox manner of thinking and 
using writing, the party members at this time had relative intellectual freedom, which 
meant that their journalism was independent of, and separate from, Party influence.91 
In actuality, the journalist seminar did not initially publish their seminar contents in the 
SEPM. The original publication is not noted and member Yuan Shu could not recall the 
name of the original paper in his memoirs. However, it is the SEPM that comes to be 
most associated with the seminar. After publishing several issues, conflict developed 
between the seminar contributors and the newspaper editors, causing Wu Bannong, who 
was working for the SEPM, successfully persuading the paper to establish a supplement 
for them: the Journalist Seminar.92 It is important to note that the influence of the 
Journalist Seminar column still exists as it was the foundation of the Chinese Youth 
Journalists Association, which grew into the current Chinese official journalist 
organisation: All-China Journalists Association.93 At the time, the Journalist Seminar 
noted their purpose: 
We are trying our best to enrich the column to take part responsibility 
of improving journalistic endeavour. These are the materials that we 
need in accordance with our plan: prisoners. 
1. Discussion of journalism theories 
2. Information about Chinese and foreign scholars on journalism 
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studies 
3. Studies on practical techniques for the press  
4. Introduction and investigation on the local press 
5. Information about the journalistic cycle, and all theoretical and 
practical narratives based on the view of other subjects about 
journalism studies and management.94 
 
In 1935, the Journalist Seminar changed to being published each Thursday. As can be 
seen from the following table, the contents of the Journalist Seminar in this period 
became more and more concerned with political events specifically, with Japan and with 
some mention of Italy. The state of the press and newspapers in Soviet Russia and 
Germany were also discussed. The moral and personal dilemmas facing journalists and 
the discussion of character reveal the concerns that journalists were facing during this 
increasingly tense period. At the same time, issues of pay and conditions as well as the 
state of journalism overall are continuing. As can be seen from the table, the death of 
the influential Missouri School of Journalism founder, Walter Williams, was well noted 
in the Seminar. It is also interesting to see that the very form of the Journalist Seminar 
– the supplement – was also under consideration. Towards the end of the year, Japanese 
press censorship and control come to dominate. The journalists are clearly affected and 
many come to see journalism as a way of saving the nation. 
In this year – 1935 – Cheng She-Wo, who had delivered the lecture that the Journalist 
Seminar article “Three developmental routes for newspapers” was based on, established 
the newspaper, Lih Pao, in Shanghai. Cheng She-Wo formed the paper after touring 
American institutions. The paper relied on simply written human interest stories, 
reaching a circulation of 200,000.95 There was strong interchange between newspapers 
at the time and Journalist Seminar contributor Yun Yiqun later went to work for the 
newspaper, Lih-Pao. 1935 was also the year of the important Zunyi Conference. At this 
conference, the leadership of Mao Zedong in the Chinese Communist Party was 
confirmed and the CCP marked their movement from Russian style central military 
practices towards a system to “develop and organise the struggles of the broad masses.”96 
This would be very significant for the future of Chinese journalism, specifically limiting 
options for professionalisation. Although journalists at the time were suffering from the 
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conflict with the Nationalist party, which was seeking to enforce partisan journalism, to 
a large extent they were protected by Shanghai’s extraterritoriality. However, travelling 
outside showed that the protection offered by extraterritoriality was only limited to the 
international or foreign settlements. For example, renowned media magnate and 
journalist, Shi Liangcai, along with his wife, son, niece, and the son's schoolmate, were 
attacked on Chiang Kai-shek’s instruction when holidaying outside Shanghai in Haining 
town, Zhejiang Province. Shi Liangcai, his chauffer, and his son’s school mate died. 
Chinese journalism’s professionalism was also being limited by actions of the 
Nationalist Party, through compromising actions by Chiang Kai-shek's secret police – 
the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics. Headed by Dai Li, who also headed the secret 
Blue Shirts, Bureau agents sometimes posed as journalists, which reduced the 
professionalism and reputation of the occupation, overall: 
Lacking police authority and cover, Dai Li’s men frequently chose to 
pose as journalists, since this gave them a plausible reason for asking 
questions and taking photographs, Zhang Renyou, for example, 
pretended to be in charge of the Shanghai office of Wenzhou ribao. 
Many agents actually held bone fide jobs as reporters an even 
published journals and magazines.97 
Around the same time as the Zunyi conference, tensions between the Nationalist armies 
and the Japanese worsened, with the East Chahar Incident and the North Chahar Incident. 
A series of agreements led to Japan gaining greater control of Chahar and Rehe. By the 
close of the year, the December Ninth Movement broke out in Peiping. Thousands of 
students from universities of Peiping took to the streets, appealing the government to 
promote democratic development, stop the civil war and prepare for a self-defence war 
against Japan. 
Journalists acknowledged the dangers but still strove for professionalism. On the first 
year anniversary of the Journalist Seminar column, Yun Yiqun argued for the 
professionalism ideal. As he said:  
We deeply feel that journalists hold a very responsible position within 
the current environment. However, some journalism staff today have 
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almost forgotten their responsibilities and we realise this is a very 
dangerous situation, which concerns both the healthy development of 
the Chinese journalism endeavour and the fate of the whole Chinese 
nation. We had confidence that the Chinese press would use their 
initiative and drive, but it seems like lots of staff do not take the 
disturbing facts seriously. Therefore, we should not rely on others, but 
rather take the responsibility ourselves.98  
 
By 1936, Yan'an in Shaanxi province had changed hands from Nationalist Party control 
to Chinese Communist Party control (in large part because of the close positive 
relationships the communists had built with local people. The arrival of the last 
Communist troops in Shanbei marked the end of the Long March. It was this year that 
American journalist Edgar Snow also arrived in Shanbei, the Red Base of Chinese 
Communist Party, to conduct interviews for the Daily Herald. The inclusion of Snow 
was part of the Chinese Communist Party’s strategy to engage and involve the Western 
media with their struggles. 
The Journalist Seminar ceased after 88 issues with the last issue being released on 7 
May 1936.99 In the memoirs of active members, which were published in the 1980s, it is 
claimed that the Nationalist Party put strong pressure on the SEPM to close the 
supplement. However, it is likely the reasons were far more complex and multi-factorial, 
such as the difficulties of collecting enough articles each week and the departure of many 
journalists to other cities. As the list of articles from 1936 shows, censorship and 
discussions of the role of journalism dominated these last months of the supplement.100 
The SEPM personalised the growing conflict between the Japanese and Chinese in 1936 
with a letter that addressed the hurt a young Japanese child had experienced when bullied 
by a Chinese boy. The case involved a boy in a Japanese school being “slightly thrown” 
by a Chinese boy, leading the school to demand Chinese and Japanese police action. It 
showed an attempt to de-escalate tensions between Chinese and Japanese citizens by 
humanising the protagonists and putting the issue into the correct proportion. The article, 
concentrating the broad and powerful issues down to the interaction between the two 
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children, “provoked more comment than any of the scores of weighty pronouncements 
which have been published”.101  
Dear Kasuo Kose: 
We are deeply regretful over your rough handling. Painful 
recollections convince us that it is no fun to be even slightly thrown by 
other boys' of any nationality!  
In mentioning this matter, we speak from an expert point of view, for 
the Americans in the office of the Shanghai Evening Post were mostly 
raised in small but highly international small towns of the United States. 
Without exception, we each and all of us can testify, to having been 
thrown, at about your age and for some years thereafter, both slightly 
and with enthusiastic vigour, by boys from under many flags. These 
boys were coloured white, black, yellow, brown, red and all the other 
skin-hues known to the human race, and our general impression is that 
it hurts about as much to be thrown by a fellow-American as by a 
Chinese, providing both throw with the same vim and vitality. On the 
other hand, if an American or, say, a Japanese, throws harder than a 
Chinese, the first hurts worst. 
Without having had the pleasure of your personal acquaintance, Kasuo, 
we have a notion that you didn't ask to be put into the newspapers. We 
rather imagine that, if it were left up to you, you'd prefer to fight your 
own battles. We doubt very much if you want to play eyen a minor part 
in provoking an International incident. 
In short, it's our idea, that perhaps you might, if left to yourself, find 
ways and means, of your own to square accounts with that Chinese boy 
if he really did you dirt. You are up against a pretty common boy 
problem, and we are willing to believe you are competent to handle it 
in due course if let alone and given elbow room. 
Without meaning to judge your elders too harshly, Kasuo, we suspect 
that in this affair your supply of common sense is better than theirs, 
We suggest that the school authorities, the Pootoo road Police Station, 
the Japanese Consular Police, the Japanese Consulate General and the 
Japanese Embassy all fall back and see if you are not perfectly 
competent to look out for yourself even at the tender age of four 
years.102 
By the beginning of 1937, Japan had control of the Chinese provinces of Heilongjiang, 
Jilin, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, Chahar, Suiyuan, Hebei, Shanxi, and Shandong, either 
through military invasion or through collaboration with Japan-friendly governments. 
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The Japanese colony of Manchukuo gave Japan a firm foothold in China’s north east but 
China’s central power, and site of the Nationalist Government was Nanjing. Defeating 
Shanghai would be a huge step toward defeating Nanjing. This also was the year that 
the SEPM’s radio channel began to broadcast under the name ‘Ta Mei Radio Station’. 
The Battle of Shanghai broke out in a similar way to the Marco Polo Bridge incident of 
July, 1937, with Japan capitalising on historic unequal treaties. Under the Shanghai 
Ceasefire Agreement of 1932, China was prohibited from having any army presence 
within Shanghai. The same agreement gave Japan the right to base troops in Shanghai. 
In the lead up to the battle, the Japanese used the features of the Shanghai Ceasefire 
Agreement to full effect.  
By mid-1937, the Japanese had multiple military garrisons within the city and its many 
factories and warehouses were militarily reinforced. The Japanese navy also patrolled 
Shanghai’s rivers. In August, Japan dramatically increased troop numbers in Shanghai, 
precipitated by the shooting of a Japanese Lieutenant, which led the Nationalist 
Government to break the terms of the Shanghai Ceasefire Agreement and bring Chinese 
Army troops into Shanghai. Small scale, small arms gun fire quickly escalated to 
outright battle. The start of full-scale war between China and Japan can be recognised 
as the peak time of the newspaper and the boom period. As Gould himself recollected 
that following the Japanese attack on Shanghai his newspaper stepped into the ‘golden 
opportunity’. On 14 August 1937, the Japanese air force started to bomb Shanghai and 
many causalities followed as did chaos in the city. Whilst other papers shut down in the 
attack, the SEPM immediately increased printing and the press machines worked 
without stopping.103 Chinese resistance and success despite significant technological 
disadvantage surprised the Japanese military, which had expected a quick and easy 
victory. However, after nearly three months of fierce battle, the Chinese army withdrew 
from metropolitan Shanghai on 26 October 1937 and Shanghai was occupied by the 
Japanese.  
The SEPM was established in a time that saw the Nationalist Government under threat 
from every direction. In violent conflict and competition with the Chinese Communist 
Party, it resorted to internal state-controlled terror to control and destroy its internal 
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enemies. While it was weak, due to internal competition and ideological hatred of the 
Communists, it failed to quell the invasion by the Japanese, by military power or 
diplomatic might. Its policy of prioritising internal pacification over external resistance 
proved to be disastrous. This period for the SEPM ended in August 1937. 
Shanghai as an ‘isolated Island’, 1938 
The Battle of Shanghai began in August, 1937 and was formally won by the Japanese 
military on 12 November. A couple of weeks later the Nationalist Government 
announced Chongqing as the wartime capital of China. Prime Minister Konoye 
Fumimaro was unwillingly to escalate the war in China but finally yielded to pressure 
from hawks in both his government and military. Requests for additional troops were 
approved and the ever-growing Japanese military presence further antagonised the 
Chinese pushing the conflict towards full-scale war.104 The Nationalist Party recognised 
the importance of the role of international propaganda. After seven months integration, 
the Publicity Department of the Nationalist Party established a special section to take 
charge of international propaganda under the leadership of Hollington Tong.105 Tong 
recalled it in his memoirs: 
On November 15, 1937, I received the welcome word that the Supreme 
National Defense Council had abolished the Fifth Board, alone [sic] 
with other sweeping Government reorganizations... the functions of the 
Fifth Board were to be transferred to the Ministry of Information, 
which would be a Kuomintang organ. The Ministry would contain an 
international department with authority over overseas publicity. As 
Vice-Minister, I was to head this department. I retained this authority 
until the end of war. Ministers of Information came and went but I 
remained in my International Department.106 
Tong explained the focus of propaganda efforts: 
Of course, our big propaganda target during these pre-Pearl Harbor 
years was the U.S..... During 1937 to 1941, I was fully occupied with 
this tremendous propaganda task... While we were extending our 
                                                 
104 Fujiwara Akira, Nitchū zenmen sensō [A Comprehensive War between China and Japan] (Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 
1982), 69-72. 
105 Wu Yanjun, “Kangzhan Shiqi De Guoji Xuanchuanchu [The International Propaganda Section during the War of 
Resistance against Japan],” Minguo Dang’an 1990, no. 2: 118. 
106 Hollington Kong Tong and Walter C. Mih, Chiang Kai-shek's Teacher and Ambassador: An Inside View of the 
Republic of China from 1911-1958, General Stillwell and American Policy Change Towards Free China 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Author House, 2005), 89, cited in Yanagisawa Hideo, “'International friend': Ernest 
Hemingway in the classified documents of China's Kuomintang,” Hemingway Review 29, no. 2 (Spring 2010), 133. 
133-47. 
106 
 
propaganda reach throughout the English speaking world, the 
representatives of major magazines and newspapers were beginning to 
come to Chungking to report China's side of the war.107 
The main activities of the International Department of the Ministry of Information were 
described in a document, "The Summary Reports of the Propaganda Operations": 
Highly regarded by cosmopolitans concerned about the Far East, the 
articles on China written by foreign reporters staying in China and 
published in foreign countries shall be probed. If anything is found to 
be inappropriate, it shall be eliminated or suspended, and the reporter 
should be persuaded to admit his fault. Propaganda from the 
department, when dispatched by foreign reporters, is expected to be 
most effective, which can be realized only when we establish our 
credibility in utilizing them. The maneuver is troublesome and difficult, 
but shall never be slighted.108 
From the outbreak of the war the fate of the SEPM began to fundamentally change for 
the worse. The Battle of Shanghai commenced on 13 August 1937 and on the following 
day there were two accidental air bombings within a kilometre of the SEPM offices, 
which struck the Cathay Hotel and then a large group of Chinese refugees congregating 
at an intersection. The war stimulated a new demand for news which increased the 
circulation of the SEPM. As Gould recalled,  
‘The Post rolled special editions off its rickety flat-bed press as fast as 
they could be thrown together. Tai Mei Wan Pao ran up a big 
circulation with the advantage of a rotary press. Soon we all started a 
morning edition called simply the Ta Mei Pao. This latter paper, hastily 
staffed with men picked up from other papers which shut up shop as 
the Japanese began increasingly to dominate Shanghai life, was where 
my real headaches began.’109 
Starr’s Declaration and Reporting of the Nanjing Massacre 
After the retreat of Chinese troops in November, Japan began to put pressure on the 
foreign concession administrations of Shanghai, asking them to ban anti-Japanese 
activities in the foreign concessions. Okamoto Suemasa as the Japanese Consul-General 
to Shanghai firstly wrote to Cornell Sidney Franklin, the Chairman of the Shanghai 
Municipal Council, proposing that the Shanghai concession administrations should take 
measures to ban the distributing of anti-Japanese leaflets and fly sheets. Harada 
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Kumakichi, Japanese Defence Attaché to China, in the meeting on 20 November with 
senior officials, including the Secretary-General of the Council Stirling Fessenden, 
warned that Japanese troops reserve the right to take any further action if necessary when 
the foreign concession administrations were not able to effectively restrain the anti-
Japanese activities and the press propaganda. Although the concession administrations 
claimed to keep neutral, they orally promised to actively co-operate with Japan under 
the realistic pressure.110 Soon after, newspapers in Shanghai were convened by the 
Shanghai Municipal Council to attend a conference, in which they noticed that 
censorship would still not apply to the English newspapers, but the work of Chinese 
newspapers’ publication must be cautious. The concession administrations particularly 
emphasised that as Japan had controlled the areas around the concessions they must be 
taken seriously. Any publication stimulating local Chinese resistance ambitions would 
irritate Japanese, and it may cause them to come into the concessions, and take over the 
newspapers.111 
The Concession administration under Japanese pressure and influence chose to 
compromise and therefore in November 1937, a conference was held where the 
Shanghai Municipal Council made it clear that they supported both the French 
Concession and the Settlement. It was revealed that the Japanese, who held the power 
and occupied the space around the settlement, were prepared to take over the job 
themselves if the Settlement and Concession officials could not control the Chinese 
papers. After carefully checking the regulation of the Shanghai Municipal Council, 
Gould and Samuel Chang, a main editor of Ta Mei Wan Pao, they decided to adhere to 
these new regulations.112 This was the beginning of the Chinese edition of the SEPM’s 
obvious censoring of news and reporting as well as a divergence in content from that 
being printed in its English language edition.  
Although the newspaper compromised with the settlement administrations they still 
maintained a professional journalism ethic and this brought trouble to the paper. The 
newspaper later published Chiang Kai-shek’s speech un-redacted in the morning edition, 
and it led to the conflicts with the concession administrations. A week later they printed 
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a milder speech by Chiang on the economic problems leading to a two-week ban of the 
Ta Mei Pao by the foreign authorities.113 This prompted the SEPM’s management to 
declare that they would continue to print regardless of the ban. French police responded 
with the statement that no papers would be circulated, but the English language version 
did not come under these same restrictions.114 
Up to the end of November, the Japanese further stood up to the anti-Japanese 
newspapers in the Shanghai foreign concessions. On 28 November, twelve newspapers 
in Shanghai were notified that the Japanese military would begin to exercise censorship 
from 3 pm that day. They were warned that they would suffer consequences if they 
ignored the regulation. Japan on 13 December stated to all newspapers in Shanghai that 
from the evening of the next day, articles must pass censorship before they were 
published.115  Under this aggressive pressure, Starr issued an important protestation 
which was published in both the Chinese and English editions of the SEPM on 16 
December. It was published again on 15 July 1940 when Wang Ching-wei’s authority 
announced it would expel fifteen Americans, including Starr, Gould and a British 
journalist. In Gould’s memoir, he mentioned that after hearing of the black list: 
Neil Starr and I immediately published a front-page jointly signed 
statement of policy. We commented on the “order of deportation” as 
having no pretence of legality or any chance of legal execution. We 
reprinted part of an earlier statement we had issued during December 
1937 in which we had said that our papers strove to follow the best 
American newspaper tradition of “free speech, of fearless and hard-
hitting editorials, realistic and non-partisan, and of straight news 
presentation, devoid of editorial bias.” We stressed that “they submit 
to censorship from nobody.” We said that “our policy has been at all 
times sympathetic to the only recognized Government of China” and 
that though we sought to be reasonable and not blindly defiant, 
“outrage and illegality are not weapons that can change us.” 116 
This statement is regarded as the beginning of the Movement of Foreign Flag 
Newspapers in Shanghai. However, when the SEPM took a harder line in public, the 
paper, to a certain degree, had to compromise under pressure from the Japanese and 
Shanghai concession administrations. At the same time as Starr’s demonstration was 
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issued, Japanese troops occupied Nanjing and the subsequent massacre ensued over the 
following weeks. The English edition of the SEPM immediately reported this event in 
detail.117 Obeying the instructions given by the Shanghai concession administrations, 
the Chinese edition absolutely ignored this event.  
Hollington Tong’s deputy was Tseng Hsü-pei, who had long term experience in press 
work in Shanghai.118 Hollington Tong’s background as a Missouri-trained journalist 
coherently and smoothly merged with Chiang Kai-shek’s political ambitions in the 
wartime period, to create an obvious focus on the English-language press, especially 
newspapers in the Shanghai foreign settlements. 119  This emphasis reflected the 
Nationalist Government’s reliance on propaganda, linked to the psychological needs 
under a wartime environment and, through this and the competing development of 
journalistic models in the Communist Party, the professionalisation course of Chinese 
journalism was transforming. Hollington Tong believed that winning over the support 
of foreign newspapers in Shanghai settlements was vitally important as they had 
international influence, which then affected the public opinion of the readership’s home 
country. When they started their work in Shanghai, they found that the Japanese had 
bought over and taken control of the majority of papers with the exception of the 
Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury and the China Weekly Review (edited by John 
Powell).120 Thus, these two newspapers became the preferred publications.  
On December 5 1937, the Dadao (‘Taoist’) Government, formally the Great Way 
Municipal Government of Shanghai, was inaugurated, as the administration of Shanghai 
moved from invasion phase to occupation.121 This government was formed before the 
Japanese troops had taking Nanjing and before the provisional government was formed 
in Beijing. This precipitous action was the outcome of competition for control of China 
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being fought out between the Japanese military divisions, the Central China Area Army 
based in Beijing and the Central China Area Army based in Shanghai.122 The Central 
China Area Army was trying to bolster its power by forming a government. The regime 
used the yin and yang symbol as its flag and attempted to create a veneer of being 
thoroughly Chinese, with the inauguration ceremony acted out as “a piece of theatre”.123 
It was run predominantly by Chinese collaborators from outside Shanghai but had very 
little under its control, with the international settlement, French Concessions and 
military zones being out of its control, and areas such the Central District and Zhabei 
being depopulated and bombed out.124 Even the outlying counties it claimed, such as 
Baoshan and Chongming, were not in its control initially and some never entered its 
control.125 Su Xiwen took the mayor’s position: 
 
It is unknown who first coined the term “isolated island.” At the time 
it was universally popular… “isolated island” generally referred to the 
Shanghai settlements, but it did not include all the settlements, nor did 
it include the Huxi sector of the extrasettlement roads. Its area extended 
from the Huangpu River in the east to Fahua Road and Daxi Road in 
the west, and from Suzhou River in the north to Zhaojia Creek in the 
south. Although Hongkou district north of Suzhou River was part of 
the Shanghai International Settlement, it was an area of concentration 
for military offices of the Japanese Army and overseas Japanese 
residents, commonly known as the Japanese Concession, so it was not 
part of the “isolated island.”126 
 
The SEPM continued to publish its English language evening and morning versions Ta 
Mei Wan Pao (morning edition) despite the invasion and occupation. It can be 
demonstrated that the SEPM performed the role of leader in the fight with the Japanese 
invaders and the regime in the Isolated Island period. For example, the SEPM’s 
numerous reports on Hungzhou’s capture and the appalling behaviour of Japanese troops 
were reprinted across the globe. As an example, the Canberra Times in Australia printed 
the article ‘Japanese Excesses, Shanghai, Friday’ on Saturday the 8th of January 1938: 
The "Evening Post" publishes letters from foreigners resident at 
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Hangchow stating that Japanese troops after their arrival were given 
three days’ holiday. 
They looted wine shops resulting in a terrible orgy in which civilians 
were killed and women raped.127 
 
The SEPM was even-handed in its criticisms though, also reporting on the folly of the 
Nationalist Government in leaving European and Chinese doctors and nurses 
unutilised.128  The SEPM journalist, H. G. W. Woodhead, continued to support the 
Japanese regime. In January, 1938 the foreign press printed an article ‘Britain's Policy 
in China. Japanese Statement. Possibility of Conflict that recounted Woodhead’s 
interview of a senior Japanese Commander who argued for Britain to co-operate with 
Japan: 
I am afraid that ‘if Britain goes beyond the policy of simply defending 
her interests in China and makes a determined stand to maintain her 
political and economic relations with the Kuomintang, a very serious 
Anglo-Japanese conflict may arise,’ declared General Matsui, the 
Japanese military commander, when interviewed by Mr. Henry 
Woodhead, formerly editor of the Shanghai Evening Post, for 
publication in 'Oriental Affairs.’ General Matsui added: 'There is no 
doubt about Britain's Far East policy. Her support of the Kuomintang 
is emphasised by the steadiness of Chinese exchange since the 
outbreak of hostilities and the large amount of arms and ammunition 
supplied to China. Japan's, actions may have offended Britain, but 
Britain cannot take action behind Japan's back in China, which is 
Japan's lifeline and is essential for our expansion, especially after 
Japan's own growth and development. Nevertheless. I must not be 
represented as seeking trouble with Britain, with which we desire to 
co-operation.  
'The restoration of war-stricken areas in the neighbourhood of 
Shanghai,' he said, 'will necessitate a Chinese regime with ample 
resources, which must be drawn from the Customs, whence the sums 
allowed for foreign loan services must be much lower than hitherto. 
Meanwhile negotiations on that subject are taking too much time and I 
may have to revert to the original plan of taking over the Customs to 
enable the arrangement foreshadowed above to be made.' 
 
Woodhead later recalled that he suffered much insult and abuse because of his refusal to 
accept that China was blameless: 
I suppose no foreign journalist has been subjected to so much abuse in 
the Chinese nationalist organs as I have. There have been occasions 
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when abuse has given way to threats. During the Sino-Japanese 
conflict in Shanghai in 1932, when I refused to adopt the view that 
China had been blameless in the matter of provoking Japanese 
retaliation, both in Manchuria and Shanghai, there were weeks when 
hardly a day elapsed without my receiving anonymous threatening 
communications. I was threatened with death in numerous forms.129 
 
Those settlement papers that had to submit to censorship found that it was not always 
possible to predict what would cause offence or concern to the Japanese-managed 
regime. The regime did not necessarily wish to hide all their acts, and did not apply the 
same interpretation of events as that by non-Japanese journalists and readers. A telling 
example is that of South City Self-Governing Committee head, Chen Yun, who was 
assassinated to create fear amongst the collaborators. When checking the morning 
papers, Censor Wu Hongkai reported that he did not have to censor anything. The regime 
did not view reportage on the details of Chen Yun’s assassination as subversive, as 
creating fear among collaborators or as giving succour to the rebels. Rather, advertising 
Chen Yun’s death was seen as adding legitimacy and credibility to the regime, by 
proving that people loved the regime so much they were prepared to die for it.130 
Annual Anniversary of the Macro Polo Bridge Incident 
In the week preceding the Marco Polo Bridge Incident the Shanghai Municipal Police 
contacted and visited the main Chinese newspapers in Shanghai, including tabloids, 
requesting that they not publish articles regarding the second anniversary of the event 
between 6 and 12 July, 1939. According to the Shanghai Municipal Police files, the 
SEPM was visited by police between 1 and 3 July and the General Editor Gould, after 
receiving the request, is recorded as having “promised to co-operate with the Municipal 
Police to the best of his ability.”131 Under police pressure Gould promised to cooperate 
with the foreign authorities of Shanghai, but his statement suggests that he was leaving 
himself some room to manoeuvre. The other newspapers in the same report all agreed 
to obey the orders of the Municipal Police.  
After visiting the SEPM, the Director of Police Services, Commandant L. Fabre, sent a 
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letter to Gould on 4 July reminding him of his promise to refrain from publishing articles 
that might disturb the public order. Commissioner of Police, Major K. M. Bourne, 
reported to Fabre the following day that all Chinese language newspapers, including 
those that were foreign-owned, had given assurances of compliance with the order. 
However, the police themselves gave little credence to promises by those newspapers. 
A handwritten note by a Special Branch Officer scrawled on Municipal Police files 
indicates this lack of faith. It reads: “The assurance sounds good but I place no reliance 
on it. The papers will be watched by the Sp. Branch.”132 In fact, the request of the 
Shanghai Municipal Police did not subtle tangible effect on the Shanghai Evening Post 
and Mercury. On 7 July, Ta Mei Wan Pao on its first page in accordance with source of 
the Associated Press published Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s toughly worded 
speech, saying China was established based on a strong ground and all national enemies 
must have the fate of failure finally.133 On the second page, the paper used the Telegraph 
Agency of the Soviet Union’ article of ‘two years war against Japan invasion’, 
emphasising Japanese plan of quickly ending the fighting in the battlefield of China had 
been failed, and China by its advantages would finally achieve the victory.134   
Partisan newspapers 
With their moves westward, both the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party 
intensified and consolidated their own partisan media system. Meanwhile, in Shanghai, 
by relying on extraterritoriality and the anti-Japanese nationalism over the one year time 
frame of the Isolated Island, the Shanghai-based media utilised their Western ownership 
as a signboard to successfully avoid censorship and strengthened public opinion against 
Japanese invasion and the Chinese collaborated government.  
The year of 1938 opened dramatically with worsening tension between the Nationalist 
party and the Communist party, with Communist Party’s Xinhua Daily newspaper being 
attacked in Chongqing on the evening of 17 January 1938. The newspaper’s history to a 
certain degree reflects the spotty Nationalist-Communist relations. As the war against 
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Japan went on, conflicts between the two parties intensified ceaselessly, interference 
against the Xinhua Daily through public censorship or secret sabotage became 
increasingly frequent. The day before, the Japanese Premier Konoe announced the 
cessation of negotiations with the Nationalists over settling the war.135  
Gould and his journalistic colleagues were caught in a dilemma: although they struggled 
against the authorities during the war, they also needed to compromise and negotiate in 
order to ensure the survival of the newspaper. This was the case for wartime reporting.  
There is some evidence that the compromise made by Gould may have even breached 
his own code of ethics. In 1938, the Nationalist Party’s Bureau of Investigation and 
Statistics intercepted a secret Japanese telegram dated 10 April from Shanghai to Tokyo. 
This telegram, which is currently held in Taiwan’s archives and has not been previously 
translated into English, suggest evidence that the SEPM was not politically neutral and 
may potentially have broken the Missouri Journalist Creed by engaging in cheque-book 
journalism. The telegram reads as follows: 
It is said that the editor in chief of the Shanghai Evening Post and 
Mercury recently received a certain amount of allowance from Chiang 
Kai-shek and Soong May-ling. At the end of last month, the newspaper 
received money of 50,000 yuan provided by Soong Tse-ven as the fund 
for propaganda against the Reformed Government (of the Republic of 
China).136 Early this month, the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury 
published a significant number of news articles and many comments 
against Japan with venomous tone.137 
It is worth noting that the telegram provides no actual evidence and, in fact, seems to be 
repeating a rumour. The most acceptable interpretation of this telegram is that the 
Japanese forces in Shanghai were being asked to account for the hostility being 
displayed by the SEPM during this period. The explanation of bribery was more 
acceptable than the alternative explanation: politics and the reporting of straight news.  
In this same year, the Chinese edition of the SEPM also added a literary supplement, 
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‘Night Light’. Yet the overall threatening atmosphere continued to develop. From as 
early as February, the SEPM staff L. Z. Yuan and Samuel Chang started to receive 
threatening letters and parcels containing decaying human hands and other body parts, 
threatening newspapers to cease their anti-Japanese activities.138  
In March and April 1938, Ta Mei Wan Pao published a serialized translation of a 
Japanese novella, Ikiteiru heitai (Soldiers Alive), by Ishikawa Tatsuzo. This novella: 
… dealt with the behavior of Japanese soldiers in China. The novella 
was published in Japan in the March 1938 issue of Chuo koron 
(Central review) but was suppressed by the Japanese police because of 
its explicit coverage of Japanese atrocities in China.139 
This novella illustrates that Japanese war aggression was not supported by all in Japan, 
and that writers in Japan were also facing censorship problems.  
Meanwhile Gould was making statements to support war morale, for example, in the 
story ‘American Journalist Confident of Chinese Defence’: 
HONGKONG, March 18.—Complete confidence in the future of the 
Chinese campaign for defence against the Japanese is expressed by M. 
Randall Gould, director of the "Shanghai Evening Post," organ of 
American interest in China, and correspondent of the Boston 
"Christian Science Monitor," who has just returned from a visit to 
Hankow. 
"The Chinese have now the upper hand in operations," he declared. 
"Chinese troops movements are extremely rapid and their guerilla 
tactics working extremely well."140 
During the period, the SEPM also produced a radio segment called “A letter from the 
Editor of the Shanghai Evening Post”, which was a regular radio episode by Randall 
Gould that played on international radio stations.141 Unfortunately, little is known about 
the contents of these episodes.  
While there were critical and analytical stories on Japanese atrocities and morale-
                                                 
138 Chu Chen, ‘Calamity of the newspapers’, Journalist Weekly, 18 December, 1938 
139 See Karen L. Thornber, “Early Twentieth-Century Intra-East Asian Literary Contract Nebulae: Censored Japanese 
Literature in Chinese and Korean,” Journal of Asian Studies 68, no. 3 (August 2009): 763–64; Karen L. Thornber, 
Empire of Texts in Motion: Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese Transculturations of Japanese Literature (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 190–207 cited in Parks M. Coble, China's War Reporters (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,2015), 213. 
140 Around the World, The Workers' Weekly, 15 April 1938. 
141 Programmes On the Air Tonight, The Mercury, 19 May 1939. 
116 
 
boosting stories of Chinese success, the number of stories outlining the Japanese 
activities in China were surprisingly few and were buried within the paper, even very 
extreme situations such as the Rape of Nanking: 
The Damei wanbao, which was published in the unoccupied foreign 
settlement in Shanghai, for instance, carried a two- part article on April 
3 and 5, 1938, entitled “Rijun zhanzhu hou zhi Nanjing” [Nanjing after 
being occupied by the Japanese military]. This was a translation of an 
account that had originally appeared in the English- language China 
Weekly Review on March 19, 1938, as an unsigned article entitled 
“Nanking—What Really Happened—and the Japanese ‘Paradise.’ ” It 
began by quoting a Japanese account describing an idyllic situation in 
Nanking, reading in part, “One sees a playground for Nanking children, 
with soldiers and Chinese children happy together, playing joyfully on 
the slides.” The article then gives the real story, which was an orgy of 
looting, mass executions, and rapes when the Japanese entered the city. 
“The Japanese combed the former Chinese capital looking for money, 
loot and women.” Women from sixteen to sixty were victims, and 
protests of foreigners to Japanese diplomatic authorities were of no 
avail. With fifty thousand Japanese forces in the city, the report stated, 
only seventeen military police had been deployed to control the 
anarchy. The report concluded that more than ten thousand people had 
been killed and eight thousand to twenty thousand women raped. Few 
Chinese would have read the English-language original, so by 
including a translation, the Damei Wanbao brought this information to 
a much wider audience. Yet the two articles were relatively short and 
both placed on the lower section of page 3 of the paper.142 
It is possible that placing these shorter articles deep within the paper was a strategy to 
avoid the attention of censors and allow the journalists a greater degree of safety in an 
incredibly volatile environment. 
On May 3 1938, Su Xiwen recognised the Reform Government of the Republic of China 
in Nanjing, and accepted its flag in Shanghai. Liang Hongzhi became leader and the 
Dadao Municipal Government of Shanghai ended. This same year, Nationalist figure 
Wang Ching-wei (who was noted in the SEPM’s 29 September 1933 edition), 
disappeared from Chongqing into Vietnam. By the end of 1938, the Chungkuang 
Mansion in Shanghai was hastily prepared for a conference. This conference was 
between the Japanese Imperial Army and Wang Ching-wei’s representative to discuss 
peace between the Nationalists and Japan. The plan vacillated and evolved from peace 
movement or ‘third force’ to a collaborationist regime and Wang Ching-wei morphed 
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from negotiator to leader.143 
It must be remembered that Wang defected from Chungking in 
December 1938 but the ‘Reorganized National Government of China 
was not formed until March 1940, and even then the government of 
Japan delayed full recognition for another half year. During the entire 
period there was continuing series of secret contracts between high 
level Japanese and Kuomintang negotiators.”144 
 
The official conference report of November 1938 recognised Wang Ching-wei as the 
individual who would become leader at the opportune time, and he was recognised as 
the regime’s leader well before becoming official recognition in 1940.145 
In June 1938, intense patriotism which occurred in each newspaper was detected by 
foreign observers when they felt the Nationalist Party flags waved in all anniversaries 
and sensational editorials to advocate people against invaders and collaborators. 
Although these activities were organised by the Nationalist Party behind the curtain, the 
existence of overwhelming nationalism in Shanghai had been an indisputable fact.146 In 
February of the same year, Zhu Xinggong joined the Chinese edition of the SEPM.147 
He straightaway started to manage and edit the supplement of Night Light.148 In the 
Shanghai Isolated Island, the positions of the majority of people, especially amongst 
intellectuals, were complex and ambiguous. Open resistance only applied to the minority 
of people, and most of them were frightened by their actions.149 Zhu Xinggong belonged 
to the very small minority of people who persisted in the clear-cut resistance position. 
In Jin Xiongbai’s memory, Zhu was described as “a madman”. 
Because of Zhu’s presence, the Night Light was significantly changed from a literature 
supplement to a channel for Chinese nationalism. Just as Jin Xiongbai said, anti-
Japanese invasion and Wang Ching-wei’s collaboration was the target to lead off 
nationalism in Night Light. In the column, many articles directly condemned Japanese 
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invasion and exposed Wang Ching-wei’s collaboration activities. In the article ‘Japanese 
Dream’, the author directly mentioned the content of the Tanaka Memorial for revealing 
Japanese ambition to annex China. As the author wrote: 
Eight years ago, Tanaka Giichi wrote down that “in order to conquer 
the world, we need to conquer China first; in order to conquer China, 
we need to conquer Manchuria and Mongolia first” in his memorial. 
This is not just a temporal crazy action.150 
 
Confronting the ambitions of Japan, the author listed examples of empires failed 
attempts to conquer others, such as the cases of Persia, Rome, Mongolia and Napoleon’s 
France.  Scoffing at Japan the author suggests that the pursuing of the Japanese dream 
“that there is one day that Japanese will become the language of the world” would make 
them commit a double blunder of history. However, Japanese ambitions had already 
been brought to bear on the Chinese people at that moment. The author’s tone advocated 
Chinese people hit back at the Japanese with violence: 
I initially did not believe such things can happen, but I have witnessed 
it up to now. Not only myself, but also my nation, and my country are 
suffering such things. 
The only way which can awaken them is to pick up sticks and hit the 
heads of these dreamers.151 
 
Stories and common fables were often used as tools to maintain Chinese national identity 
and to illustrate the nature of the collaborative regime. Furthermore, they also served as 
a moral warning against betraying China by collaboration with the occupying forces. 
The ‘Story of a Fly’ is an example of such a fable used in this way (see translation in 
appendices). The fly, believing that safety lies with his own kind, ignores a warning 
from a bee and goes to the place where it sees all of its own kind gathered. Alas, it soon 
discovers that it too is now stuck to fly-paper and suffers their same fate. Reflecting the 
actions of many Chinese who went along with the collaboration regime believing its 
rhetoric and promises of protection, the author warns the reader through the character of 
the bee that “it is not 100% safe to follow others, and safety may not exist in the world 
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at all.”152 
Another method of attacking Japan and Wang Ching-wei was to cite Chinese historical 
stories to motivate and inspire Chinese national spirit and integrity. ‘Su Wu to Shepherd’ 
is a famous Chinese historical story, in which Su Wu was shaped as the symbol of loyalty 
to the motherland. When the story was published during the war against Japan, it had an 
obvious purpose of utilising the past to allude to the present. In the article ‘The Spirit of 
Su Wu’, the author particularly narrated the story in a way that the character Wei Lü 
parallels Wang Ching-wei and his collaborative regime, and hints at ways Chinese 
people might deal with it. As the author wrote: 
When Su Wu was detained in Xiongnu, Wei Lü volunteered to attempt 
to persuade him to surrender. Let us have a look at what Wei Lu said. 
“Mr. Su, I, Wei Lü, betrayed to the emperor of Han, and surrendered 
to Xiongnu. Thanks for the grace by Chanyu (chief of the Xiongnu in 
ancient China) that I was granted a peerage. Now, I possess more than 
ten thousand slaves, and countless horses and other livestock all over 
the mountain. Such high position and great wealth that I have would 
be rendered to you tomorrow if you surrendered today. Otherwise, who 
will remember you after you died and your body will become fertilizer 
for the grass?” 
Su Wu kept silence after these honeyed words. Wei Lü kept saying that 
“if you adopt my suggestion to surrender, I would like to become a 
sworn brother of you. However, if you refuse me today, do you think 
you can be lucky to have another opportunity to meet me when you 
want in the future?” 
Besides promises, Wei Lü threatened Su Wu by force, but whether he 
finally achieved his aim? Not only did Su Wu scold him, but even 
broke up the friendship with him since then. 
The spirit of Su Wu is an just awakening spirit!153 
 
Besides Chinese stories, there are foreign models in Night Light to encourage Chinese 
patriotic enthusiasm to resist Japan and strive for national independence. At the 
beginning of the article, the author introduced the geographic position of Poland which 
was surrounded with three main European powers: Russia, Austria and Prussia. It 
unavoidably led to the fate of Poland which was conquered and governed by foreigners 
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for a long time until 1918 when Poland acquired independence. This historical 
experience caused the Poles to exile overseas. The author emphasised that although five 
million Poles were living overseas, they still maintained their language and national 
identity, and never forgot their motherland. As the author said: 
The Poles as Slavs have a total population of 25,000,000, and there are 
5,000,000 living in separate places in the world. In America, when 
Poles meet with each other, they still speak Polish, and their children 
all accept education in Polish. Every Pole is able to sing the national 
anthem ‘Mazurek Dąbrowskiego’ (Poland Is Not Yet Lost). Since the 
new Poland was established, many Poles have returned to Poland.154 
However, the author did not purely emphasise the nationalism of Poland, but also highly 
praised the spirit of striving for democracy and freedom of the Poles. As the author 
mentioned: 
The white eagle on the Polish national flag is the symbol of freedom 
that the Poles enjoy. The Poles irrevocably seek the sacred freedom, 
and carefully protect it. All people who struggle for freedom are always 
considered countrymen and brothers in the Poles’ minds. The Poles 
participated in every war for freedom in the last century. Wars 
stimulated growing nationalist sentiment and helped many oppressed 
nations acquire their dream of becoming independent. The Poles in the 
tumultuous tide restored their glorious motherland, established a free 
and independent new Poland, and wrote a glorious historical page that 
people admire.155 
 
The tactic of stimulating people’s connection to their native place was also used to 
arouse people’s national sentiment in Night Light. The author of the article ‘Stories of 
Chilli’ was from Hunan Province. He was proud of the tough temperament of the Hunan 
people, and he owed it to eating chilli. Hence, the author introduced and praised chilli. 
I am curious as to whether chilli can hearten people up, and make them 
become tough and gutsy. The fact shows that people from Hunan and 
Sichuan are the toughest and most unafraid in China. There are some 
old sayings, such as ‘tough temperament of People in Chu area’ and 
‘the Qin Empire must be destroyed by the people of Chu even if there 
were only three Chu households left’. These expressions reflect the 
honour and glory of Hunan people. 
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However, at the end of the article, the author proposed a question: 
 
I am obviously not able to have chilli for every meal since I have been 
in Shanghai, so I yearn for chilli very much. When I write this article, 
saliva spurts to my lips. However, which day can I go back to my 
homeland to have chilli?156 
 
Based on the wartime background, it hinted that the Japanese invasion prevented people 
in Shanghai from returning to their hometown as usual, and to an extent, it inspired 
people’s emotions with regard to their hometowns.  
 
A common fable  
 
That year saw numerous assassinations of collaborators, such as regime’s foreign 
minister Chen Yu as well as Tang Shaoyi, who was assassinated on September 30 by 
the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, in fear he would become leader of the puppet 
regime of Nanking. 157  Chen Yu’s assassins were arrested and interrogated by the 
Shanghai Municipal Police for 16 weeks, revealing nothing. After six days being 
interrogated by the Japanese police, they revealed everything, including the existence in 
the International Concession of a secret wireless apparatus used to keep in contact with 
Kunming, Chongqing, Tianjin and Hong Kong.158  
 
Wang Ching-wei established his intelligence service in Shanghai known as No. 76 and 
as a result Shanghai was affected by a serious terrorist-like atmosphere. Nationalist 
executions of collaborators and Secret police executions of rebels abounded. Gould 
recollected that Wang Ching-wei’s gangsters set up headquarters at 76 Jessfield Road in 
the west of Shanghai. This heavily guarded place was a scene of horrific crimes such as 
ransoms, kidnapping, threats and even be-headings. According to Gould, families of the 
victims that could not afford the ransoms, received ears, fingers and other body parts 
through the mail. Although the Wang Ching-wei government was still not able to 
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directly control the newspaper within the foreign settlements, No.76 created obstacles 
to block the distribution channels and threaten or even assassinate journalists and editors 
to effectively establish control of the journalism. 
The SEPM became a vital concern in shaping attitudes and therefore the newspaper 
became the target within this setting.159 On 18 April 1939, Zhou Guodong, the general 
vendor of the SEPM was assassinated.160 In April, No. 76 also attempted to purchase all 
issued papers of the SEPM and they stamped out-dated copies and mixed them with 
current editions to sell in the low light of the evening with the aim of destroying the 
credit of the newspaper. 161  Wang Ching-wei’s attempts to stifle the news made 
international headlines: 
MISHAPS TO MAILS "DON'T GO THROUGH." 
Japanese administration of the China posts is breeding a flock of 
"incidents" involving foreign use of the mails, and protests have been 
flying thick and fast in the direction of the responsible Japanese 
authorities who plead provocation without touching on the central 
point as to whether they actually have the right to exercise such power.  
Newspapers have been among the major victims thus far, but a 
considerable variety of mishaps (if they may be called that) has 
overtaken mail matter of various sorts.  
One of the earliest victims of the censors was the American-owned 
Shanghai "Evening Post and Mercury." No notification was ever given 
to the management, and its payments in advance for mailing continued 
to be accepted, but complaints from outport subscribers speedily 
revealed the fact of a sporadic and largely unsystematic holding-up of 
individual issues, this later developing to a point where only one or two 
issues a month seemed to get out. Formal protest was lodged by the 
American Consulate-General, but neither this nor official 
conversations elicited much.  
Similar trouble began to be experienced by the American China 
"Weekly Review" and the British North-China "Daily News," and in 
no case could any satisfaction be obtained. Finally the censors turned 
their hands to incoming publications, and it was learned that a number 
of American periodicals from the United States had been detained, 
while others suffered scissorings of objectionable matter. Such a storm 
was raised over this that the practice quietly halted, at least temporarily.  
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Meanwhile the only uniformly critical (of Japan) paper in North China, 
the “Peking and Tientsin Times” of Tientsin, British-owned, began to 
have issues burned by 'the post office officials, and eventually – after 
the British Embassy had lodged a protest – there was an announcement 
that .it would henceforth be delivered through the mails to no one but 
the Embassy! This caused a further protest and a. storm of fresh, 
objections throughout the press.162 
 
It can be seen that the regime censored newspapers without addressing whether this was 
legitimate and newspapers responded with a range of strategies such as appeals to 
diplomatic power and appeals to the basis of commerce (that a service that had been paid 
for should be allowed). It can also be seen that strenuous protest was, in fact, successful. 
As well as disrupting the mail, attempts were made to physically destroy the newspaper 
with bombs and Chinese staff were even killed in the main street.163 The French had 
good physical protection against the attacks provided by small buildings in the street. 
One Chinese member of the French police force was shot dead however much potential 
damage from bombs was minimised by them being intercepted and disabled just in 
time.164 
The fall of Wuhan in October 1938 is a significant marker of the War of Resistance 
against Japan, which created a situation where both China and Japan were in a stalemate 
and felt powerless to immediately annihilate each other by military means. This led to a 
subtle change in Chinese social psychology. The outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge 
Incident triggered Chinese patriotic passion to mobilise for the cause of resisting 
Japanese invasion, and people nationwide eagerly responded to the call of saving the 
country.165 However, the bloodshed of Chinese armies on the battlefields during the 
early stage of the war did not stop the apparent Japanese aggressive attack in the view 
of many people, although the defiant aim of the Japanese for a three-month battle to 
conquer China had already failed. Almost ten months of fighting over Wuhan finally 
finished in October 1938 with Japanese military occupation to the city. After a huge 
sacrifice by both sides, the Nationalist Government had to head west again, and Japan 
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gave up massive pursuing and attacking, turning to tighten the stranglehold of the 
northern areas of Chinese occupation.166 The horrific war, which would undoubtedly 
continue over a long period of time presented complexity and uncertainty.  
Journalist Weekly 
Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury started the Journalist Weekly supplement to the 
SEPM’s Chinese edition in December 1938. Compared with the Journalist Seminar 
publishing era of 1934 to 1936, China had been facing some new predicaments. The 
Journalist Weekly would become a platform for Chinese journalistic staff to rationally 
rethink their duties and responsibilities in this special war-time period after experiencing 
indignation and harsh realities at the early stage of the war.  
 
Table 3: Complete list of Journalist Weekly articles – 1938167 
No. Date Title 
   
1 1938.12.12 Prologue 
    The past and today of journalism in Hong Kong 
    Internal news agencies in China 
    Journalism of inland China in developing 
2 1938.12.19 Sources of warfare news 
    Critic journalism and journalistic criticism 
    News about guerrilla warfare in Pudong 
    Calamity of newspapers 
    Information of the press in inland China 
3 1938.12.26 Fault of newspapers in Shanghai 
    About the conflagration in thatched shacks in West Shanghai 
    Interviewer and newspapers 
    Investigation of newspapers in Chongqing 
    Information of the press in inland China 
 
As can be seen from the list of articles in Journalist Weekly in 1938, journalistic concerns 
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included the state of journalism in the cities such as Chongqing as well as the hinterland 
and overseas in Hong Kong. Political news of the most dire sort was reported. At the 
same time, Journalist Weekly also interrogated the state of journalism itself. 
The original intention of the supplement forum from the prologue of the Journalist 
Weekly seemed to be only confined to enhance journalists’ cultivation and principles in 
the view of professionalism. The article started with two distinct social impressions 
towards journalists that they were positively regarded to transmit information and 
express demands for people, but negatively considered to be responsible for covering up 
and glamorising evil. The author did not explicitly state the reason for such a radical 
view towards journalists in the society. Instead he raised the renowned journalist Cheng 
Shewo’s previous censure on Shanghai journalists and interpreted the aim of opening 
the Journalist Weekly, saying: 
Cheng Shewo in the previous year was invited to deliver a journalism 
workshop, and his first words were in the view of newspapermen of 
Peiping and Tianjin, most of Shanghai journalists like starting rumours 
when nothing happens and fleecing based on a critical condition. I 
today must point out that this is a serious misunderstanding. Shanghai 
journalists in terms of professional ability and courage are much better 
than those Peiping and Tianjin journalists. This statement partly 
reflects the truth although it sounds slighting exaggerated. A cultural 
celebrity I met on the day before yesterday said it is true that the private 
life of those journalists who have their nightlife is definitely somewhat 
romantic. The criticism which asks to impose a strict discipline for 
journalists’ private life is too unnatural to accept. My friends are well 
satisfied when they hear such pleading for them, but it should not 
become the reason to have a lower serious and rigorous requirement. 
In this epoch, journalists hold a position of great responsibility, and 
raise people’s increasing awareness of their responsibility. It seems 
that people are willing to remain distant from journalists in their daily 
life, but hope journalists become a reliable compass inside. Therefore, 
journalists obtain a new lease of life. Vitalised journalists shoulder a 
heavy cross of workload, setting off on their long journey. They are 
not lonely, but will encounter great difficulties. They need to cooperate 
with comrades, thus to stepping into the path of safety. 
Journalists’ lives should not be deified. They must have some 
knowledge gaps and vices in their private life as they are just mortals. 
It may be difficult to overcome all problems and weakness, but they 
must make some progress if they try their best.168 
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It is therefore obvious to see that journalists’ cultivation and high principles in the 
author’s opinion are the critical elements to influence the journalists’ public image and 
social contributions. 
In this article, the criticisms made at a seminar two years prior by Cheng Shewo were 
labelled as untenable by the author who instead praised the Shanghai journalists over 
and above their colleagues of Peiping and Tianjin for their courage and professional 
skills. The author emphasised the importance of self-improvement of journalists as 
ordinary people with shortcomings and the cultivation and development of high 
principles, which had deteriorated during the wartime period. The aim of the Journalist 
Weekly, as the article shows, was to provide a platform where journalistic staff can 
communicate with each other for common progress.169  
However, within Journalist Weekly, the topic of tightening control over journalism 
became a focus. Administrations usually enhance their restriction over journalism as one 
of the measures to tighten political and military controls during the war for supreme 
national interests, and this was generally accepted in Journalist Weekly. The main 
motivation was native nationalism and patriotic enthusiasm. The article ‘Journalism and 
Freedom’ by the author pen-named Pangguan was typical in expressing the connection 
between freedom and interests of the nation-state in journalism. The author believed 
journalism should have sufficient freedoms, and further pointed out preventing these 
freedoms was just the deadly enemy of journalistic endeavours. However, this argument 
in the author’s opinion was based on the precondition that the national interests should 
be paramount to all the others. As the author wrote:  
This freedom should be wielded with the premise of non-prejudiced 
national interests. There is no doubt that the freedom must be restricted 
once it challenged the national interests. Unifying consensus and 
actions is crucial in the process of social mobilisation for completing 
the aim of struggling for national independence. Otherwise, we shall 
become zombies of liberalism forgetting our nation and country, as 
seen in the case of Liang Shih-chiu.170 
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That Liang Shih-chiu was considered as a negative case was closely and inseparably 
related to his elaboration of principle to adopt articles when he was in charge of a column 
to be published on the ‘Plane’, a supplement of the Central Daily News. On 1 December 
1938, Liang made such demonstration on the prologue of ‘Plane’: 
Resistance against Japan right now has been above everything, and as 
a result, many people are not able to avoid mentioning ‘resistance’ 
once they start writing. I slightly disagree with the phenomenon. We 
are definitely very happy to adopt the articles with the idea of 
resistance, but the articles that are not relevant to resistance are 
welcome as long as they reflect the truth and read smoothly. It is not 
necessary to lamely make a link with resistance. Nobody can benefit 
from the resistance ‘Eight-legged essays’.171 
 
This statement from Liang Shin-chiu instigated a deluge of criticism by intellectual men 
of the former League of Left-Wing Writers, such as Zhang Tianyi, Hu Feng and Yu 
Dafu. Under public pressure, Liang was finally forced to resign from the post of editor 
in chief of the supplement, which he only had for four months. In fact, most articles 
published in ‘Plane’ under Liang’s management were relevant to resistance against 
Japan, although there was still a certain gap compared with many other publications 
considering the enthusiasm and measure of anti-Japanese propaganda.172 
The structure of extraterritoriality and the location of the newspaper office contributed 
to the SEPM to become a target of the regime’s attention. Uchiyama Kanzo described 
such a situation that a thief followed by the Shanghai Municipal Police escaped along 
North Sichuan Road to a lane located in Chinese governed area. After making sure there 
was no Chinese police around, the thief sat down there, and the Municipal Police was 
not able to take any action because it would challenge Chinese sovereignty.173 The 
newspaper office of the SEPM was just located in the Avenue Edward VII, which was 
the border between the International Settlement and the French Concession. The 
newspaper building on the French Concession side, and Wang Ching-wei’s intelligence 
service could make the most of this factor to execute their terrorist activities. As Jin 
Xiongbai recalled: 
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As the No. 76 did not have any informers in the Shanghai Evening Post 
and Mercury, when they broke into the building of the newspaper, they 
felt they were lost and could not locate the editors’ office. They threw 
grenades and shot randomly at anyone inside. Staff of the paper were 
terrified and they escaped immediately. Then, the rebels burst into the 
typesetting room, upsetting letterpress types from the case shelf. Some 
workers who did not flee in time were killed. There was an armoured 
vehicle dispatched by the police of the French Concession parked 
outside to protect the newspaper office. … The rebels who were taking 
actions inside after hearing alarms blaring … raced out of the door 
under Pan Gongya’s order. There was a Vietnamese policeman in the 
armoured vehicle. … When he saw Pan Gongya guiding a group of 
rebels armed with guns rushing out of the building, he immediately 
fired at Pan. Pan’s leg was hit and wounded and he at once shot back, 
hitting the head of the Vietnamese policeman, he died instantly in the 
armoured vehicle. … Pan Gongya with his wounded leg tried his best 
to run across the Avenue Edward VII into the International 
Settlement.174 However, his ability had fallen short of his wishes. 
After throwing his gun into the International Settlement, another side 
of the avenue, Pan was finally arrested by the police of the French 
Concession. Another of Pan’s fellow whose surname was Shi was 
arrested at the same time.  
…  
As Shi’s gun had been thrown in the French Concession, (the police of 
the French Concession) did not have effective evidence to accuse him. 
Shi claimed himself as a victim, saying that he just passed by the scene 
and was wounded by shrapnel. He also had a pass certificate of 
Japanese military police in Shanghai. The police of the French 
Concession could not do anything, but noticed Japanese military police 
coming out to release him. A pass certificate of Japanese military 
police was ferreted out from Shi. … The Police of the French 
Concession did not dare to displease Japanese, and asked Japanese 
military police to bail him out soon after as well.175  
 
1938 clearly saw an environment of terror for Shanghai’s journalists, with Chu Chen 
noting in his Journalist Weekly article ‘Calamity of Newspapers’ on 19 December 1938: 
Following the retreat of Chinese troops from Shanghai as the war 
developed, the city became an isolated island and with this change the 
press in Shanghai fell into darkness. Many newspapers that had been 
publishing for a long time were suspended. Under strong pressure 
created by the occupation forces, many intellectuals and journalists 
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accepted new tasks and successively moved into hinterland China. 
There is however a minority of journalists who have decided to remain 
in Shanghai and these have begun a long march in a lonely and 
dangerous environment. This is the so-called ‘period of calamity of 
newspapers’. Those journalists who have stood fast and remained in 
Shanghai are subject to all manner of bloody terrors and coercion. Such 
coercion spans from soft promises to threats and intimidation, 
bombings, poisoned fruit, and even the delivery to journalists of 
severed human body parts such as arms and heads. In the face of such 
menace and seduction, the beliefs of some have been shaken and these 
collaborate with the enemy, engaging in shameful works in betrayal of 
their homeland. However, the majority of these combatants of 
journalism still remain true to their own positions. They use up the last 
of their strength in the fight to give hope to people in the Isolated Island. 
It has been more than one year since the outbreak of the full-scale war 
against Japan, several new newspapers have been established in 
Shanghai, and some newspapers that possess a long history have been 
re-established. It appears on the surface that it is a boom for the press 
of Shanghai, but if we analyse the situation more carefully, we can see 
that the boom is abnormal. That is to say that the press of Shanghai 
operates in a ‘difficult’ period and the degree of the difficulty is 
growing.   
It is obvious that the press in Shanghai along with the whole city will 
continue its descent into darkness until the balance of the war is 
fundamentally reversed. To consolidate our front, we should enlarge 
our scale, enrich our contents and unify our position, so that our 
fighting capacity can be intensified.176 
Chu Chen identified three aspects of Isolated Island journalists’ weakness: lack of unity, 
irrationality in the division of focus and coordination within newspapers and waste of 
resources, and finally, and understandably, the tense atmosphere of the war. 
Conclusion 
The importance of the turbulence in politics during this early period of the SEPM cannot 
be understated. The SEPM was established as a specifically American voice in an 
overwhelmingly British Shanghai. The paper accommodated the views of the British by 
allowing Woodhead’s column (albeit with corrected American spellings). In this early 
stage of the SEPM’s existence, the challenge of how to report the Japanese actions in 
first in Manchuria and soon after in Shanghai, posed real difficulties for the SEPM’s 
editors and owner. Taking a strongly American view, the paper became a voice against 
the actions taken by the Japanese military, especially the atrocities committed against 
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civilians. This was especially important as censorship started to be imposed and then 
was accelerated during this period. As can be seen in this chapter, methods and 
effectiveness of control of the press differed in the Nationalist and Communist controlled 
areas. In both cases, however, control of the press was seen as important for achieving 
military and political aims. During this period, the SEPM began its Chinese language 
radio station, thus avoiding some of the limitations placed on print media. One of the 
SEPM’s responses to the increasingly tightening situation was to foster debates around 
the notion of journalism itself. Through hosting the Chinese language supplement 
Journalist Seminar, the SEPM provided a space for discussion regarding the practices 
of journalism and provided a platform for discussion of increasing professionalism of 
journalism. This was very important, especially as the 1930s progressed. Politics came 
to feature more prominently in the Journalist Seminar and the function of journalism 
and its role in the affairs of the nation was a hot topic. With changes in the SEPM’s 
Chinese language publications (closure of the morning edition, commencement of the 
evening edition and the pictorial), the space for a more overt Chinese nationalism of 
resistance against Japan was created. The supplement Night Light highlighted the 
controversial views of its editor, Zhu Xinggong. 
After Shanghai became an ‘isolated island’ in the later part of the 1930s, challenges 
intensified for the SEPM. However the paper continued to foster the professionalisation 
of journalism and provide a space for discussing the role of journalism through the 
Chinese language supplement, Journalist Weekly. Underpinning the ability of the SEPM 
to publish its potentially inflammatory articles and reporting of news unpalatable to all 
sides (Japanese, Communist and Nationalist) was its positioning, as an American owned 
newspaper in the French Concession. Protection provided by extraterritoriality was 
essential for the operating of the paper in both its English and Chinese versions. There 
were very real dangers for those associated with newspapers of going beyond the 
protected space as the murder of Shi Liangcai in 1934 demonstrated. By this later period, 
extraterritoriality was consistently undermined with the assassination of newspaper 
workers even in protected zones. 
Overall, this period shows the striving towards a professional journalism which is 
diverted and altered from its natural course by the demands of an increasingly fraught, 
violent and dangerous situation. Journalism’s role in saving the nation from attack 
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became highlighted. As discussed in the next chapter, the murders of the Night Light 
editor Zhu Xinggong in 1939, and editor Samuel Chang in 1940, and assistant manager 
T. Y. Lee in 1941 were a huge blow for the SEPM and symbolised the dangerous and 
dire state that journalism found itself in during increasingly troubled political times.  
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Chapter 3: Reporting in the time of war 
The Chinese Youth Journalists Association is strongly concerned 
about the dire situation faced by journalists in Shanghai. The 
Association in the demonstration wishes for the journalists in Shanghai 
to sustain their faith, and keep their efforts to maintain internal justice 
and safeguard the cultural fort in the south of the Yangtze River. 
Nearly half of the total amount of newspapers in Shanghai have been 
suspended, as a result, there must be many journalists who have left 
their jobs. The Chinese Youth Journalists Association has established 
its branches in the main cities of China, and is willing to try the best to 
help the journalists who are not able to engage in journalism work 
arrange new jobs in other cities. The Association expresses the great 
indignation towards the terrorist attacks to journalists, and the respect 
and sympathy for the journalists involved into serious troubles as they 
stand their ground in front of temptation.  
                                                           Journalist Weekly, 10 July, 19391 
 
In 1939, journalists in Shanghai faced a terrible situation. The military conflicts between 
the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party during the War of Resistance against 
Japan intensified.2 Journalism was being dragged into the nationalistic approach in order 
to combat the Japanese forces. At the same time, Wang Ching-wei’s regime undertook 
a range of violent measures to intimidate and control reporting. The SEPM suffered 
badly during this period with five journalists assassinated. Despite the SEPM’s 
commitment to straight reporting of news and to ideals of professionalism, the demands 
of war began to affect the paper and its publications. The SEPM had to navigate between 
the pull of nationalism through social demands and the very survival of its staff. 
Censorship and Propaganda 
Journalist Weekly columns continued to raise issues around journalism practice and the 
tension of practicing professional journalism in times of warfare. An article printed on 
6 February 1939 reflects that the core values of professional journalism during the war 
began to be re-explained with politicised nationalism elements. An author with the 
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penname Yu wrote an article ‘Journalism education and the major of law politics 
journalism’ which proposed that some people chose journalist as their profession with 
the simple aim of winning promotion and getting rich.3 The author pointed out that 
although they may not become corrupt officials, their reason at least to be journalists 
were based on opportunism. Nevertheless, the author deemed that the case for 
revolutionary politicians to manage newspapers for their political ambition should be an 
exception. The author claimed that acceptance of the newspapers being published for 
political aims during the war against Japan reflects the blurring of the function of the 
press for public service in the minds of Chinese journalists. Yu has demonstrated that 
many students who were training at journalism schools in Shanghai would become 
professional journalists and thought under the national crisis, these people would play 
an important role in establishing cultural forts for Chinese resistance cause and using 
‘paper bullets’ to annihilate enemies. 
On 16 April 1939, the SEPM’s Ta Mei Pictorial closed. In the same month, former 
Nationalist power figure Wang Ching-wei, after acquiring Japanese commitment and 
support, slipped into Shanghai in April 1939, and took refuge in a Japanese hotel in 
Hongkou area under the Japanese protection. Wang Ching-wei collaborated with the 
Japanese to establish his government in the spring 1939 and then formed a strong 
intelligence service known as No. 76 in west Shanghai, violent terrorist activities against 
journalists ensued. Zhao Guodong, a general newspaper vendor of the SEPM, was 
assassinated. As the result of the clamour of national interests being paramount under 
the wartime atmosphere, the public opinion of tightening press control and the resulting 
governmental deeds under the support of this public opinion successively eroded the 
space for liberalism and professionalism. During the wartime period, more and more 
people were converted to the view that the press under government control could become 
an effective weapon to attack enemies, and to counteract enemy propaganda campaigns. 
As reflected in pages of the Journalist Weekly, censorship, propaganda and rumour were 
especially topical. 
In the article ‘Censorship and Propaganda’, the anonymous author listed methods, 
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importance and side effects of censorship and propaganda, which in the author’s views 
were two of the most powerful means to realise social control. The author’s low opinion 
of censorship and propaganda may clearly be seen from the definition of the two terms 
given in the beginning of the article. As the author said: 
Censorship is a passive containment of individuals’ freedom to express 
ideas and behaviours that clash with the present national system. 
Propaganda is passive creation of information for giving rise to a 
common opinion within the group.4 
 
The author then proposed that censorship should be essential in society for preventing 
harmful publications, such as salacious fiction to perturb good social order during peace 
time, but the use of this measure must be strictly restricted to prevent abuse by those 
people in power for the purpose of enhancement of their own authority. This was 
elaborately expounded through the example of adverse repercussions for children under 
strict discipline by their parents. In the author’s view, the degree to which the citizen’s 
free expression is restricted was a notable identifier for classifying liberal countries and 
dictatorships, and thus, the most perfect censorship was running in the Soviet Union, 
Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy: 
In peacetime, it is necessary for government to carry out censorship, in 
the hope that social order can be maintained and people’s benefit can 
be safeguarded. Drama and fiction content which is considered filthy 
will be forbidden regardless of its country of origin. However, 
governors usually utilise censorship to establish their personal 
authority and consolidate their power. As a result, censorship will be 
abused. Take parents’ attention to their children’s acts for instance, if 
parents discipline their children excessively, it may cause two possible 
situations. Children may become hyper timed, dull, subservient and 
feel themselves inferior; or in contrast, children may also tend to be 
rebellious, aggressive, stubborn, and get some other bad habits. In the 
same way, when a government excessively controls their people’s 
speech, they will receive a similar result. Just as an old saying of 
Confucius, ‘virtuous and law-abiding people should have considerable 
autonomy rather than much restriction, and foolish and savage people 
should be educated and punished for them to understand the fault they 
commit.’ Modern liberal countries are not willing to control people’s 
speech, and even if they want, they are not able to implement measures 
to do so. However, dictatorships, such as Soviet Russia, (Fascist) 
Germany and Italy, have utilised censorship perfectly. As a result, 
people do not dare to speak out their frustration and fury. Finally, when 
these widespread discontents accumulate to a certain level, they will 
overwhelmingly break out.5 
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Enhancing control over speech and expression during wartime, however, was 
commended as an essential means for the government to effectively mobilise social 
resources in fighting with enemies. In this special period, as the author expressed, the 
situation is that “when government has determined its diplomatic guiding principal, 
differences will weaken the force of resistance and be advantageous to enemies to 
blatantly propagandise themselves, and as a result, triumphalism will falter.” The author 
further deemed that only relying on censorship may not be sufficient for the government 
to implement its policies because social phobia was widespread during wartime, to such 
an extent that rumours can still be easily and quickly transmitted and scattered even 
when there is strict censorship. Due to this circumstance, propaganda was proposed to 
be utilised in conjunction with censorship. 
A consensus was almost reached in the Journalism Weekly that public speech and 
expression during wartime should be strictly controlled and dominated by government 
rather than continue to enjoy the right of freedom: although most people who hold this 
view might feel antipathy against the governmental restriction and leading position 
aimed at journalistic activities. In the article ‘Propaganda and Rumour-mongering’, the 
author under the pen name Jun Yi thought about propaganda as: 
Propaganda is more important to fascist countries. The nature of 
fascism is cheating and blackmail. Only propaganda can mask its evil 
and ugly weakness. Exaggerated rhetoric is adopted to daunt timid 
persons and sensational statements are used to fill the stomach of 
hungry people.6 
 
However, the author believed that results demonstrate convincingly that propaganda is 
an important segment in the process of war and plays a critical role for military victory. 
This was presented through the case of self-examination by German Emperor Wilhelm 
II towards the First World War that “German failure is attributed to none of the Times 
by themselves.” Besides showing the importance of propaganda, this case implying 
British propaganda model to a certain degree hints that the character of a democratic 
country is not inconsistent with wartime propaganda policy. This provided critical 
legitimacy and a basis for supporting China to enhance control over journalism during 
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wartime. 
Compared with Britain, America carried considerably more weight within Chinese 
society. In the mind of Chinese intellectuals during the republic period, America stood 
out as a model for China to emulate. Therefore the most persuasive influence on public 
opinion for Chinese to follow during the wartime period was the evidence based 
American reality of enhancing journalism control. America in the article ‘Journalism 
and Freedom’ was glorified as “the most free and open country” in the world. It was 
followed by the author’s full agreement with President Roosevelt issuing a stern warning 
to some American media who had, based on unjustified conjecture, reported that there 
were disagreements between the President and the Secretary of State. This case 
happened in America which, in the author’s opinion, was considered the most complete 
democracy and firmly proved that the press during the wartime “should not be a private 
institute of liberalism, but an institute of public propaganda strictly controlled by 
government.” Based on this, the author condemned attempts of branding reproaches of 
‘dictator’ upon President Roosevelt, and strongly questioned their motivation in 
upholding freedom and democracy in this affair. 
The American case in the article ‘Censorship and Propaganda’ is also a critical ground 
of argument. As the author writes: 
Propaganda during wartime is remarkably effective. For instance, the 
Entente Powers, as the United States’ participation finally achieved 
victory. Most of the American people initially did persist in 
isolationism, not willingly getting entangled in the war. However, their 
disgust with Germany increased as the days passed after large scale 
propaganda was implemented, and the warring public opinion 
ultimately dominated America nationwide. This made U.S. 
Government dare to formally declare war. George Creel, the head of 
the United States Committee on Public Information, after the war 
based on his experience of propaganda wrote down the book, How We 
Advertised America. It was said by him that propaganda documents 
were totally 75,000,000. In his opinion, ‘paper bullet’ truly contributed 
to the victory of the Entente Powers.7 
 
Combining the case of the United States successfully utilising propaganda to achieve 
victory in the First World War with the validity of censorship in the discourse above, 
the author drew the conclusion that it was permissible to support the Nationalist 
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Government to strictly control public opinion by the means of censorship and 
propaganda. As the author’s summary stated: 
All comments contrary to present anti-Japanese policy and 
undermining national unification should be censored strictly. … Strict 
instructions must be issued against those prevailing cock and bull 
rumours at present.… We should adeptly exploit propaganda to make 
people know what has happened. Propaganda should be widely, 
technically and systematically used to influence foreign public 
opinions.8 
 
From the text above, it may not be difficult to identify that Chinese intellectuals’ 
concerns regarding the United States were one-sided, and concentrate on tightening 
control over speech and expression during the wartime period. Based on this observation, 
the author proposed that China should imitate American wartime propaganda and 
censorship, but ignored the fact that such control was cancelled in America soon after 
the wars, and that the US political and social system underpinning the censorship could 
reasonably adjust to meet a changed social context after the war and relinquish that 
control. It was just those very elements of a political mechanism for restoring press 
freedoms post-war that China lacked and which were ignored by Chinese intellectuals, 
seriously impeding post-war Chinese journalism. Modern wars have usually produced a 
restriction of civil liberties and a tightening of political and military controls. Journalism 
activities as the carrier of social speech and expression thus were restricted as one of the 
measures used for tightening political and military controls during the war for supreme 
national interests. Therefore, it is not surprising to have such a strong voice of advocating 
enhancing journalism restriction in the Journalist Weekly. 
Enhancement of journalism control, in which propaganda and censorship as the main 
measures are also a feature of wartime America, but under the adjustment by American 
political and social mechanism, the degree of the control can be adjusted based on the 
change of social demand. In anticipation of cooperating with military engagement in 
European war, America created the necessary public atmosphere to successfully engage 
in relevant acts during the First World War. The Espionage Act, which was aimed at 
punishing the people who fabricated news and expressed ideas that might interfere with 
military actions, exert adverse effects on morale in the armed or military conscription, 
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was issued on 15 June 1917. In the Sedition Act, which was issued in May 1918 based 
on the amendment of the Espionage Act, people who had behaviours or speech identified 
as disloyal, profane or insulting to the form of American government, Constitution and 
national flag would be punished as well. In addition, based on the Trading-with-the-
Enemy Act, passed in October 1917, cable, telephone and telegraph for foreign 
communications would be censored by the Censorship Board.9 However, this situation 
was soon changed with the end of World War I. The Sedition Act was annulled in 1921, 
and the American public opinion during the 1920s was to advocate the people to forget 
the issues in the wartime period, and return their concentration back to peaceful life. 
There was a moment that reports exposing corruption in high places, entertainment news 
and commercial advertisement became symptomatic of interwar American journalism.10 
Chinese political and social conditions were not conducive to emulate America. Using 
the American example as the case to prove China could enhance control during the 
wartime looked convincing, but China would not be able to acquire the result obtained 
by the American model. The enhancement of control over the press and public opinion 
under authoritarian politics could only have made Chinese journalism step into complete 
and irreversible partisan mechanism. This might not be realised by those intellectuals. 
They had a utopian fantasy towards post-war Chinese development that China would 
seamlessly realise democracy with the victory of the War of Resistance against Japan. 
This perception was reflected in their views on the French Revolution. 
In search of a revolutionary model 
To commemorate 150 years anniversary of the French Revolution, the Chinese edition 
of the SEPM on 14 July 1939 published a special issue with 16 pages, which were twice 
the standard amount. Therefore, sufficient articles to introduce French ethos and discuss 
the French Revolution, and advertisements of French commodities were also published 
on this day. 
In these articles, although a full-scale debate was under different topics and views about 
France, the common message at the core was that the French Revolution was highly 
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regarded as the cornerstone of French democracy and prosperity, and the model for 
China. The newspaper of the day revealed a strong emotion which admired and yearned 
for French democracy, and attributed all of these to the revolution. The author under the 
pen name of Tie Lang in the article ‘Commemoration of French Democracy: A Lesson 
for Chinese People’ to understand the French Revolution as: 
The French Revolution broke out on 14 July 1789. This great 
movement features prominently in the history of the West. The 
influence of the French Revolution not only liberated the people of 
France, but also enlightened democratic movements in Europe. The 
importance of the historical contribution of the French Revolution can 
be equated with the Renaissance, and the Protestant Reformation.11 
In the short commentary, the author greeted “the democratic France is continuing its 
prosperity,” and shouted “long live France!”12 
Chinese intellectuals expressed their enthusiasm towards France, and an important 
reason seemed to be that they had found out an inspiration and antidote to solve Chinese 
issue from the history of continuous revolution in modern France. At the critical position 
that the cause of Chinese resistance against Japan was confronted with an unprecedented 
predicament, Chinese intellectuals hoped to enlighten the people, and give the Chinese 
confidence for the future by using the case of the French long-time revolutionary history 
with particular reference to the way that French people finally achieved victory over 
domestic and international reactionary groups. In the article ‘Struggle between Light and 
Dark: Impressions in Terms of the Commemoration of the French Democracy and 
Republic’, the atmosphere of celebrating French National Day was reminiscent of the 
French long-time revolutionary history, and this history in the author’s view is 
successive fighting between ‘light’ and ‘dark’. As the author described: 
Seeing they are jubilant to celebrate this great day: the commemoration 
of democracy and republic, besides expressing sincere congratulations, 
I am evoked with infinite feelings. When we recall the heroic French 
Revolution, we should understand the revolution is affected by the 
uphill struggles that accompany successive counter attacks. The light 
and dark could not get through a day without fighting against each 
other in more than eighty years.13 
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Democratic and prosperous France today was deemed as the ‘light’ was victorious over 
the ‘dark’, and the author believed that the successful revolution in France was a lamp 
at Chinese feet for achieving victory of resistance against Japan, and was an omen that 
China in the future, would achieve the same greatness as that which France had achieved. 
The author said: 
Light relentlessly struggled against dark for more than eighty years. 
Dark sometimes covered light, but ultimately, light can completely 
exorcise dark, brilliantly illuminating the human beings. The current 
Chinese war against Japan is just the striving for light. Light is 
intensely struggling against dark, and the final result must be the 
victory the same as France. History tells us that it is a self-evident truth 
that light finally will come.14 
 
The article ‘Commemoration of French Democracy: A lesson for Chinese People,’ 
presents a similar view of point. The author under the assumed name ‘Tie Lang’ 
interpreted French freedom and equality that people enjoyed today after 82-year 
revolutions as the victory which was dearly bought with long time struggle and 
tremendous sacrifice. As the author said: 
Revolution is not easy work. Its success must be irrigated by blood and 
with successive struggles by people. French people engaged in 
revolution for 82 years. The difficulty that they met during this time 
has not been impossible to put into words, but they finally achieved 
their political aim of enjoying freedom and equality.15   
 
The author then deemed that Chinese revolutionary situation was not pessimistic 
compared with France, therefore, by insisting on revolution, China would be able to 
realise what France had achieved. It formed an optimistic picture in the author’s mind 
that the victory of the war against Japan would mark the final success of Chinese 
revolution. 
When we recall the Chinese situation before the Revolution of 1911, 
we can find it was even better than France before its revolution. 28 
years have passed after the Revolution of 1911. Although 28 years are 
not a long period considering the revolutionary process, Chinese 
people have become solid concrete from lacking spirit of cooperation 
after striving by countless martyrs. China has not been the sick man of 
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Asia, but a world lion. The victory of the War of Resistance against 
Japan will be the final success of Chinese revolutionary cause. Victory 
is dawning in the distance. Light is in front of us. Let all Chinese people 
together to continuingly strive for that.16 
 
When the idea was proposed that China would gain freedom and democracy after the 
victory against Japan by referring to the French example, it might have been ignored on 
the basis that there was no clear link between the French case and Chinese reality. As a 
result, Chinese intellectuals should have considered seriously how to utilise the French 
experience for China, but unfortunately, what they did was simply to equate the result 
of revolutions in France and the fate of post-war China. Revolutions in France seemed 
to be regarded as a model of China by Chinese intellectuals. However, their one-sided 
and superficial understanding towards the violent and bloody revolutions over 80 years 
made them assess the situation of post-war China over optimistically. As a result, 
nationalism was invoked without essential scruple of its negative long-term influence 
for post-war China, in the hope that this could help China to defeat Japan as soon as 
possible. Meanwhile, the legitimacy of both the Nationalist Government to realise more 
strict and full-scale social control through the war, and the Chinese Communist Party’s 
violent proletariat revolution was objectively proved. All of these to a certain degree 
accelerated Chinese journalism to step into a partisan way. 
The impact of violence, both threatened and real 
Neutrality proved difficult when the SEPM, along with the people of the Isolated Island 
of Shanghai, began to experience real terror, tracing back to Wang Ching-wei’s 
establishment of his intelligence service, No. 76. From this time, the press in Shanghai 
suffered bloody suppression, as Japan and the Reorganised Nationalist Government of 
the Republic of China found an effective method to clamp down the media’s resistance. 
Resistance against such collaborationists finally was “savagely though ambiguously 
sustained” as Wakeman noted.17 The SEPM during the Isolated Island period suffered 
heavy sacrifice. Hu Daojing’s list of martyrs in the War of Resistance against Japan 
included 13 journalists who were killed in the line of duty during the Isolated Island 
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period. Of these, five worked for the SEPM.18  
Cracking down on the SEPM through brutal assassination was an updated means after 
Wang Ching-wei was not able to peacefully cope with the threat of nationalism 
unleashed by the newspaper. Ma Xiaotian and Wang Manyun, two important officials 
in Wang Ching-wei’s government described it in the following: 
In the summer of 1939, Wang Ching-wei launched the so called 
movement for peace in Shanghai. Such collaborating activities 
incurred unanimous condemnation from the social public. The 
Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury was more active than other 
newspapers in the condemnation. … Ding Mocun initially directed 
some people to mediate with the intent of stopping the aggressive tone 
of the newspaper. Instead of abating, the newspaper’s scolding of 
Wang Ching-wei escalated. Ding Mocun and Li Shiqun felt that a more 
forceful approach was required as previous attempts had not been 
effective. They ordered Wu Shibao to violently attack the Shanghai 
Evening Post and Mercury aimed as a deterrent to crush the public 
opinion.19 
 
Already before the establishment of Wang Ching-wei’s regime and his intelligence 
service there was suppression of, and threats against, the SEPM which were likely 
imposed by the Dadao government of Shanghai led by Su Xiwen. These efforts to silence 
the paper were not effective but were quite frightening. Early on 1 April 1938, the 
morning edition of Ta Mei Wan Pao received a threatening letter which contained a 
bomb threat. The letter was as follows. 
The “Ta Mei Wan Pao Morning Edition” has been attacked on two 
different occasions by terrorists. “Tsung Tseu Deo Zung” (“Spring and 
Autumn Taoist Priest”) addressed to the General Manager, and which 
reads as follows: 
“This Taoist priest is well acquainted with geomancy. It has now been 
found that your paper will certainly be bombed on April 6. Care should 
be exercised.” 
This letter was sent by post on March 26. Its envelope bears the 
following printed words: “The Feng Feng Radio Advertising 
Company”. A chop of the Post Office for insufficient postage is affixed 
to the envelope.20 
 
Given it was April Fool’s Day, it was unclear whether or not the letter was of a serious 
                                                 
18 Hu Jingdao, “Ercidazhan Mengguo Xunzhi Baoren Lu [A Name List of Journalists of who were killed in the line 
of duty during the Second World War],” Baoxue Zazhi (Newspaper Research) 1, no. 4 (1945): 38. 
19 Cai Dejin and Shang Yue, eds., Moku: Wangwei Tegong Zongbu 76 Hao [The Hell: The No. 76, the Headquarters 
of the Intelligence Service of Wang Ching-wei’s Puppet Regime] (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, 1986), 58. 
20 Shanghai Municipal Police file, D8298/43. 
144 
 
nature and an article was published the next day which referred to the letter as being a 
practical joke. Based on this situation it was very difficult to determine the truth of this 
threat and in fact other threats to the newspaper successively followed. This contrasts 
markedly with the period when No. 76 was operating in which threats were backed with 
real violence such as beatings, kidnappings, bombings and assassination.21 
Figure 5: Map of Shanghai, 194022 
 
The Dadao government of Shanghai was not able to control the publication inside the 
foreign settlements so their only option was the forbidden circulation of the newspapers 
outside the area but this method in many cases was not effective. The SEPM, for example, 
was successfully smuggled outside and this caused problems for the government. On 6 
March 1938, Shen Yi, the head of the publicity section, reported to the mayor Su Xiwen 
that the SEPM and two other newspapers were continuously smuggled for sale in varying 
ways from the foreign settlement areas into Pudong.23 This situation changed things until 
Wang Ching-wei’s regime was established. At this point, the SEPM began to suffer 
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serious attacks. 
Gu Zhizhong was one of the journalists who experienced and witnessed Isolated Island 
Shanghai. According to his description, Wang Ching-wei’s enthronement in Nanjing, 
and later actions incurred wide-spread condemnation and fierce scolding by the press in 
Shanghai. This resulted in Wang Ching-wei’s bitterness towards the newspapers and 
journalists who had opposed him. As a result, he established intelligence service 
headquarters, which specifically planned and implemented bombing, kidnap and 
assassination activities at No. 76 Jessfield Road located in the West of the International 
Settlement where which was sparsely populated.24 As Gould recalled, Wang Ching-
wei’s gangsters set up headquarters in the west of Shanghai. This heavily guarded place 
was a scene of horrific crimes such as ransoms, kidnappings, threats and even 
beheadings. It was recalled by Gould that families of the victims that could not afford 
the ransoms, received ears, fingers and other body parts through the mail. The 
publication became a vital concern in shaping attitudes and therefore the newspaper 
became the target within this setting.25  
Despite the Wang Ching-wei government still not being able to directly control the 
newspaper within the foreign settlements, No. 76 created obstacles to block the 
distribution channels and threaten or even assassinate journalists and editors to 
effectively establish control of the journalism. On 18 April 1939, Zhou Guodong, the 
general vendor of the SEPM, was assassinated.26 In April, No. 76 also attempted to 
purchase all issued papers of the SEPM. They stamped out-dated copies and mixed them 
with current editions to sell in the low light of the evening with the aim of destroying 
the credit of the newspaper.27 As well as this, attempts were made to physically destroy 
the plant with bombs and Chinese staff were even killed in the main street.28 Although 
the SEPM suffered this attack, they viewed it only as a minor transgression, and 
continued to publish stronger rhetoric to scold Wang Ching-wei. Matters escalated and, 
in June 1939, No. 76 sent threatening letters to newspaper editors and reports to each 
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newspaper, asking them to immediately change their attitudes, otherwise they would 
face death. Zhu Xinggong, who was the editor of the Night Light supplement in the 
Chinese edition of the SEPM at that time published the letter in order to laugh at the 
senders, although it appeared to carry a mandatory death sentence.29 The No. 76 felt 
obliged to target specific persons as the means to deal with the newspaper. Thus, the 
SEPM supplement editor Zhu Xinggong became their first target to be killed.30 Night 
Light editor Zhu was assassinated on 30 August, when walking out of the SEPM office. 
Zhu’s death in late 1939 opened a new subtle relation between the SEPM and Wang 
Ching-wei’s regime. The press under Wang Ching-wei’s suppression with radical means 
had to compromise after balancing their journalists’ survival and basic standpoints with 
Wang Ching-wei’s regime who at least still wanted to present that their political values 
were to bring peace to Chinese in public. H. Arthur Steiner considers the results from 
the terrorist actions taken by Japanese and Chinese collaborative regime aimed at 
curbing media as ineffective.31 This conclusion might be drawn without taking into 
account the sensitive change of the media’s attitude to the Japanese and their 
collaborative regime after Wang Ching-wei’s intelligence system performed a series of 
terrorist assassinations. As Wakeman concludes, the position of the majority of people 
in the Isolated Island Shanghai vacillated in a grey and equivocal range between 
resistance and collaboration, and truly committed resistance only happened in a small 
group of the population. 32  This situation facilitated Wang Ching-wei’s intelligence 
service to set goals more accurately and implement ways to suppress the actions of the 
press.   
In the first a couple of weeks after Zhu Xionggong’s death, Night Light published many 
articles to mourning for him and to praise his fearless spirit in facing the enemies. 
Afterwards, it returned to its initial position as a literature supplement rather than an 
outlet for nationalism. Moreover, shortly after Zhu’s death, Wang Ching-wei convened 
an international journalist conference on 7 September 1939. Randall Gould was initially 
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invited to attend the conference, but as Zhu Xinggong was assassinated and Gould 
wished to propose some questions that Wang Ching-wei was unwillingly to answer, 
Gould did not attend. The Chinese edition of the SEPM published an editorial 
commentary on the conference. The editorial expressed its condemnation of Wang 
Ching-wei’s regime for Zhu Xionggong’s death by joking no one at the conference died 
from food poisoning or from anything sharp.33 On 23rd April, 1940, Wang Shih-chieh, 
Republic government minister, attended a dinner party to welcoming returning overseas 
Chinese. At the party, he met Samuael Chang. Later that evening, Wang noted in his 
diary his appreciation for the valiant resistance against the Japanese shown by Zhu 
Xinggong and the SEPM. He noted that although Zhu had received many threats just 
before his death, he remained utterly without fear.34 Zhu Xinggong should be classified 
as one of the minority of real patriots in accordance with Wakeman’s description of the 
social features of Isolated Island Shanghai. However, there was another view of Zhu 
Xinggong’s resistance and sacrifice, as expressed in Jin Xiongbai’s recollections: 
Zhu was eccentric. In other words, he was a famous person, but he was 
also considered a madman. He usually liked to drink alcohol and 
smoke, and relying on the narcotic feeling, he wrote down some 
cynical articles to acquire the admiration from his readers. His aim was 
just simply like this… In the very beginning, No. 76 thought he was 
just mad, and did not plan to end his life. Some people had warned him 
not to scold with such strong rhetoric, but he openly replied in the 
newspaper that ‘I do scold, and people who do not like it could beat 
me’. His attitude was courting death indeed. It made No. 76 compelled 
to kill him for its authority.35 
 
Zhu Xinggong’s image is represented in two quite different recollections. Most people 
recalled him as a hero. However, for Jin Xiongbai, Zhu only scolded Wang Ching-wei.  
Both views agree that the assassination of Zhu was because the nationalism that he 
released through the newspaper had threatened Wang Ching-wei’s regime, rather than 
journalistic professionalism. In accordance with Hu Daojing’s recollection, it was 
dangerous to engage in journalistic works to resist against Japan in the Shanghai Isolated 
Island. For journalists, even if they were in the International Settlement or the French 
Concession, they were still at risk to be kidnapped or assassinated by enemies at any 
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time.36  
Hu Daojing read a range of different newspapers every day during the Isolated Island 
period, so that he could get the information to help get him out of danger. He mentioned 
that on a day in the winter of 1940, when he was reading the Shanghai Evening Post and 
Mercury, a news piece on the first page suddenly came into view, and shocked him. It 
was reported that the Japanese troops would implement patrol two days later in a specific 
place of Hongkou where he was living. As it belonged to the International Settlement, 
the place did not incur Japanese troops, but since the Japanese would come, Hu in 
accordance with his experience made a judgement that it was very possible that the 
Japanese would break into resistance houses to search during their patrol. He collected 
many books and newspapers, and some of them were with the contents of resistance 
against Japan. He realised that once they were found by the Japanese, it would be a 
disaster. Therefore, he urgently looked for and hired a house in another place. The next 
day, he moved to the house with his family in a hurry.37  
Assassinations and their impact 
No. 76’s killing of Zhu Xinggong was the opening act with regards to its attacks against 
the SEPM. After Zhu’s death the following three SEPM staff were assassinated in turn: 
Samuel Chang, Cheng Zhengzhang, and Li Zunying. Samuel Chang was the next 
SEPM’s journalist to be assassinated. On 23 April 1940, Wang Shih-chieh, the minister 
of the Publicity Department in Chongqing, attended a dinner party to welcome returning 
overseas Chinese where he met Samuel Chang. Only a few months later, on 16 July, 
Samuel Chang was lying dead in a pool of blood, assassinated while having a coffee and 
sandwich at a German café on Nanjing Road.38  
Chang’s death clearly demonstrated the dilemma faced by journalists at the time, a 
dilemma with real consequences. Samuel Chang’s death was understood as a sacrifice 
of the press in resisting Wang Ching-wei’s collaboration regime. Gould in his 
recollections described the events of Samuel Chang’s assassination. He wrote: 
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On Friday afternoon I was called off the Columbia Country Club tennis 
courts by three simultaneous phone messages telling of the 
assassination of Sammy Chang, my colleague and best Chinese friend. 
Sam had stopped in a café for a cup of tea. It was his habit to stop there. 
His name had been on the list of eighty-three Chinese, and only the day 
before I had asked if he was carrying a pistol. He had lifted his gown 
and showed one strapped around his waist. On the day of his death he 
wore it, but he committed two major errors. One was to follow a usual 
habit in stopping at a public place. The other was to sit with his back 
to the door. Two Chinese gunmen walked in, shot Sam instantly dead 
from behind, and walked out again – killing on their way a Pole who 
tried to stop them.39 
 
However, Jin Xiongbai’s recollections had a different narrative about Chang’s 
assassination: 
He had made contact with Wang Ching-wei’s regime, agreeing to 
change the standpoint and news bias of the Shanghai Evening Post and 
Mercury and had been receiving a certain amount of money regularly. 
However, Chang always failed to fulfil his promises, and it irritated No. 
76. Chang just simply attempted to avoid meeting with No. 76. Finally, 
he was killed by indiscriminate gunfire when he had lunch at Kiessling 
Restaurant, a place that served Western food located on the crossroads 
between Nanjing Road and Jing’an Tempele Road.40 
The effects of assassinating Samuel Chang was immediate. As soon after he was 
assassinated, the Tai Mei Pictorial that he led was not able to continue. In September 
1939, about two months after Chang was assassinated, the Tai Mei Pictorial published 
its last issue and ceased to exist.41 
Only a month later on 19 August, another SEPM editor, Cheng Zhenzhang, was 
assassinated. However, No. 76 did not stop at that. The assistant manager of the SEPM, 
Li Junying, slept in the newspaper’s office for one year following Chang’s death but was 
finally assassinated 23 July, 1941. He was killed by a gunman, with a bullet to the back 
of his neck, on the street in front of the SEPM office building. 42  
Faced with the horrors in Isolated Island Shanghai, temporary escape was the choice that 
had to be made for some journalists. L. Z. Yuan, an editor of the SEPM was just one of 
these journalists. According to Gould:  
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One day a quiet Chinese walked up our stairs, entered the news room, 
and sat down with L. Z. Yuan, our Chinese city editor. After he had 
left, Yuan came in to me and said, “You know, that fellow described 
every movement I have made all around Shanghai during the past four 
days!” The caller had come from the puppet Gestapo out at 76 Jessfield 
Road. They wanted to let Yuan know he was being shadowed, mostly 
to worry him, I suspected. The emissary had put a proposition to pay 
Yuan several times his monthly salary if he would give allegiance to 
Wang Ching-wei. It was not desired that he quit us – quite the contrary 
– rather that he spy on us, and of course quit giving us information 
detrimental to the repute of the Nanking regime and its Shanghai 
representatives, who lived in a constant state of fear. … Yuan did not 
join the opposition, but he did take a quick trip to British-protected 
Hong Kong to conserve his health. Later he “sat out” the war safely 
under an assumed name in Manila.43 
 
C.V. Starr and Randall Gould faced similar dangers which forced them into choosing to 
leave Shanghai. On 15 July 1940, Wang Ching-wei issued a blacklist of foreigners for 
deportation, on which there were one Briton and six Americans, including both Starr 
and Gould.44 Under these conditions Starr and Gould were finally compelled to leave. 
The role of managing the newspaper was handed to Frederick Burr (F.B.) Opper in early 
1941.45 Thereafter, the voice of resistance against Japan and the Chinese collaborator 
regime within the paper was relatively silenced; although Gould still believed that, under 
Opper, the paper went on to further reveal the atrocities of Japanese imperialists and 
Wang Ching-wei’s regime.46  
Journalists during the Isolated Island period were obliged to reconsider their stance in 
the face of terror and brutal assassinations, and the press staff were forced to choose 
amongst their professional ideals, social needs to nationalism and basic survival. With 
the Nazi defeat of France and the creation of Vichy France (July 1940) the French 
Concession still retained its independence but greater cooperation occurred between the 
French authorities in Shanghai and the Japanese forces. In the latter part of 1940, 
international newspapers reported that a photographer of the SEPM had been arrested 
while attempting to take photographs of the Japanese take-over of the French 
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concessions’s courts.47 
Thus it compromised journalistic professionalisation. Jin Xiongbai who occupied 
important positions in both the organs of the Nationalist Party and Wang Ching-wei’s 
regime recalled: 
I worked for the press for quite a long time, thus I was particularly 
involved with the news about colleagues working in my profession. 
Unfortunately, there were so many journalists’ lives lost. When I read 
the details in the newspapers, I consistently felt shocked, guilty and 
deeply grieved about these journalists who were sacrificed one after 
another. I felt I was close to them, but I was not able to help them. I 
often argued with Zhou Fohai that most of journalists simply were 
pleased to dedicate themselves to their profession and follow the rules 
of professional conduct, and their behaviours did not contain any 
political elements. Even if they used sharp and fierce rhetoric, it was 
just derived from their conscience to express what they thought. I 
secretly introduced some very important and close journalists who 
claimed to be resisting the Japanese to meet with Zhou Fohai for 
collaborating ideas. When Zhou met them, he frankly said that “you 
just scold Japanese based on whatever you like, but as government, we 
have our difficulties. I hope we can understand each other spiritually, 
so that radical and sharp rhetoric can be reduced.” Nearly every 
important journalistic staff in Shanghai at that time was accompanied 
by me to meet with Zhou Fohai, but I am not willing to name those 
who considered themselves as dutiful journalists. This is the best I can 
do.48 
 
After suffering a number of assassinations, the SEPM managers realised that the 
newspaper may not be able to continue its publication work. On 14 September 1940, 
Wang Shih-chieh received the news that the management of the newspaper was 
considering to suspend and sell their properties. Wang immediately sent telegrams to the 
liaisons in Shanghai, instructing them to persuade the management of the SEPM to 
relinquish the idea of suspending the paper, and promised to provide financial 
assistance.49 This reflects the newspaper’s involvement in politics during the war against 
Japan. 
In contrast to the serious conflicts with the Nationalist Government before the war, the 
SEPM during the Isolated Island period had a much closer relationship with Chiang Kai-
Shek as they both faced common enemies. Chiang Kai-shek was interviewed by the 
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SEPM around this time. In Gould’s interview with him, he highly praised the 
contribution of the SEPM. As he told Gould:  
We all appreciate very much the friendly American attitude expressed 
by your publications and by other Americans in China. You have had 
some troubles because of your independent stand, we realise. We feel 
that you have shown great courage in standing for what you believe to 
be right and for presenting your news and editorial views without 
wavering through fear of violence directed against you.50 
In fact, the SEPM, contrary to Chiang Kai-shek’s comment, had not held its ground of 
being politically neutral; rather, on the basis of the need for resistance against Japanese 
invasion, it actively cooperated with the Nationalist Government to engage in resistance 
propaganda. 
There has also been some speculation about the espionage activities undertaken by the 
SEPM, both before and during the Pacific War. The Publicity Department of the 
Nationalist Party secretly set up an office in the Isolated Island Shanghai to provide 
funding support to the newspapers who gave publicity to resistance against Japan.51 Xu 
Weinan, who once worked together with Hu Daojing in pre-war Shanghai, became the 
person in charge of the office.52 
The war also had the effect of drawing the SEPM into intelligence activities. The 
Shanghai Municipal Archives has a collection of documents that were sent to New York 
by the editors of the SEPM. Only one of these documents has been published thus far – 
a document sent by the SEPM to the United States on 4 November 1941. This hard copy 
document contains general information on a wide range of topics relating to the situation 
in China, including politics, economic, financial, commercial and military information. 
It is a Chinese-language reproduction without the original English-language version, is 
marked ‘private reading only’, and is without name, address and social position of both 
recipient and addresser. It appears quite possible it was an espionage report provided to 
the U.S. government, however, if it is, the quality of information provided is very low. 
This document includes nine pieces of information, summarised as: 
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Currency Support: The Stabilisation Board of China, an institute 
established by Britain and the United States aimed at helping the 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Government maintain the exchange rate 
of Chinese currencies during the wartime, successfully persuaded 
Chongqing administration to agree to give their continued support to 
the Shanghai exchange market which had been controlled by Wang 
Ching-wei.   
Chongqing versus Shanghai: Tsiang Ting-fu mentioned that extra-
territoriality must be abolished immediately in post-war China, but the 
Chinese government might consider adopting Western representatives 
in Tianjin and Shanghai in the future. 
Economic Future: Weng Wenhao, minister of the Economy 
Department of the Nationalist Government, said that China should be 
an ordinary capitalist country on the basis of private enterprise and a 
large scale of capitalist modern industry. However, many officials 
represented by Tsiang Ting-fu insisted that China in the future would 
neither be a capitalist nor corporatist country. 
Present Currency Situation: Four government-owned banks of china 
had issued 14,000,000,000 yuan, and many private businessmen and 
government officials had complained about such a huge amount of 
currency. 
State Budget Deficit: In the summer of 1941, the actual revenues of 
the Chongqing administration less than 10% of their expenditure. Thus, 
the government had to rely heavily on issuing bonds. 
Commodity Prices: The commodity prices in Free China were three 
to ten times higher than Shanghai.  
Transportation: industry consumer goods were transported by trucks 
from Guangzhou to Chongqing. The Burma Road was very active. 
Since the outbreak of the Eastern Front of World War II, few goods 
from the Soviet Union were transported into northwest China.   
Governmental Business Activity: The Nationalist Government 
tightened up control and management over more and more industry 
and commerce activities. Many businessmen complained that the 
government was very ineffective, but they attempted to seize the high 
profit businesses.  
Politics: the situation in the Wuhan of 1938 had vanished in 
Chongqing. He Yingqin and Chen Lifu who insisted on government 
control had dominated the government. Meanwhile, Dai Li and his 
intelligence service were cracking down on dissidents and thousands 
of democratic and liberalists had been charged with the idea of left 
wing and pro-communism, and most of them had been monitored and 
controlled. Their actions had been limited. The dissidents were 
doubting that He Yingqin and Chen Lifu were attempting negotiating 
with the Japanese so as to maintain the strength of the Nationalist 
Government for the purpose of finally annihilating the Chinese 
Communist Party, but people still believe that Chiang Kai-shek would 
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continue to fight against Japan. 53 
 
Propaganda for the Nationalist Government in Chongqing 
The SEPM’s strong standpoint supporting Chinese resistance alienated Wang Ching-wei 
in Shanghai at that time. The sacrifice made at the SEPM for free speech and anti-
Japanese resistance was significant. According to Chen Cunren’s recollections, the daily 
4 pm release of information through publications contrasted the bravery of the Chinese 
armies with the cruelty of the Japanese armies. This encouraged a highly emotive 
reaction amongst the people of the Isolated Island and of all the newspapers, the SEPM 
received the strongest reaction. 54  As it has been examined above, such a strong 
standpoint incurred a heavy sacrifice for the staff of the SEPM through the loss of lives. 
Meanwhile, it also drew the attention of the Nationalist Government in Chongqing to 
create propaganda to gain international sympathy and support. 
The Nationalist Party realised the importance of improving international propaganda 
since the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7 July 1937. After 7 months 
integration, the Publicity Department of the Nationalist Party established a special 
section to take charge of international propaganda under the leadership of Hollington 
Tong, and his deputy Tseng Hsü-pei, who had long term experience of the press work 
in Shanghai.55 Hollington Tong, with his specialist background as a Missouri trained 
journalist, and his links with the English press (especially newspapers in the Shanghai 
foreign settlements), was able to streamline the foreign propaganda section and 
successfully align the foreign press in China with Chiang Kai-shek’s political ambitions 
during the wartime period.56 This was a significant indicator of the blurring of the 
boundary of journalistic professionalism. In serving the psychological needs of the 
wartime environment, the Nationalist Government began to successfully embed 
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propaganda within professional journalism. This subtle shift fundamentally transformed 
the course of professionalisation in Chinese journalism.    
When Hollington Tong came to Shanghai he found that the Japanese had control over 
most of the foreign newspapers in Shanghai and whilst they used both legal and illegal 
methods, it was only the SEPM and the China Weekly Review that still unconditionally 
supported the Chinese positions.57  
As a result of compromise between Japanese and Western powers after the Battle of 
Shanghai, the International Settlement and the French Concession survived, although 
the rest area of Shanghai was seized by Japanese. In the view of many people, the 
settlement area meant an oasis where they could not only flee from Japanese cruel rule 
but also organise resistance activities more conveniently. The Japanese and the Chinese 
collaboration regimes established their media inside the settlement thus attempting to 
influence public opinion. However, relying solely on this method, they were not able to 
change the strong social thought of anti-Japanese invasion and resistance. Pro-Chiang 
Kai-shek media consistently gained support from the majority of people. As a result, 
they were a thorn in Japanese side. In order to silence the press, Japanese clamped down 
on the governors of the International Settlement and the French Concession to ask 
Chinese media inside to accept Japanese-organised censorship. Through announcing 
their foreign ownership, these media enterprises (especially the British and the American) 
were able to refuse the censorship. This movement became known as the ‘foreign 
national flag newspapers’. It is through extraterritoriality that the occurrence of the 
relatively free environment for journalism publications. Once Japan declared war on 
Britain and America, and the Pacific War fully broke out, Hong Kong was occupied by 
Japan. On 9 December, China formally declared war with Japan, and the Japanese Army 
occupied the Shanghai International Settlement. All anti-Japanese newspapers were 
censored, and the Isolated Island period ended. The SEPM evening version’s last issue 
was 8th December, 1941.  
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The situation faced by the journalists of the SEPM reflects the dilemma faced by all the 
press in Isolated Island Shanghai. Nationalism was fuelled by the Japanese invasion and 
the violent and repressive actions of the Chinese collaboration regime. Censorship alone 
was not effective in controlling the field of the foreign published newspapers and 
therefore they relied on terrorism and threatening behaviour.58 The press became the 
outlet for nationalism. The rise of nationalism eroded the space for professionalism in 
journalism to guide the journalistic enterprise. The press benefited from a relatively free 
speech environment in the foreign settlements of Shanghai but the protection derived 
from extraterritoriality for journalism became increasingly ineffective in the face of the 
cruel repression wielded by Wang Ching-wei’s intelligence service. Between passionate 
nationalism and the instinct for survival, journalists were torn between resistance and 
collaboration. The history of the SEPM in suffering brutal repression during the Isolated 
Island period reflects the dilemma facing the press of being caught between resistance 
and compromise.  
The Japanese victory, although decisive, was not straight forward. By winning Shanghai, 
the Japanese military was left with the dilemma of how to effectively govern a city that 
contained the International Settlement and the French Concession while, at the same 
time, fighting a guerrilla resistance with Chinese patriots within the city. At that time 
Japan was at war with China, but they were at peace with the countries of the foreign 
settlements. The Chinese resistance and criminal elements also recognised, and 
capitalised on, the strategic opportunity offered by the foreign concessions. So, there 
was a delicate and uncertain period between the fall of Shanghai on 26 October 1936 to 
7 December 1941 when Japan entered World War II. 
The SEPM and the War of Resistance against Japan 
The Pacific War launched by Japan not only destroyed the stable structure of colonial 
powers within China, but also directly endangered national security of many other 
Western powers. Those Western powers had to reach a compromise with China for 
fighting with Japan as their common enemy. In this process, those Western powers 
unavoidably gave up most of their colonial interests in China, and Chinese nationalism 
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was proliferating. Nationalism, which was sparked in the semi-colonial areas of China’s 
east coast during the War of Resistance against Japan spread nationwide.   
On 6 December 1941, Japan launched the Pacific War by bombing Pearl Harbour. On 8 
December 1941, the Japanese government declared war on Britain and America. Soon 
after, the Shanghai Settlement was fully occupied by the Japanese Army. All anti-
Japanese newspapers inside the Settlement were forced to close. The Isolated Island 
period, which lasted for four years, had come to an end. The SEPM editor, Fredrick 
Opper later described the invasion of the French Concession and their offices in the 
article: “Post Editor Tells How War Hit Shanghai”: 
The story of what happened to the Shanghai Evening Post and its 
personnel from the moment Japanese boarding parties went aboard the 
U.S.S. Wake and H.M.S. Peterel in the Whangpoo in the early morning 
of December 8 (Far East time) is a fairly good mirror of what occurred 
generally in Shanghai and deserves a retelling if only for that reason. 
From 4:30 a.m. until 10 a.m. that grey day in Shanghai the sole 
evidence of Japan’s attack, save for the Rising Sun flag flying over the 
Wake and the occasional drifting pieces of wreckage from the sunken 
Peterel, was the presence of innumerable placards throughout the 
downtown area announcing a state of War and calling on residents to 
remain [obscured]. 
No Japanese troops were in evidence in the French Concession or that 
part of the International Settlement south of Soochow Creek. But at 
about 10 a.m. trucks, loaded with Japanese troops and bluejackets, 
poured across the bridges and their occupants swarmed through the city. 
The Post was almost the first establishment to be visited by the 
newcomers.  
Herded Into One Room 
All employees were herded into one room by a non-commissioned 
officer and a dozen privates, waving mausers with carefree abandon.  
Names were taken, everybody was searched, our radio station was 
sealed and a general inspection of the premises was carried out.  
The next morning the chief of the Japanese Army Press Bureau "gave 
permission for the Post's continued publication. Since from the 
moment Japan and the United States were at war it was impossible for 
any American to take authority for continuing publication, due to the 
fact that Shanghai simultaneously became enemy territory under 
American law, it was obviously impossible for any agreement with the 
Japanese Army to be binding on the American publisher, C. V. Starr, 
then 10,000 miles away in New York. Needless to say publication of a 
paper using the name "Shanghai Evening Post & Mercury” under 
Japanese censorship and Japanese permission was as distasteful to him 
as it was illegal.  
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Such considerations failed to weigh very heavily on the Japanese 
military, as might be suspected. 59 
 
Opper went on the describe how the Japanese insisted that H. G. W. Woodhead, who 
had been characterised formerly as very pro-Japanese, although apparently not pro-
Japanese enough, had nothing to do with the ‘Pseudo-Post” publishing. The Japanese 
had closed the American United Press service, so the Pseudo-Post used the Domei 
Transocean, (Nanking) Central News, Havas, Stefani and Tass services, saying “Domei, 
never distinguished for impartiality, out-did itself in grandiose claims of Japanese 
superiority and vicious slanderous attacks against the United Nations.”60 
Opper refers to Lt. Morita Matsuda: 
a former Princeton and University of Missouri student and assistant 
Army Press Bureau chief [who] told them to cut down their small Tass 
contribution even further and to make it a point to use a Domei release 
as the lead story every day. 61 
 
Opper described how slow Japanese movement and reassurance worked their magic, and 
that life in the French Concession (and indeed across Shanghai) continued as normal, 
albeit without buses and automobiles, and with increasing persecution of foreigners and 
rapidly increasing numbers of Japanese people. 
Constant propaganda directed at the Chinese hammered at the theme 
that Japan was saving Asia from Anglo-American overlordship while 
at the same time propaganda directed at those same Anglo-Americans 
sought to prove that Japan had no evil intentions against individual 
Americans and Britons but sought only to "preserve peace and order” 
which had been made impossible by the "machinations of Roosevelt 
and Churchill."…  
Pro-Chunking Chinese continued their anti-Japanese activities in the 
city with assassinations and bombings a common occurrence. In fact 
they became so frequent that the Japanese finally forced every Chinese 
male to serve in a neighborhood "peace and order” group and areas 
where disturbances occurred were blockaded for days with people in 
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many cases dying of hunger and lack of medical attention. 62 
Opper went on to describe how some locals and foreigners escaped Shanghai and others 
co-operated with the Japanese, including in preparing anti-American propaganda. He 
described the SEPM financial editor, John Ahlers, who continued writing copy for the 
pseudo Post, but refused to alter his honest reporting and was promptly fired. Opper 
described his difficulty in getting people outside Shanghai to understand that life for the 
Britons, English and Dutch continued on in Shanghai much as before, with servants 
caring for them, evenings at nightclubs or theatres and normal working life. However, 
this changed on December 20, 1942: 
On that day J. B. Powell, editor of the “China Weekly Review," Victor 
Keen, correspondent of the “New York Herald-Tribune” and a number 
of foreign businessmen were arrested by the Japanese Gendarmerie 
and held in the Bridge House, the apartment house on North Szechuan 
Road near the Central Post Office and the New Asia Hotel. 63 
 
Over several weeks, Opper describes his life before and during internment, and his 
fellow captives. However, strangely, he does not mention his fellow SEPM journalist, 
H. G. W. Woodhead, who spent three months at Bridge House.64 While some accounts 
describe Woodhead as mostly or strongly pro-Japanese, as British opinion turned against 
Japan, so, too, Woodhead’s opinion appeared to. He is described as spending “years 
denouncing Japanese militarism in China and as broadcasting strong anti-Japanese 
messages on radio “at the direct behest of the British government.”65  
Pacific War 
With the USA entering the war, General Joseph Stilwell came to the Nationalist capital, 
Chongqing, as the commander of U.S. forces in China and as the Chinese Government’s 
chief U. S. military advisor. The Sino-American Cooperative Organisation (SACO) – an 
organisation created by the SACO Treaty signed by the Republic of China and the 
United States of America in 1942 – established a mutual intelligence gathering entity in 
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China.  
SACO, also known as Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organisation, was 
set up by the US Navy and Chiang Kai Chek’s head of secret police– the Bureau of 
Investigation and Statistics – Tai Li. The commander for the American forces was Navy 
Captain Milton E. Miles. SACO – a US Navy operation – worked in parallel (and at 
times in competition) with the CIA’s forerunner; the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). 
At the same time as SACO was operating, OSS head Donovan was planning a major 
intelligence initiative – the Dragon Plan – with the SEPM founder and owner, C. V. 
Starr.66 There were numerous plans to use the SEPM assets as part of the war effort, 
including using journalists to spy. There are also references to the ‘Starr plan’, likewise 
using Starr’s resources. However, these espionage exploits did not seem to go far, due 
in large part to power squabbles within and between Chinese and American power 
players. 67 It appears that Starr’s espionage ambitions began before the outbreak of the 
Pacific War, and, as outlined in the previous chapter, the quality of output from the 
SEPM was possibly dubious. 
With the outbreak of the Pacific War, wartime censorship and propaganda mechanisms 
were reapplied in America. After only one month, the Code of Wartime Practices for 
the American Press was passed quickly and came into operation. Nevertheless, there had 
been a decrease in limitations towards use of the code to thwart mail publications and 
other restrictions of free speech by using relevant acts compared with the heavy 
limitations that applied in the First World War. Moreover, respected people in the 
American press were nominated as the main regulators of wartime journalism 
management. Byron Price, executive news editor of the Associated Press, was appointed 
as the director of the Office of Censorship, in which 14,462 staff were in charge of 
censoring mail, cables and radio communications transmitted between America and 
other countries. Elmer Davis who had worked for the New York Times for a decade and 
had taken a position of news analyst and commentator of the Columbia Broadcasting 
System was named director of the newly created Office of War Information that was 
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established to take charge of propaganda works.68 Even with the American concern for 
freedom of expression and the rights of the press, there was acceptance that censorship 
and propaganda were reasonable in wartime. Certainly it was consistent with the 
Missouri School’s journalists creed that acknowledged that the public good should be 
considered when deciding what to publish.  
In wartime Chongqing, there were two censorship systems that all media had to face. 
Firstly, the Nationalist government maintained a regime of censorship over both the 
Chinese and foreign newspapers.69 Secondly, reports that were relevant to American 
military operations in China were required to accept American military censorship.70 
The most significant difference between these forms of censorship was that the 
American’s were mainly concerned with military security, whereas the Chinese 
censorship extended to political concerns, and reports were refused publication for the 
protection of favoured individuals.71 Gould regarded the wartime censorship by the 
Nationalist government as detrimental to Chinese Publication Law, as censors were 
practically free to delete content they considered inappropriate, whereas he did not 
comment negatively on American censorship. 
Meanwhile, Randall Gould continued his activities in China despite having left Shanghai. 
As a previous Far East Correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, and occasional 
contributor, he returned to this role, reporting form Chongqing. Like many patriotic 
entrepreneurs who moved their factories from Shanghai to Chongqing before Japanese 
occupied East China, Gould prepared to re-establish the SEPM newspaper after 
Shanghai fully fell into Japanese hands.  
At this time, the Liberation Daily – under the direction of the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party – began to be completely revised. The newspaper on the day 
published an article ‘A Notice about revising the Party’s Organs’ written by the 
Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP. It was followed with an 
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editorial ‘To the Readers’, which emphasised the Party’s spirit, its character as a mass 
movement, its aggressive style and organisational discipline as the highest principles of 
the Party’s media organs. This was the period that CCP launched the Yan’an 
Rectification campaign, with the purpose of giving political education to the many 
people who had joined the party during its expansion. The plan was also to distance the 
CCP and its members from Soviet Union influences: 
The campaign had two interrelated purposes: consolidation of Mao’s 
control of the Communist movement and tightening of ideological and 
organizational discipline.72 
 
Writers were central to this movement. At the talks at the Yan’an forum on literature 
and art held in May 1942, Mao Zedong said: 
The writers and artists do not have a good knowledge either of those 
whom they describe or of their audience; indeed they may hardly know 
them at all. They do not know the workers or peasants or soldiers well, 
and do not know the cadres well either. What does lacking in 
understanding mean? Not understanding the language, that is, not 
being familiar with the rich, lively language of the masses. Since many 
writers and artists stand aloof from the masses and lead empty lives, 
naturally they are unfamiliar with the language of the people. 
Accordingly, their works are not only insipid in language but often 
contain nondescript expressions of their own coining which run 
counter to popular usage.73 
 
This view of journalists’ role was very different to that held by those outside the Chinese 
Communist Party. They did not necessarily see a direct understanding and experience 
of a situation as being essential to being able to report on it. However, they did accept 
that partisan journalism was part of the price of being at war. The second half of 1942 
saw Japanese expansion across the Asia Pacific, along with some significant defeats. 
The US’s victory at the Battle of Midway on 7 June marked a shift in the balance of 
power toward the Allied Forces in Asian and Pacific areas. Japan invaded the Alaskan 
territory of Attu and Kiska, the Philippines, and areas that are now known of as Malaysia, 
Singapore, Solomon Islands, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, but by the end of the 
year, they had all but lost Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, and New Guinea. 
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On 1 January 1943, a weekly New York edition of the SEPM was started.74 After Pearl 
Harbour and the increasing control of the SEPM by Japanese administrators, Gould and 
Starr decided to reclaim the reputation of the SEPM through this new edition, published 
outside China. The New York edition would counter Japanese propaganda.75 The news 
covered in the opening edition make a clear stance. The opening edition had the 
following cover stories: 
“Private Claims Against Japan Being Studied”, which outlined options 
for economic recompense for property owners at the war’s conclusion 
“War Outlook For Far East Encouraging” by Earl H Leaf, which 
announced the tide of the War had turned against Japan 
“News Letter Becomes Newspaper” a brief announcement that 
explained that previous newsletters had become the official new York 
edition, and how to place advertisements 
“Post’s editor Tells How War Hit Shanghai” by the Editor Fredrick B 
Opper 
“New Communication Lines To Far East Are Being Opened”, which 
described the re-establishment of radio communication between the 
USA and Asia 
“Repatriation Still A Hope In Washington”, about the repatriation of 
1,800 Japanese citizens 
“Extraterritoriality will soon Vanish”, about plans to abandon extra-
territorial rights in China 
“The Shanghai Evening Post Carries On”76 
 
The article “The Shanghai Evening Post Carries On” describes the purpose of 
the paper: 
Some fifteen years ago a group of young men started out to publish an 
American daily newspaper in Shanghai. The enterprise was undertaken 
with serious understanding of the difficulties and obligations involved.  
On several occasions it became necessary to state clearly the principles 
on which the Shanghai Evening Post was conducted and from 1937 
onward it was necessary to emphasize them repeatedly.  
A front page statement on December 16, 1937, over the signature of 
Cornelius V. Starr, declared that the newspaper's policy was to follow 
the best American newspaper tradition of free speech, of fearless and 
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hard-hitting editorials, realistic and non-partisan, and of straight news 
presentation devoid of editorial bias. 
Again, on July 17, 1940, a statement signed by Cornelius V. Starr and 
Randall Gould said that it has been our settled desire to operate upon 
principles of American policy in keeping with our American 
ownership and control... Our policy has been at all times sympathetic 
to the only recognized Government of China... In questions affecting 
the Government and people of China, as on all other vital issues, we 
have spoken our mind honestly and freely for what we deemed the right. 
Perhaps a day may come when this will no longer be possible in 
Shanghai; in such event, we shall bow with good grace and retire. 
Pearl Harbour temporarily put an end to The Shanghai Evening Post 
in Shanghai. Our last issue there appeared on Saturday, December 6, 
1941.  
There was no publication on Monday, December 8. When a newspaper 
bearing our name appeared from our plant the following day it was no 
more our own than the pseudo- National Government of China now at 
Nanking is the true National Government of China now at Chungking. 
Our editor was denied participation and later was imprisoned until his 
repatriation. Nevertheless, it is a source of deep regret to us that 
anything of the sort could happen, whether by force majeure or 
otherwise.  
Repeatedly, we stated principles under which The Shanghai Evening 
Post was conducted and we still hold to those principles. They involved 
an obligation. Unfortunate circumstances have made it appear that we 
have not lived up to that obligation. We feel that we must now contrive 
to carry on in the spirit so often expressed to our friends in Shanghai.  
The New York Edition of The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, of 
which this is the first issue, is an embodiment of that feeling. At as 
early a date as possible we hope to establish a Chungking Edition. 
Through them, we hope to keep alive the spirit of our original 
undertaking. 77 
 
According to Yu Maochun, the New York edition was watched carefully by the FBI in 
America as they were concerned that the SEPM was encroaching on their territory.78 
This article foreshadows the opening of the upcoming Chongqing edition and also 
provides more detail of the Japanese-controlled the SEPM that continued to publish. 
Australian newspapers quoted this Pseudo Post, for example, The Age newspaper of 11th 
April 1944 quotes the SEPM (Japanese-controlled English language daily).79 The article 
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by Leaf that appeared on the first New York edition’s front page is noteworthy as this 
United Press journalist, who is credited as the Associate Editor, had visited Yan’an as a 
guest of the CCP in April 1937 and was very impressed with his observations. However, 
he fell foul of the Party when he offended his hosts, by telling them what to do: 
The CCP was in need of foreign assistance in the late 1930s but it had 
to be on CCP terms and strictly under CCP control. Mao told Evans 
Carlson, “We welcome these foreigners who come to help us. But the 
trouble with so many foreigners is that they soon want to dictate. They 
must remember this is China and that while their advice is eagerly 
received, we are the ones to decide if and how it will be used.”80 
 
As referred to within the front page article of the first New York edition of the SEPM, 
early 1943 also saw the relinquishing of British extraterritoriality in China, with the 
signing of the Sino-British Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extra-Territorial Rights in 
China, further fighting in New Guinea, with Australians and Americans gaining the 
upper hand, and Japan having victories in Guadalcanal, including their clandestine 
evacuation, however, by early February, the taking of Guadalcanal is the first major 
achievement of the American offensive in the Pacific war. The Japanese bombed 
mainland Australian and begin a three-day massacre of civilians in Changjiao. By 
August 1943, Japan declared independence for the State of Burma under Ba Maw, a pan-
Asianist, who saw Japanese influence as being preferable to British. 
In October, the SEPM again published in China – based in Chongqing. It was reported 
in the press as follows: 
Behind steel doors and armed guards, even before Pearl Harbor, 
Randall Gould edited the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury under 
Japanese guns. When the Japanese took over the paper after December 
7, 1941, Mr Gould and his publisher, C. V. Starr, began a New York 
edition to maintain the vigorous continuity of the Host's name. Now, 
at last, there is an edition in Free China. Mr Gould and Frederick Burr 
Opper printed their first Chungking edition of the Post October 30. 
Some idea of this fine journalistic epic may be gathered from Mr 
Gould's story to "The Christian Science Monitor," of which he was 
formerly chief Far Eastern correspondent. Here it is: 
Anybody with 15 Chinese dollars – equalling 75 United States cents – 
now can obtain the first American newspaper published in' Free China 
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— the Chungking edition of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury. 
Even at that rate, we already see we won't make any money. But we do 
have fun. Costs of the enterprise are terrific, including months of, 
United States preparations, a 15, 000-mile trip almost by way of the 
South Pole, Himalayas, and Chungking, costs designed to make any 
business manager weep. However, nobody is submitting any taxi bills. 
Transportation is strictly "on the hoof" and the Editor of our new. 
Chungking edition, Frederick Burr Opper, and myself are developing 
jack-rabbit legs from climbing tile ancient stone steps to the apparently 
equally ancient office of Chungking's daily newspaper, the National 
Herald, perched against a hillside overlooking the Yangtze.81 
 
However, the re-establishment of the SEPM only occurred after a long and tortuous 
process. In September 1943, a formal application for publishing in Chongqing was 
submitted. It later needed to be approved by five different sections of the government, 
but the Nationalist Government presented active attitude.82 
First Chongqing issue 31 October 1943 
Due to the long wait for the formal licence of publication, Gould wrote a letter on 20 
October to Ho Yao-tsu, the Mayor of Chongqing, enquiring to publish the first issue of 
the Chongqing edition on 31 October 1943, which was in accordance with their original 
plan in the situation of without formal publishing approval. In the letter, Gould 
mentioned Opper had negotiated with Ho Feng-shan, director of the Intelligence 
Department of the Foreign Affairs, and Hollington Tong, Vice Minister of Publicity, and 
had acquired affirmative answers from both of them. Mayor Ho in his reply letter 
claimed that he had noticed the publication censorship section of Chongqing to allow 
the SEPM to publish on 31 October.83 
Producing the paper was quite an ordeal. According to Gould, the conditions for getting 
the paper printed were challenging. The paper was printed in a shabby office. As it was 
reported:  
… ancient office of Chungking's daily newspaper, the 'National 
Herald,' perched against a hillside overlooking the Yangtze. The 
Herald.' like the 'Evening Post,' Is a wartime refugee, having moved its 
none - too – modern Chinese-made presses from Hankow through the 
Yangtze gorges in 1938. It gladly made an arrangement for publication 
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with the 'Post' as a weekly, but the combined operation is straining the 
facilities of what is probably the world's most unique print shop. 
This is entered through a doorway in the cliff face leading to an S-
shaped tunnel equipped by two gas-guard curtains. Suddenly the 
passage opens into a larger room chiselled from rock considered 
Chungking's .finest bombproof. Under a bamboo framework 
supporting a split-bamboo false ceiling which protects against falling 
rocks sit Chinese compositors on high stools peering by dim electric 
light copy uncomprehended and sticking type. 
Two American linotypes inside the cave retired from old age. As the 
galleys are filled, Chief Printer Chen, a veteran of Hankow who never 
found it necessary to learn English to operate English-language 
newspapers, assembles it into wooden forms on a "stone" consisting of 
a plank covered by a strip of tin. A decrepit Chinese press chugs 
intermittently from the power of a Shanghai-made electric motor with 
frequent ministrations of the "chief engineer" whose sole tools are a 
printer's "stick" and a monkey wrench. The locally made 'Herald' prints 
on two grades of paper at a different subscription price, but the 
'Evening Post’ is employing only the best, rendering even use of cuts 
occasionally possible.84 
 
The circumstances in Chongqing that the newspaper faced were very different from 
those in Shanghai’s French Concession. Gould seemingly understood their plight, as he 
said that “since there is no longer any extraterritorial privilege for foreigners in China, 
and no areas of foreign control, any American or other foreign-owned publication comes 
fully under Chinese law and Chinese officials, which is as should be.” Gould deemed 
that it had been a terrific beginning to acquire permission during the wartime period.85 
Perhaps just because of his sense of urgency about the re-establishment of the newspaper 
and the relatively supportive attitude of the Nationalist Government, he felt may lead to 
his consideration for the journalism control and censorship posed by the Nationalist 
Government, and underestimate how potentially serious the issue would be.  
The main barrier in the application was that the Nationalist Government had tightened 
its control towards journalism and publication, particularly regarding foreigners. Gould 
at the moment might have not realised that the SEPM would not have been able to 
publish in Chongqing based on the common process when he was mentioning his 
appreciation for the help and special assistance from Hollington Tong, Soong Mei-ling 
and other friends. As Gould said: 
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In starting a Chungking (Chongqing) edition of the Shanghai Evening 
Post and Mercury in the fall of 1943, Fritz Opper and I had the 
advantage of great good will which had been built up among Chinese 
public and officials all the way up to and including the Generalissimo 
and Madame Chiang by the attitude of our former publications, the 
original Post and the Ta Mei vernacular papers. Even so, it was still 
necessary for us to get the permission of five different sets of officials 
before a license was promised.86 
 
However, what he should thank for were the newspaper staff included himself who 
risked their lives to hold fast to their own positions in the Isolated Island. The comments 
made by the Intelligence Department of the Foreign Affairs shown that the SEPM as a 
foreigners’ paper should been forbidden to publish in Chongqing, but the paper was 
specially approved to legally publish just because of considering its justice actions 
against Wang Ching-wei regime in Shanghai. It was specially emphasised by the 
Department of the Foreign Affairs that this case would not be applied to other foreigners 
to proposed similar request.87 Therefore, it could be argued that the SEPM would have 
not been able to be re-established without its special contribution for Chongqing and the 
resultant great sacrifice for fighting against Wang Ching-wei regime in Shanghai.  
The Cairo Declaration was formally proclaimed by the United States, Great Britain and 
the Republic of China on 1 December. The contents of the Cairo Declaration includes 
consensus reached in the conference that Japan must unconditional surrender, give up 
all islands occupied in the Pacific after the First World War, recognise the independent 
of the Korea, and return Manchuria and Taiwan to China.  
As a matter of fact, the formal permission for the SEPM to be published in Chongqing 
was not issued until 11 February 1944. Benefited from the special approval by the 
Nationalist Government, the wish to re-establish the SEPM in Chongqing was finally 
realised, but more serious issue followed subsequently that the paper must comply with 
the strict wartime censorship on principle. This became the most important constraint 
on the development of the newspaper in Chongqing. 
1944 marked the Japanese Army’s Operation Ichi-Go campaign in Henan, Hunan and 
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Guangxi Provinces, aimed at controlling the traffic line from Manchuria to Southeast 
Asia, so that more war materials could be delivered to the Japanese front.  It also saw 
the arrival of American Vice President Henry Wallace to Chongqing – the highest-
ranking US official to visit China at that time. The Chinese and Foreign Journalist Group, 
including Harrison Forman, Israel Epstein, Xie Shuangqiu and Zhao Chaogou, arrived 
in Yan’an in June, commencing their interviews.  The editorial, “Welcome American 
comrades-in-armies”, was published on 15 August in the Liberation Daily, an organ 
newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party.88 The year 1944 ended with the end of the 
Operation Ichi-Go campaign. The Japanese Army achieved military victory, but both 
Chinese and Japanese sides suffered significant losses, and Japan did not achieve the 
result that they anticipated.  
The increasing censorship 
Gould, soon after the establishment of the SEPM in Chongqing, realised that the 
newspaper would not be able to publish as freely in editorials as it was in Shanghai 
French Concession, and all editorials of the Chongqing edition must be censored before 
its publication. Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government might approve the 
newspaper to publish in Chongqing in the hope that it could continue the co-operation 
with the Government, striving for international support to Chinese resistance against 
Japan as it was in the Isolated Island Shanghai. However, the intention of either Starr or 
Gould was still to attempt to maintain the newspaper with American professional 
features. As Gould said:  
[…] Neil Starr nevertheless hadn’t sent us out on a propaganda 
enterprise. We would try to make this an American newspaper only by 
printing true news, but we would completely avoid any question as to 
whether our editorial ideas might in some official’s view be right or 
wrong in a given instance.89 
 
In contrast to pre-war Shanghai, the newspaper in Chongqing had not been able to enjoy 
many freedoms derived from extraterritoriality, and nearly all journalism activities of 
the newspaper were strictly control by the Nationalist Government. Indeed, the 
censorship implemented in Chognqing during the war against Japan had incurred sharp 
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criticism for a long time. Wang Shih-chieh as the minister of the Publicity Department 
of the Nationalist Party on 11 January 1940 at the dinner with Chinese journalists had 
heard the complaining about the censorship.90 Since the outbreak of the Pacific War, 
American journalists reinforced their concern on Chinese situation, but the Nationalist 
Government implemented more strict censorship. Western journalists organised several 
activities to advocate the Nationalist Government to reduce their control over journalism, 
but they did not receive any active feedback. 91  Under these circumstances, 
professionalism ideals which had been ran counter to the political and social atmosphere 
in Chongqing sowed the seeds for the long time frustration of the newspaper in 
Chongqing, and finally felt obliged to suspend on the eve of Victory over Japan Day. 
The SEPM in Chongqing often suffered publication crisis derived from the censorship 
from both China and the United Station. Compared with the American censorship, the 
Nationalist Government had stricter regulation. A typical case was the incident where 
Joseph Stilwell was forced to leave China in October 1944. Gould, in his memoir 
mentioned that a report of the Associated Press on 30 October 1944 about Stilwell being 
relinquished of his military power and leaving China. 388 words were firstly censored 
by the Americans and then China censored and deleted 104 words, and finally the piece 
of news was read as “Chungking, Oct. 29 – Stilwell is known to have taken formal leave 
of Chiang.”92 Gould further added:   
The comparatively heavy American share of the censorship on that 
particular dispatch was due to the fact that the American army censor 
got first bite. He took out everything he didn’t want Spencer Moosa to 
say about American aspects of the Stilwell recall, and the Chinese 
censor then attended to everything Spencer had said about why the 
Chinese wanted Stilwell removed. Ultimately the American censorship 
was relaxed on this story and a great deal was revealed, mostly through 
Washington. But so far as the Chinese could control filings from 
Chungking, they kept the cork in the bottle.93 
 
This had not been the worst period of the paper in Chongqing. The SEPM in its early 
time in Chongqing did not experience overmuch troubles from the Chinese censors as 
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most of the news reported were about the United States. However, increasing numbers 
of Chinese news which were not reported in Chongqing local Chinese newspapers were 
published in the SEPM. It attracted many Chinese readers, especially government 
officials, to read the paper, but simultaneously drew Chinese censors’ attention. In the 
early 1945, editors of the SEPM felt they were being not able to bear the censorship of 
Chongqing.94 In Gould’s memoir, there was a news report of the SEPM about Stilwell, 
and there was only a paragraph censored, but in the whole week of the negotiation 
between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, Chinese censors proposed that 
the paper could not publish anything, even the announcement issued by the Nationalist 
Party.95 As Gould recalled:  
[…] one week during the height of the Kuomintang (the Nationalist 
Party) – Communist negotiations, after Charlie (Charlie Miner) had 
successfully passed through the international censorship and filed to 
New York a full account of this still unconcluded squabble, he was 
advised by the local censors that he could print nothing whatever on 
the subject in our Chungking edition. […] Charlie radioed me in New 
York, saying that he proposed to print the substance of what he had 
been allowed to file telegraphically to us “unless forcibly restrained.”96 
 
Gould persuaded Miner to keep calm and told him not to publish any news or editorials 
about politics, but to state in the newspaper that there should be a long report, but it had 
been censored, and if readers were interested in the news and they could read the New 
York edition if possible.97 
The New York edition reported: 
Chou En-lai, Communist leader, has arrived in Chungking as 
scheduled, according to a dispatch from the Chungking Edition of the 
Shanghai Evening Post late this week.  
Agreement between the National Government headed by 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist Government of 
Yenan strongly hinted in private Washington advices to the Shanghai 
Evening Post last week was still hanging fire this week, but there were 
indications in a dispatch from the Post’s Chungking Edition that some 
sort of a settlement was anticipated momentarily. The dispatch read:  
"While withholding details beyond saying that the negotiations were 
continuing, Dr. T. V. Soong, Acting President of the Executive Yuan, 
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declared today (Wednesday): The (National) Government is showing 
a genuine desire to welcome the Communists into the national effort. 
Meanwhile, it is learned that Chou En-lai, Communist delegate to the 
People's Political Council, is scheduled to arrive in Chungking tonight 
(Wednesday), presumably bearing Yenan’s answer to the Government 
proposals, which have still not been officially disclosed.” 
At this point, 149 words were censored, and the dispatch continued:  
“The presence of Chou En-lai in Chungking, if confirmed, is regarded 
as a hopeful sign that there is some prospect of settlement. Otherwise, 
he would be very unlikely to make a personal visit to the capital at this 
time."  
Last week's Post report that there were strong indications of an 
agreement, according to private Washington advices to this newspaper, 
was followed by subsequent indications that the negotiations had 
struck a snag owing to the demands being made by the Communists.  
About the same time, however Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was 
quoted in an Associated Press dispatch from Chungking as predicting 
that the Nationalist differences with the Communists would be settled 
peacefully. He quoted as adding there would be no civil war in China 
as long as he was at the helm.98 
 
Although this change of censorship might be based on the authority’s political 
consideration, it caused a dilemma for the Chongqing edition of the SEPM. Randall 
Gould was concerned that because the newspaper was run under the Chinese law, he 
could not print the news truthfully and was reluctant to take money from their readers, 
due to what he saw as false pretences.99 To the SEPM, although it had to bear the strict 
censorship, there were still positive features of the newspaper, such as some high level 
officials in Chiang Kai-shek’s government who had American study experience and 
similar ideologies with Gould. This element made Gould maintain his patience towards 
the Nationalist Government in Chongqing at the same time when he complained the 
environment of the press in Chongqing. When the SEPM applied to establish in 
Chongqing, Soong May-ling and Hollington Tong provided critical support and 
assistance, thus the paper, by not bribing any officials, was able to be successfully 
approved to publish by the Nationalist Government, in which corruption had been a 
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serious issue.100  
In the time of the SEPM published in Chongqing, Hollington Tong by his active attitude 
helped Gould successfully solve many issues when he was irritated by the censorship of 
Chongqing. In October 1943, Louis Mountbatten took a plane from India across the 
Himalayas to Chongqing. Japanese air force at that time had implemented air attacks 
aimed at this air route, and many American flights had been shot down. In accordance 
with this situation, censors of Chongqing accepted an order that the name of 
Mountbatten should not be occurred in any news and editorials. Just then, Gould in a 
report which was not relevant to Mountbatten’s visit to China mentioned the name of 
Mountbatten, and the censors asked Gould to delete the whole article. It irritated Gould 
and he immediately had it out with Hollington Tong. Tong understood and accepted 
Gould’s concerns and amended regulations of the censorship, and Gould felt in his 
debt.101 As Gould recalled:  
I went direct to Hollington Tong. I pointed out not only that my text 
involved no security consideration whatever, but that the general 
orders were stupid and possibly self-defeating. The very fact that the 
name of Mountbatten, ordinarily mentioned fairly often by the 
Chungking correspondents, was suddenly disappearing entirely from 
all press messages was bound to be a suspicious factor to the Japanese, 
who copied every word going out of Chungking by radio and were 
extremely smart in drawing deductions. 
Holly saw the point. He not only authorized the restoration of my text 
to its original form, but I believe he sent down an amended order, 
leaving the whole question to the censors’ personal discretion in any 
future instances. Holly appreciated my presentation, and his response 
to it was not merely kindly but intelligent. I know that his subordinate 
censors were glad about what had happened, for they told me so. It was 
never a pleasure for them to have to take arbitrary action. But their jobs 
depended on carrying out orders, naturally.102 
 
However, the general environment in Chongqing was still very strict and Tong 
implemented the harsh censorship policy but also showed sensitivity in his handling of 
Western journalists. For issues that he thought posed no serious threat to the government 
he was able to listen to and compromise with journalists. However, on critical issues, 
                                                 
100 Gould, China in the Sun, 334. 
101 Gould, China in the Sun, 332. 
102 Gould, China in the Sun, 332. 
174 
 
especially those pertaining to the CCP, he gave no ground but showed sophistication in 
the way he implemented his orders with regard to these journalists. For example, Chris 
Hopper from the SEPM, Harold Isaacs of Newsweek, and Clyde Farnsworth of 
Associated Press submitted applications to visit Yan’an after October 1945 but these 
were denied by Hollington Tong. Regarding the denial of these applications Tong said, 
“I favored this ban myself, in part in fairness to the correspondents. It seemed to me far 
better to refuse the permission outright than to permit them to take the trip and then 
apply wholesale censorship to their dispatches.”103 
Wang Shi-chieh was another important enlightened high level official in Chongqing. In 
Gould’s opinion, he was a liberal official and journalists were basically satisfactory to 
his working style. Gould, before his leave from Chongqing, had a very good 
conversation with him. As Gould said:   
I had a talk with him before my departure and found him ready to admit 
that the tight censorship was doing China much harm abroad. We 
agreed that if the prestige of the Chungking correspondents continued 
to suffer because of their inability to tell a full story, that would only 
play into the hands of American keyhole columnists and stay-at-home 
magazine strategists who could command an even greater following 
for what they termed their “inside stuff on China – what the Chungking 
censors won’t pass.”104 
 
Indeed, these enlightened officials not only in their mind did support free expression and 
professional journalism but also did provide significant help to the SEPM. In the spring 
of 1945, Wang Shih-chieh and Soong Tse-ven promised to American ambassador 
Patrick Hurley that strict censorship should not be a long term policy of China, and they 
supported to present news with diverse views to the public.105 However, they were not 
able to fundamentally change the partisan trend of Chinese journalism development. 
When the Nationalist Government implemented strict censorship in Chongqing, a 
Communist partisan journalism management system under the Mao Zedong’s absolute 
control had been established in Yan’an. And it would unavoidably cast a shadow over 
post-war Chinese journalism. 
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Many government officials liked to read the SEPM because they could acquire Chinese 
news that could not be published in other newspapers.106 However, censorship became 
increasingly more restrictive with the victory of the war looming. This change was 
relevant to a political rivalry which was developing between the Nationalist Party and 
the Communist Party. In early 1945, news of a negotiation between the Nationalist Party 
and the Communist Party was censored in the Chongqing edition.107 Randall Gould 
suspected this was in order to prevent a retort by the CCP.108 
When the private press was trapped by the restriction of an ailing economy and wartime 
journalism management in the course of the Nationalist Government heading west, 
organs of the Nationalist Party rapidly received the benefits from their key role of anti-
Japanese propaganda. As a result, the Nationalist organ system during the war against 
Japan explored and consolidated its influence in the southwest of China where it was 
used in a weak area for the party’s propaganda machinery to reach before the war, and 
this incurred much resentment from the Chinese Communist Party.109 Meanwhile, the 
Nationalist Party kept high vigilance of the Communist’s journalistic activities within 
Nationalist controlled areas. The Chinese Communist Party, on the one hand, made the 
most of its organs’ legal position obtained as a product of the formation of the anti-
Japanese national united front to exert the Communists’ influence to alter the public 
opinion to favour the Communist in the Nationalist Party controlled areas. On the other 
hand, the Party actively engaged in united front works, aimed at dividing and 
demoralising the Nationalist propaganda machinery in secret by co-opting and 
mustering support from the press and publishing controlled by the members of the 
Nationalist Party who were sympathetic in a way to the Communist Party, the third 
political parties and social organisations. These activities of the Communist Party often 
suffered the Nationalists’ obstruction and suppression, which was a fuse of deteriorating 
the relations between the two parties during the war. 
In early 1945, the Yalta Conference closed, with clauses associated with the Soviet 
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Army sending troops to Manchuria. Within a couple of months US President Roosevelt 
had passed away – succeeded by Harry S. Truman – and the SEPM reported that the 
Japanese may withdraw across Asia. The Army news reported that there were rumours 
of planned Japanese troop withdrawal from Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, south China 
and even central China. They reported this as circulating in diplomatic circles in 
Chungking, due to Japan’s military and diplomatic failures: 
The Chungking edition of the Shanghai Evening Post listed four 
reasons supporting- the suggestion: –" First, the defeats in Burma and 
in the Pacific, resulting in a direct threat to the Japanese homeland, 
may force the Japanese to call more troops home to strengthen the 
island defences; secondly, the Japanese, with the end of the European 
war in sight, may feel forced to take precautionary measures against 
the possibility of a Russian invasion of Manchuria, especially in view 
of .the termination of the Russo-Japanese pact; thirdly, China’s efforts 
to . strengthen and re-equip its armies, with the help of the United 
States, have imposed a growing threat to the Japanese hold on 
communications and the coastal corridors in south and central China; 
fourthly the growing probability of American landings on the China 
coast.110 
 
On May 8th, Germany acknowledged unconditional surrender. And, with Allied success, 
imminent, at the end of June, the difficult decision was made to discontinue publication 
of the Chongqing edition.111 On the front page of the final newspaper, C. V. Starr, 
Randall Gould and Charles Miner made a statement under joint names that the current 
wartime censorship had become unacceptable, forcing the Shanghai Evening Post and 
Mercury to deviate from its original principle of providing straight news. As a result, the 
newspaper team felt that they had no choice but to suspend publication until after the 
victory of the war.112 
While there was strong censorship, the paper was allowed to publish around issues 
supported by the nationalists, for example, backing Chungking’s mayor Gen. So Yan-
tsu about the assault of a Chinese woman by a crowd for being in the company of a US 
Embassy Official: 
Said the Chungking editor of the "Shanghai Evening Post": "Scandal-
mongers appear to have persuaded many Chinese that every American 
in uniform is a lecher, and every Chinese girl who allows herself to be 
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seen with him in public is a prostitute."113 
 
As Gould recorded, one week during the negotiations between the Nationalist party and 
the Communist party, Charlie Miner successfully passed through international 
censorship and was prevented by local censors to publish anything even a statement 
issued by the Publicity Minister. His reaction was one of anger and frustration and he 
reported to New York a full account of the incident he wanted to disclose and confirmed 
that he would go ahead anyway unless he was forcibly restrained. Gould tried to 
negotiate with Miner by pointing out the seriousness of abiding by the Chinese law but 
if Miner felt his position was intolerable then he should close down. The outcome was 
that Miner omitted the political statement but clearly indicated to his readers that he had 
been forced to leave out details and that the readers were encouraged to seek the 
American publication to reveal the censored section. 114 
Suspended publication in Chongqing 
Just before the victory of the War of Resistance against Japan, a sudden increase in 
censorship by the Nationalist government led to the Chongqing edition suspending 
publication on 24 June 1945. This was unexpected, because there were no censorship 
troubles in the first year of the Chongqing edition, and the newspaper was successful in 
attracting numbers of Chinese English-reading subscribers.115  
The final edition included the statement: 
DELETED BY CENSOR 
An experiment concludes with this issue of the Chungking Edition, 
Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury. 
In an announcement published in the first number, appearing Oct. 13, 
1943, we reviewed the record. Fifteen years previously a group of 
young men has started an American daily newspaper in Shanghai. 
They surmounted many difficulties, added a Chinese-language affiliate, 
but suspended by Japanese compulsion from Dec. 6, 1941. 
On Jan. 1, 1943, we started a weekly American Edition of the Shanghai 
Evening Post and Mercury in New York City. In introducing our 
Chungking edition 10 months later we said: “though the appearance 
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and frequency of our present publications under war conditions 
necessarily differ from the original Post, we intend to preserve the 
original character and principles whose primary interest was always 
straight news.” 
We have now come to the conclusion that publication of an American 
newspaper in the Posts’ tradition has clearly impossible in China under 
wartime censorship restrictions which go far beyond considerations of 
military security. Therefore we are suspending under victory as ben 
won, when we expect to resume daily publication in Shanghai. 
Meanwhile our American Edition, which represents news and editorial 
policies of the former Shanghai paper, is continuing. Subscribers to the 
Chungking edition are offered an option of their money back for the 
amount of unfilled subscriptions, or the American edition by mail, 
subject to the operations of the Chinese censorship.116 
 
The statement was signed by C.V. Starr, Randall Gould and Charles S. Miner. The 
editors forewarned of this in the New York edition of the SEPM on 22 June 1945, in the 
front page article “Post suspends Wartime issue in Chungking” along with printing 
Chongqing edition’s statement about closing and added: 
During its 20 months of existence the Chungking edition won a 
considerable following among bother foreign and English-speaking 
Chinese readers, Five hundred copies a month were donated to the US 
Army and flown to various points within China, where these were 
made available to readers of the American armed forces by the Special 
Service Section. At the outset the Chungking edition specialized on 
news send by radio from the United States, but in response to reader 
demand it published an increasing percentage of news from points 
within China. Special pains were taken to assure an impartial 
presentation.117 
 
The article went on describing intermittent conflict with censors during 1945, explicitly 
noting that censors’ concerns did not include the changes of biased reporting; rather the 
censors’ concerns were non-military. An example is provided of a blanket ban on 
printing anything about the Communist Party during an acute stage of cross-party 
negotiations. The SEPM pointed out that they were not subject to any additional 
censorship than the Chinese press. It summarised it, so: 
It was known to be an American newspaper and its tradition previously 
had been to publish all angles of every news story regarded as 
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important. 
Under such circumstances, the editor and management of the 
Chungking edition found themselves in an increasingly embarrassing 
position, It was therefore decided, after due consideration, to suspend 
publication for such time as war censorship compels an abandonment 
of original standards. 
 
The stories on the front page of the first New York edition after the Chongqing edition’s 
closure – the edition of 29 June 1945 – were fairly consistent with those in the New York 
edition before the Chongqing edition’s closure. The front page articles of 29 June 1945 
were:  
“Dim Hope Held For Immediate Repatriations” – a reprint of the State 
Department’s report on the status of Japan’s prisoners of war and civil 
detainees 
“Gold At 1800 –I After Sales Are Suspended” – about the gold sales 
in Chongqing 
“Heading For Moscow” – about T.V. Soong’s trip 
“National City Opens Philippines Branch At Former Quarters” – 
around National City Bank’s reopening 
“Trade Registration” – about the extension of timeframes for foreign 
firms to register in China (a story from Charles Miner reported by radio, 
direct from Chungking) 
“War Fronts Of The Far East” 
“Chiang Hails U.S. War Aid But Stresses Economic Need” – a story 
from Charles Miner reported by radio, direct from Chungking 
“38 Specialists End Technical Studies In U.S.” – about Chinese 
visitors under a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration program 
“First Attached, China Also 1st On Charter Roll” – about signing of the 
Charter of the United Nations 
“N.Y. Observance Will Make China’s Eight Years Of War” – about 
the Ambassador’s guest speaking engagement.118 
 
Around this time, in China, work was being done on healing the problems between the 
Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. As part of this plan, on 1 July 1945, six 
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representatives of the People's Political Council visited Yan’an at the invitation of the 
CCP.  
Huang Yanpei admired the democratic emphasis that Mao propagated, and praised the 
efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to improve Chinese progress.119 On 7 August, 
Huang Yanpei’s book, Return from Yan’an was published by Guoxun bookshop in 
Chongqing, and the Xinhua Daily published striking advertisements on its front page for 
three days. Published without accepting censorship, this book, published mere days 
before Japan’s surrender, marked the beginning of the Movement of Refusing 
Censorship. 
The Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, aimed at urging Japan to 
surrender as soon as possible, was issued on 26 July. On 6 August, Hiroshima was 
bombed, on 8 August, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria began, on 9 August Nagasaki 
was bombed and on 15 August Japanese Emperor Hirohito announced the surrender of 
Japan. The following day, he issued an Imperial Rescript ordering Japanese forces to 
cease fire. However it is not until 9 September that the Japanese troops in China formally 
surrender, marking the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War. 
The SEPost and Mercury editor, Gould, entered the post-War period with an optimistic 
view towards freedom of the press in post war China. He based this positive outlook on 
the statements of T. V. Soong, President of the Executive Yuan, and Wang Shih-chieh, 
Minister of Information who together assured the U.S. Ambassador Hurley that 
liberalisation was a key future focus and that censorship was not an ongoing practice 
within the press institutions in China.120 Gould had a favourable impression of Wang 
Shih-chieh due to an earlier conversation when Wang Shih-chieh was first appointed to 
the publicity ministry; he indicated to Gould that he recognised the damage that the 
censorship was doing abroad.121  
With the end of the war, thoughts of seeking peace and democracy initially began to 
spread amongst intellectuals, and then influenced the whole society. When the War of 
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Resistance against Japan broke out and resistance became main theme of Chinese society, 
some intellectuals further hoped this war could be an antidote to change the political and 
social chaos, which both the Revolution of 1911 and the May Fourth Movement failed 
to realise.122 To them, the coming of VJ Day should not just mean a military victory, but 
a historical opportunity to improve post-war peace and democracy. However, there was 
a huge gap between Chinese social reality and their political ideals, and this stimulated 
their general anxiousness. This anxiousness was expressed well by General Zhang 
Zhizhong, who wrote in the face of the victory: 
Despite the great victory of the War of Resistance against Japan, 
domestic issues are still loaded with danger and are delicately poised. 
This makes us raise a sense of anxious consciousness.123 
 
Conclusion 
Journalists and newspaper organisations faced an impossible situation during the second 
Sino-Japanese War and the Isolated Island Period for Shanghai. Fear, intimidation, 
supplemented censorship as setting the scene for insurmountable obstacles to 
professional journalism. Newspapers were vital in the War of resistance against Japan, 
and the SEPM, clearly led the charge of foreign-owned newspapers in resisting 
censorship. Their sacrifice was great: at least five staff were murdered, including 
colourful and well known editors Zhu Xinggong and Samuel Chang. 
The SEPM’s editors and owner were very keen to preserve the tradition of the newspaper 
particularly its commitment to professional news reporting. Once the paper fell under 
Japanese control, Starr’s strategy was to open the New York edition in order to continue 
to publish editorials and news that could no longer be produced once extraterritoriality 
was eradicated in Shanghai. After the situation in Shanghai was untenable, the SEPM 
accomplished an impressive feat in managing to get the paper re-opened in Chongqing. 
Overcoming great difficulties in producing the paper (getting supplies, carrying out 
printing, as well as distribution) the Chongqing edition proved to be invaluable in the 
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wartime situation. English readers included those from all sides who wanted to know 
what was going on. However, having to operate under both Nationalist and American 
censorship regulation proved too much for the SEPM. The paper closed just before the 
War of resistance against Japan reached final victory. 
In the vastly different world of post-war Shanghai, the SEPM’s editors and owner sought 
to re-establish the paper, now one of only two English language papers in Shanghai. 
Unfortunately, without the protection of extraterritoriality and in a very changed 
political environment, the SEPM was to face obstacles which even the ingenuity, grit, 
and determination of Gould and Starr were unable to overcome
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Chapter 4: Return to Shanghai: ‘Victory Brings Rebirth’ 
Two months after the suspension of the Chongqing edition of the SEPM, a campaign 
that sought to scrap censorship broke out in Chongqing and later spread to other cities 
across Nationalist Party controlled China. This campaign, known as ‘the Movement of 
Refusing Censorship’ was largely instigated by the deep-seated political divisions 
between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. With victory over Japan 
looming, it could be said that the catalyst for the movement was also a mounting 
sentiment of optimism and urgency regarding the possibility of ushering in an era of 
civil liberties and democracy, or at the very least, the restoration of pre-war freedoms 
and rights. The movement finally achieved a temporary victory. This provided the 
impetus for the re-establishment of the SEPM in Shanghai. After the outbreak of the 
Refusing Censorship Movement, C. V. Starr and Randall Gould believed that it would 
be the turning point of post-war Chinese journalism. Thus, they made the decision to re-
establish the SEPM in Shanghai. The first part of this chapter outlines this broader 
historical context in which the SEPM was able to recommence newspaper and radio 
operations in Shanghai. 
Prelude to the Movement of Refusing Censorship 
Although the Nationalists and the Communists had avowed to sincerely cooperate with 
each other against Japanese invasion, sharp and complex contradictions and conflicts 
which had gradually grown since the outbreak of the War of Resistance fundamentally 
altered the pre-war balance of power between the two parties.1 Up to the victory of the 
war, these fundamental contradictions and conflicts were not eased up, rather, the issue 
of post-war power distribution raised tensions between the two parties, reaching a 
critical point breaking out in a military clash. This potential risk was sensitively captured 
by Peter Vladimirov, the liaison officer for Comintern in Yan’an, and it was recorded in 
his diary of 21 August 1945 based on his observation that the Communist and the 
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Nationalist armies mixed and clashed when they were simultaneously dispatched for the 
takeover of local regimes in the former Japanese occupied areas, and they reproached 
each through the media.2 
Besides the increasing risk of military conflict, the struggle by both sides over the issue 
of journalistic control also continued. With the privately owned media outlets 
constrained by an ailing economy and the restrictions of wartime journalism 
management as the Nationalist Government headed west, organs of the Nationalist Party 
rapidly received the benefits of their anti-Japanese propaganda. As a result, the 
Nationalist Party consolidated its influence in the southwest of China, and this incurred 
much resentment from the Chinese Communist Party.3 Meanwhile, the Nationalist Party 
maintained high vigilance regarding the Communists’ journalistic activities within 
Nationalist controlled areas.  
The Xinhua Daily was one of the main Communist organs of propaganda and it was able 
to legally publish in the Nationalist Party controlled areas during the war against Japan. 
The paper in the process of propagating Communist political views and policies often 
engaged in bitter wars of words with the Nationalists and other “dissidents” from other 
parties. Although the legal position of the Xinhua Daily was recognised until 28 
February 1947, the Nationalists were well aware of the actual threats to their regime 
from Communist propaganda disseminated through the paper. Hence, restrictions in 
public and sabotage in secret against the Xinhua Daily continued from the time of its 
establishment in Wuhan on 11 January 1938.4 However, the Nationalist Party fully 
understood that despite the enduring campaign of spite between the two parties, they 
could not ban the Xinhua Daily (considered a signpost of the Nationalist-Communist 
relations by foreigners) lest the CCP gain an opportunity to condemn the Nationalist 
Party for sabotaging their cooperation in their struggle against Japan, and thereby 
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winning the sympathy and support of public opinion.5 
Apart from legal propaganda in the Nationalist Party controlled areas, inviting 
journalists to visit Yan’an was another highly successful Chinese Communist Party 
tactic during the war. The accounts given by the Western journalists whom the Party 
invited to visit Yan’an, such as Edgar Snow and Agnes Smedley, were particularly 
beneficial to the Party in projecting a contrasting image, undermining the existing 
unfavourable public perception. What they wrote influenced their governments’ policies 
attitude towards the Chinese Communist Party, generating a wide range of international 
support that the Party was badly in need of at that time.6 The group of Western and 
Chinese journalists who visited Yan’an on May 17 1944 were included on a list of 
journalists’ that the Publicity Department of the Nationalist Party strictly scrutinised. 
But even so, they did not realise that Xie Shiangqui, director of the interview section of 
the Saodangbao (a Nationalist military organ) was aiding the Communist Party from 
within the Nationalist camp.7 
Movement of Refusing Censorship 
One of the objectives of the Communist united front works was to do as much as possible 
to undermine the Nationalist wartime censorship. The Communists slowly built up 
enough strength to strike back against the Nationalists, whose own propaganda had been 
undermining them. The outbreak of the Movement of Refusing Censorship was a result 
of Communist united front works. A key figure is Huang Luofeng. He was one of the 
Communists active on the press and publication front in the Nationalist Party occupied 
areas. Huang joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927.8 After spending his early 
life in Yunnan Province for the Party’s revolutionary cause, he engaged in the 
publication of books in Shanghai that aimed to introduce the theories of Communism to 
the masses. He moved to Chongqing in 1939, as the manager running the Dushu 
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Publishing House. He also shouldered liaison work between the South Bureau of the 
Central Committee of the CCP and the press and publishing sector in Chongqing.9 The 
New Fourth Army Incident in January 1941 entirely unmasked the hostility between the 
two parties, and as a result, the Nationalists forcedly closed three publishing institutes 
(Dushu, Shenghuo and Xinzhi) suspected of close links with the Communist Party.10 
Huang consequently felt obliged to flee to Hong Kong.11 During that time, he still kept 
in touch with the Chinese Communist Party organisation under the pseudonym of Yuan 
Zhao.12 In the spring of 1942, he returned to Chongqing, and continued the work of 
secretly establishing united front operations there, in accordance with Zhou Enlai’s 
instructions.13 
The heads of 13 publishing institutes who had pro-Communism leanings or were to a 
certain degree sympathetic to the Communist Party were successfully called together in 
the summer of 1943 – effectively sowing the seeds for the establishment of the New 
United Publishing Enterprise Agency. This agency was initially just a forum, in which 
members convened a couple of times per month to discuss their perspectives on the 
current political situation. Huang exploited his skills in handling the forum in subtle 
ways to propagate the CCP’s guidelines and policies.14  It was to culminate in the 
formation of a publishing united front in Chongqing under the leadership of the CCP. 
Huang Luofeng held the position of president in this agency, and Guoxun Bookshop, 
which performed a critical role in the later Movement of Refusing Censorship, was a 
member of the agency. Shang Ding, as the manager of Guoxun Bookshop also assumed 
a directors’ role in the agency.15 Later, Huang launched a series of activities through this 
agency against the Nationalist wartime censorship and economic policies which 
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restricted the press and publishing.16 
On 1 July 1945, six representatives of the People’s Political Council visited Yan’an at 
the invitation of the CCP. Huang Yanpei as a representative during this trip had a 
conversation with Mao Zedong, seeking his advice on the way forward for the nation-
building of the future: 
(Huang Yanpei): Based on my about sixty-year experience, which just 
takes what I’ve seen with my own eyes into account, I deeply feel that 
prosperity can come quickly, but it is difficult to elude the final fate of 
perishing. A great deal of units, such as a person, a family, a group, a 
place, and even a country, are not able to avoid the dominance by this 
law. In the early period, people are engrossed. … However, when the 
environment gradually gets better, people accordingly become 
languished. … When we read a history, we can find incalculable cases 
of terminating the political regime and self-defeating. … All in all, 
things are always develop by this law. I basically know some deeds of 
the main leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. I hope to find a new 
way which can loosen the bonds of the law. 
Mao Zedong answered that “we have explored a new way, in which 
we shall not obey this law. The new way is democracy. The 
government will not slack only if it is supervised by the people. When 
everyone takes their own responsibility, terminating the political 
regime will be avoidable and unnecessary.”17 
 
After returning to Chongqing, Huang, in accordance with a pre-arranged agreement, 
wrote accounts of his trip, and submitted them to Shang Ding for publication. When 
Shang Ding received the manuscripts, he thought this book reflected the achievements 
of the CCP in its controlled area, and would expose the Nationalists’ long-term lies 
aimed at disgracing the Communists. For this reason, he felt that the Nationalist censors 
may ban the book, or they would require him to delete any content that cast an 
unfavourable light on them.18 Labouring under the anxiety of this dilemma, Shang Ding 
sought out Huang Luofeng to talk matters over. After being deep in thought for a 
moment, Huang proposed to circumvent the censors and publish the book directly. 
Moreover, he suggested that this book could lead the charge and may act as the catalyst 
for a tempest of censorship refusal. He promised that if Huang himself would commit to 
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this idea, he would mobilise tens of book shops and publishing houses in Chongqing to 
follow, and try to persuade all others in cultural, publication and news reporting 
activities to support this movement.19 
On 7 August, the book was published. 20  After mobilisation, on 17 August a joint 
statement formally announced the refusal of censorship from 1 September 1945 - 
signatures from 16 publishing institutes in Chongqing were appended. This document 
was soon submitted to the Publicity Department of the Nationalist Party, the Association 
for the Promotion of Constitutionalism, and the People’s Political Council. 21  The 
influence of the movement continued to expand. After September, this movement spread 
to other cities.22 On 12 September, the Minister of Propaganda, Wu Kuo-chen, declared 
that censorship of the wartime period would be annulled from 1 October, but the area 
where the military were still attempting to regain control from Japanese forces would 
not be included. The Nationalist Party in its 10th Central Committee convened on 22 
September also decreed that the censorship over the press, books and magazines would 
be cancelled from 1 October.23  
Re-establishment of the SEPM and its Radio Station in Shanghai 
Soon after the announcement, Charlie Miner went back to Shanghai to investigate the 
viability of the re-establishment of the newspaper. He learnt that local censors were still 
reluctant to report the chaotic political and economic situation, and in order to 
recommence publishing, the government required that publishers had to agree to submit 
to censorship.24 When Miner returned to the original newspaper office in Shanghai, he 
found that much equipment had been stolen. However, these problems did not affect the 
decision to resume the daily newspaper in Shanghai. As Starr and Gould believed, 
increasing numbers of Chinese would embrace fairness and common sense, so they 
decided to accept what they thought would be only temporary censorship in order to re-
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establish the SEPM.25 As Gould recalled:   
With the peace, there arose hope that censorship in China would 
instantly be no more. But one of the first announcements issued by the 
National Government after Japan’s surrender was that censorship 
could not yet be relinquished. This was not taken lying down; by 
September 15 a total of twenty publications in Chungking had taken 
formal stand that they would not submit their products to the tender 
ministrations of the censors any longer. On October 1 China’s wartime 
censorship was stated to be abolished – but only in Free China. On the 
plea that military operations were still in progress in areas of Japanese 
occupation, the lid remained on there. Soon after arrival in Shanghai, 
Charlie Miner found that the Chinese censors objected to a full 
portrayal of the chaotic political – economic situation either through 
local publication or in radio messages home. 
Nevertheless it was decided to resume publication of the daily 
Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury. Charlie was at first denied entry 
to our plant by a Japanese sentry posted at the door, although this was 
a month after Tokyo’s surrender. He employed flanking tactic and 
went in through a window. Much of our equipment had been stolen. 
Even after Charlie was grudgingly granted free entry, he had a terrific 
job on his hands in restoring enough order to the print shop to permit 
renewed operation. Also, it was made clear by the Chinese authorities 
that we must promise to submit to censorship if we wanted permission 
to publish again. Charlie queried Neil and myself in New York City, 
and we told him to go ahead, accepting all Chinese Regulations on the 
presumption that fairness and common sense would prevail. 26 
 
After extensive preparation, the SEPM finally resumed publication in Shanghai on 24 
September, and on the front page, C. V. Starr, Gould and Charlie Miner submitted a joint 
article entitled ‘Victory Brings Rebirth’ symbolising their aspirations for the future. In 
the article, they pointed out that they fully understood the challenge they would face, 
and their aim was to retain the original newspaper’s values of reporting ‘straight’ news 
and independent views because they firmly believed that this would be beneficial to both 
China and America.27 
In late September 1945, the SEPM regained the Huang Pu Radio Station, and re-
established its Ta Mei Radio Station.28 On 8 October, the station signed a corporation 
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agreement with the United States Information Service. In accordance with this 
agreement, the station would be used by the United States Information Service until 31 
December 1945.29 Unfortunately, before this contract had expired, the Ta Mei radio 
station was under new ownership due to the restrictions of the radio ownership policy of 
the post-war Nationalist Government. 
The pre-war prosperity of radio broadcast, which generally derived (especially in foreign 
concessions) from private Chinese and foreign-owned radio stations in east coast 
metropolises, no longer existed during the War of Resistance against Japan. In the 
Japanese occupied areas, radio stations that were not willing to cooperate with the 
collaborationist regimes were forced to close. Meanwhile, using the war as a pretext, the 
Nationalist Party did not permit independent radio stations in the areas it controlled 
either.30 Unlike the newspapers and news agencies, due to the fixed and cumbersome 
nature of the machines and equipment, the Nationalist Party’s official radio station’s 
move to the west did not proceed smoothly. The situation began to turn from 1939 
onwards when the Central Radio Enterprise Bureau was established to guide and govern 
the national radio network as determined by the Nationalist hierarchy. When non-official 
radio stations were restricted by both subjective and objective factors to broadcast in 
hinterland China, the Central Radio Station under the auspices of the government rapidly 
developed and began to establish its superiority in the Nationalist Party controlled areas. 
From then on, official radio stations overwhelmingly replaced private Chinese and 
foreign-owned stations and began to dominate China.31 
Radio - under the monopoly of officials - played an important role for the Nationalist 
Government, helping it to secure the final victory of the War of Resistance. After the 
Nationalist Government retreated to southwest China, it realised that it was difficult to 
deliver newspapers on time in this vast and inhospitable region, and the news that did 
arrive through print-media was either already stale upon arrival, or became stale very 
soon thereafter. Radio therefore replaced the newspaper as the Nationalist armies’ main 
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means for accessing up-to-date news.32 Furthermore, radio held far greater strategic 
importance for the Nationalist Government during the war time than newspapers did. 
Compared with conventional propaganda methods, radio can more easily penetrate into 
the enemies’ occupied areas for the purpose of diffusing propaganda to the masses. This 
fact was raised in a manual printed by the Publicity Department of the Nationalist Party 
in 1942. It was entitled The War of Radio Propaganda – besides diplomatic strategy, 
economic pressure and military force, radio was spoken of as one of the essential 
weapons in the war.33 Wu Daoyi, the director of the Administration of Radio, in a post-
war speech summarising the contribution of radio to the victory over the Japanese, 
praised radio staff by acknowledging that during the war they had fulfilled an enormous 
responsibility as the mouthpiece of the government, which allowed it to exert 
considerable influence over public opinion.34 Radio during wartime China obviously 
had been considered a political resource that the government should control and exploit 
to serve its own ends, rather than a platform for freedom of speech. 
This approach to radio station management was copied nationwide with the Nationalists’ 
post-war takeover of areas formerly occupied by the Japanese. It is no surprise then that, 
given the incredibly powerful means of communication radio represented at that time, 
the Nationalist Government made the decision to implement overarching control and 
strict management of radio stations in post-war China. On 27 August 1945, the Ministry 
of Transportation and Communications issued a notice in Shanghai, in which it was 
explained that the Nationalist army would soon arrive in Shanghai, and that radio 
propaganda would become an important activity after the military operation.35 Chen 
Guofu, an influential decision maker in the Nationalist Party, in a special telegram dated 
19 September addressed to Qian Dajun, the mayor of Shanghai, made particular 
reference to the following points: that radio is the mouthpiece of the nation-state of 
China, enabling it to broadcast the Chinese voice to the world; radio is a critical tool for 
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propaganda and for the education of the Chinese people.36 
The Nationalist Party’s emphasis on radio meant that this enterprise in post-war China 
unavoidably developed along party controlled lines. Although a distinct policy about 
radio station management had not yet been enacted in late 1945, Starr (by his own 
initiative) had learnt that the Nationalist Government held the view that foreigners 
should not have the authority to own radio stations. Based on this information, he quickly 
made a decision to sell up the Ta Mei Radio Station. Upon the recommendation of Liu 
Guangxun, the former owner of the station, Zheng Zhaoji and Wang Yancun presented 
themselves as potential purchasers of the station. On 3 November 1945, Jack Yuen and 
Li Wenjie (as attorneys representing the SEPM) and Zheng Zhaoji signed the contract 
conveying the property rights of the Tai Mei Radio Station.37 
As the contract between Starr and the United States Information Service had not at that 
time concluded, the United States Information Service still held the right to use the Ta 
Mei Radio Station until December 1945. On 15 December 1945, Zheng Zhaoji signed a 
new contract with the United States Information Service to the effect that the Tai Mei 
Radio Station broadcast the Voice of America program for one hour every day, and in 
return for this, the American side provided vacuum tubes and other essential spare parts. 
Starting from June 1946, the time of broadcast for Voice of America was reduced to half 
an hour every day as supplies from the American side were reduced. The contract was 
not renewed when it terminated on 31 December 1946.38 After Zheng Zhaoji took over 
the radio station from Starr, we can see that he retained the name of ‘Ta Mei’ and the 
association with the United States Information Service. There was no specific regulation 
regarding radio stations under private Chinese ownership for a quite a long time after 
Chiang Kai-shek’s take-over of Shanghai. In this period, the general attitude of the 
Shanghai Municipal Government was to decline to support any private Chinese radio 
stations until a formal regulation had been issued.39 Nevertheless, the early post-war 
radio management was in chaos. The Shanghai Radio Station, as an official medium of 
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the Nationalist Government in Shanghai also undertook administrative functions to 
manage local radio stations but such a facility did not possess a strong administrative 
capacity to cope with a complex situation bereft of precisely defined regulations. 
Particularly complex issues surrounded the radio stations whose associations included 
government and foreigners. This point was reflected in the file concerning the Shanghai 
Radio Station and the Central Broadcasting Management Office dated 8 December 1945:  
Despite the Ministry of Transportation and Communications absence 
of any approved application for private Chinese radio stations to 
broadcast, three private radio stations have defiantly broadcasted and 
four stations are preparing to broadcast. As for radio stations owners 
of the communities of the party, governmental and military systems, 
or foreigners, thirteen stations are broadcasting, and seven stations are 
preparing to broadcast. Some of them have submitted application, but 
others directly started their broadcasting business. As a result, the 
contents of radio programmes are problematic and the condition of 
radio signal is chaotic. Before these stations acquire legal permits, 
although we (the Shanghai Radio Station) can trace and investigate 
them in the name of the Shanghai Branch of the Central Broadcasting 
Management Office, much damage has been done and many problems 
still remain. We are also not willingly to request Shanghai Police 
Office to execute our tasks by proxy because this might raise a doubt 
that the administration authority of radio stations have been taken over 
by police. All in all, there have been 72 radio stations in Shanghai, 
including running and preparing to run, and the quantity of radio 
stations is proliferating. If we do not work out an effective way to 
immediately ban these stations, more than 40 private stations that we 
have commanded to suspend may continue their broadcasting in the 
name of public communities or foreign ownership, and at that time, the 
situation will be more difficult to control.40       
 
The formal policy was finally decreed in Shanghai on 16 March 1946.    
Act Three: radio station except for those owned by state are classified 
as two types:  
1. Public radio stations: radio stations established and owned by 
government agencies of the Republic of China are recognised as public 
radio stations, with an exception that radio stations established and 
owned by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications are 
classified as state owned radio stations. 
2. Private radio stations: radio stations established and owned by 
citizens of the Republic of China, or companies, manufacturers, 
schools and organisations established and owned purely by Chinese 
citizens are recognised as private radio stations.   
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Act Four: foreign institutions, people, companies (not absolutely 
established and owned by Chinese citizens), manufacturers, schools, 
organisations are totally forbidden to establish and own their radio 
stations in China. 
…  
Act Six: all who intend to establish radio stations must fill the forms 
designed by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, and 
submit to the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. A radio 
station can only be established after official check and approval. 
…  
Act Twenty Five: radio stations are not allowed to broadcast erroneous 
news, all comments, information, songs and words must be without 
contents of resisting government orders and policies, jeopardising 
public security, and exerting harmful influence on social morality.41 
 
There was a turning point marking the Nationalist Government’s change in policy 
regarding radio station control: the situation went from relative chaos in the early stages 
after VJ Day to orderly and effective administrative control maintained by the state 
apparatus. Just five days after the policy was issued, Shanghai Telecommunication 
Bureau (STB) declared that all radio stations (including those operating under public 
and private ownership) must register in the five days from the 25th to the 30th of that 
month. 42  Shanghai Police Office on 2 April submitted a proposal for their 
implementation plan as predicated on Act 25 of the Radio Management Regulation 
issued by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications.43 Just as Starr had learnt, 
foreign radio stations were absolutely forbidden. Moreover, the Nationalist Government 
decided to use its diplomatic resources to facilitate the elimination of foreign radio 
stations from China. During the 29th conference of the Central Radio Enterprise 
Guidance Committee of the Nationalist Party convened in June 1946, it was formally 
proposed that preliminary investigations concerning foreign radios located in Shanghai 
should in the first instance be undertaken by the STB, and then the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was to take responsibility for negotiating with relevant foreign institutes on the 
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matter of the closure of radio stations.44 
In light of the Nationalist Government’s decision to mobilise all resources to shut down 
foreign radio stations, the retention of the name of ‘Ta Mei’ would inevitably bring 
troubles. The Central Broadcasting Management Administrations (CBMA) soon 
suspected that the conveyance of ownership might be a trick, whereby the American 
counterpart operated through a puppet Chinese owner with the intention of eluding the 
banning of their radio stations. Subsequently, a supplementary investigation was 
requested by telegraph on 12 July to the STB.45 In its report to the CBMA, the STB 
confirmed on 16 November that the Tai Mei Radio Station was completely Chinese 
owned and managed. Five days later the CBMA responded with the instruction that the 
Ta Mei along with three other radio stations must cease operations in the near future, as 
they were believed to be owned by foreigners – specifically owners holding American, 
Soviet Union and French nationalities respectively.46  On 10 December, the CBMA 
ordered the STB to close the aforesaid four radio stations and pointed out that the 
Publicity Department had informed the relevant embassies that these stations would be 
closed immediately and their equipment would be dismantled and removed.47 After 
receiving such unambiguous instructions, the STB issued a notice on 20 December, 
stating that excepting 18 radio stations which had been registered, all other radio stations 
must stop their illegal broadcasting activities before 31 December. The following day, 
the STB contacted the Shanghai Police Office and the Songhu Garrison Command to 
authorise forced closure of those radio stations that persisted in broadcasting after 31 
December. The Bureau also contacted the Shanghai Branch of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to afford diplomatic assistance (if need be) in the process of banning foreign 
radio stations.48 
The Ta Mei Radio Station, as a result, was obliged to suspend all of its business on 1 
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January 1947. Starr in the interim announced that the Tai Mei Radio Station had 
absolutely no further connection with his business, and this notice was published in the 
SEPM. Government investigations into Ta Mei ownership were a very slow process. 
Finally, after nearly nine months of waiting, the station was confirmed as a private 
Chinese station, and restored to full broadcasting capacity until 26 September 1947.49  
The SEPM and its Discontents: Building and Labour Disputes  
Since the middle of the War of Resistance, the Nationalist Government was continually 
afflicted by increasingly serious corruption. The irony of the situation was not lost on 
the newspaperman Zhang Youluan whose take on it was popularly circulated in the 
streets of Chongqing as “people struggling with shortage of materials at the battle front, 
officials enjoying high living in the rear-end.” Corruption also drew Western journalists’ 
attention. As some incidents of corruption were exposed in their news reports, which to 
a certain degree damaged the image of the Nationalists in the eyes of the West, they felt 
obliged to tighten censorship further, with a specific focus on Western journalists.50 
The huge task of seizing assets in areas formerly occupied by the Japanese further 
stimulated the cupidity of Nationalist officials. Many were overwhelmed by the urge to 
line their own pockets during the takeover process. Corruption affected Shanghai with 
special severity. Wu Kuo-chen, the mayor of Shanghai at the time, recollected that 
although corruption started with the Nationalist’s takeover, it was commonplace 
everywhere in the country - Shanghai as the largest city of China with the highest 
population and greatest wealth became the Eldorado of Nationalist bureaucrats intent on 
amassing huge wealth. In the eyes of those in a position to plunder the spoils of victory, 
Shanghai achieved the high water mark of corruption.51 He pointed out that different 
sections of the government and military had their own right to seize assets, but there was 
no centralised administration to plan, manage and monitor this process. It is no surprise 
then that the Nationalist commissioners competed avidly to seize as many properties as 
they possibly could.52 Their corruption seriously damaged civil interests, and caused far-
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reaching inflation which was very negative to national economic recovery and 
development at the very beginning of post-war era. It also (to a large degree) encouraged 
the deformed partisanship characteristic of journalism in post-war China. With regards 
to media operations, the Nationalist takeover usually made it very difficult to return 
property to the real owners.53 Cheng Shewo, a famous newspaperman, expressed his 
anger at the baneful influence derived from the Nationalist corruption in the following 
way:  
It definitely should be private newspapers’ responsibility and duty to 
sacrifice ourselves for the country in the cause of resisting foreign 
invasion. Today, we have achieved the great victory, and there is no 
way that private newspapers should be returned to their real owners. 
We shall resume our enterprise while relying on our own hard work. 
We are not going to ask for any direct or indirect allowance from our 
government, but there is only one request that we need to make: we 
need to take our property back from the Japanese. We do not want to 
occupy the property belonging to others, but if our own property in the 
first place were robbed by the Japanese, and then seized by our 
government, we will struggle untiringly for its return as long as we 
survive.54 
 
Besides the aforementioned Nationalist policies, corruption was another element, which 
seriously circumscribed the SEPM’s post-war development. After the newspaper had 
been re-established in post-war Shanghai, Gould arrived in China with the passion to 
rise to the challenge of realising his ideal of establishing a genuine American style 
newspaper that delivered objective news based on an independent view.55 However, 
serious corruption dampened his ardour after he arrived in China and realised that his 
hopes and expectations were miles apart from reality. After he left China in 1949, he 
detailed a catalogue of woes, which ranged from having to take public transport, the 
forced occupation of places of amusement and buildings by various gangs and military 
forces, to problems resulting from the low morale of the Nationalist troops, who were 
continuously troublesome. 56  The newspaper itself was a victim of undisciplined 
behaviours. 
Avenue Edward VII where the SEPM had been located in the French Concession was 
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renamed Chun Cheng Road, which was based on the name of Chiang Kai-shek. The 
newspaper office was located at No. 17, but it only occupied the first floor of the building. 
The second floor, No. 15, was occupied by a group of soldiers who belonged to the 
Ministry of Communication. These soldiers did not pay rent to the landlord, and 
regularly dumped rubbish and dirty water out of the windows.57 Their activities were a 
source of aggravated nuisance for the newspaper’s office. Relying on his good private 
relations with the mayor, Wu Kuo-Chen, Gould hoped to get permission to use the 
second floor of the building temporarily for the printing machine.58 The printing factory 
which was located next door at No.19 and was being restored after extensive fire damage. 
On 12 July 1946, Gould applied to temporarily use the rooms upstairs until the No.19 
was fully restored.59 On July 17, the Shanghai Municipal Government ordered the 23rd 
Military Police regiment of the Songhu Garrison Command to investigate and verify the 
relevant facts regarding the building’s use. 60  The Songhu Garrison Command sent 
instructions on 22 July to the 23rd Military Police regiment to perform the order. 
However, the 23rd Military Police regiment used the investigation to attempt to occupy 
No.15 themselves as their barracks. In their report, it was argued that the disputed 
building belonged to the International Savings Society, but that the agent had transferred 
the house to Chen Ziya to manage. However, Chen Ziya, who worked for Wang Ching-
wei’s regime as the Chairman of the Grains Council had been arrested as a traitor. 
Director Liao Hua of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics had confiscated this 
property and sent soldiers from the Ministry of Transportation and Communications to 
hold it. In fact, these soldiers did not have any administrative affiliation with the Bureau 
of Investigation and Statistics, which meant that their occupation was in breach. The 
Military Police also claimed that the SEPM were relying on their special American 
position in their proposal to take over the second floor. The investigators then argued 
that the newspaper’s proposal to use the second floor was unacceptable. At the same 
time, they argued that the soldiers currently occupying the building did not have 
permission to do so. The Military Police suggested that the Songhu Garrison Command 
should order that these soldiers be removed from the building to make the building 
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available as a barracks for themselves (the Military Police).61  
In their reply to the Shanghai Municipal Government, the Songhu Garrison Command 
sought to maintain the existing arrangements. On 14 August, the Songhu Garrison 
Command repeated the contents of the investigation as reported by the Military Police, 
but at the same time, they emphasised that the soldiers living at No. 15 were under the 
order of Bureau of Investigation and Statistics. This was done without any mention of 
the Military Police’s conclusion that these soldiers were occupying the house without 
proper cause or authorisation. The Songhu Garrison Command thought that the requests 
from by both the SEPM and the Military Police were unreasonable. It is likely that the 
Songhu Garrison Command realised that any suggestion of changing the status quo 
would offend the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, an important agency that they 
could not afford to displease. 
Wu Kuo-chen tried his best to help the newspaper use the room of No. 15 in the way of 
lease. Gould appreciated every support afforded to him from the mayor, but this was not 
able to change his negative attitude concerning the corrupt post-war governance of the 
Nationalist Party.62 The position of the SEPM therefore became increasingly awkward. 
The corrupt Nationalist Government had certainly discouraged and exasperated Gould. 
However he persisted in his own anti-Communist standpoint, which differed markedly 
from John Powell’s position, who criticised the Nationalist Party corruption and 
American policy towards China.63 This dilemma, if you like, accounted for much of the 
post-war internal tensions that the newspaper faced. The editorials of the post-war SEPM, 
which appeared to the outside world as radical and highly critical of Chinese society, 
was a visible embodiment of this dilemma. In Wilkinson’s view, when Gould became 
rather disillusioned with post-war Shanghai soon after his return, the editorial of the 
SEPM under his leadership contained many more snide and barbed sarcastic remarks 
whose targets included the Communists, the Nationalist Party and Chinese all on the 
same day!64 This had its source in Gould’s profound disappointment with the situation 
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he found the SEPM in – constantly having to deal with the pernicious consequences 
derived from serious corruption. Indeed, the very adverse circumstances Gould 
encountered had more to do with the sharp, disgruntled moodiness of the editorials than 
the explanation favoured by Wilkinson, namely that Gould was a hypocritical China 
hand. Not only did the Nationalist corruption frustrate private Chinese and foreign 
initiatives to restore the supportive framework of professional journalism in the 
aftermath of the war, but it also gave them little room to manoeuvre politically.  
On top of this, the SEPM was continuously dogged by labour disputes. In accordance 
with the archives, the earliest labour dispute after the re-establishment of the paper in 
Shanghai happened in early 1946. Labour disputes continued until and even after the 
final closure of the newspaper. They were initially caused by residual historical issues. 
In March 1946, Zhu Changhai, the representative of many former employees who had 
worked for the Chinese edition of the SEPM before the civil war, appealed to the 
Shanghai Municipal Government. He alleged that they were dissatisfied that the SEPM 
managers had not re-employed them after its re-establishment. Zhu Changhai claimed 
that the former workers that he represented had all fought against the Japanese invaders 
and the Wang Ching-wei regime, and had paid a heavy sacrifice during the Isolated 
Island period. In addition to Zhu Xinggong and the others who were murdered, many 
other workers were arrested, and Zhu Changhai himself was injured from the shooting 
perpetrated by Wang Ching-wei’s spies. The workers said they had no complaints 
concerning those matters as they fully understood that they were opposing invaders, but 
they could not accept that they were now refused employment, when they knew the 
newspaper was being republished.65 
The Shanghai Municipal Government conducted an investigation into this case, and 
coordinated the negotiations between employers and employees. According to the 
investigation, the SEPM had employed some of the former workers of the English 
edition and magazine department. In response to the workers who had not been re-
employed, the newspaper’s representative, Xu Dachun, explained that the newspaper 
management did not know that these workers were still in Shanghai when they were 
preparing to republish. He contended that the newspaper was not able to provide further 
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employment for the former workers, but that the newspaper could offer them a 
reasonable severance pay. The workers accepted severance pay in lieu of re-employment, 
but they sought to increase the payment. The amount of severance pay that they sought 
was far beyond what the managers of the newspaper would accept, so an agreement was 
not reached. The management finally proposed that they would ask C. V. Starr, the 
owner of the newspaper who was living in New York, about the specific amount of 
severance pay that would be acceptable. The workers expressed their willingness to wait 
for Starr’s reply. 66  It is unclear how the matter was resolved. There is no further 
documentation in the archives on this matter but it is highly likely that the workers and 
the newspaper reached a private agreement. 
The pressures from the inflation in the Nationalist Party-governed regions were directly 
reflected in the workers’ unrest.67 Ample evidence in the archives shows that the SEPM 
workers were not satisfied with their wages, as they failed to keep pace with inflation. 
Gould claimed that serious inflation meant that cash sometimes lost nearly half of its 
nominal value overnight in the Nationalist Party-governed regions, and that his 
newspaper paid wages based on the cost of living index as issued by the Nationalist 
government. This problem led to recurrent labour disputes as the index was revised, at 
first, on a monthly basis, and later on a fortnightly basis. Obviously, in this period of 
severe inflation, prices soared daily, and the workers’ interests would suffer a heavy loss 
if their wages were paid in accordance with fortnightly revisions of the cost of living 
index. For Gould, there was no other feasible way to pay wages. Moreover, the 
newspaper, which was on the brink of bankruptcy due to the impact of inflation, was 
experiencing difficulties in meeting rising wage requirements as well. According to 
Gould’s recollection, workers of the SEPM could not acquire satisfactory results as 
inflation had made the profits of the newspaper nearly valueless.68In the process of these 
labour disputes, it could be said that both employers and employees were victims of the 
Nationalist regime. Therefore, it is not hard to understand why Gould expressed his 
disregard for the Nationalist regime, despite sharing similar values to the Nationalist 
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Party.69  
The SEPM News Reports on Demonstrations of 1946 and 1947 
The SEPM and the anti-Soviet student demonstrations of 1946 
By the end of 1945, General George Marshall was appointed as the special envoy of 
President Truman to China. He arrived in China with the intention of mediating between 
the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. After he dialogued formally with Chiang 
Kai-shek, the Three-Party Talks (George Marshall, Zhang Qun and Zhou Enlai) were 
held. In the early days of 1946, the armistice agreement was signed by the Nationalist 
Party and the Communist Party, and the Political Consultative Conference was held. 
However, in reaction to a series of outrages perpetrated by the Soviet Army in 
Manchuria, an Anti-Soviet student demonstration broke out in Chongqing on 22 
February 1946, resulting in damage to the building that housed the Xinhua Daily. 
The anti-Soviet demonstrations of 1946 were ignited by the Soviet Union’s patent 
disregard for Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. After the Soviet Army defeated the 
Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria, without any notice given to China, massive 
industrial equipment in the locality was demounted and carried back to the Soviet Union 
as booty. Simultaneously, the Soviet Armies in Manchuria frustrated the Nationalist 
Government’s desire to assert its sovereignty over Manchuria. These actions aroused 
strong indignation amongst Chinese youth, especially students, whose discontent finally 
culminated in several student demonstrations. These started in Chongqing and spread to 
other cities in the February 1946.  
Media propaganda and disputes between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party 
regarding the anti-Soviet demonstration lasted for three days. This demonstration 
disadvantaged the Chinese Communist Party. Making the most of this situation, the 
official media of the Nationalist Party, the Central Daily, praised the Chongqing 
students and other people who attended this demonstration. Articles about the anti-
Soviet demonstration occupied nearly the entire second and third pages of the Central 
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Daily on 23 February.70 The Central Daily usually focused on two points: that all social 
classes strongly supported this patriotic demonstration, and that the Chinese Communist 
Party was an accessory to the Soviet Union’s crime. On the second page, the news that 
Chongqing citizens were moved to tears when they witnessed students’ demonstrating 
in the streets was published in the Central Daily.71 On the same page, there is another 
article which expresses the fact that the sense of obligation towards Manchuria apparent 
in the Chongqing demonstration also resonated among students in Shanghai, Sichuan 
and Jiangxi.72 Due to the fact that the office of the Xinhua Daily was damaged in this 
demonstration, the Central Daily reported that when students and Chongqing citizens 
passed the office building of the Xinhua Daily, they put up slogans on the wall and 
windows.73 The slogans were later destroyed, and this action provoked the students’ 
anger.74 Police tried to prevent a conflict, but it was loudly declared that people who 
protected the Xinhua Daily were traitors, and the newspaper office was immediately 
vandalised.75 In order to reinforce this to the reader, an editorial entitled ‘Pure Patriotism’ 
was published on the second page. The editorial included high praise for students’ 
patriotic demonstration, explaining not only the government position towards the Sino-
Soviet relations and the current problems in Manchuria, but also attacking the CCP’s 
shameful role in collaborating with the Soviet Union.76 
Reports about the demonstration in the Xinhua Daily were distinctly different from those 
of the Central Daily. The Communist newspaper, dated 23 February 1946, published an 
article playing down the image that the Soviet Union violated Chinese sovereignty by 
strongly emphasising the damage to its newspaper office building. According to Xinhua 
Daily, this act of violence was committed by Nationalist Party “ruffians and spies.” 
Concerning the demonstration itself, a brief report simply mentioned that the students 
had held a demonstration on the Manchurian issue, but focused on how the Nationalist 
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Party “ruffians and spies” had utilised the chaotic situation to smash the office building 
housing the Xinhua Daily. This report was published in prominence on the second 
page.77 In contrast to the Central Daily, the Xinhua Daily also published eye-witness 
accounts from people who condemned the act of damaging the newspaper office. On the 
third page of the Xinhua Daily, many signed letters were published, reputedly from the 
masses, who were moved to express their sympathy towards the suffering of the Xinhua 
Daily. On that day, the Xinhua Daily also published an editorial, which stated that the 
exclusionist dictators of the Nationalist Party had damaged its building.78 The editorial 
also claimed that there were banners visible in this demonstration that clearly belonged 
to the Radical Youth Association of Greater East Asia. The editorial further argued that 
this was proof that the Nationalist Party had been working in collaboration with Japanese 
imperialists and their puppets. 
The SEPM news report regarding this event did not play into the hands of either of these 
opposing propaganda strategies. On 23 February, the newspaper placed a report on the 
front page entitled ‘Students Demonstrate against USSR here on Red Army Day.’ The 
SEPM’s views concerning this demonstration were expressed both implicitly and 
explicitly. What the article chose to include and exclude is very telling. This report was 
written by newspaper journalists who conducted interviews themselves, rather than 
using any sources from news agencies. They especially shunned sources from the 
respective Nationalist and the Communist Party news agencies. In the SEPM report, it 
was noted that in the morning 2000 students had marched to the Soviet Consulate-
General’s building in order to demand that the Soviet Union respect Chinese sovereignty 
in Manchuria.79 Moreover, the SEPM reported a list of the seven demands that the 
students addressed to the Soviet Union. It also documented the reactions of Shanghai 
university students to these events. Under the pretext of not being able to prove the 
veracity of the facts, the SEPM chose to avoid making any comments about the version 
of events as reported by either the Nationalist or the Communist Parties. For example, 
the damage to the Xinhua Daily newspaper office was not reported. The author of the 
SEPM article reported that this demonstration against the Soviet Union was reminiscent 
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of the past May Fourth Movement.80 This is a reference that all Chinese and most 
foreigners in China would have understood. On 4 May 1919, Chinese students held a 
patriotic demonstration in Beijing against Japanese designs on Chinese sovereignty. This 
movement fostered the patriotism of Chinese youth. Clearly, the editorial choices in the 
SEPM article expressed its support for the anti-Soviet demonstration; the allusion to the 
May Fourth Movement is strong evidence of this, as it indirectly acknowledged that 
what the Soviet Union had recently done in Manchuria was as offensive and beyond the 
pale as what the Japanese had done 30 years earlier. 
Incidentally, after the CCP seized political power in 1949, this anti-Soviet demonstration 
was barely mentioned in Chinese history books.81 In order to prove the legality of its 
socialist regime, the Chinese Communist Party glorified the Sino-Soviet friendship and 
attempted to conceal the facts about the plundering of China by Stalinist Soviet Union. 
This strategy was clearly reflected in official propaganda by the CCP in 1950. According 
to this propaganda, when Japan surrendered, a number of industries in Manchuria had 
been destroyed, and the subsequent Nationalist Party occupation of Manchuria and the 
ensuing civil war led to Manchuria suffering further devastation. 82  After the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union helped China restore 
and develop manufacturing industries according to the equal Sino-Soviet agreements.83 
The anti-Soviet demonstration of 1946 directly reflected the Soviet Army’s 
mistreatment of Manchuria. This was in opposition to the CCP’s argument. 
The SEPM and the anti-American student demonstrations of 1947 
On Christmas Eve 1946, Shen Chong, described as a student of Peking University, was 
raped by an American marine, William Pierson. This is significant, as it incited several 
anti-American demonstrations which led to the American Army’s withdrawal from 
China in January 1947. The findings of the investigation by the American authorities 
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raised doubts about her account of the event. The investigators claimed that Shen Chong 
did not resist violently, and that only evidence of normal sexual activity could be found 
after a genital examination, concluding that the rape was not as she alleged.84 
The Nationalists blamed the incident on the Communists. Evidence which directly 
establishes a link between Shen Chong and the CCP has not been found. It was strongly 
suspected that the Chinese Communist Party fabricated the incident with the hope of 
sparking anti-American sentiment amongst China’s citizens, thus causing the Nationalist 
regime to suffer due to its dependence upon American aid. At least this is the account 
that has been accepted from such important sources as Wu Kuo-Chen, the Mayor of 
Shanghai. As a senior officer of the Nationalist Party, he believed that the majority of 
anti-American demonstrations in the Nationalist Party-governed regions were instigated 
by the CCP, in order to cut off aid from the United States to the Nationalist 
government.85  
As would be expected, the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party newspapers 
offered markedly different views on the anti-American demonstrations. The attitude of 
the Central Daily was contradictory and revealed a dilemma. On the one hand, it made 
a valiant attempt to shun the reporting of this demonstration as it feared further arousal 
of anti-American sentiments. On the other hand, it sought to show that the National 
Government took an uncompromising stance in the negotiation of the rape incident with 
the Americans. The news about the incident in the Central Daily News was published in 
an inconspicuous place on the fourth page, and simply stated that the anti-American 
demonstrations were a response to a rape and that the authorities had negotiated with the 
American side, requiring them to punish the culprit by law.86 The following day, the 
Central Daily News published another report entitled ‘General Marshall attaches great 
importance to the Peiping incident.’ It informed readers that General George Marshall 
and the Ambassador John Leighton Stuart had understood the importance of this 
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incident.87 It attempted to promote the view that the American authorities had worked 
very hard in the interests of the Chinese people. 
 
In contrast to the Central Daily publications, Liberation Daily exercised the strategies 
of the Communist Party, utilising the anti-American demonstration to promote the image 
that American imperialism and its puppet Chiang Kai-shek regime were the enemy of 
the Chinese people. On the front-page of January 3 1947, in an article entitled ‘Protesting 
the Bestiality of the American Army,’ the Liberation Daily used approximately half of 
its paper content to report how anti-American demonstrations broke out in many Chinese 
cities, due to the “fact” that Americans looked down on and insulted the Chinese.88 The 
following day, with the obvious aim of reinforcing the propaganda effect of this anti-
American demonstration, the Liberation Daily published some negative reports 
regarding American society on the front page. These reports included a case of 
embezzlement involving an American Senator and the purported high crime rate in 
America after the Second World War.89 
Although this demonstration was directed against the Americans, the SEPM did not try 
to cover it up. The newspaper remained committed to its opposition to this 
demonstration through its reports, but its reports were diametrically opposed to those of 
the Liberation Daily. On 3 January, the SEPM published a piece of news entitled 
‘Central University Students to Take Part in Large Protest Parade Today’ on the front 
page. The author of this news report was a newspaper correspondent - he based his 
account on interviews that he had conducted himself. The article introduced the issue of 
the anti-American student demonstration in Nanjing. 90  According to this report, 
however, the protesting Central University students did not reach a unified agreement 
on the requirement regarding the withdrawal of the army. A dispute arose in a meeting 
that they held on the New Year’s Day about whether or not the withdrawal should be 
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limited to the U.S. Army or should also include the Soviet Army.91 In addition to this 
report, the SEPM published a letter (purporting to be bona fide) sent by a Shanghai 
university student in which he wrote that although he was sympathetic to the plight of 
the unfortunate girl in Peiping, the rape incident should not become a pretext for a 
political movement against America or Americans given that the cooperation between 
China and America was important to the future prosperity of both nations. He reminded 
readers to never forget that the armies of both China and America had fought shoulder 
to shoulder against the Japanese.92 The letter was indeed conveniently pro-American. 
However, there is no reason to doubt that the origin of this letter was genuine.  
Compared with the reports of the anti-American demonstration published in the Central 
Daily and the Liberation Daily, the standpoint of the SEPM was relatively independent 
as it was different to both the Central Daily of the Nationalist Party and the Liberation 
Daily of the Communist Party. As an American-run newspaper, the SEPM did not 
behave like the Central Daily, which was mortally shy of this event and endeavoured to 
hide the American marine’s shameful crime of rape. Although this event was 
disadvantage to the American interests in China, it was still reported on the front page 
of the SEPM with details. Meanwhile, the newspaper did not behave like the Liberation 
Daily, which deliberately sensationalised this event and aimed at shaping a negative 
image of the United States in China. The SEPM’s position seems to have been that the 
inflammatory nature of the crime should not be enlarged as a political issue detrimental 
to Sino-American relations, the perspective conveyed in the student’s letter made the 
SEPM’s reporting of this event appear more neutral. However, the only English edition 
of the SEPM was maintained in post-war China, and it was not able to have much 
influence to Chinese society. This case reflects partisan journalism domination in post-
war China. 
The ‘White Gaps’ of the SEPM and its Closure 
As analysis of the two demonstrations has shown, Gould made his editorial opinion clear 
through deft selection of material for publication – this is exactly what we would expect 
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an experienced and clever editor to do. However, more colourful claims have been made 
about Gould during this period. He was described as snide, insolent and ready to lash 
out against any thing that annoyed him in post-war Shanghai.93 At the same time, he was 
praised by Paul French as using provocative methods to resist the imposition of 
censorship by the Nationalist government. According to French, Gould infuriated 
censors for allowing readers to understand his meaning when many of his news items 
were deleted due to the censorship exercised by the Nationalists. He achieved this by 
leaving plenty of white gaps in his newspaper during the last period of the Nationalist 
regime.94 Close analysis, however, reveals that the issue of the white gaps is more 
complex than French portrays. 
White gaps, in fact, only occurred on a few days of May of 1949. All of the white gaps 
occurred in relation to news about military reversals suffered by the Nationalists. 
According to Gould’s recollections, censorship suddenly became ‘whimsical and 
irritating’ in the late spring of 1949. As pure blank space was forbidden after censors 
deleted some parts of a news report, Gould found a humorous way of meeting the 
demands of the censors while drawing attention to the act of censorship. He placed 
ironical advertisements in these blank spaces. Examples were statements such as ‘we are 
for good government’ or ‘tell us about your prosperous business in the columns’. These 
amusing attempts to draw attention to censorship were possibly nothing more than that 
– it could be argued that they seemed to have achieved little, but then it is very unlikely 
that Gould expected to do anything but annoy the censors. He certainly would not have 
been deluded enough to believe that he could strike a decisive blow at censorship by 
engaging in these overtly provocative and puerile games. Actually, the Nationalist 
Party’s extremely strict censorship in May 1949 was just a desperate ploy. On 23 April, 
Communist troops occupied Nanjing, the capital city of the Nationalist regime. The 
controlling methods used by the Nationalist Party were not limited to the excesses of 
censorship. On the day before the Communist Party occupied Shanghai, they also 
indulged in what could only be termed – given the circumstances – futile public displays 
of delusions of grandeur or exercises in extremely optimistic wishful thinking. In either 
case, the fact that Nationalist soldiers were ordered to hold a parade bearing banners that 
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stated that the Nationalist Government would win the war soon in the streets of Shanghai, 
and this the very day before they actually fled the city, was indeed an empty spectacle 
and no doubt a desperate gesture orchestrated by the generals seeking to rally the 
populace to pay the ultimate sacrificial price so that they themselves could hold onto 
Shanghai for a little longer.95 
Figure 6: An example of Gould’s response to censorship and the ban on 
‘white gaps’ in the paper, May 21, 194996 
 
Currently, there are some distinct accounts (supported by largely insufficient evidence) 
regarding the newspaper’s closure. Chinese scholars generally share a similar view. 
They attribute the necessity of closure to the newspaper’s hostile activities with regards 
to the Chinese Communist Party and more widely the interests of the Chinese people. 
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The evidence that they draw upon inevitably focuses on the SEPM labour disputes and 
the publication of false reports regarding mines in the mouth of the Yangtze River.97 
Neil O’Brien basically takes the Chinese scholars’ side. Relying on the statements made 
by the SEPM staff in July 1949, he argues that the main reason for the newspaper’s 
closure was Gould’s attempt to shirk his responsibilities with respect to the workers’ 
pay.98 However, Paul French offers a radically different explanation for the closure. He 
argued that the newspaper suffered a very serious set-back after Communist troops 
occupied Shanghai when communist members, posing as newspaper staff, infiltrated the 
newspaper office and required Gould to publish pro-communist reports and articles. 
French argues that this forced Gould to close the paper. 99  According to Frederic 
Wakeman, the SEPM’s closure needs to be attributed to Gould’s strong dissatisfaction 
with employees in the print room – specifically their interference with the paper’s news 
editorial.100 There may be an element of truth to both these arguments. However, the 
evidence each side presents to support its position is scant, to say the least. 
This section will re-examine the process of the newspaper’s closure through a 
comprehensive analysis of relevant primary sources. There have been a variety of 
primary sources available to reveal the history of the newspaper’s closure. These include 
Gould’s memoirs, relevant records held in the Shanghai Municipal Archives, memoirs 
of bystanders, and relevant news reports by several newspapers. Later, Gould wrote 
down his own account of the newspaper’s closure, and this was published in the form of 
an article in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science in 
September 1951. Relatively complete records documenting the newspaper’s closure 
have been conserved by the Shanghai Municipal Archives. John Leighton Stuart visited 
Shanghai in the summer of 1949 to acquaint himself with the circumstances that 
American businesses and citizens were experiencing there under Communist rule. This 
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is how he indirectly came by the story of the newspaper’s closure.101 A discussion of 
these matters can be found in his memories. Last but not least, the closure of the SEPM 
drew wide attention at the time, and was reported by several newspapers. Relatively 
complete and diversified primary sources make it possible to uncover more of the history 
of the SEPM’s closure. 
On 23 May, Shanghai finally changed hands again. Shortly, it could be observed that 
scores of rumbling trucks fully loaded with soldiers travelled towards the Bund from the 
west, and columns of soldiers were marching behind in a curtain of darkness. At 3 a.m. 
in the morning of the next day, the noise of the machinegun and rifle rang out in the city 
of Shanghai.102 In the morning, as Gould relates, “residents peeked out of windows to 
see Communist soldiers in greenish-yellow uniforms stretched out on sidewalks asleep 
under the Nationalist victory banners!” By 25 May 1949, the People’s Liberation Army 
had captured Shanghai. With the Communist troops making a triumphal march into 
Shanghai, one after another, the traffic of the city was severely jammed. It created a host 
of difficulties for the SEPM to publish that day’s papers. The street that the newspaper 
office was located in was blockaded off for a time, and many workers who were living 
in the north or east of Shanghai were not able to get to work. The service from news 
agencies that the paper relied as a source of news was at one time completely knocked 
out.103 In spite of these difficulties, the paper still managed to publish four pages that 
day, which included an important editorial, speculating on the newspaper’s prospects in 
a Shanghai under Communist rule:   
This newspaper feels that it can speak for the American community of 
Shanghai. Perhaps to some extent it can in this matter speak the mind 
of the foreign community generally. We do not believe that there is any 
major difference as between the foreign and the Chinese communities. 
In other words, we believe that here is a very generally held point of 
view: Shanghai is essentially non-political. It is a great trading and 
industrial city. What it hopes is that a true “liberation” has now come. 
If this proves to be the case, Shanghai can provide a tremendous 
resource in starting the whole of China back on the road to 
prosperity.104 
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From this editorial, the paper had identified itself only as an English paper for the 
Americans in Shanghai, and at most for the foreign community residing in Shanghai. 
The management of the paper knew at that moment that a Communist victory eliminated 
the hope of recreating the glamour and influence of 1930s that its Chinese edition had 
allowed it to enjoy. They might also have realised that despite the concessions they were 
willing to make, the SEPM’s survival was not assured. If the CCP revealed that it had 
no tolerance for private and foreign commercial interests in Shanghai, the political and 
economic conditions needed to maintain the SEPM’s viability would no longer exist. As 
to that, the managers of the paper could only hope that the coming Communist authority, 
after fully weighing the value of Shanghai as a unique trading and industrial centre both 
for China and the world, would allow Shanghai to enjoy a neutral almost non-political 
position. On 20 March 1949, a report to Chen Cheng reflects that Gould intended to 
continue the SEPM after Shanghai was to be taken over by the Communist troops, 
although he was hesitating and took a sceptical attitude towards the CCP. As the report 
shows: 
Most of foreign businessmen in Shanghai are remaining hesitant. 
Many foreign journalists who are working in the areas of Nanjing and 
Shanghai have decided to continue to work in their place when the 
Communist troops intrude into the south. Randall Gould, the editor in 
chief of the SEPM, has close relations with American businessmen in 
Shanghai. He remains hopeful but has realised that tribulations may 
come. However, he still believes that the business would continue 
under the CCP’s administration, and wishfully thinks that the 
publication of the Shanghai Evening Post Mercury will be maintained. 
Recently, the CCP has implement prohibition aimed at those foreign 
journalists in Peiping and Tianjin, and the official news office of the 
United States had been forbidden. Gould deemed that the CCP might 
begin to muzzle the press. He mentioned that Zhou Enlai in Chongqing 
during the war against Japan did promise Gould, among others, that 
the CCP would maintain the freedom of the press, and no censorship 
would be implemented under the CCP’s administration. Gould at that 
time even believed these statements. He spoke out the promises made 
by the CCP, and regarded the CCP during that time as rather 
trustworthy, but today, he feels obliged to doubt these promises.105 
 
This was indeed a high-risk gamble. Nevertheless, Gould still wanted to give the coming 
Communist regime the benefit of the doubt. In March 1949, on the basis of what the 
Chinese Communist Party did in occupied Manchuria and North China, Gould surmised 
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that there were no firm grounds for optimism in a Communist dominated Shanghai.106 
He pointed out that the Chinese Communist Party did not fulfil their commitment to 
safeguarding the freedom of the press. In Peiping, two Chinese newspapers and 
seventeen foreign journalists were forced to cease their journalistic activities, even 
though these foreign journals were not involved in politics. 107  However, he also 
mentioned some positive elements in Communist-governed areas. He recognised that 
law and social order had been established and that in North China there was still freedom 
of religious practice.108  Based on this analysis, Gould finally decided to remain in 
Shanghai while preparing for the worst. As he predicted, the SEvening Post and Mercury, 
as the only American daily in Shanghai, would continue to be published after the 
Communist takeover of Shanghai.109 There is evidence that such optimism was certainly 
not shared by everyone in a position of responsibility at the SEPM. Wu Kyatang is a 
case in point. As the executive editor of the paper, Wu Kyatang became a person of 
interest for Communist secret agents. He was provided that if he became a member of 
the CCP, his position would have been more palatable. However, as someone who had 
trained professionally in the United States, and believed in democratic principles, the 
political aims of the CCP proved to be unacceptable to him. For this reason, Wu arranged 
to escape to Japan by the last commercial flight out on 16 May.110 This took place on 
the eve of the occupation of Nanjing by the People’s Liberation Army. 
As for the Chinese Communist Party, there was no reason to suspend the Communist 
revolution in Shanghai. The revolutionary tasks of the Party were confirmed and 
crystallised in its Second National Congress.111 In accordance with the declaration of 
this congress, capitalist imperialism and feudal warlord-bureaucracy were considered to 
be the main plagues to be stamped out – according to this perspective, they had been the 
source of untold tribulation and suffering for the Chinese masses. Consequently, the 
congress confirmed that these internal menaces would be the targets of the Party’s first-
stage revolution, known as the democratic revolution. 112  The declaration also 
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emphasised that the success of the democratic revolution would not achieve complete 
liberation of the proletariat. The CCP decided that as it was the only political party 
representing the interests of the proletariat, it would therefore need to mobilise the 
oppressed masses to bring the whole edifice of capitalism crashing down, and gradually 
bring about a society based on genuine communism – “from each according to his ability, 
to each according to his needs.”113  
The Party recognised the need to continue its revolution until all elements antagonistic 
to the aims of communism had been eliminated. Chen Yi’s speech in 1952 summarised 
the political achievements of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in such terms: 
In the past three years owing to the persistent efforts of the people, 
Shanghai has changed from a city dependent on the imperialist 
economy for its existence to a city independent of the imperialist 
economy and which is developing on its own. Shanghai is no longer a 
city serving the imperialists and reactionary elements but a city for the 
people and production. Shanghai has wiped out the dirt and poison left 
behind by the imperialists and their running dogs and has started on its 
way to normal and healthy development. 
                                                     Mayor Chen Yi, Shanghai, May 28, 1952114 
 
The implementation of socialist programs aimed at raising the general welfare of all 
comrades certainly would certainly bolster the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist 
Party in the eyes of the Chinese masses (if such a scheme could actually be brought 
about) as well as bolstering the legitimacy of its newly attained membership in the world 
Communist camp. As a recognised member of the international Communist camp it was 
also obliged to recognise the Soviet leadership, and identify with the orthodoxy of the 
Communist revolutionary theories, as expounded by the regime in the Soviet Union. 
This norm emerged in the pre-war Comintern. The common revolutionary cause and the 
unshakeable belief in Marx-Leninism made the Communist parties in each country join 
together under the Comintern, which in reality was dominated by the Soviet Union, and 
formed a relationship of superiors and inferiors with each other. Moscow was the centre 
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of the international Communist movement. The regime there was imbued with 
overarching authority and legitimacy in matters relating to the interpretation of classic 
Communist theories and to the implementation of Communist revolutionary movements 
in other countries. Such interparty relationships had to be maintained if these regimes 
were to succeed in their mission.115 A politically neutral Shanghai could not be allowed 
to exist – it would have meant accepting Western economic liberalism, which was 
irreconcilable with the orthodox Communist revolutionary theoretical system. Had the 
Chinese Communist Party adopted such a policy, the new and still fragile Chinese 
Communist state power would have found itself shunned and shut out in the cold in 
unprecedented isolation from the international Communist camp. This might have spelt 
political suicide for the regime.  
Cleaning the media up was therefore one of the highest priorities for the Chinese 
Communist Party in the process of wiping “out the dirt and poison left behind by the 
imperialists and their running dogs” – leaving them in place was entirely incompatible 
with implementing the socialist transformation in Shanghai. It can be seen that the Party 
was prompt in its drastic takeover and reform of local newspapers and radio stations. 
The business of the SEPM continued as usual within the first few days of the 
establishment of Communist rule in Shanghai.116 However, many Chinese owned media 
outlets rapidly ceased operations. 
In 1948, the CCP enacted its media policy, aimed at completely dominating news media. 
On 8 November, the Decision of the Solution towards Foreign news agencies in 
liberated cities was issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 
According to this policy, news media were considered to be tools of the dominant classes, 
political parties and social groups engaged in class struggle at the perennial expense of 
the proletariat.117 This was a clear signal that the Party would take absolute control over 
all news media from commercial operations to news reporting, and independent media 
would not be allowed to exist in Communist China. In addition, the activities of Western 
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journalists’ were ear-marked for further restriction. From 1948 onwards, in order to 
maintain control, the Soviet Union required the Chinese Communist Party to modify its 
foreigner policy, and discontinue its relations with the West, including non-communist 
foreign supporters. 118  In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party issued more explicit 
policies against foreign interests in China. The Second Plenum of the Seventh Party 
Central Committee was held in March, and during that conference, Mao Zedong put 
forward the strategic principle of absolutely and methodically ridding China of imperial 
influence. At the conference, he specifically emphasised the need to restrict Western 
journalists. This change meant that even those pro-Communist Western journalists felt 
unwelcome.119 
Shenbao, which had had a history of over 70 years, became the first target for “reform.” 
The history of Shenbao finally came to an end on 27 March 1949 when the last edition 
of the paper was printed. The next day, in the same building, on the same printing presses, 
editions of the Liberation Daily were printed. This paper had been designated as the 
organ of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China.120 This 
event - that Shenbao as one of the oldest and the most influential commercial newspapers 
in contemporary China was replaced by Jiefang Daily - has symbolic significance, as it 
marked the coming of a whole new era in the history of Chinese journalism, an era 
dominated by Communist ideology. Many other Chinese managed media which were 
classified as being close to the Nationalists were suspended on March 28. Chinese owned 
newspapers, such as China Times, Ta Wan Pao, Hsin Min Pao, Sin Wan Pao, Hua Mei 
Wan Pao, did not publish on that day.121 Meanwhile, the Shanghai Radio Station was 
taken over by the Shanghai Military Control Commission, and was then transformed 
into the Shanghai People’s Radio Station and started broadcasting on this very same 
day.122 Nevertheless, the only three foreigners owned newspapers in Shanghai - the 
North China Daily News, the SEPM, and the China Weekly Review – continued to 
publish. Perhaps not quite as usual, but at least they were still in operation – for a limited 
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time.   
Shortly after this, the SEPM began to experience some serious setbacks. As one of the 
most important symbols of a new state power, the new Communist authority replaced 
the Nationalist Gold Yuan with the Renminbi, which became the only legal currency in 
Shanghai. However, a set of standard wages based on the new currency akin to the living 
index of the Nationalist government was not implemented.123 This posed a considerable 
hidden problem. Inflation was still not controlled effectively, so labour disputes were 
bound to occur as long as workers demanded higher wages. If this occurred, the SEPM 
management would not have had any power to negotiate with a reasonable wage 
acceptable to both sides.  
Such an issue really should have been resolved with the Communist government, but 
communication between the parties had become problematic. Although it had been 
announced that American, British or other foreign nationals’ affairs in Shanghai would 
be dealt with by a foreign affairs office, it was difficult to talk with an appropriate person. 
All conversations were required to be formal and conducted in Chinese even if the 
official was known to have good English language ability.124 English, formerly the 
lingua franca of daily life in Shanghai, especially inside the foreign settlement, was now 
forbidden. Not surprisingly this sudden and radical change induced panic and anxiety 
among the foreigners.125 Obviously, the Communists considered the continued use of 
English in Shanghai as an ugly reminder of Western colonialism. It indicated that the 
CCP not only had no intention to rely on Western commercial activity and capital in 
Shanghai, but it also indicated that it intended to make the foreign presence a target for 
attack. 
This point was further confirmed in early July when the temporary ban on the departure 
of foreigners was issued, and although this ban was eventually cancelled, departure visas 
for foreigners were no longer as easy to obtain and required payment of exorbitant fees 
to cover such items as workers’ benefits.126 At this moment, the Communists’ strategy 
to wipe the slate clean of foreign influence in Shanghai began to emerge. The 
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Communists needed a pretext, and conflicts between oppressed Chinese workers (the 
proletariat) and foreigners (not fully and overtly in support the new state power) would 
do very nicely. As Stuart summarised, these conflicts were usually based on labour 
disputes regarding wages. The new regulations brought in by Communists of course 
were designed to place foreigners in a distinctly disadvantageous position. Those who 
were found to be in breach of these regulations were punished in a “name and shame” 
manner favoured by the Communists – violators were often forced to make formal 
apologies in local newspapers.127 For a time, this form of public punishment became 
more and more frequent.128 Through it all, the media obviously performed a critical role. 
The Party needed to transmit its anti-imperialism political view through propaganda 
disseminated by the media operations it had managed to dominate. This was, of course, 
as we have seen, the motive behind the Communists’ immediate control of the local 
press.  
The staff of the SEPM could not save themselves from the Communist media purge. 
When July set in, labour disputes with the management of the paper consistently heated 
up, and finally triggered the closure of the newspaper. On 8 June, five representatives of 
the employees were appointed to negotiate with the management on the matter of 
restoring the same payment that they had had in 1946.129 By 11 June, the two sides had 
failed to reach any agreement - the dispute centred on the specific amount of the wage 
increase. The workers’ demands meant a triple increase in costs based on their current 
wages, and in the view of the newspaper’s management, their demands exceeded the 
limits of their ability to pay. This situation was reported to the Communist authority in 
Shanghai, in the hope that the dispute would be resolved with the authority’s mediation. 
The authority took a passive attitude. On the one hand, hoping that the negotiations 
between labour and management would continue, while on the other hand, they were 
not prepared to respond to the crucial question of a new living index.130 As the core issue 
of the negotiations could not be resolved, subsequent negotiations also failed to achieve 
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any results. 
The tempest which culminated in the closure of the SEPM finally broke on 14 June. On 
that afternoon, Douglas, the business manager of the newspaper, telephoned Gould, and 
urgently reported that he had been besieged in his office by members of the newspaper’s 
labour union agitating about the midmonth payment.131 Gould and Miner then hurried 
to the office where the greatly increased numbers of labour union members demanded 
that their pay claims be met immediately. 132  About the labour organization, Gould 
recalled that its members had enlarged in the past a few days from originally just printers 
to the union of workers and staff, and now it asked the management of the SEPM to 
immediately make the final decision about the midmonth payment. Gould believed that 
based on the situation that the new index was not issued, labourers relying on the CCP 
administration’s sanction proposed the wage scale which was far more than the 
purchasing power of their original wages.133 Once again, negotiations proved futile, and 
when Gould, Miner and Douglas tried to leave the newspaper office building and return 
home, they were detained by workers and locked in the building. Under these conditions, 
Gould announced that the newspaper would close until discipline was restored. Shortly 
after, three representatives of the city’s General Labour Union arrived on the scene and 
provided mediation. After much discussion, Gould agreed to publish the newspaper of 
the following day, and in return for this, they were released, and the workers for their 
part guaranteed that future negotiations on wages would be orderly.134 
Things seemed to have taken a favourable turn so far. However, a news report by Gould 
changed the situation again, and made it develop more and more unmanageably. The 
negotiation was to be arranged at 4 o’clock the next day. Just before 3 o’clock when the 
newspapers for the day should have started to print, Gould unexpectedly received a 
phone call from Douglas who had just been given notice from the labour union of the 
printing house that workers would refuse to print the paper unless an article (written by 
Gould) which reported a crisis in Shanghai caused by the new government was 
withdrawn from the front page. 135  This demand in Gould’s view was absolutely 
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unacceptable, and it was sternly refused: 
My news story certainly did not reflect credit on the government, but 
it was fair and factual. For this reason, and also on general principle, I 
declined to accept the unprecedented theory that our union might 
dictate the contents of our news columns.136 
 
Gould thereupon issued a written order to ask that the newspaper article be printed as 
originally written. However, the 15 June edition of the newspaper was not printed, and 
the SEPM was not published after 14 June 1949.137 Gould later contacted the North 
China Daily News, and asked them to print the SEPM’s unpublished news of 15 June, 
but the report was in the end censored by the workers of the North China Daily News in 
the same way.138 When Gould made the decision to order his workers to proceed with 
the publication of the censored news report, he might not have noticed that a subtle 
change in his situation had just occurred. 139  Just two days before, on 13 June, the 
Shanghai Military Control Commission had issued the regulations governing private 
radio stations in Shanghai, which was published in Liberation Daily of that day: 
Article Three: Without the allowance of the Commission, all political 
programmes, such as commentaries, political speeches and newsletters, 
are forbidden to broadcast. 
Article Four: All radio programmes should not include the content of 
anti-People’s Government, anti-Liberation Army, anti-Chinese 
Communist Party, anti-Chinese People, anti-world democratic 
movement, and corrupting public’s morals.140 
 
Although the regulation nominally was only for radio stations, it demonstrated that the 
Communist Shanghai authority had zero tolerance of any view which was in opposition 
to its own. Gould’s news report definitely sabotaged the Communists’ view of the 
situation, so there was no reason for the governors to allow the article to be published. 
In this situation, things could only have been resolved by Gould agreeing to withdraw 
his news report from publication. However, Gould was just what John Leighton Stuart 
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claimed he was, “with a fine sense of his duty to the newspaper.”141He made a stand, 
and even went as far as attempting a counterattack by having his report published in the 
British owned newspaper, but his efforts were fruitless. 
The decision determining the ultimate fate of the SEPM was made over the next few 
days. Through radiophone, Gould established contact with its owner C. V. Starr, who 
attempted to visit Shanghai to deal with the crisis, but was refused a visa. During their 
talks, Starr advised Gould that the problems relating to wages would not be a stumbling 
block if the full independence of the newspaper editorial could be maintained; otherwise, 
the newspaper should be closed. 142  On the basis of this instruction, Gould, in the 
negotiations on 21 June, stated he wanted to discuss the wage issue and continuing 
publication, but the workers must be prepared to accept two of his claims: printing 25 
newspaper copies of 15 June, and signing a document ensuring they would not interfere 
with the editorial affairs of the newspaper. Their representatives declined to accept 
Gould’s proposal, and the negotiations broke down.143 
Gould’s position was quite clear: censorship should simply not be carried out by his 
workers who, although able to set type in English, could not understand English at all 
and had never previously shown any interest in the contents of the newspaper. From his 
point of view, it must have appeared that the labour union of the SEPM was just a puppet 
of the Communist authority, which could not tolerate the existence of any independent 
foreigner-run newspaper. Based on this analysis, Gould announced his resignation as 
editor of the newspaper and president of the publishing company, and declared his 
company would cease all business from 1 July.144 The formal declaration was handed 
over to labour representatives in the negotiations of the 23 June.145 
It is John Leighton Stuart’s view that the Communist authority did not directly 
participate in the dispute between the management and the workers.146 Perhaps viewed 
from the outside, the situation seemed like this. However, Gould nursed a longstanding 
suspicion concerning the workers in the print room of the newspaper. Early in his letter 
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to General Albert Coady Wedemeyer on 17 November 1948, Gould complained that he 
felt “surrounded by wolves and saboteurs in our own plant.”147 Since CCP took over 
Shanghai, Gould’s experience made him further believe that the CCP’s influence was 
behind the labour movements. As he said: 
The Communists arrived in Shanghai almost wholly without program 
for dealing with city problems. Wishing to win the prompt and full 
support of labor, they proceeded at once to expand all union 
organizations and to give quiet assurance that any tactics short of actual 
violence would be approved in extorting “new deal” conditions from 
ownership – especially foreign ownerships.148  
 
In Shanghai, the quantity of labour movements and strikes in the second half of 1949 far 
exceeded any time before. Elizabeth Perry attributes this situation to the economic 
difficulties. She points out that many capitalists moved to Hong Kong, Taipei and Tokyo 
due to their anxiety to the circumstances in the Chinese Civil War, and it led to the trend 
of business closure and labourers’ wages to be reduced. Thus, labourers had to struggle 
for their livelihood. She also emphasises that the new Communist regime openly 
promised their acknowledgement of the proletarian supremacy further encouraged and 
stimulated the labourers’ movements.149 To the closure of the SEPM, the motivation of 
the labour dispute was far more than the wage issues. Workers’ attempts to interfere 
with editorial affairs thus to absolutely control the paper was what the CCP expected. 
As for Gould’s suspiction that the Communists must have masterminded the workers’ 
activities, it was, to some extent, corroborated by evidence provided by the Printers’ 
Union of Shanghai when it made public its relations with the Chinese Communist Party, 
published in the Liberation Daily of 24 and 25 October 1949: 
After the victory of the War of Resistance against Japan, […] our 
worker mates established ‘Shanghai Municipal Letterpress Printing 
Professional Trade Union’. It functioned under the Nationalist 
reactionaries’ organisational system on the surface, but the Communist 
secret agent in reality guided the union, preparing to struggle against 
the Nationalist reactionaries. […] Up to September 1947, as the 
Nationalist reactionaries more crazily devastated our revolutionary 
organisation, […] for saving the effectives of revolution, our comrades 
of the secret agent felt obliged to lurk and work secretly. This situation 
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was maintained until Shanghai was liberated, and after that, we were 
re-organised. […] It was told to our worker-class proletariat 
brotherhood that we will achieve victory if we stand by the side of 
people’s revolution, and those who support anti-people and anti-
revolution shall be defeated and annihilate by people’s force.150 
 
Although there is evidence that strongly points to the maintenance of a close relationship 
between the Communist authority and the workers of the SEPM, Gould (in the process 
of figuring this out) demonstrated a consistently provocative and uncompromising 
approach to conflict. Such behaviour on Gould’s part in a sense played into the hands of 
the CCP – making an example of Gould sent a clear and positive message to the public 
regarding the CCP’s determination and ability to overcome the hegemony of and the 
“running dogs” of American imperialism. The closure of the paper was a public 
spectacle that proved that in the face of the CCP’s public authority, the means of 
resistance at the disposal of the newspaper were absolutely negligible. Even in the 
Isolated Island period, the SEPM struggled in its own way and as best it could against 
the regime of Wang Ching-wei and the Japanese occupying forces - it was a contest 
between the public authority of the Wang-Japan group and the immunities afforded by 
the terms of extraterritoriality of the Western powers in Shanghai.  
It is worth outlining the situation for foreigners in Shanghai at the time of the CCP 
takeover. Since the occupation of Nanjing by the Liberation Army, the CCP had refused 
to recognise the John Leighton Stuart’s diplomatic status in his capacity as American 
ambassador. On the morning of 25 April, a small force of the People’s Liberation Army 
broke into the American ambassador’s residence, entering Stuart’s bedroom.151 Huang 
Hua had previously explained the CCP’s position regarding all former embassy officials 
when he met with Stuart on 13 April – they could only be treated and protected as 
ordinary foreign nationals, and they were not to be recognised as diplomats nor enjoy 
diplomatic privileges until their respective countries had established diplomatic relations 
with the new Chinese Communist state power (the CPP).152 In the interim, and until its 
authority and control had been properly established, the Liberation Army had search and 
entry rights with regards to any premise in the occupation of suspicious person, be he or 
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she Chinese or foreigner.153Stuart still had a strong sense of mission to fulfil in his 
capacity as ambassador, although it had been made clear from the Communist side that 
they no longer recognised him as America’s ambassador. Notwithstanding, he proposed 
to visit Shanghai with the purpose of acquainting himself with the situation for local 
American interests under Communist rule.154 When Philip Fugh called on Huang Hua 
on 31 May, he brought up the proposed itinerary of Stuart’s visit to Shanghai.155 The 
Communist authority finally approved this itinerary, which permitted Stuart to set out 
for Shanghai on the evening of 11 June.156 However, he was not allowed to exercise any 
ambassadorial function and or power: 
I had determined … to make an issue of the internationally accorded 
rights of diplomatic immunity in such matters as not having baggage 
searched. The Communist official position was that we had no such 
rights, being only ordinary citizens, so this might well be a test of 
conflicting principles.157 
After making representations to relevant authorities, Stuart was in the 
end begrudgingly allowed to style himself “former” American 
Ambassador in Shanghai.158 Clearly, effective consular protection for 
American citizens in Shanghai could not be obtained in any 
meaningful way. It was under these circumstances that those at the 
helm of the SEPM had to oppose the Communist state apparatus single-
handedly.  
Although the SEPM had been ordered to cease operations, workers’ 
pay was still a pending issue. And just at that moment came the ever-
effervescent event of the Yangtze River mining report. The North 
China Daily News initially reported on it on 10 June. In the evening of 
that day, the SEPM published a front page news report with the title of 
MCC Investigating Reported Mining of Shanghai Harbour. The 
following days, this news was repeatedly reprinted.159 The Communist 
Shanghai authority did not take the news seriously until 21 June when 
the Liberation Daily announced that this news was pure invention: 
The so-called news that mines are laid at the mouth of the Yangtze 
River by the Nationalists has now been proved as a downright rumour. 
This rumour was initially fabricated and spread by the British owned 
the North China Daily News. Obviously, this intrigue was a close 
teamwork by several groups, and finally aimed at creating hardships of 
Shanghai people’s daily life which make them fall into the trap that 
they set. If we review the news published in the past week, we can 
easily figure out the truth of the rumour campaign. The North China 
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Daily News on 10 June published a long report about so-called 
‘shipping suspended here as river entrance feared mined’ on the front 
page. They did not gain any relevant official information from the 
military representative of the (Shanghai) Customs, but they constantly 
report and discuss the so-called news based on the words, such as 
probably, perhaps. Later, such rumour prominently featured on the 
front page of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury. […]. 
This wave of rumour attack was definitely masterminded by the 
British-American Imperialists who try to generate difficulties for the 
people of Shanghai. Shanghai’s People from all walks of life are irate 
considering the deliberate fabrication by the North China Daily News-
led media, and ask the government to severely punish relevant 
responsible parties.160 
 
One day after the article was published, Peyton-Griffin, the editor of the North China 
Daily News, was summoned to the Foreign Affairs Department of the Shanghai Military 
Control Commission and compelled to explain the news report, which the Commission 
characterised as a deliberately fabricated rumour.161 The following day, Peyton-Griffin 
published a formal apology in several Shanghai newspapers, guaranteeing that he would 
not make the same mistake. Later, the Shanghai Military Control Commission issued a 
formal warning to the North China Daily News stating that this was in accordance with 
their finding of the fact of the breach of regulations (i.e., the publication of fabricated 
anti-revolutionary news) and in order to honour the public’s strong condemnation of the 
newspaper. This administrative sanction was published by many newspapers. According 
to the commission’s requirement, the offending paper (the North China Daily News) had 
to publish it on its front page.162 
The event of the Yangtze River mining report reflected the Communists’ strategy of 
dealing with the problem of foreign media outlets in Shanghai that were not 
unequivocally pro-Communist. In the Liberation Daily article regarding the Yangtze 
River Mining report, it was pointed out that the mining information had not been 
released by Communist officials. Therefore, it concluded peremptorily, the Yangtze 
River mining report as published in the North China Daily News was untrue. This was 
a clear signal from the CCP that the media had no right to report any news which had 
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been gathered by their own devices - they could only quote the information that had been 
authorised by Communist officials. The CCP had effectively brow-beaten the media 
throughout the whole course of the event. Of course, it had been the one to scream 
“rumour” longest and loudest, triggering the outbreak of the event; and then it had 
mobilised the indignation of the masses, while advocating the intervention of its own 
authority; and finally forced the hapless person (Peyton-Griffith) responsible for the 
publication into a position of abject humiliation by requiring him to publish an apology 
on the front page of his own newspaper. As a result, what started out as a “journalism” 
incident was enlarged into a political event that involved the whole society. In the 
process of “resolving” the issue to its own satisfaction, the Communist regime reinforced 
its legitimacy as the ablest opponent to the imperialists still present on Chinese soil, and 
the most strident and tireless protector of the Chinese proletariat. 
The event of the Yangtze River mining report soon reverberated in the bowels of the 
SEPM’s printing room. On 24 June, the Shanghai Municipal Bureau for Social Works 
received an indictment to demand the Shanghai Communist authority to punish Gould. 
It included the allegation that Gould had cheated his workers out of their payment, and 
that the workers had recently discovered two inflammatory new reports penned by the 
editor of the SEPM. The newly exposed reports included: (1) English transcription and 
Chinese translation of Chiang Kai-shek’s speech (given by radio) received in Shanghai 
on 7 June:  
Chiang Kai-shek promised Shanghai over the radio from Taiwan last 
night that he would recapture this city within four months or commit 
suicide. 
Such was the report today from several local Chinese listeners who 
said they had heard the Generalissimo orate on his life and hard times 
for one hour over the air. 
First Chiang apologised to the people of Shanghai for losing the 
metropolis. He explained that the reason his promised “fight to the 
last man” had misfired was that troops in the rear had been bought 
off, causing a chain-reaction of disaster. 
But all that is being fixed up, he intimated. 
Although the course of his projected recapture campaign was 
expected to include air-bombing, he said, people could consider 
themselves safe in a radius of 40 miles from the center of Shanghai. 
In other words, Shanghai and suburbs would not be bombed but such 
city as Quinsan would appear to lie barely within the area of 
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projected operation. Whether such cities as Hangchow and Nanking 
would be spared or included as more than 40 miles from Shanghai 
evidently was not made clear in the broadcast.163  
  
 (2) the Yangtze River mining report of 10 June with both English and Chinese 
translation:  
The Shanghai Military Control Commission was today 
investigating the report that a Nationalist LCM had mined the 
Yangtse River mouth, suspending shipping operations for the 
past 24 hours. 
A Shanghai Maritime Customs official said that the only 
method to determine specifically whether the river entrance was 
mined, would be to mine sweep the entire harbor. 
Lake of available craft for such operation now places the harbor 
in a vacuum, as the reports have prompted local shipping 
concerns to delay or divert arrivals and departures of vessels, 
pending clarification of the situation. 
It was reported this morning that a foreign shipping firm had 
radioed to foreign naval craft, berthed outside of the Yangtse 
River, to probe the possibilities of the suspected mine-laying 
activities. this however could not be confirmed. 
A high Customs official, responsible for the distribution of the 
warning to all shipping concerns, said that officially the harbor 
was still open to shipping, but that operators were warned to 
use their own discretion. 
Only activity in the harbor, with the except of small junks, was 
the dispatching this morning of a Customs light tender up-river 
to tie-down a wreckage buoy. 164 
 
And (3) the Chinese translation of the disputed news report about the Shanghai labour 
disputes by Gould.165 It is hard to imagine that such work could be completed only by 
the workers themselves. 
In short, the workers alleged that Gould owed them money (even though he had declared 
that operations had ceased) as the wage dispute was still unresolved and they had 
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uncovered damning evidence of false and inflammatory reports - both disloyal to and to 
the discredit of the Communist regime. The print room workers did not recognise 
management’s order to suspend the newspaper’s operations. They insisted that they were 
still working as usual, and they were owed wages that included days worked after the 
cessation of operations. Irony of ironies, Zhou Enlai was one of the persons who 
participated in the final closure of the SEPM. On 28 June 1949, the Shanghai Committee 
of the Chinese Communist Party reported to Zhou Enlai on the measures taken regarding 
matters involving Gould and the SEPM. John Powell also ignored Gould’s 
announcement by distancing himself from Gould’s position and declaring that he and 
his newspaper stood with the workers and the CCP.166 Not surprisingly, Gould was the 
personal target of many attacks from the time of the announcement of the closure of the 
newspaper until he left Shanghai in December 1949. Liberation Daily, a mouthpiece of 
the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee (it also published World Affairs as an official 
magazine of the Chinese Communist Party) described Gould as an “imperialist wood-
worm” who launched psychological warfare against the Chinese people through the 
fabrication of rumours whose sole purpose was to mislead the masses.167  
In early September 1949, C. V. Starr finally responded to pressure by paying out a large 
sum of money from New York for the demobilisation of the workers, and the labour 
disputes forthwith came to a close.168 Gould notified the Shanghai government that the 
payment had been made to the workers. It was also reported by Liberation Daily as 
following:   
Through the three months since 14 June when the workers of the 
American owned Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury were sent away, 
they stood out for their inflexible conviction concerning their 
reasonable demands. Up to 9th of this month, the issue of payment that 
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the workers demanded had generally stalled. […] It finally ended with 
victory thanks to the workers’ daring work. All of the workers voted 
that their victory derived from the protection of people’s rights and the 
support given to the truth by the people’s government. They wanted to 
express their thanks to the people’s government.169 
 
Obviously, for the Communist authority, it was a patent propaganda victory over former 
“imperialist masters.” As Gould said, the Communist regime achieved popularity by 
compelling owners to pick up the tab for all the workers’ wage demands.170 But from 
capitulation, came release. Gould finally obtained the visa he needed from the 
Communist authorities that permitted him to leave China. He left on 25 September by 
the repatriation ship General Gordon.171  
The SEPM, Professional Journalism and Turbulent Modern China 
Since its establishment in 1929, the SEPM had an historical life of about 20 years, in 
which it experienced the boom of national economy and unequalled national crisis in 
pre-war Shanghai, the gory Isolated Island, difficult time in wartime capital Chongqing, 
depression in post-war Shanghai, and finally was forced to close in June 1949, only half 
a month after Shanghai was taken over by the CCP. Not only does the SEPM reflect an 
odyssey of an American newspaper in China, but is a history to record the vicissitude of 
the professionalisation of Chinese journalism in the first half of the 20th century as well. 
As an American owned and managed newspaper, the SEPM in its journalistic practice 
unavoidably had American features, such as the reporting of news based on American 
journalists’ viewpoint and standing points of editorials which reflected American 
interests. These features made the SEPM different from any other Chinese or British 
newspapers. However, the newspaper did not affiliate with the American government 
and any American political party. As a commercial newspaper, its priority was definitely 
its readers. Maintaining a sufficiently large quantity of readers through the provision of 
news reporting and editorials was the key way for the newspaper to survive. C. V. Starr 
as the owner of the SEPM utilised the newspaper as the main platform to publish 
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advertisement of his insurance company. The advertising effect, to a large degree, 
depended on the quantity of the newspaper’s readers. 
Americans in China and some Chinese senior officials were the main readers of the 
English edition of the SEPM. Both groups were keen to know American official standing 
points regarding significant events and the Chinese policy of the United States. Many 
editors of the Chinese edition had American education background, and American values 
more or less influenced their news reporting and editorial works. More importantly, the 
American features did not turn out to be the obstacle to the Chinese reading the Chinese 
edition of the paper, but this became a main selling point. Thus, American features in 
the news bias of the SEPM were the result of commercialisation rather than purely 
political position. 
The American news bias of the SEPM seemingly had been in conflict with journalistic 
objectivity, which is a key principle in professionalism ideology. The importance of the 
value of objectivity is that it was not merely an ideal disconnected from reality. 
Objectivity was supposed to be the raison d'être of all activity at the practical level, and 
as such it was also an inevitable source of ethical dilemma.172 Although journalism 
objectivity is defined and explained by different scholars based on their own views and 
perspectives, there is a common value which is to reduce subjective factors in news 
reporting. Dennis and Merrill, for example, propose three key points of objectivity: “1) 
separating facts from opinion; 2) presenting and emotionally detached view of the news; 
and 3) striving for fairness and balance”.173 Michael Schudson identifies the cannon of 
the concept with four points: “1) through expressed allegiance to the norm in speeches 
and textbooks; 2) ethnographic observations of journalists at work; 3) content analysis 
that measures the degree of impersonality and non-partisanship in news stories; and 4) 
resistance displayed by adherents when the norm is challenged or criticised”. 174 
Objectivity ideally is to make journalism overstep political influence, but how and in 
what degree it can be realised in practice is always a question to be debated and 
challenged by scholars. Carey, for example, argues that objective means journalism 
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under the commercial motive adjusts its political position to be diverse, thus to avoid 
alienating any certain group of audience.175 Michael Schudson also questions this term. 
He argues that both ‘partisan’ journalists and ‘objective’ journalists all reject “inaccuracy, 
lying and misinformation,” but ‘objective’ journalists do not like ‘partisan’ journalists 
who present information from a specific group or organisation without critical 
assessment. 176  From the scholars’ discussions above, it is clear that the notion of 
objectivity is incapable of fully encasing subjective information and influence 
particularly once the demands of commercialisation with its need to attract readers are 
satisfied. Based on the view of history, the emergence of objectivity is a progress for 
journalism to avoid partisan domination, and improves the professional independence 
of journalism. 
However, the later development of journalism objectivity became distinct with the 
United States. National crisis and the full scale war against Japan in the 1930s 
objectively changed the trajectory of the professionalisation of Chinese journalism, and 
in this process, partisan journalism realised its restoration and began to dominate the 
press in China. When the press regresses to the position of endorsing for political parties, 
journalistic objectivity will be unavoidably deprived as the foundation of the concept, 
which is against partisan journalism has not existed. 
As an American newspaper which had a long history of publication in Shanghai foreign 
settlement, the SEPM is unavoidably doubted towards its property that whether the 
newspaper was a product of Western colonialism in China. Thus, it will be further 
challenged regarding the paper’s ideology of public service, especially whether it 
serviced for underclass Chinese. First of all, social poverty and colonialism should not 
be simply understood as a binary opposition relation. Moreover, moral criteria based on 
nationalism should not be simply adopted as the only dimension to describe the relations 
of the two concepts. Professional journalism is better to serve public interests when 
interacting with social poverty and unfair under a colonial system rather than partisan 
journalism. Indeed, the professionalisation of Chinese journalism was just a benefit from 
treaty ports and colonies in Chinese territory. With the pro-condition of professionalism, 
                                                 
175  James W. Carey, “The Communications Revolution and the Professional Communicator,” The Sociological 
Review 13, no. s1 (May 1965): 23. 
176 Schudson, “Objectivity Norm American Journalism,” 150. 
233 
 
social poverty and other problems under colonialism are likely to be reported and 
discussed by the media in a relatively objective view. Partisan journalism, in the contrary, 
simply serves for the interests of political parties, and the issues, such as poverty and 
colonial compradors, in partisan media will unavoidably become the agendas 
manipulated based on the parties’ interests. 
Undoubtedly, the CCP’s propaganda made the Party acquire sympathy and public 
opinion support in the Chinese Civil War. Unfortunately, to a large degree it marked 
failure of professional journalism in China. Since the outbreak of the war against Japan, 
the situation forced the SEPM to co-operate with the Nationalist Government. The 
influence of the American diplomatic policy might have been a reason to facilitate this 
co-operation, but the property of the SEPM as a commercial newspaper which was 
independent from political parties was not changed. With the restoration of partisan 
journalism in post-war China, it seized the space for professional journalism, causing 
the newspaper to experience a depression in post-war Shanghai and its final closure in 
June 1949. The case of the SEPM represents the process of commercial newspapers 
during the war against Japan to be successfully incorporate and controlled by the 
Nationalist Government. However, there was another typical case during the war period 
that the CCP achieved control over some relevantly independent journalists. Both of 
them together marked the end of professional journalism in China, and thus the 
competition of propaganda between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party 
became the main stream of post-war Chinese journalism, and the CCP’s propaganda 
finally achieved victory in 1949. In the following paragraphs, Edgar Snow’s case will 
be presented to concisely explain the process of professional journalism to be 
transformed into the CCP’s propaganda agent during the war against Japan. 
Edgar Snow was an American professional journalist who graduated from the Missouri 
School of journalism. After he arrived in China, he witnessed the growing national crisis 
and other serious social issues. Snow began to disappoint the Nationalist Government, 
and his ideas began to be well to the left of centre, but he still maintained his independent 
position and fully understood that American newspapers would lose their trust in him as 
long as he was known as a pro-Communist.177 However, successively serious national 
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crises made Snow unknowingly involved in Chinese politics. Prompted by the sympathy 
to students’ patriotic emotions, Edgar Snow together with his wife Helen Foster Snow 
not only supported, but also encouraged and guided Chinese students to attend 
demonstrations against the Japanese invasion and Chiang Kai-shek’s foreign policies 
regarding Japan. However, these students’ movements were not purely patriotic 
demonstrations, but had been permeated by the influence of the Chinese Communist 
Party and the left-wing organisations which were closely related to the CCP.178 
Snow’s professional journalistic position was inevitably distorted since he began to be 
involved in Chinese politics. Distorted professionalism combined with the Chinese 
Communist Party’s interests brought about his journalistic trip to Yan’an. Based on the 
standpoint of a professional journalist, this was a significantly important trip to present 
an unknown world to most people, but simultaneously forfeited his principle of 
objectivity derived from an independent position and professional consideration in his 
journalist work. Not only was it mixed with nationalism, but also deeply mingled with 
the interests of political parties. Professional journalism ideology also lost its place with 
Snow’s trip to hinterland China. It was proven afterwards that the combination of 
Snow’s political connection derived from his participation in the activities by left-wing 
organisations and the CCP, and the Party’s political needs to acquire support for 
establishing its united front work, were critical factors in Snow’s visiting Yan’an.179 
Finally, Snow’s writing became a successful propaganda for the Chinese Communist 
Party as it reflected CCP’s politics. Since then, he was forced to modify his writing 
several times with the amendment of CCP’s policies.180 After these experiences, Snow’s 
halo as a professional journalist was unavoidably questioned and challenged. To the CCP, 
their political propaganda was successfully released in the way of professional 
journalism, and thus received good results. 
Snow’s case further highlights the process through which professional journalism 
ideology became distorted under growing nationalism pressure, and then compounded 
with the political needs of the regimes in hinterland China. The restoration of political 
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parties’ domination over journalism was thus realised. Being different from Gould, Snow, 
with his deep disappointment regarding the Nationalist Government, placed his hopes 
in the CCP. Unfortunately, the party’s journalism policies were derived from, yet even 
more strict and sophisticated than, Lenin and Stalin.181 The publication of the SEPM in 
the Isolated Island Shanghai and Wartime Capital Chongqing, and Edgar Snow’s visit to 
Yan’an, were two different ways in which the nationalism pressure compounded on 
professional journalism and co-operation with Chinese regimes in the hinterland. 
Compared to the first, the latter way was more fatal to professional journalism as the 
closure of the SEPM shows. 
Snow’s experience to a certain degree reflects that resistance against exotic threat and 
struggling for domestic reform were the two main elements came cross the modern 
Chinese history. Li Zehou proposes that enlightenment was finally repressed by saving 
the nation.182  Edmund Fund amends the binary opposition relations between the two 
terms, and he argues that cherishing liberal and democratic values and demanding for 
political and constitutional reform may not be always in the opposite with establishing 
a strong and powerful government and inspiring anti-imperial nationalism. However, 
Fund still has to recognise the historical fact that Chinese struggling for personal rights 
and political reforms did not fundamentally challenged the ruling order of the Nationalist 
Party and changed the result of the Chinese Civil War.183 
Based on the case of the SEPM, saving the nation and enlightenment in journalism 
development of modern China might not be absolutely in opposition to each other, but 
the objective result is that political parties relying on the successively growing 
nationalism since the outbreak of the war against Japan realised their control and 
domination over journalism and it led to the depression of the SEPM in post-war 
Shanghai and the final closure in June 1949. During the wartime period, either Gould or 
other Chinese journalists who published articles in the Journalist Weekly, a supplement 
of Ta Mei Wan Pao, expressed the idea that they fully understood the necessity of 
government exerting control over journalism for the highest national interests, which 
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was resistance against Japanese invasion, but they anticipated the new beginning of the 
professionalisation of journalism in post-war China. Thus, their professionalism ideal 
was only limited as an ideal and under the effective governance of the Nationalist 
Government, there was little space for the SEPM to practice professionalism. 
Fung owns the frustration of efforts for domestic reform in modern China to the weak 
position of Chinese intellectual elites’ cultural tradition in competing with the dominant 
political culture which was armed and violent.184 However, to Chinese journalism, only 
this reason is not sufficient to explain the good development of its professionalisation in 
pre-war Shanghai and post-war Hong Kong. The case of the SEPM presents that the 
national crisis in the 1930s finally forced many journalists in China to change their 
persistence on independence of journalism and choose to cooperate with the Nationalist 
Government.185 When professionalism ideals were submerged by the emotion of saving 
the nation, politicians would occupy the moral high point to realise their control over 
journalism. Hopes for restoration of professional journalism in post-war China were 
finally disillusioned with the Nationalist Government’s takeover of the former foreign 
concessions in the treaty ports and realised effective management over the press there. 
Although Nakamura Motoya argues that controlling journalism was not the policy of the 
Nationalist Government at the early stage of post war China, he still recognises that 
Hong Kong became the sanctuary of intellectuals to critic politics since 1947 as the 
Nationalist Government began to strengthen their policy for free speech.186 The sharp 
contrast of the boom of the press in post war Hong Kong and Shanghai proves again the 
fatal weakness of the professionalisation of Chinese journalism, heavily dependent on 
the existence of treaty ports and colonies. 
Conclusion  
The experience of the SEPM was not an accident nor an isolated case in the history of 
journalism in China. The means the CCP mobilised to achieve social control were 
actually highly effective – it was a case of skilful social mobilisation by means of a long-
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honed mastery of the machinery and techniques of mass propaganda. Although the North 
China Daily News maintained publication by reaching a temporary compromise with the 
Communist regime regarding the issue of the Yangtze River mining report, sharp and 
deep contradictions plagued the paper as it tried to balance very conflicting objectives – 
maintenance of the standards and principles of professional journalism while avoiding 
the ire of the Communist regime. However, the newspaper suspended operations soon 
after it published reports on the Korean War which were a source of serious irritation 
for the Communists in June 1950.187 Other papers, such as John Powell’s China Weekly 
review, gained much respect for their struggles and losses at the hands of the Japanese. 
The SEPM, however, clearly led the charge of the foreign-owned papers in resisting 
censorship a well as resisting the Japanese. Gould was proud of the SEPM’s endeavours 
and efforts. He wrote in his memoir that no other Shanghai paper dared to fight the 
Japanese to such an extent. His adherence to professional standards during the trying 
final year of the paper is testament to the depth of his commitment.  
From what has been examined in this chapter, the SEPM persisted in its principle of 
reporting news objectively and in an independent manner, even though the general 
media environment in post-war Shanghai and China in general was immersed in political 
propaganda. When faced with the controlling censorship of the Nationalist regime, 
Gould chose a tactful way to stem the tide of trouble and successfully maintained the 
newspaper’s independence. Emery and Roberts in The Press and America: An 
Interpretive History of the Mass Media recommended the New York Times as a model 
of professional journalism in so far as it consistently conveyed a reasonable attitude in 
public reporting, seldom allowed personal invective to colour its reporting, and 
consistently avoided the extremes of black-and-white news reporting.188 The present 
study argues that the SEPM largely realised this ideal in Shanghai despite the fact that 
the media environment was at times extremely harsh. In such a chaotic period and 
society, what Gould had to deal with in order to secure the SEPM’s survival and continue 
to publish in alignment with the core values of professional journalism was well and 
truly far beyond issues limited to the niceties of nuanced reporting. Gould’s risky 
strategy may reflect that he was not fully aware of the relevant policies of the CCP. His 
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observations of the bitter experience of both Chinese and foreign media in Manchuria 
and North China after the Communist’s occupation should have made him realise that 
this was nothing more than the result of the implementation of the CCP’s policies. 
However that may be, it certainly appears to have been a case of unfounded hope 
triumphing over bitter experience. If so, that is entirely to Gould’s credit. 
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Chapter 5: China, journalism, the SEPM and Bourdieu’s 
theory of field 
 
This thesis has demonstrated how the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, as a foreign 
owned and run entity, enjoyed the benefits of extraterritoriality, and that this is a central 
part of its success during this period. Once extraterritoriality ceased in Shanghai, the 
story of the survival of the SEPM is one of prolonged struggle before its final closure in 
1949. It is important now to explore the potential of a possible future iteration of research 
on this newspaper, namely the application of a theoretical framework that attempts to 
delineate more precisely the underlying forces shaping the development of professional 
journalism in early twentieth century China. This chapter seeks to marry the foregoing 
findings of this present study of the SEPM to key elements of Pierre Bourdieu’s (1930 - 
2002) theoretical framework (as proposed in Outline of a Theory of Practice) with the 
aim of further elucidating key aspects of the journalism field in China. 1  As Silvio 
Waisbord so succinctly puts the case: 
The emergence of journalism in modernity, as well as other 
occupations and professions, reflected the broad process of the division 
of labor and the specialization of technical knowledge. What happened 
in the press and journalism was another manifestation of the increased 
complexity and organization of modern society in institutions with 
their own rules and norms. By directing our attention to the relation 
between the journalistic field and other fields, Bourdieu’s theory offers 
a dynamic, action-oriented perspective that contextualizes journalism 
within a set of social and historical developments. Journalism, its 
practices and ideals, cannot be understood in isolation from a particular 
social formation and the complex ever-changing interaction between 
fields. 2   
 
Monika Krause’s research uses Bourdieu’s theory of fields of cultural production to 
focus on the relevant historical evidence in the United States regarding the history of the 
public service ideal that has permeated discourse about journalism there from the late 
19th to early 20th centuries.3 She concluded that the implementation of the journalistic 
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ideal of public service in the United States has largely depended on the presence (within 
the autonomous journalism field) of field-specific capital, which is independent of 
political advantage or literary merit.  
Active news-gathering or reporting is the distinctive innovation of journalism. This 
practice became common in the 1860s and 1870s, with the emergence of a relatively 
autonomous field of practice with its own stakes, relatively independent from political 
advantage or literary merit. The power of field-specific capital to organise practices in 
the media has varied since then. The field consolidated in the era from 1890 to 1914, 
with the newspaper industry expanding. In this period we see a first golden era for local 
reporting and investigative journalism.4 
Krause enumerates the advantages that the application of the concept of the journalistic 
field brings to studies such as hers and this present one:  
Field theory allows us to historicize journalistic ideals and analyse 
their institutional base […]; 
Field theory directs us to the prevalence of a distinctively journalistic 
practice as an indicator of journalistic autonomy. Active news-
gathering from a variety of sources is the distinctive innovation of 
journalistic production and whether and how much this happens needs 
to be considered in examination of journalism as journalism […]; 
Field theory allows us to integrate evidence across media forms. News 
production as a whole is an important and neglected unit of analysis; it 
is both narrower than ‘the media’ or ‘communication’ as a whole, and 
broader than specific media forms or genres […];  
Field theory allows us to compare field properties across historical 
periods or national contexts […]. We can examine the force of field-
specific capital to organize practices. We can examine the changing 
relationships of the journalistic field with other fields, most notably the 
economic and the political field.5 
 
Huang Shun-Shing and Hsiao Hsu-Chih explored the applicability of Bourdieu’s field 
to the history of journalism in non-Western countries. By reviewing research on the 
press in post-war Taiwan, Huang Shun-Shing found that although there were increasing 
numbers of studies that contributed to supplying more abundant details to form a fuller 
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picture of journalism, the emphasis was, in the final analysis, still limited to exploring 
the theme of absolute social control by the Nationalist Party. He found that this was so 
even when these studies focused on policies and legal dimensions relevant to the history 
of journalism. Huang criticised these research methods for submerging the study of 
journalism history into narratives of political development, thereby preventing the 
development of the press from being studied for its own sake. 6  By adopting the 
Bourdieu’s theory of field, he found evidence that challenged the standard notion that 
the dilemma of the press in Taiwan is derived from unavoidable political and economic 
pressure. Instead, he argued that the problem is more one of journalists’ lacking a sense 
of history and needing to collectively re-think the dilemmas that their contradictory roles 
pose for them. In Bourdesian terms, the multiplicity of positions within the field that 
journalists occupy as instruments of state propaganda for national ideology, guardians 
of public opinion independent of authority while at the same time striving for 
commercial viability and advantage.7 Hsiao Hsu-Chih focuses on the assassinations of 
journalists in China during the Republican period (see chapters 2 and 3 of the present 
study) and analysed its effect on the press.8 In his opinion the application of Bourdieu’s 
field theory yielded information that challenged received ideas about the meaning of the 
assassinations. This approach enables scholars to imagine and explore alternative facts 
and possible meanings. Moving the focus of research to a more comprehensive 
examination of the multi-dimensional features of the journalistic field (during the 
Republican period) and its relatedness to local society and political violence allows for 
a shift in interpretations of historical evidence that have tended towards an inherently 
revolution-centred viewpoint which has sought to represent the assassinated journalists 
as martyrs to free speech. 9 
It has been argued that a comprehensive history of journalism in China needs to not only 
acknowledge the foreign origins of newspapers in modern China, but also account for 
how foreign ideas and practices of professionalisation were introduced into China and 
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adapted to local conditions. This makes the SEPM an important vehicle for exploring 
many aspects of Chinese journalism of the late 1920s to the late 1940s. Indeed, it has 
been amply demonstrated that Shanghai’s special conditions made it a haven for the 
flourishing of Chinese journalism, despite the political turmoil in China in the late 1920s. 
It has been noted that the Manchurian warlord leader Chang Hsueh-liang was persuaded 
to join the Nanjing Nationalist Government that Chiang Kai-shek led in December 1928, 
and it marked the successful accomplishment of the Northern Expedition. China at that 
moment was only nominally unified, and real power in many areas was still wielded by 
local warlords. This situation led to the civil wars within the factionalised Nationalist 
Party from March 1929 to November 1930. Additionally, the CCP had possessed its own 
military force, and successively organised riots and created Soviet Zones nationwide.  
Crucially, it has been shown that by studying the newspaper’s archives there is much 
evidence of the efforts to professionalise journalism throughout this turbulent period. 
We have also seen that there is much evidence of the devastating effects that such 
conflicts had on the development of professional journalism. This period of the SEPM 
is very much marked by the angst-ridden articles that many Chinese journalists felt the 
need to write (often – for their own safety - anonymously) as their activities as journalists 
began to shift from protecting the public interest through objective reporting (a value 
chiefly derived from the professional prototype of American journalism) to activities 
that became increasingly partisan; and ultimately to forms of journalism heavily 
controlled by the ideologies of the CCP (particularly after the military takeover at the 
end of May 1949). Up to the early 1950s, the original mass media market, which had 
been maintained for nearly half a century, became a vehicle for highly politicalised and 
state-managed Communist propaganda.10  
Introducing field theory 
A central concept in Bourdieu’s work is what he refers to as habitus. This concept 
involves an analysis of both the course of an individual history and history as it is 
objectified in institutions. Therefore this chapter explores the historic conditions of 
journalism’s beginnings in China. This is a prerequisite to understanding the habitus of 
some of the key figures at the SEPM when it was established in 1929. Application of 
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field theory also highlights the central importance of semi-colonial extraterritoriality that 
arose in the nineteenth-century due to China’s weakened state - relative to other nations 
such as Japan and Britain - coupled with the Qing government’s ability to apply 
precedents from its own indigenous legal system (developed out of the necessity to 
manage conflicts with the Manchu population).  
The existence of this system meant that the rulers of the Qing Empire had experiences 
to draw upon when they accommodated foreign demands for extraterritoriality and built 
institutions in order to deal with its problems. Nowhere is the continuity between 
“traditional” and treaty port institutions more salient than in the case of the Mixed Court 
in Shanghai. By comparing the Chinese version of the treaty texts with other legal 
sources, we can observe a direct borrowing and adaptation of long existing Sino-Manchu 
legal concepts and institutions.11  
The professionalisation of journalism within China itself was heavily – but not solely - 
dependent upon the existence of treaty ports that supported the cultural, legal, political 
and economic conditions that facilitated the flourishing of a distinct culture of 
professional journalism; or more properly, according to Bourdieu’s approach, the 
development of a distinct habitus specific to the journalists (agents) working for 
newspapers established and protected by extraterritoriality. Shanghai’s enjoyment of the 
benefits of extraterritoriality created a social microcosm or ‘field’ which facilitated and 
supported the flourishing of professional journalism there. In The Logic of Practice, 
Bourdieu understands human beings’ practices through the conceptual lens of what he 
calls the habitus - a Latin term meaning ‘disposition,’ ‘condition’ or ‘state.’ This concept 
is a sort of shorthand for an array of conditioning factors (socio-cultural, cognitive, 
environmental and historical) that endow an individual with ‘dispositions’ that are more 
or less valuable or legitimate depending on the social sphere that the individual is acting 
within. As Bourdieu explains, habitus is “constituted in the course of an individual 
history, imposing its particular logic on incorporation, and through which agents partake 
of the history objectified in institutions.”12 Habitus shapes behaviour in accordance with 
largely unexamined assumptions and presumptions about an individual’s legitimate 
                                                 
11 Pär Cassell, “Excavating Extraterritoriality: The ‘Judicial Sub-prefect’ as a Prototype for the Mixed Court in 
Shanghai,” Late Imperial China 24, no. 2 (December 2003): 157-58. 
12 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 57. 
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place and role within a social sphere, or what Bourdieu calls ‘field’(see Diagram 1: The 
Field of Cultural Production in the Field of Power and in Social Space).  
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice (1972) comprises three main elements, namely field, 
capital and habitus. The interplay of these elements leads to strategy or practice, i.e. our 
unconscious behavior that is in conformity with our interests and that aims at achieving 
our objectives by investing capital and fighting for capital. Bourdieu’s major 
contribution is […] the reconciliation between structure and agency or macro and micro. 
In this respect, Bourdieu understands practice as the result of social structures on a 
particular field (structure; macro) where certain rules apply and also of one’s habitus 
(agency; micro), i.e. the embodied history that is manifested in our system of thinking, 
feeling, perceiving and behaving. The habitus assures the collective belief in the rules 
of the social game (illusio) and that actors act in accordance with their position on the 
field (doxa), which depends on their relative amount and structure of economic, cultural 
(and social) capital.13  
Field is an analytical concept central to Bourdieu’s work. He posits the existence and 
motion of fields within social space. A field is constituted of a range of historical 
networks with specific power (political power and economic power) or capital (social, 
economic, cultural and symbolic capital). 14 According to Gaventa,  
Bourdieu introduces the concept of the field to denote the social arena 
in which power struggles and conflict take place, in which specific 
kinds of capital (economic, cultural, social symbolic) are at stake and 
certain forms of habitus and dispositions are fitted for success.15 
 
The accumulation and transmission of the various kinds of capital (or resources 
considered valuable) existing in a given field occurs through the process of socialisation 
or ‘incorporation’ of human lives - each individual is thought to embody by degrees the 
                                                 
13 Matthias Walther, Repatriation to France and Germany: A Comparative Study Based on Bourdieu’s Theory of 
Practice (Wiesbaden, Hesse-Darmstadt: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2014), 15. 
14 Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1992), 16. 
15 Jonathan Gaventa, Power after Lukes: a review of the literature (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 
Brighton, 2003), 7.   
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presence or absence of existing capital within a field. For example, this process is best 
illustrated in an explanation of cultural capital: 
Cultural capital (capital culturel) is especially transferred by family 
and education and may be institutionalized in the forms of educational 
qualifications. Cultural capital is the primary cause for status and 
relative positions within a social field. It can exist in three forms. In 
the incorporated (or embodied) state (forme incorporée), the cultural 
capital is a durable system of dispositions and represents one’s entirety 
of intellectual qualifications or human capital […] and one’s culture or 
cultivation that presupposes a process of embodiment as it implies a 
time-intensive labor of inculcation and assimilation ([…]. Hence, the 
acquisition of incorporated cultural capital cannot be delegated. The 
work of acquisition is the work of oneself. The objectivized form 
(forme objective) of cultural capital exists in the form of material 
objects, e.g. books, paintings, monuments, instruments etc. that are 
transferable in their physical state. Finally, in the institutionalized form 
(forme institutionnalisée), cultural capital takes the form of a 
certificate of cultural competence, e.g. a formalized academic 
qualification (diploma) that is socially sanctioned by an institution.16 
 
The capital each agent (actor or participant) acquires and is able to mobilise forms the 
framework and shifting parameters of an individual’s potential and actual agency within 
the field: 
 It is the structure of objective relations (la structure des relations 
objectives) between the agents on a field that defines dominant and 
dominated positions […] and that determines what agents can and what 
they cannot do, i.e. which practices are possible and which not. Put 
another way, the position an agent occupies on a field creates self-
evident rules that determine his potential cruising radius, i.e. the limits 
of social mobility within a social field. This doxa forms the sense of 
our place and the feeling of what is possible and what not.17 
 
The term doxa is originally from Greek. Doxa, in Bourdieu’s approach, is the experience 
“when there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the 
subjective principles of organisation, the natural and social world appears as self-
evident.”18 Bourdieu initially proposed three (apparently) distinct types of capital: (1) 
economic capital, or the ownership of economic resources such as money and real 
property; (2) cultural capital (see above) that provide advantages facilitating the 
                                                 
16 Walther, Repatriation to France and Germany, 10. 
17 Walther, Repatriation to France and Germany, 9. 
18 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory, 164. 
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acquisition of higher positions in the society; (3) and social capital that refers to the 
social networks in a section of society, or across intersecting sections of society that 
allow access to valuable resources (both material and immaterial), relations and 
influence.19 Bourdieu also added a fourth type, that of symbolic capital, or honour and 
recognition; in other words, the credit, authority and the reputation an individual enjoys, 
thanks to the readiness of others to recognise possession of the other three species of 
capital: 
 Besides the right to enter a social field, the capital structure also 
determines an agent’s position on the field or social space in general. 
Bourdieu insists on the fact that positions on social fields are relative. 
They are determined by the volume and structure of the agent’s capital 
portfolio that is compared to that of other agents on the same field, 
especially regarding economic and cultural capital.20 
 
Bourdieu understands symbolic capital as “the form that one or another of these species 
takes when it is grasped through categories of perception that recognise its specific logic 
or, if you prefer, misrecognise the arbitrariness of its possession and accumulation.”21 
Another concept central to this present study what Bourdieu calls hystereis, a Greek verb 
meaning ‘that which comes after’ or ‘to come later.’ According to Ron Martin, the use 
of the term first appeared in the natural sciences, in studies of the magnetic and elastic 
properties of metals and materials:  
The following analogy may help to illustrate the idea of hysteresis. 
Assume a spring is suspended vertically, and that initially a small 
weight is then attached. The spring will stretch. The weight is then 
removed, and the spring returns to its original shape and state. Then 
the spring is subjected to the same treatment using successfully heavier 
weights. At some point, the weight applied to the spring will be such 
that when it is removed, the spring will not return to its original shape 
and state, but will be left permanently stretched. The downward 
pressure on the spring will have exceeded the spring’s ‘elasticity 
threshold’: hysteresis can be said to have occurred.22 
 
Bourdieu adopts this term to describe the state whereby an “individual’s dispositions 
become dysfunctional and the efforts they make to perpetuate them help to plunge them 
                                                 
19 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital,” in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, ed. 
John G. Richardson (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986), 243. 
20 Walther, Repatriation to France and Germany, 11. 
21 Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 119. 
22  Ron Martin, “Regional Economic Resilience, Hysteresis and Recessionary Shocks,” Journal of Economic 
Geography, (2011) : 7-8. 
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deeper into failure.”23 He also illustrates this state with the example of generational 
discord: 
A famous example is the generation conflict where the habitus of 
agents has been developed at different points in time leading to 
different understandings of which practice is ‘reasonable’ for one 
generation versus ‘scandalous’ or ‘unthinkable’ for the other 
generation.24 
 
Bourdieu understands the socialisation, or conditioning, of the individual as a “purely 
social” and “quasi-magical” process that ensures the perpetuation of certain durable and 
stable resources and dispositions within a field through the processes of (primary and 
secondary) habitus:  
Primary socialization is the socialization that comes from the family 
during childhood. The resulting primary habitus (habitus primaire) is 
rather stable. The schemes of action and perception that have been 
transferred during childhood are an education that is linked to the 
parents’ social position in the social space. Therefore, the primary 
habitus is about ‘internalizing the external’ as the parents’ modes of 
thinking, feeling and behaving that are linked to their position in the 
social space are internalized in the children’s own habitus. […]The 
secondary habitus (habitus secondaire) is built on the primary habitus 
and especially results from one’s education at school and university, 
but also from other life experiences.25 
 
The individual – through “a readiness to take seriously the performative magic of the 
social” – is incorporated within social institutions in such a way that his or her 
subjectivity becomes conditioned to serve and “comply with the demands immanent in 
the field.” 26 This would appear overly deterministic as it seems to deny, or at least give 
little weight to the existence of the agency of each individual. This would perhaps be so, 
were it not for what Bourdieu refers to as the “performative magic of the social” – the 
magic is to be found in the process of incorporation of the individual with the promise 
of “a meaningful world, a world endowed with sense and value, in which it is worth 
investing one’s energy.” As Bourdieu demonstrates: 
[…] it is through the capacity for incorporation, which exploits the 
body’s readiness to take seriously the performative magic of the social, 
                                                 
23 Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations (Standford: Standford University Press, 2000), 161. 
24 Walther, Repatriation to France and Germany, 14. 
25 Walther, Repatriation to France and Germany, 13. 
26 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 57-58. 
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that the king, the banker or the priest are hereditary monarchy, 
financial capitalism or the Church made flesh. Property appropriates 
its owner, embodying itself in the form of a structure generating 
practices perfectly conforming with its logic and its demands. If one is 
justified in saying, with its logic and its demands. If one is justified in 
saying, with Marx, that ‘the lord of an entailed estate, the first-born son, 
belongs to the land’, that ‘it inherits him’, or that the ‘persons’ of 
capitalists are the ‘personification’ of capital, this is because the purely 
social and quasi-magical process of socialisation, which is inaugurated 
by the act of marking that institutes an individual as an eldest son, an 
heir, a successor, a Christian, or simply as a man (as opposed to a 
woman), with all the corresponding privileges and obligations, and 
which is prolonged, strengthened and confirmed by social treatments 
that tend to transform instituted difference into natural distinction, 
produces quite real effects, durably inscribed in the body and in belief. 
An institution, even an economy, is complete and fully viable only if 
it is durably objectified not only in things, that is, in the logic, 
transcending individual agents, of a particular field, but also in bodies, 
in durable dispositions to recognise and comply with the demands 
immanent in the field.27  
 
Bourdieu further defines habitus as “the durable and transposable systems of schemata 
of perception, appreciation, and action that result from the institution of the social in the 
body or in biological individuals.”28 There is a “double and obscure relation” between 
field and habitus. As Bourdieu explains: 
On one side, it is a relation of conditioning: the field structures the 
habitus, which is the product of the embodiment of the immanent 
necessity of a field or of a set of intersecting fields, the extent of their 
intersection or discrepancy being at the root of a divided or even torn 
habitus. On the other side, it is a relation of knowledge or cognitive 
construction. Habitus contributes to constituting the field as a 
meaningful world, a world endowed with sense and value, in which it 
is worth investing one’s energy.29 
 
Habitus permits agents to adopt advantageous practices and strategies within the field. 
Bourdieu further proposes a three-fold analysis of field that seeks to elucidate the 
following dimensions: (1) relative positions of the field in question to what Bourdieu 
refers to as an over-arching field, known as the field of power; (2) relative positions of 
specific agents and institutions within a given field; and (3) the habitus of agents and 
                                                 
27 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 57-58. 
28 Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 126-27. 
29 Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 127. 
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institutions of the field in question.30 To examine the position of any given subfield is a 
critical step for revealing its boundaries: 
One of the key insights in Bourdieu’s work […] is that fields do not 
exist in isolation, but they are in permanent relations with other fields. 
The boundaries of any given field are demarcated in relation to others 
on the basis of a unique capital – characteristics such as particular skills, 
training […]. They have a particular capital constantly nurtured to 
reinforce separation and to protect them from external influences.31 
 
Each relative position within a field represents a spatial distribution of capital and power. 
In order to recognise and accumulate different species of capital (such as the enjoyment 
of higher prestige) for present enjoyment or to have such capital at one’s disposal to 
mobilise it strategically or profitably in the future, each agent must internalise field-
specific rules in order to have any chance of succeeding in the field in question. 
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice and Journalism: Applying Bourdieu to 
Journalism 
In On Television and Journalism, Bourdieu proposes the notion of the journalism field, 
which he characterises as an independent microcosm governed by its own laws - due to 
their unique rules, fields are autonomous. However, he also qualifies this autonomy as 
relative. Given that each field is embedded in a social space, its position simultaneously 
possesses the interactive relations of attraction and repulsion with other fields. For 
instance, the intellectual field may also be influenced by the politic, the economy or 
religion. Bourdieu asserted that the internal practice of journalism cannot be understood 
by examining external conditions alone because of the journalism field’s specific (but 
not absolute) autonomy.32 
Bourdieu and other researchers have analysed the relative position of the journalistic 
field. It is located in its most contiguous surroundings, the field of cultural production, 
which is also part of the field of power in the social and national space (see Diagram1). 
Bourdieu divides the field of cultural production into two horizontally arranged sub-
fields: (1) the cultural pole close to small-scale production, for example small literary 
journals and avant-garde arts that are produced for a narrow group of cultivated people, 
                                                 
30 Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 104-05. 
31 Waisbord, Reinventing Professionalism, 12. 
32 Pierre Bourdieu, On Television and Journalism (London: Pluto Press, 1998), 39. 
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specialists and experts; and (2) the economic pole, which is akin to large-scale 
production. Journalism is generally included in the second pole as it is understood to 
produce for mass consumption. Each field in Bourdieu’s paradigm is a space teeming 
with conflicts and competitions amongst agents (participants) contending for monopoly 
over the ‘effective’ capital of the field in question. In Bourdieu’s The Rules of Art 
(considered to be one of the most accessible presentations of his sociological approach) 
he considers substantial and potential positions or position-takings, which are possible 
or problematic, as products of the logic specific to each field.33 Under the structure and 
position of a field’s setting, Bourdieu argues, internal and external competition is the 
mechanism that maintains the dynamic operations of the field which also leads to 
changes within and outside the field.34   
In An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Bourdieu and Wacquant’s very comprehensive 
introduction to Bourdieu’s theoretical approach), ‘field’ is described in the following 
terms:  
In highly differentiated societies, the social cosmos is made up of a 
number of such relatively autonomous social microcosms, i.e., spaces 
of objective relations that are the site of a logic and a necessity that are 
specific and irreducible to those that regulate other fields.35  
In the artistic field, effective capital appears as cultural authority, whereas in the field of 
power effective capital is understood to be the potency of power itself within the 
hierarchy of position-takings and the relative rate of conversion of each position’s 
authority within the field.36 Bourdieu regarded a field as “a field of forces and a field of 
struggles in which the stake is the power to transform the field of forces. In other words, 
within a field, there is competition for legitimate appropriation of what is at stake in the 
struggle in the field.”37 Exploring external conditions for the transformation inside a field, 
Bourdieu deemed that internal struggles of a field are to a certain degree arbitrated by 
external bindings and influences. He further explained that even if struggles inside a 
                                                 
33 Pierre Bourdieu, The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1996), 232. 
34 Rodney Benson, “Field Theory in Comparative Context: A New Paradigm for Media Studies,” Theory and Society 
28, no. 3 (June 1999): 465-66; David Hesmondhalgh, “Bourdieu, the Media and Cultural Production,” Media, Culture 
& Society 28, no. 2 (2006): 213-14 
35 Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 97. 
36 Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 17-18. 
37 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Political Field, the Social Science Field, and the Journalistic Field,” in Bourdieu and the 
Journalistic Field, ed. Rodney Benson and Erik Neveu (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 44. 
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field are based on a field’s inherent logic concerning what is most at stake, the outcomes 
of such struggles often rely on that particular field’s connections with struggles external 
to itself in the field of power.38  
In The Field of Cultural Production (an edited collection of his essays) Bourdieu further 
proposes another analytical concept (pertinent to this present study) which he refers to 
as the (two) principles of hierarchisation. He uses this concept to characterise he 
dynamics of struggle in the field of cultural production: (1) the heteronomous principle 
relates to fields with a heavy dependence on the economic and political forces that 
prevail in the field; and (2) the autonomous principle for fields endowed with specific 
kinds of capital that foster a degree of independence from the economy. 39  The 
comprehensive autonomous degree that a given field or sub-field possesses will 
determine the power relations in the struggle whereby each contending agent or group 
of agents is attempting to impose their own standards and authorisations (in other their 
own version of ‘effective’ capital) on the whole set of agents and producers all aiming 
at the same goal or symbolic capital. The autonomous degree can be diversified over 
time (and according to national tradition) and the entire structure of the field for this will 
be altered.40 The decline of the autonomous degree of a field corresponds with growing 
demands for heteronomy both within and outside of the field.41  
Bourdieu deemed that understanding the degree of autonomy of both the journalistic 
field and the various publications that journalists produce within the field is critically 
important for revealing the prevailing circumstances in the field.42 In a recent study 
entitled ‘Bourdieu, the Media and Cultural Production,’ David Hesmondhalgh provides 
a convincing example of how the application of these concepts specific to Bourdieu’s 
concept of the field of cultural production is of relevance to understanding contemporary 
media production, providing that (for Hesmondhalgh’s purposes) greater emphasis is 
accorded (than in Bourdieu’s work) to the relationship between cultural production and 
cultural consumption. Hesmondhalgh draws attention to the value of Bourdieus’s 
                                                 
38 Pierre Bourdieu, The Rules of Art, 252. 
39 Pierre Bourdieu and Randal Johnson, The Field of Cultural Production (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993), 40. 
40 Bourdieu and Johnson, Field of Cultural Production, 40. 
41 Bourdieu and Johnson, Field of Cultural Production, 45-46. 
42 Bourdieu, “The Journalistic Field,” 43. 
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approach in so far as it places emphasis on the interconnectedness of the field of cultural 
production with other social fields. This is especially pertinent to the analytical 
foundation of the present thesis, depending as it does on these distinctions inherent to 
Bourdieu’s approach, such as the classification of the small-scale production and large-
scale production as two sub-fields: small-scale production is considered to possess a 
relatively higher degree of autonomy (with regards to the field of power); whereas large-
scale production (where journalism is located) is more subject to the rules beyond the 
sub-field.43 The salience of this distinction to the present study will become increasingly 
apparent (see below).  
Thus, seeking objectivity in journalistic practical work is a behaviour, which is known 
as habitus in field theory. It relies highly on the type and the quantity of capital that 
journalism possesses in the field. When journalism possesses the relevant democratic 
political and cultural capital, the degree of freedom that journalism can enjoy will be 
higher than it would be without such capital. Seeking objectivity, to this degree, is the 
journalistic habitus that results from a journalistic field with appropriate capital. Thus, 
journalistic objectivity in practice is highly restricted by capital compared with the 
notion of objectivity proposed just as an ideal. 
Bourdieu considered the core focus of competition specifically in the field of cultural 
production as the struggle for legitimate monopoly over the field, especially for the 
authority to dominate public opinions. Furthermore, “occupants of the two opposite 
poles of the field of culture production has at stake the monopoly of the legitimate 
intentions of the writer which are organised around the two interrelated conditions of 
autonomy and heteronomy.”44 Just as the existence of the competition, which causes the 
alteration of the distribution and relative weight of species of capital, the structure of the 
field is modified, and the field therefore possesses a historical dynamism and 
flexibility.45  
 
 
                                                 
43 Hesmondhalgh, “The Media and Cultural Production,” 214; Bourdieu, The Rules of Arts, 217. 
44 Bourdieu, The Rules of Art, 256. 
45 Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 18-20. 
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Figure 7: The Field of Cultural Production (Bourdieu) 
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Applying field theory to the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury 
Bourdieu’s background was as an ethnographer; one of his earliest works was Sociologie 
de l’Algerie, published in 1958. It argued that: 
Social science cannot simply provide detached, objective knowledge 
about situations but, equally, it cannot be merely the projection of 
subjective, inherently narcissistic social involvement. Bourdieu argued 
that reflexivity involves subjecting objectivist explanations of primary 
experience to a second-order scrutiny, as a result of which unreflecting 
situations and detached analyses of them are both submitted to 
sociological analysis. Objective representations of situations are as 
much parts of the reality to be explained as the realities which they 
seek to represent.46 
This necessitates the description of environments, processes and interactions that may 
seem obvious to the insider. For example, a Bourdieusian analysis of London Fashion 
Week includes substantial detail on aspects that are well-understood by even the most 
casual observer, such as ticketing arrangements and the catwalk layout.47 For this reason, 
some obvious elements of both China’s and journalism’s history, politics, practices and 
personalities may be described in an unusual – but necessary – degree of detail. 
In order to apply a Bourdieusian analysis of journalism through the prism of the SEPM 
it is necessary to understand the environment that the SEPM began in. As a parallel, 
when studying contemporary Algeria, “Bourdieu argued that it was necessary to have 
an understanding of the status quo ante of traditional Algerian society as a pre-requisite 
for understanding the contemporary reality of social breakdown.” 48  The centre of 
modern Chinese press was geographically located in very limited colonial and foreign 
concession zones. These areas in the Bourdieu-proposed field of cultural production are 
located in the top most area in the following diagram:  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 Robbins Derek, "The Responsibility of the Ethnographer: An Introduction to Pierre Bourdieu on 'Colonialism and 
Ethnography'," Anthropology Today 19, no. 2 (April 2003): 11. 
47 See Joanne Entwistle and Agnès Rocamora, "The Field of Fashion Materialized: A study of London Fashion Week," 
Sociology 40, no. 4 (August 2006): 735-751. 
48Robbins, "The Responsibility of Ethnographer," 11. 
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Figure 8: The Field of Cultural Production – Modern China 
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the growing profession of journalism within the Qing Empire and Beiyang/Warring 
period had access to the economic and cultural capital of the semi-colonies and foreign 
concessions. Those involved in the earliest days of journalism benefited from 
opportunities to acquire and accumulate economic and social capital, with their ability 
to move within, between, and in and out of these liminal zones of extra-territoriality. At 
this time, very few people had this privilege. Likewise, their Christian beliefs became 
avenues to access further economic and social capital within publishing. In the field of 
Chinese politics, the Protestants such as the London Missionary Society experienced 
low social capital, having to face persecution by the Qing government, ideological 
differences with the powerful Catholic Church and the dislike for them of the East India 
Company. However, their support of each other and interrelations within the field of 
publishing led to the accumulation of strong capital within the field of professional 
journalism, as exemplified by the career of journalist and publisher Wang Tao. It could 
also be argued that the habitus of the protestant missionaries was highly compatible with 
that of publishing and, as it evolved, professional journalism. The non-conformist 
habitius was in large part made of the doxa of a focus on the individual’s relationship 
with God; reading the Bible; and spreading the Gospel (literally meaning good news). 
This doxa – individualism, literacy and news – was highly compatible with the 
developing doxa of professional journalism. 
Extraterritoriality, both politically and economically, provided essential protection for 
journalism activities. At that time, colonies and treaty ports were located in the Chinese 
areas with the most developed economies, active cultural exchanges with the West, and 
were the most open to almost all things foreign. In contrast to China’s hinterland, they 
were very cosmopolitan in outlook. The experience of semi-colonialism formed part of 
the essential habitus for many Chinese, including those Chinese journalists who helped 
to create the earliest formation of the profession. One cannot understand the Chinese 
journalists’ habitus without understanding the effects for semi-colonialism and 
nationalism. The semi-colonial features combined with the innate Chinese social system 
formed a special modern Chinese nationalism with ambiguous and subtle features. 
Nationalism can be seen as the product of imagined communities, and as such 
nationalism in most of the African and Asian continents can be characterised as “in its 
origins a response to the new-style global imperialism made possible by the 
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achievements of industrial capitalism.”49 To be specific, capitalism, by relying on the 
circulation of printed matters, helped to create a consciousness within the masses of the 
nation. Nationalism fundamentally uprooted the rules of local historical dynasties, and 
coerced the dynasties to adapt to the new situation.50 
In addition to Chinese political culture, the special semi-colonial social structure (as 
shown in Figure 8) causes the decline of the professionalisation of Chinese journalism. 
In accordance with Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory, this situation can be understood as 
the imbalance between the capital in the colonies and the treaty ports of south-east China 
and the hinterland areas. Colonies and treaty ports, such as Hong Kong and Shanghai, 
possessed most of the capital essential for the professionalisation of journalism. In 
contrast, the hinterland areas of China which are geographically large had very limited 
capital. Under this structure, the professionalisation of Chinese journalism was fragile 
and unsustainable as it heavily relied on the existence of colonies and treaty ports.  
The opposite and intertwined relations between nativism and modern Chinese 
nationalism were subtly presented in colonies and treaty ports with people who were 
galvanised by the high demand for labour to move into there from all over China. 
Nativism haunted Chinese modern nationalists, and triggered heated discussions and 
debates amongst them about whether a powerful central administration should be 
established to maintain a highly united China or China as a nation-state should be not 
more than a sum of a simple addition of each regional part. 51  Bryna Goodman by 
observing the transition of people’s identities in the modernisation of Shanghai found 
that when immigrants moved into the new and completely strange metropolis, they were 
firstly held together by the associations formed and founded based on their native 
places.52 The following excerpts from an article written by Wei Hua for the SEPM 
supplement Night light (14 July 1939) is illustrative of these extremely profound 
attachments to native place: 
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The Story of Chilli 
…  
I am curious to know whether chilli can hearten people up, and become 
tough and gutsy. The fact shows that people from Hunan and Sichuan 
are the most tough and unafraid in China. There are some old sayings, 
such as ‘tough temperament of people in Chu area’ and ‘the Qin 
Empire must be destroyed by the people of Chu even if there were only 
three households left’. These expressions reflect the honour and glory 
of Hunan people. People from Hunan and Guangxi like chillies, and it 
is rather interesting that people in west Hunan like the spiciest of food. 
Therefore they should just be the representative of ‘tough temperament 
of people in Chu area.’ If people in Jiangsu and Zhejiang were 
accustomed to have chillies, would their temperament become tougher, 
and would the nickname ‘people of tough temperament’ therefore still 
apply to Hunan only?  
…  
Since I have been in Shanghai I am obviously not able to have chilli 
for every meal, so I crave chilli. As I write this article, saliva spurts to 
my lips. So, when can I return to my homeland to have chilli?53    
Native-place associations were the essential ingredients of the Shanghai municipal 
ecology in the following half-century, and structured social, economic and political 
organisations in the city’s development. 54  The colonial administration in Shanghai 
preferred native-place associations to Chinese authority in dealing with the maintenance 
of order in the foreign concessions. Native-place associations, therefore, acquired their 
influence, and the leaders of the associations became substantive representatives of 
Chinese communities. This process objectively not only made the native-place 
associations possess the function of municipal administration, but also promoted these 
associations to form a combined Chinese community to cooperate with or struggle 
against colonial administration. Once the native-place associations were drawn into the 
conflicts with colonial administration, they could obtain nationalist praise from people 
for their attempt against imperialism.55 
It has been proposed that the degree of foreign aggression was proportionate to increased 
nationalism, but inversely proportional to increased nativism.56 However, one should not 
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overlook the opportunity for nativism to combine with colonialism to form a special 
mentality. At the same time many Chinese nationals resisted and resented colonialism, 
they also felt the progressiveness of Western modern civilisation, acquired practical 
benefits (or capital) through their collaboration with colonial administration, and felt a 
sense of being recognised and had a greater sense of self-worth from the mere fact of 
being of service to the colonisers. In essence, in the colonialists’ field, the colonialists 
held power and decided on the rewards and recognition system. This led to a situation 
where Chinese people participated in the field – taking pride in their identity as inhabits 
of the colonial area – but simultaneously accepting the colonialists’ judgement of them 
as being inferior. The concept of ‘mimicry’ well summarises the split personality as a 
typical feature of people who are subjects in the colonial system. To live under the 
colonial administration, they have both humble and rebellious attitudes to their 
colonisers. It has been proposed that in a semi-colonised country, such as China (never 
fully conquered by Western powers) the ‘mimic’ personality would be more visibly and 
exaggeratedly present. This feature was especially embodied in those compradors and 
commercial elites who had threads of connection with Westerners. Although they hold 
the identity documents to prove their Chinese citizenship, they would be willing to 
accept their position as being colonised and hoped to realise a complete Westernisation.57 
The existence of the ‘mimic’ personality became an essential part of the Chinese middle-
class habitus and can be seen in the growth of professional journalism in China. 
Following in the footsteps of the United States, Chinese journalism started its 
professionalisation from the 1920s, but the Chinese political and social foundation for 
this development was absolutely different from that of Western countries. In 1920s 
China, the space in the field of cultural production occupied by professional journalism 
was confined, and the structure of such a field itself under semi-colonial China was 
unstable. In this situation, professionalisation would unavoidably suffer fatally once the 
field structure changed in the 1930s. Part of the suffering that was to be the lot of many 
professional journalists in Shanghai during the 1930s was the deep-seated anxiety 
regarding the development of professional journalism and a profound sense of pending 
doom or generalised pessimism that grew as the political situation worsened. The 
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commitment to the Missouri School of Journalism ideal of public service in increasingly 
adverse circumstances was to become a very real source of suffering. This is clearly 
expressed in Lu Yi’s “call to journalistic arms” contribution to the SEPM supplement 
Journalist Seminar (14 November 1935). Equally to the fore is his sense of alarm and 
desperation: 
Saving Our Nation by Intensifying Our Work Standards  
Currently, our journalistic endeavour, the same as our nation, is 
suffering a misery. The development of journalism, to a large degree, 
is limited by its environment. It is undeniable that the press in China 
has achieved an obvious progress these years, but journalists who still 
have a clear analytical mind will not feel fulfilled in the present 
situation compared with the pace of the epoch and the responsibility 
that we should take. For an endeavour, if we want it to make significant 
progress, its every single cell needs to be strengthened, and the press 
in China is no exception. With the exception of the corrupted journalist 
with slackness and complacency, and damnable journalists who 
consider the press as their tool for their own personal promotion of 
official career and fortune, journalistic staff should constantly 
strengthen themselves and optimise their team to accelerate the 
development of the press and taking up the mission of the epoch to 
guide people to achieve the victory of improving Chinese social 
development. This is our vocation! We hope our colleagues through 
their professional organisations come together to engage in academic 
and practical skills studies, re-think relevant theories, rectify morals 
and discipline in order to strengthen the force of the movement, which 
aims at changing immediately the mentality and behaviours of 
decadence, pessimism, romance, timidity and selfishness, so that we 
can form a strong journalistic fighting group to struggle with the 
sinister environment.  
Colleagues of the Journalist Seminar are all juniors of the press, but we 
always hold steadfast to our position as a cog in a big machine, and 
never give up the responsibility of being a cog. By our determination 
to improve the press in China at the current stage, we started self-
education work in Shanghai. We always exert ourselves for our 
ultimate goal whatever the efficiency or influence of our work in the 
past year. Improving the press in China at the present time is a 
significant duty, thus it definitely not something our small group of 
people can complete. However, we do believe that our will-power and 
beliefs are by no means our group’s concern, but a common need in 
the society. Therefore, we throw ourselves into work actively, and 
hope all our peers nationwide can join together to improve the 
endeavour. We hope we can become tighter in order to foster wide-
spread progress. The crisis of the Chinese nation is intensifying day by 
day. Under these difficult circumstances, every journalist should get 
behind saving our nation!58  
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To be specific, had China established a political system similar to that in Western 
democratic countries, professionalism would have continued after China’s semi-colonial 
status ended. However, this was not to be. The Revolution of 1911 only made China 
become a nominal republic, and in the following 25 years it was deeply entangled in 
warfare among warlords, civil war between the Nationalist Party and Communist Party, 
and successive threats and armed infiltration by the Soviet Union and Japan. Although 
the economy and culture during this period achieved a certain degree of prosperity, a 
genuine republican system had never been established up to the outbreak of the War of 
Resistance against Japan. It was with this background that the SEPM was established. 
An analysis of the field in the period spanning the establishment of the SEPM to the 
Japanese invasions saw the field of the commercial Chinese press remaining in very 
limited colonial and foreign concession zones, but with competition opening with the 
creation of Communist Party presses. Whilst extraterritoriality continued to provide 
protection for journalism activities, they were constrained by the growing assertiveness 
of the Nationalist Government and the fear of the Japanese invasion. The extra-
territoriality of the settlements created a free field for journalists within the settlements 
who worked for foreign newspapers, which gave them more freedom, fully capitalised 
on by the SEPM journalists. However, they certainly had good reason to carefully weigh 
the capital and power of those around them as they were under attack by the Japanese, 
by the Nationalists and by the British. The cultural and social capital of belonging to 
the Missouri school clearly influenced hiring of the SEPM staff, from Crow, to Gould, 
and onward. 
The nomos of the SEPM staff began with the official line that staff were independent of 
owner C. V. Starr. However this explicitly changed with the invasion of Manchuria, 
when C. V. Starr asserted his economic capital and dictated the newspaper’s view. This 
would not necessarily have caused a professional crisis (hysteresis), as the staff were 
thinking on similar lines. Key parts of a journalist’s nomos are directly impacted by the 
fact their means of expression is ultimately owned by the employer, who can change the 
terms of the agreement at will. Although the owner, editors and journalists experienced 
their habitus within the field of journalism, the fact remains that the owner has the 
ultimate economic capital and can decide the “rules of the game.”  
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Certainly, use of censorship and propaganda can be consistent with professional 
journalist practices and philosophy. Even within the Missouri School’s Journalists’ 
creed (or nomos), the need for censorship (and partisan journalism) at times of national 
crisis is recognised: “I believe that suppression of the news, for any consideration other 
than the welfare of society, is indefensible.”59 Indeed, from the very start, the nomos of 
the SEPM explicitly acknowledged that there was an aspect of national self-interest for 
Americans, for example stating they were “firm on matters involving Sino-American 
relations.”60 Indeed, American journalists in China were very comfortable in China and 
with the Chinese, especially as compared to their experience of Japan and the Japanese. 
This was demonstrably not because China offered more political or journalistic freedom 
than Japan: before Japan’s whole scale invasion of 1937, the Japanese government had 
tolerated a fair amount of journalistic freedom, especially compared to Chiang Kai 
Shek’s military government. 61  Life in China had been viewed by the American 
journalists as more enjoyable than in Japan, due to factors such as extraterritoriality and 
their relations with Missouri-trained locals: 
Autonomous Western communities in China and extraterritorial 
privileges made them more psychologically secure and relaxed than in 
Japan. Moreover, they maintained a cordial relationship with 
American-educated Chinese officials, including Hin Wong, editor of 
the Central China News Agency, and Hollington K. Tong, the censor 
of foreign press at the Ministry of Information.62 
 
The American journalists were predisposed to relate to and enjoy Chinese people and 
culture more than Japanese, and even the Shanghailander Briton. The Chinese journalists, 
likewise connected well with their American colleagues – the American progressive 
ideology and rhetoric (albeit a form of American imperialism) “was greeted by the 
Chinese as an antidote to European and Japanese styles of naked exploitation.”63 The 
nomos of professional journalism explicitly changed with invasion: “First, wartime 
journalism management should be a united rather than permissive. The external aim of 
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wartime journalism management and control is to strive for strengthening our country 
and crumbling enemies, and the internal aim is for avoiding leakage of military secrets, 
reinforcing people’s consciousness to fight and promoting the civil-military cooperation 
nationwide.”64 Despite the SEPM’s distinctly anti-Japanese position, the senior staff 
maintained the doxa of the SEPM at that time did not stem from nationalism but rather 
that this is a professional commitment to reporting.  
The conditions in the external ‘field of power’ were always in a state of flux, rendering 
fragile and unstable the balance between the field of cultural production in colonies and 
treaty ports and the field of cultural production in hinterland China. The status quo began 
to be subverted seriously after the commencement of the war against Japan. During this 
period, social life took on a crazy, inherently contradictory character, very much 
expressive of a prolonged “crisis” situation: 
[…] “life in the “isolated island” was not just “poverty.” The 
extravagant era of “lopsided prosperity” formed a striking contrast… 
teahouse brothels sprung up like mushrooms and conducted a booming 
business. Movie theaters were perpetually overcrowded, and dance 
halls proliferated. People idled away their time on the dance floor in 
the afternoons and evenings, and morning dances even appeared for 
those whose cravings were seemingly unsatisfied… It is small wonder 
that contemporaries described life on the “isolated island” as both 
heaven and hell… During the Isolated Island Period between 1937 and 
1941, the term became a synonym for “solitude,” “overcrowding,” 
“nowhere to live,” “luxury and dissipation,” “lopsided,” “soaring 
commodity prices,” “depression,” “unfree,” and “struggle.” This usage 
originated from the collective daily lives of the people on the “isolated 
island” of Shanghai… 
 
In Shanghai during the Isolated Island Period, on one side was overweening wealth, and 
on the other were the bones of those who had frozen to death in the streets, leaving 
people somewhere between “resistance” and “apathy.”65 
While the Japanese invasion was an incredible boon for the intensification of nationalist 
sentiment and the proliferation and dissemination of its attendant ideologies and 
activism, it meant the beginning of an extended period of crisis for the journalists 
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working at the SEPM, known in Bourdieusian terms as a state of hysteresis. There was 
a misalignment during the extremities of this period between journalists’ nomos and 
doxa – a disparity that would cost some journalists their lives. The ‘Journalist Seminar’ 
expressed the journalists’ nomos of “We should not fear any threat” even though a 
renowned journalist, his son’s friend and a chauffeur were murdered. The nomos of 
fearlessness must have been tempered by real life when developing the journalists’ doxa. 
Interestingly, during this period, there was no conflict between the nomos and doxa of 
the communist party members and other journalists. They are united in the partisan urge 
to save China. Communist Party Member, Lu Yi, condemned “corrupted journalists with 
slackness and complacency, and damnable journalists who consider the press as their 
tool for their own personal promotion of official career and fortune”, focusing on 
individualistic problems. He viewed the journalist as a partisan nationalist: “Under the 
difficult circumstance, every journalist should get behind the effort to save our nation!” 
Part of the SEPM doxa was about valuing diversity of opinion, as is demonstrated by 
their diverse staffing, for example with leftist, Thackrey, anti-communist Hsaio Fung-
soh, and pro-Japanese Woodhead. The habitus of the SEPM journalists – where they 
bring their nomos, doxa and capital to play within the field – was influenced by 
American ways of thinking, behaviour and habits, as the paper were formed and run by 
Americans. The paper was run as a habitus that was less racist than many British 
contemporaries – not only were the Americans a welcome relief from the old-school 
colonialism of the British, Starr gained some notoriety for publishing news in mandarin, 
appointing Chinese people to his management board and offering his western and 
Chinese staff the same conditions. Working with Americans, rather than British, could 
arguably have assisted Chinese agents in addressing and resolving issues of mimic 
personality: the Chinese agents gained the benefits and pleasures of the West, without 
being beholden to their Western colleagues as their colonial masters.  
Arriving in Shanghai in the early 1930s, Harry Carr (1935, p. 186) of 
the Los Angeles Times reported that “everybody hates everybody else 
in Shanghai’’ and ‘‘upon one point only do they (Europeans) 
concentrate, emotionally, intellectually, and spiritually: they all hate 
the Americans.” 66 
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Struggling to integrate the fearless reporting that was valued by the Missouri-trained 
journalists and the fear of the growing power and ruthlessness of the Japanese, 
journalists relied on their wordsmithing – their social and cultural capital – to respond 
to their predicament. They wrote multi-layered pieces that were subservient to the 
Japanese on a superficial level while showing their rebellion in a nuanced way. 
According to field theory, each position is objectively determined by its objective 
connections with the rest of the positions in the field, so the journalists’ position in the 
field changed significantly when the Government changed from Chiang Kai Chek’s 
Nationalist Government, to the Japanese Imperial Army to Wang Ching-wei’s regime. 
These reciprocities between these agents in the field (the journalists and the ruling group) 
made up fundamentally different productive properties. For the journalists, this was a 
sudden and extreme change, with delays in adapting their habitus in response 
(hysteresis). At first in the Isolated Island period, journalists clung to their nomos of 
professional reporting – focusing on fearless reportage. Their doxa was more complex, 
for example, from the beginning there was pressure from the owner to report against the 
Japanese. Looking at the Isolated Island as its own field can give useful insight of the 
distinct habitus of Isolated Island inhabitants. 
China, which had long been controlled by various political forces, was 
again divided into the enemy-occupied area, the Guomindang-
controlled area, and the liberated area. Because China is a vast country, 
daily life was not the same everywhere. Even in a small area like 
Shanghai, due to the “isolated island,” different scenes of life appeared. 
The “isolated island” is a temporal concept but also a spatial concept.67 
 
In the Battle of Shanghai, the French Concession and International Settlement declared 
neutrality. With the outbreak of war shortly before, gates and fences had been built to 
separate the settlements from the surrounding areas; the International Settlement 
actually seized this opportunity to expand its size. However, there were still ways to 
enter the settlements and refugees began to pour into the Shanghai settlements for safety, 
for example, with more than 60,000 refugees flooding in just one day.68 Thus the Isolated 
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Island was porous from its very beginning. To cope with huge population flows, the 
foreign concessions shut down all external traffic and the French Concession proclaimed 
martial law prohibiting all traffic. Still waves battered the gates and fencing, gaining 
entry. Many refugees wandered the streets destitute, while a hundred refugee camps 
were established in opera houses, temples, sports fields and schools.69 Movement into 
and out of the Isolated Island occurred but took on a dangerous element, with many 
abuses by the Japanese troops who patrolled and controlled the borders. During this time, 
exchange of information was vital to survival. Newspapers were key – they even opened 
in the refugee camps: 
As early as October 30, 1937, The Gazette (Xinwenbao) reported on 
the establishment of a print workshop at the Jincheng Refugee Camp. 
Later, under the direction of the Chinese Vocational Education Society, 
each of the camps launched self-help production projects.70 
 
Access to capital became a life and death matter in the Isolated Island. Smuggling and 
hoarding were regular strategies, the housing market boomed and garbage restaurants 
opened, which served food picked out of garbage:71 
Even the beggars no longer asked for money but waited near the 
shelves of various food stands: when they saw someone buying a 
flatbread dough twist or a rice bun, they would steal it. People 
generally did not report such thefts, and the police did not intervene.72 
 
During the war against Japan, Chinese intellectuals and journalists began to support 
government control over the press instead of their professional ideals, in the hope that a 
press highly dominated by government could inspire Chinese patriotic ambition to 
achieve victory over the Japanese. However, to do so, many suffered extreme privations. 
Inflation was a huge issue: 
When the face value of currency no longer corresponds to its actual 
value, the power of material objects becomes more apparent. Chen 
Cunren wrote in his book: At first, I could buy two reams of newsprint 
with the money left over from hospital consultation fees, after expenses. 
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Now the price of newsprint rises every day in a straight line, and 
gradually I could only buy one ream; a few days later, I couldn’t buy 
even one ream. I switched to hoarding things like indanthrene dyestuffs, 
sugar, and powdered milk. 73 
 
Those newspapers with foreign ownership were sheltered to an extent by their 
extraterritoriality. The French Concession and International Settlement created a distinct 
field to operate in – an opportunity not shared by locally owned papers. The SEPM’s 
political, cultural and social capital were enhanced by this arrangement, giving them 
greater power to resist government attempts at censorship. In this violent period, with 
Nationalists killing collaborators, Wang Ching-wei’s agents killing rebels, and the 
Nationalists and Communists fighting each other as well as the Japanese, it took some 
readjusting for the journalists’ habitus to adapt to the new conditions. For example, Zhu 
Xinggong was actively and militantly working against the Japanese, however, with his 
assassination, nationalist sentiment in Night Light fell into depression, and Night Light 
returned to its original focus as a column devoted to literature. Wakeman argues that 
Chinese resistance towards Japanese and the collaborationists they supported was 
overcome by brutal means intertwined with ambiguous elements. 74  Although 
nationalism, to a certain degree, was successfully repressed by cruel means in Shanghai, 
it had indeed brought Chinese journalism to an irreversible transformation. With 
complete Japanese occupation of the city, large numbers of journalists left Shanghai and 
moved to hinterland China – the ideas and experience they had acquired in Shanghai 
were applied in their journalistic practice there. Many cherished illusions of a free and 
democratic post-war China, which would necessarily facilitate the revival of 
professional journalism. However, as Hung Chang-tai argued, an increase in patriotic 
emotion was nefarious to professional ideals.75  
 
The choice of which side to back - what political ideology to support - was a vexed one. 
Journalists not only had to choose to support either the Nationalists or the Communists, 
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but also were sometimes in a bind about the degree to which they ought to let go of the 
cherished values of professional journalism, such as freedom of the press, something 
which Pang Guan, writing for the SEPM supplement, Journalist Weekly (7 July 1939) 
clearly believed was not in anyone’s interest (and least of all the national interest) to 
cling to in the absolute. His position regarding a relaxation or suspension of this ideal is 
aligned with the Journalists’ Creed (or nomos) of the Missouri School (as noted above) 
to uphold the welfare of society - above all else - at times of national crisis: 
Journalism and Freedom 
[…] Journalists and journalistic agents should have sufficient freedom, 
and attempts to restrict such freedom will be considered an adversary 
of journalism. This ought to be an unalterable principle. Nevertheless, 
this freedom should be wielded with the premise of not prejudicing 
national interests. There is no doubt that freedom must be restricted 
once it challenges national interests. Unifying consensus and actions is 
crucial in the process of social mobilisation for completing the aim of 
struggling for national independence. Otherwise, we shall become 
zombies of liberalism forgetting our nation and country as shown by 
the case of Liang Shih-chiu. […].76 
 
Events did turn more people toward the Communist view, and many left-leaning 
journalists entered the field, thus changing the interactions and interconnections between 
agents. Even the long standing feud between Liang Shih-chiu and Lu Xun can be read 
as acting out of this powerful conflict between the habitus of the writers who supported 
the Nationalists and those who supported the Communists. No one remained outside 
partisan politics. Liang Shih-chiu argued for the right to judge literature and art based 
on his own values, while Lu Xun argued literature and art should be a critical tool to 
educate and evoke people under the circumstance of the war against Japan.77  The 
tension existed between saving the Chinese nation and protecting the freedom of 
journalism. Their apparently superficial squabbles were often nuanced and could be 
interpreted on numerous levels, and reflected diametrically opposed habitus. For 
example, when Lu Xun labelled himself a proletariat as a political act of associating 
with the ‘little’ people he was highlighting Liang Shih-chiu’s earlier definition of 
“proletariat” as “the lowest class who served the state […] only by having children” 
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(Liang 1929b, 3), emphasising Liang’s membership of the elite.78 In Liang Shih-chiu’s 
habitus, those with economic, cultural and social capital are elevated, while in Lu Xun’s, 
those without this capital are not - this would become especially noteworthy in the 
Yan’an rectification movement of 1942. The Yan’an Rectification movement marked a 
sharp division between the nomos of the Western style journalists, in their quest for 
professionalism and the communist journalists, in their quest for authenticity. The 
Yan’an rectification movement has been classified as an attempt by Mao to remove his 
competitors within the party – especially those with Soviet-sponsored Comintern links.79 
However, it also targeted “the teachers, students and others who had joined the rural 
rebellions”80 as “these individuals had been pursuing their own professional, intellectual 
and political interests”.81 So, professionalisation itself was identified as an enemy of the 
revolution. The utility of thought and action was the communists’ focus: 
In brief, the authorities alleged that intellectuals invoked Marxist-
Leninist ideas without considering Chinese realities, wallowed in 
abstruse issues and valued their own experiences but not the working-
class perspective. Intellectuals hence offered few usable tactics or 
strategies for the revolutionary movement. Moreover, intellectuals 
selfishly focused on becoming successful educators, artists and so on. 
They sang their own praises and liked to put down work done by others. 
They disliked assignments incompatible with their goals and even 
flouted orders, and they came and went as they pleased.82 
 
It appears that, by contrast, the Nationalists eagerly embraced the concept of middle 
class superiority. It was said of two key Nationalists, Hu Zongnan (a general in the 
Republic of China Army) and Dai Li (head of Chiang's Military Intelligence Service): 
Educated to be elementary school teachers, Hu and Dai both felt, with 
that peculiarly unselfconscious conceit of the lumpen-intellectual, that 
they were born to enjoy a great and important destiny. Full of the 
traditional literatus’s sense of cultural self-importance… Consumed 
with a sense of their own importance and driven by an ambition that 
seemed to know no bounds…83  
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The doxa of radical equality among the Communists could be seen as diametrically 
different to the doxa of elitism of the non-communist journalists. However, there was 
one area where their nomos and doxa overlap – the importance of fighting the Japanese, 
and, to a certain extent, increasingly fierce nationalism. The overlapping fields of 
politics and journalism in Yan’an and Chongqing competed for supremacy – for 
international recognition and for financial support. This regional division has been 
repeated throughout the history of the SEPM’s publishing. The period of 1943 to 1945 
was certainly a time of conflict within China, as even the American Navy and Army 
played out their conflict through the competing OSS operations run by the Army, and 
the Navy’s SACO operations. The OSS’s SI division was dominated by China experts 
such as Hayden. By contrast, the SACO group rejected involvement of any “old China 
hands”: 
To Miles, SACO's success rested on personal respect. During his 
earlier service in China, he had cringed at Americans who thought they 
could run the country better than the Chinese, whom they considered 
lazy and dull-witted. Miles knew that attitude would destroy his vision, 
and from the start, he refused to accept any “old China hands.” 84  
 
There was a change of attitude away from Colonialism and overt racism occurring within 
the westerners, as a result of the rising capital of the Chinese agents within the field. 
This capital was political – as Chinese politicians and diplomats gained increasing 
concessions from the West to be enacted with victory over Japan – and cultural – as 
nationalism among Chinese people reduced the levels of mimicry, and the Chinese 
Communists presented a new vision of an authentic Chinese-ness that was not based on 
a European model. This conflict displayed itself clearly when the old and new habitus 
were revealed together, in sharp and strange contradiction. As one example, a 
newsmagazine reported that the SACO “learned simple rules to avoid cultural gaffes 
that would undermine the spirit of SACO: Don’t yell or say “Chinaman” or “coolie.”85 
And shortly after quoted one of the SACO members, Lieutenant Commander Stanley 
McCaffrey, saying “You probably laughed at the coolie as he rhythmically went hopping 
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along carrying a couple of loads at either end of his yo-yo pole.”86 In a second example, 
the SEPM itself said “During its 20 months of existence the Chungking edition won a 
considerable following among both foreign and English-speaking Chinese readers,” 
without pause to think that English was actually the foreign language in China. 
Important concepts in Bourdieu’s field theory such as field, habitus, capital, doxa, 
nomos and hysteresis have been applied to the case of the SEPM in order to better 
articulate aspects of its history and its place within the broader sweep of the history of 
professional journalism in China. The key concepts of field and habitus establish an 
analytical framework through which the course of an individual’s history as well as 
history as it is objectified in socials institutions can be re-told through the paradigm of a 
symbiotic relationship that dynamically transforms both entities. This chapter has sought 
to apply Bourdieu’s field theory in such a way as to tease out elements of the historical 
outline of the SEPM (compiled and documented in preceding chapters) that are 
particularly salient to the development of professional journalism in Shanghai. This 
thesis drew attention to Monika Krause’s description of the advantages of the concept 
of field of cultural production. The first and fourth points are worth reiterating here to 
remind us of the rationale for this application:  
Field theory allows us to historicize journalistic ideals and analyse 
their institutional base […]; 
Field theory allows us to compare field properties across historical 
periods or national contexts […]. We can examine the force of field-
specific capital to organize practices. We can examine the changing 
relationships of the journalistic field with other fields, most notably the 
economic and the political field.87 
The combination of this particular journalistic field’s extraterritoriality (relatively stable 
across time) with the fluctuating presence and levels of activity of agents (both Chinese 
and foreign) imbued with social and cultural capital derived principally from the 
Missouri School of Journalism generated a characteristic habitus whose doxa and nomos 
were both generic and specific. Specific enough to be recognised as valuable effective 
capital within the field of journalism in Shanghai, and sufficiently generic to have 
currency in other fields of journalism on the national and international scenes (see article 
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below published in the SEPM supplement Journalist Weekly, 10 July 1939). At least, 
this was the case until extraterritoriality could no longer shield Shanghai’s field of 
journalism from events in the increasingly tumultuous external field of power.  
A prolonged state of hysteresis was provoked:  
Expression of Sincere Solicitude for the Press in Shanghai from the 
Chinese Journalists’ Youth Association 
The Chinese Journalists’ Youth Association is strongly concerned by 
the direful troubles encountered by journalists in Shanghai. The 
Association wishes to demonstrate support for journalists in Shanghai 
to sustain their faith, and keep up their efforts to maintain internal 
justice and safeguard the cultural fort in the south of the Yangtze River. 
Nearly half of the total number of newspapers in Shanghai have been 
suspended, as a result, there must be many journalists who have left 
their jobs. The Chinese Journalists’ Youth Association has established 
branches in the main cities of China, and is willing to do its utmost to 
help journalists who are not able to engage in journalism work arrange 
new jobs in other cities. The Association expresses the greatest 
indignation towards the terrorist attacks on journalists, and the greatest 
respect and sympathy for the journalists involved in these serious 
troubles, as they stand their ground in the face of temptation. 88 
 
 
  
                                                 
88 Zhongguo Qingnian Jizhe Xuehui Gaikuang [A Introduction of the Chinese Journalists’ Youth Association], Ta 
Mei Wan Pao, 10 July 1939  
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Appendix 1: Glossary  
 
Bureau of Investigation and Statistics 軍
統 
Blue Shirts 藍衣社 
Chang, Hsueh-liang / Zhang, Xueliang 
張學良 
Chang, Samuel / Zhang, Shixue 張似旭 
Chenbao 晨報 
Chen, Cheng陳誠 
Chen, Eugene 陳友仁 
Chen, Guofu 陳果夫 
Chen, Yi 陳毅 
Chen, Ziya 陳子亞 
Cheng, Zhenzhang 程振章  
Cheng, She-Wo / Cheng, Shewo成舍我 
Central Daily News 中央日報 
Chiang, Ching-kuo / Jiang, Jingguo 蔣
經國 
Chiang, Kai-shek / Jiang, Jieshi 蔣介石 
China Times 中華時報 
Cixi 慈禧 
Dai, Li 戴笠 
Di, Baoxian 狄葆賢 
Ding, Mocun 丁默邨 
Dunhuang’s Liaison Gazette 敦煌進奏
院狀 
Fan, Changjiang 范長江 
Fang, Hanqi 方漢奇 
Fu, Siao-en / Fu, Xiao’an 傅筱庵 
Ge, Gongzhen 戈公振 
Guangxu 光緒 
Guoxun Book Shop 國迅書店 
Hang, Shijun 杭石君 
Harada, Kumakichi 原田熊吉 
Ho, Feng-shan / He, Fengshan 何鳳山 
Ho, Yao-tsu / He, Yaozu 賀耀組 
Hsin Min Pao 新聞報 
Hu, Daojing 胡道靜 
Hu, Feng 胡風 
Hu, Hanmin 胡漢民 
Hu, Shih / Hu, Shi 胡适 
Hua Mei Wan Pao 華美晚報 
Huang, Hua 黃華 
Huang, Luofeng 黃洛峰 
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Huang, Tianpeng 黃天鵬 
Huang, Yanpei 黃炎培 
Huang, Yuansheng 黃遠生 
Jiang, Guozhen 蔣國珍 
Kang, Youwei 康有為 
Kung, Hsiang-hsi / Kong, Xiangxi 孔祥
熙 
Lih Pao立報 
Li, Tsung-jen / Li, Zongren 李宗仁 
Li, Shiqun 李士群 
Liang, Qichao 梁啟超 
Liang, Shih-chiu / Liang, Shiqiu 梁實秋 
Liao, Hua 廖華 
Liberation Daily 解放日報 
Lu, Yi 陸詒 
Liu, Zucheng 劉祖澄 
Mao Tse-tung / Mao, Zedong 毛澤東 
National Herald 自由西報 
New United Publishing Enterprise 
Agency 新出版事業聯合總處 
Okamoto, Suemasa 岡本季政 
Osaka Mainichi Shimbun 大阪毎日新
聞 
Puyi 溥儀 
Qian, Dajun 錢大鈞 
Ren, Baitao 任白濤 
Saodangbao 掃蕩報 
Shang, Ding 尚丁 
Shenbao 申報 
Shen, Chang-huan / Shen, Changhuan 
沈昌煥 
Shen, Chong 沈崇 
Shibao 時報 
Songhu Garrison Command 淞滬警備
區 
Soong, Tse-ven / Song, Ziwen 宋子文 
Soong, May-ling / Song, Meiling 宋美
齡 
St. John’s University 聖約翰大學 
Subao 蘇報 
Sun, Yat-sen / Sun Zhongshan 孫中山 
Ta Kun Pao 大公報 
Ta Wan Pao 大晚報 
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Tang, Enbo 湯恩伯 
Tong, Hollington 董顯光 
Tseng, Hsü-pei 曾虛白 
Wang, Ching-wei / Wang, Jingwei 汪精
衛 
Wang, Shih-chieh / Wang, Shijie 王世
杰 
Wang, Shiwei 王實味 
Wang, Tao 王韜 
Wang, Y. P. / Wang, Yingbin 汪英賓 
Wong, Hin / Huang, Xianzhao 黃憲昭 
Woo, Kyatang / Wu, Jiangtang 吳嘉棠 
Wu, Bannong 吳伴農 
Wu, Kuo-Chen / Wu, Guozhen 吳國楨 
Wu, Tieh-cheng / Wu, Tiecheng 吳鉄城 
Xinhua Daily 新華日報 
Xinwenbao 新聞報 
Xu, Baohuang 徐寳璜 
Xu, Dachun 徐大春 
Yenching University 燕京大學 
Yoneda, Shōtarō 米田庄太郎 
Yu, Dafu 郁達夫 
Yuan, L. R. / Yuan, Lunren 袁倫仁 
Yuan, Shikai 袁世凱 
Yuan, Shu 袁殊 
Yun, Yiqun 惲逸群 
Yung, Wing 容閎 
Zhang, Binglin 章炳麟 
Zhang, Jinglu 張靜廬 
Zhang, Tianyi 張天翼 
Zhang, Xueliang 張學良 
Zhang, Zhizhong 張治中 
Zhang, Zuolin 張作霖 
Zhao, Guodong 趙國棟 
Zhou, Enlai 周恩來 
Zhu, Changhai 朱長海 
Zhu, Xinggong 朱惺公 
Zou, Rong 鄒容 
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Appendix 2: Historical Time Line 
 
1927 
April Chiang Kai-shek by his military and local forces 
launched a violent suppression directed against 
organisations, especially labour organisations, led by 
the Chinese Communist Party. It is known as the April 
12 Incident. Six days later, the Nationalist 
Government in Nanjing was established with the 
victory of the Northern Expedition led by Chiang Kai-
shek in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River. 
 
July Wang Ching-wei changed his pro-Communist 
standpoint, and announced the Nationalist 
Government he led in Wuhan would cease the co-
operation with the Chinese Communist Party. 
 
August A military rebellion planned and implemented by the 
Chinese Communist Party broke out in Nanchang, the 
Capital of Jiangxi Province on 1 August. It was the 
reaction of the Chinese Communist Party towards its 
organisations and influence being purged previously 
by the Nationalist Party both in Nanjing and Wuhan. 
It is known as the Nanchang Uprising. Then, the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
convened an emergency meeting in Hankou on 7 
August in accordance with the direction of the 
Communist International. At the meeting, land 
revolution and armed resistance against the 
Nationalist Party were confirmed as the main policies 
of the Party. Mao Zedong in the meeting proposed 
that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". 
This meeting is known as August 7 Meeting. 
 
September Insurrections in the areas closed to the border between 
Jiangxi and Hunan province broke out in accordance 
with the dispositions of the Chinese Communist 
Party. It is known as the Autumn Harvest Uprising. 
 
October Mao Zedong with the armed force who participated in 
the Autumn Uprising arrived in the country town of 
Ninggang. Since then, the Jinggang Mountain area 
began to become a Communist revolutionary base. 
 
November  Zhongguo Baoxueshi (A History of Chinese 
Newspapers) written by Ge Gongzhen was published 
in Shanghai. This is the first Chinese academic 
monograph on Chinese journalism history. 
1928 
June In the morning of 4 June, Zhang Zuolin, warlord of 
Manchuria, was killed by the explosion plotted by the 
Japanese Kwantung Army when he was on his own 
train heading for Mukden. It is known as Huanggutun 
Incident. 
 
August  The Central Broadcasting System as the official radio 
station of the Nationalist Party was established in 
Nanjing with the call sign of XKM. 
December Zhang Xueliang, son of Zhang Zuolin, who inherited 
the power of Manchuria made a ststement recognising 
Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership on 29 December. On 
this day, the Five-coloured Flag of the Beiyang 
Government was lowered in Manchuria, and it was 
replaced by the Blue Sky with a White Sun Flag 
which represented the Nanjing Nationalist 
Government. 
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1929 
April  The Shanghai Evening Post was established in 
Shanghai on 16 April. 
1930 
May The Central Plains War, which derived from the 
infightings of different fictions amongst Chiang Kai-
shek, Feng Yu-hsiang, Li Tsung-jen and Yen His-shan 
in the Nationalist Party broke out. The civil war lasted 
until November of the year when Chiang Kai-shek 
achieved military victory. 
 
June  On June 11, The Mercury was purchased by the 
Shanghai Evening Post, and the name of the 
newspaper became the Shanghai Evening Post and 
Mercury. 
December  The Publication Law was issued by the Nationalist 
Government on 16 December. 
1931 
September The Japanese Kwantung Army launched a military 
operation on 18 September aimed at consolidating its 
control over Manchuria. It is known as the Mukden 
Incident. Soon after, Japan occupied the whole area of 
Manchuria. 
 
November The Chinese Soviet Republic establishment was 
announced on 7 November against the Nationalist 
Government of the Republic of China by the Chinese 
Communist Party in Ruijin of Jiangxi Province. The 
Communist de facto controlled areas in this time were 
called the Soviet Zone. 
The Red China News Agency as the official news 
agency of the Chinese Soviet Republic was established 
in Ruijin on 7 November. 
December  Red China, the official newspaper of the Chinese 
Soviet Republic, was established in Ruijin, the Capital 
of the regime on 11 December. This newspaper is the 
earliest organ of the central regime of the Chinese 
Communist Party.  
1932 
January On 28 January, a military conflict broke out in 
Shanghai between China and Japan. It is known as the 
Shanghai Incident. 
 
March Manchukuo establishment was formally announced 
on 1 March, and Aisin-Gioro Puyi ascended the 
throne to be the emperor. 
 
1933 
January  Chinese edition of the Shanghai Evening Post and 
Mercury was published from 16 January. 
March Japanese troops occupied Chengde, the capital of 
Rehe Province on 4 March. 
 
May The Tanggu Truce was reached on 31 May. It meant 
the de facto recognition of the Nationalist 
Government towards the independent position of 
Manchukuo, and the border between the Republic of 
China and Manchukuo was based on the Great Wall.  
 
September  The Nationalist Government on 1 September issued 
the order of protection for journalists and public 
opinion institutes. Thus, the day is commemorated as 
the Journalist’s Day in the Republic of China, and it 
still continues in Taiwan. 
1934 
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October Having evaded the pursuit of the Nationalist Army, 
the Chinese Communist Party began to withdraw 
from Jiangxi Province. This is known as the Long 
March. 
 
November  On 13 November, Shi Liangcai, the owner of Shenbao, 
was assassinated when he was driving his car from 
Hangzhou to Shanghai with his wife and son. 
1935 
January The Zunyi Conference, which was held by the 
Chinese Communist Party during a stopover on the 
route of the Long March, was closed on 17 January. 
During this conference, the leadership of Mao Zedong 
in the Chinese Communist Party was confirmed. Six 
days later, Japan called out its armies to attack the 
Nationalist defenders in the border of eastern Chahar 
as retaliatory action of the military conflict between 
the Nationalist and Manchukuo on 15 January. This is 
known as the East Chahar Incident. 
 
May On 30 May, four Japanese soldiers who entered areas 
north of the Great Wall in Chahar province without 
the required travel permits by the Nationalist 
Government were detained by the local defenders. 
This is called North Chahar Incident. 
 
June The Chin–Doihara Agreement was signed on 27 June 
as the solution of the North Chahar Incident. 
According to this agreement, the Chinese parties who 
participated in detaining four Japanese soldiers must 
be punished, and migration from Shandong Province 
to Chahar would be forbidden. 
 
July The He-Umezu Agreement was secretly signed on 6 
July. The Nationalist’s military forces in Chahar and 
Rehe should have been withdrawn in accordance with 
this agreement. 
 
September  Cheng She-Wo established Libao in Shanghai on 20 
September. 
October On 4 October, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 
Army Minister and the Navy Minister of Japan 
confirmed three principles in Japanese China policy. 
It is known as Hirota’s Three Principles, which 
includes 1) to force China to change its policies 
regarding reliance upon Europe and the United States 
against Japan; 2) to force China to recognise the 
independence of Manchukuo and abandon its anti-
Manchukuo policies; 3) to force China to co-operate 
with Japan in the border areas with Mongolia in the 
light of increasingly serious communist threat from 
Mongolia.    
 
December On 9 December, thousands of students from 
universities of Peiping took to the streets, appealing 
the government to promote democratic development, 
stop the civil war and prepare for a self-defence war 
against Japan. This is known as the December Ninth 
Movement. 
 
1936 
February A Japanese military mutiny broke out in Tokyo on 26 
February. It was organised by a group of young 
officers of the Imperial Japanese Army with the goal 
of purging their political and ideological rivals in both 
military and government of Japan. The mutiny was 
soon suppressed. Since then, the military influence in 
Japanese Government began to successively increase. 
It is known as the February 26 Incident.  
 
June  On 3 June, American journalist Edgar Snow arrived in 
north Shaanxi Province, the Red Base of the Chinese 
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Communist Party, to conduct his interviews for the 
Daily Herald. 
August  The Northwest. Corner of China, a collection of 
dispatches written by Fan Changjiang during his 
visiting and interviewing as a correspondent of Ta 
Kung Pao in northwest China from May 1935 to June 
1936, was published. 
October The last Communist troops arrived in Shanbei on 22 
October, as the Communist Party ended the Long 
March.  
 
December Dissatisfaction with Chiang Kai-shek’s command to 
fight the Communist Army in Shanbei, led Zhang 
Xueliang and Yang Hucheng to mutiny after arriving 
in Xi’an, Chiang Kai-shek was held captive on 12 
December. This is known as the Xi’an Incident. After 
various consultations, Chiang Kai-shek was finally 
released on 25 December. 
 
1937 
July In the evening of 7 July, Japanese troops conducted 
military manoeuvres around the Marco Polo Bridge. 
Then the military conflicts with the local Chinese 
armies broke out, and Peiping and Tianjin were soon 
after occupied by the Japanese Army. It is known as 
the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. It marked the 
outbreak of the full-scale war of Chinese resistance 
against Japan. 
 
August The Japanese Army launched the battle, aimed at 
occupying Shanghai since 13 August. 
 
September Chiang Kai-shek made a statement in which he 
acknowledged the legality between the Nationalist 
Party and the Communist Party for resistance of 
Japanese invasion on 23 September. Thus, the Second 
United Front formed. 
 
November The Battle of Taiyuan ended. Most areas of Shanxi 
Province were occupied by Japanese Army. 
The Chinese Youth Journalist’s Association was 
established in Shanghai on 8 November. Thus, the day 
is appointed as the Journalist’s Day in the current 
People’s Republic of China.   
November On 12 November, the Japanese Army occupied 
Shanghai with the exception of the Internal 
Settlement and the French Concession. The 
Nationalist government declared Chongqing the war-
time Capital on 20 November. 
 
December The Great Way Municipal Government of Shanghai 
was established on 5 December under the Japanese 
support. Su Xiwen took the mayor position. Its 
administration areas contained all districts of 
Shanghai with the exception of the International 
Settlement and the French Concession. The Japanese 
Army on 13 December occupied Nanjing, the capital 
city of the Republic of China, and massacred the city 
for several weeks. On the following day, the 
Provisional Government of the Republic of China 
was established in Peiping under the Japanese 
support. Its administration areas were generally in 
North China. 
The Shanghai Municipal Council issued the order to 
ask all Chinese newspapers in the Shanghai foreign 
settlements to accept censorship by the Japanese 
controlled Shanghai authority. Then, on 16 December, 
C. V. Starr announced that both Chinese and English 
editions of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury 
were all American newspapers, and they refused to 
accept any censorship in Shanghai. It opened the 
journalistic movement of newspapers to claim their 
foreign ownership in Shanghai foreign settlements 
thereby enabling them refuse censorship. 
1938 
March 28 The Reform Government of the Republic of China 
was established in Nanjing on 28 March under the 
leadership of Liang Hongzhi.  
 
April The Nationalist Army achieved victory in the battle of 
Tai’erzhuang.  
 
September Japanese armies began to their military actions of 
moping up Communist controlled rural areas, aiming 
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at destroying Communist established guerrilla base 
areas. The military activities were kept until the end 
of the War of Resistance against Japan. 
October Guangzhou on 21 October was occupied by Japanese 
armies, and four days later, Wuhan also fell into 
Japanese hands. 
On 26 October, Xinhua Daily, a Chinese Communist 
Party newspaper, began publication in Chongqing. 
   
1939 
January The Japanese performed the first air attack on war-
time capital Chongqing on 15 January. This city later 
suffered bombing several times during the War of 
Resistance against Japan. On 30 January, the Fifth 
Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee of the 
Nationalist Party was closed. The Chinese 
Communist Party criticised the conference outcome 
of making the policy of passive resistance against 
Japan and active fighting against the Communist 
Party. This conference marked the beginning of the 
military conflicts between the Nationalist Party and 
the Communist Party during the War of Resistance 
against Japan. 
 
April  Zhao Guodong, a general newspaper vendor of the 
Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, was assassinated 
on 18 April.  
August  Zhu Xinggong, an editor of the Night Light 
supplement of the Chinese edition of the Shanghai 
Evening Post and Mercury, was assassinated on 30 
August. 
September The local regimes in Chahar, Suiyuan and the north 
areas of Shanxi Province which had been established 
after Japanese occupation were integrated by Japan 
within the Mongolian Borderlands United 
Autonomous Government under the leadership of the 
Prince Demchugdongrub. 
 
1940 
March Under the Japanese support, the Reorganised 
Nationalist Government of the Republic of China was 
established in Nanjing on 30 March, and Wang 
Ching-wei was the head of the regime. It took over 
the previously established Provisional Government 
and the Reform Government. The Mongolian 
Borderlands United Autonomous Government only 
nominally belonged to Wang’s regime, and still 
maintained its own administration jurisdiction. 
 
July  Samuel Chang, an editor and manager of the Shanghai 
Evening Post and Mercury, was assassinated on 21 
July. 
  Cheng Zhenzhang, an editor of the Chinese edition of 
the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, was 
assassinated. 
October Huangqiao Incident, a military conflict between the 
Nationalist troops and the Communist troops, 
occurred in the north part of the Jiangsu Province. The 
Nationalist troops were defeated. 
 
December  The Yan’an Xinhua Radio Station was established on 
30 December. It is the first radio station of the Chinese 
Communist Party. 
1941 
January In retaliation to the Huangqiao Incident, the 
Nationalist troops attacked the Communist armies in 
the south of Anhui Province. This is known as the 
New Fourth Army Incident. 
A poem by Zhou Enlai, blaming the Nationalist troops 
for the New Fourth Army Incident, and complaining 
of injustices against the Communist Party, was 
published on the first page of the Xinhua Daily on 18 
282 
 
January. 
April Japan signed the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact 
with the Soviet Union on 13 April. According to this 
treaty, the Mongolian People’s Republic was 
recognised by Japan, and in return for this, 
Manchukuo received the acknowledgement from the 
Soviet Union. 
 
June  Li Junying, a vice-manager of the Shanghai Evening 
Post and Mercury, was assassinated on 23 June. 
December Japan began to attack Pearl Harbour on 7 December. 
Then, Japan declared war on Great Britain and the 
United States, and the Pacific War broke out, and soon 
after, Hong Kong was occupied by Japan. On 9 
December, China formally declared war on Japan. 
The Japanese Army occupied the Shanghai 
International Settlement. All anti-Japanese 
newspapers were censored, and the Isolated Island 
period ended. 
1942 
April  The Liberation Daily under the direction of the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party began to 
be completely revised. The newspaper on the day 
published an article ‘A Notice of the Revision of the 
Party Newspapers’, written by the publicity 
department of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party. It was followed with an editorial ‘To 
the Readers’, which emphasised the Party and the 
people’s spirit, militant style and organisational 
disciplines as the highest principles of the Party’s 
papers. 
June The United States Navy achieved victory at the Battle 
of Midway on 7 June. It marked a shift in the balance 
of power toward the Allied Forces in Asian and 
Pacific areas. 
 
1943 
January  The New York edition of the Shanghai Evening Post 
and Mercury commenced publication from 1 January 
in the United States. 
February The Soviet Union achieved victory at the Battle of 
Stalingrad on 2 February. The victory marked the 
Allied Forces beginning to gain the initiative in 
European warfare. 
 
September Italy surrendered to the Allies on 8 September.  
October  The Chongqing edition of the Shanghai Evening Post 
and Mercury began to publish on 31 October. 
December The Cairo Declaration was formally proclaimed by 
the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of 
China on 1 December. The contents of the Cairo 
Declaration includes consensus reached in the 
conference that Japan must unconditionally 
surrender, give up all islands occupied in the Pacific 
after the First World War, recognise the independence 
of Korea, and return Manchuria and Taiwan to China. 
 
1944 
April The Japanese Army launched the Operation Ichi-Go 
campaign in Henan, Hunan and Guangxi Provinces, 
aimed at controlling the traffic line from Manchuria 
to Southeast Asia, so that more war materials could be 
delivered to the Japanese front. 
 
June On 6 June, the Allied Forces began to operate the 
Normandy Landings, and then the second front in 
Europe against Germany was successfully opened. 
The Chinese and Foreign Journalist Group, including 
Harrison Forman, Israel Epstein, Xie Shuangqiu and 
Zhao Chaogou, arrived in Yan’an, commencing their 
interviews to the Chinese Communist Party leaders. 
August American military observers arrived in Yan’an. The editorial, Welcome American Comrades-in-
Armies, was published on 15 August in the Liberation 
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Daily, an official newspaper of the Chinese 
Communist Party. 
October Albert Coady Wedemeyer replaced Stilwell to 
become the commander of the United States forces in 
China from 31 October. 
 
November Patrick Jay Hurley was appointed ambassador of the 
United States in China from 30 November. 
 
December The Operation Ichi-Go campaign ended. The 
Japanese Army achieved military victory, but both 
Chinese and Japanese sides suffered significant 
losses, and Japan did not receive the result that they 
anticipated.  
 
1945 
February The Yalta Conference was closed on 11 February. The 
relevant clauses associated with the Soviet Army 
sending troops to Manchuria were confirmed by the 
heads of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the 
United States. 
 
April President Roosevelt passed away on 12 April, and the 
president position was succeeded by Harry S. 
Truman. 
 
May Germany acknowledged unconditional surrender on 8 
May. 
 
June  The Chongqing edition of the Shanghai Evening Post 
and Mercury was suspended, as the management of 
the newspaper was dissatisfied with the harsh war-
time censorship by the Nationalist regime. 
July The Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese 
Surrender, aimed at urging Japan to surrender as soon 
as possible, was issued on 26 July. 
 
August The atomic bombs were dropped by the United States 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in turn on 6 and 9 August. 
The Soviet Union also declared war on Japan on 8 
August, and then sent its troops into Manchuria. On 
15 August, Emperor Hirohito addressed the Imperial 
Rescript on the Termination of the War, marking 
Japan’s formal declaration of unconditional 
surrender. Chiang Kai-shek on the day ordered 
Okamura Yasuji, the commander-in-chief of the 
China Expeditionary Army of Japan, to command 
Japanese troops in China to surrender to the 
government of the Republic of China. Chiang Kai-
shek also sent three telegrams to Mao Zedong, and 
invited him to Chongqing for negotiations on the 
issues of post-war China. Mao finally accepted 
Chiang’s invitation, and arrived in Chongqing on 23 
August to negotiate with the Nationalist Government. 
Three days later, the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty 
of Friendship and Alliance was announced, stating 
that the Soviet Union acknowledged the Nationalist 
Government was the only legal government of the 
Republic of China. 
On 7 August, the book Return from Yan’an was 
published by Guoxun bookshop in Chongqing in the 
situation of without accepting censorship. It marked 
the beginning of the Movement of Refusing 
Censorship. 
September  On 12 September, Wu Kuo-chen declared the 
censorship would be annulled from the 1 October, and 
the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury was re-
established in Shanghai on 24 September. 
October The Summary of Conversations Between the 
Representatives of the Nationalist Party and the 
Communist Party of China, also known as the Double 
Tenth Agreement was signed on 10 October after 
negotiations. The file aimed to solve Chinese political 
issues in a peaceful manner after their victory in the 
War of Resistance Against Japan. 
 
November When the Nationalist Party attempted to take over 
Yingkou, a port of Manchuria, from the Soviet Army 
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on 3 November, they discovered that the city had been 
relinquished to the Communist Party by the Soviet 
Union underhand. It led to the later military conflict 
between the Communist Party and the Nationalist 
Party for seizing Manchuria. On 16 November, the 
Nationalist troops forcedly captured Shanhai Pass, the 
key which connects Manchuria and North China, 
from Communist troops. 
December General George Marshall was appointed as the special 
envoy of the President Truman. He arrived in China 
with intentions of mediation between the Nationalist 
Party and the Communist Party. After He dialogued 
formally with Chiang Kai-shek, the Three-Party Talks 
(George Marshall, Zhang Qun and Zhou Enlai) was 
hold. 
 
1946 
January On 10 January, the armistice agreement was signed by 
the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, and 
the Political Consultative Conference was held. 
 
February In reacting to a series of outrages of the Soviet Army 
in Manchuria, an Anti-Soviet student demonstration 
broke out in Chongqing on 22 February. Three days 
later, an agreement between the Nationalist Party and 
the Communist Party on military reorganisation and 
the integration of Communist forces into the National 
Army was signed. 
The building of Xinhua Daily was damaged by some 
angry students and masses in the process of the 
demonstration. 
March On 17 March, the Central Executive Committee of the 
Nationalist Party refused to accept the Political 
Consultative Conference Agreement which was 
previously arranged between their representatives 
with the Communist Party and the Democratic 
League. The Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party on 25 March issued an order that 
CCP’s troops must occupy main cities of Manchuria 
after the Soviet Army withdrew from there. 
 
April The Soviet Army began to withdraw from Manchuria 
from 6 April. When George Marshall returned China 
on 18 April, Changchun had occupied by the 
Communist troops. 
 
May On 5 May, Nanjing reinstated its Capital of the 
Republic of China. On 18 May, the Nationalist troops 
occupied Siping after a fierce battle with the 
Communist troops. Then, the Communist Army under 
the pressure withdrew from Changchun, and the city 
was occupied by the Nationalist troops. 
 
June The armistice agreement in which required the 
Nationalist armies and the Communist armies to stop 
fighting for 15 days in Manchuria were announced by 
Chiang Kai-shek and Zhou Enlai on 6 June. The 
agreement later was prolonged for another 8 days. 
The Foreign Assistance Act was ratified by the 
Congress of the United States on 26 June. This act 
referred to the military and economic aids to the 
Nationalist Government of China. On the same day, 
troops of the Nationalist Party attacked Communist 
dominated areas in Hubei Province, and local 
Communist troops later successfully broke out of the 
military encirclement. 
 
July On 11 July, American Congress agreed to appoint 
John Leighton Stuart as the ambassador to China. On 
29 of the month, a transport corps belonging to the 
U.S. Marine Corps on the main transport route 
connected Peiping and Tianjin was attacked by the 
Communist troops. It is known as Anping Incident as 
the scene of the event was happened near the town of 
Anping. 
 
August  Mao Zedong, in the interview by the American 
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journalist Anna Louise Strong on 6 August, coined the 
term ‘paper tiger’ to express that the Chinese 
Communist Party had been ready to fight with 
American imperialism and the Chiang Kai-shek 
regime. 
September On 30 September, the Nationalist armies launched the 
battle to occupy the Communist controlled city Zhang 
Jiakou. 
On 5 September, the Executive Yuan of the Nationalist 
Government issued the policy of saving newspaper 
papers, aimed at limiting the quantity of printed sheets 
of the press and publication. On 7 September, the 
Ministry of National Defence made a decree 
Forbidding Foreign Radio Stations in China. In 
accordance with this decree, all foreign radio stations 
should be banned with the exception of the American 
military radio station. 
October On 2 October, George Marshall expressed his 
opposition towards the military action of the 
Nationalist troops to occupy Zhang Jiakou. Chiang 
Kai-shek then agreed on a truce for five days if the 
Chinese Communist Party accepted two conditions: 
they must attend the National Assembly and withdraw 
their troops from the eighteen places they were 
occupying at the time. After discussions with George 
Marshall and John Leighton Stuart, Chiang Kai-shek 
on 6 October agreed on a 10 days truce on the 
condition of the Communist Party accepting the 
aforementioned two conditions. However, Wang 
Bingnan, a representative of the Chinese Communist 
Party in Nanjing, on 8 October took Zhou Enlai’s 
message to John Leighton Stuart that the Chinese 
Communist Party refused to accept Chiang Kai-
shek’s conditions of truce. On the next day, George 
Marshall went to Shanghai to persuade Zhou Enlai to 
enter into further negotiation, but it was refused by 
Zhou. Two days later, Zhangjiakou and Chifeng were 
captured by the Nationalist troops, and the Nationalist 
Government declared that the National Assembly was 
to be held on 12 November. 
 
November Representatives of the United State and the Republic 
of China signed the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, 
and Navigation on 4 November. The National 
Assembly was formally held on 15 of the month, but 
only Kuomintang, Youth Party and some independent 
delegates attended the parliament. It was boycotted by 
the Chinese Communist Party and the rest of parties. 
 
December  On 24 December, Shen Chong, a student of the 
Peking University, was raped by the American marine 
William Pierson. It led to the rise of anti-American 
furores in China. Four days later, George Marshall 
asked President Truman to recall him. 
 
1947 
January The Constitution of the Republic of China was 
formally issued on 1 January, and it would be put into 
force from 25 December of the year. On 8 of the 
month, George Marshall left China, and the United 
States Department of State formally announced 
termination of its mediation in China on 29 January. 
 
February  Xinhua Daily, the only Chinese Communist Party’s 
newspaper in Chongqing, was forced to close down by 
the Nationalist Party. 
March All offices of the Chinese Communist Party in 
Nanjing, Shanghai and Chongqing were forced to 
close on 7 March, and staff drew back. All efforts for 
negotiation ended in failure, and the last military 
observers of the United States Army withdrew from 
Yan’an on 11 of the month. Then, the Nationalist 
armies waged war on Yan’an with the purpose of 
seizing it, and realised military occupation on 19 
March, however, the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party had evacuated the place. 
 
286 
 
May The Communist Army won the Menglianggu 
Campaign. The 74th Reorganised Division of the 
Nationalist Party, which was well equipped with 
American devices, was wiped out. On 20 May, 
student demonstrations against civil war and 
starvation broke out in the main cities, and 
demonstrators suffered pressure of government. 
 
August The Communist troops of Shanbei won the battle of 
Shajiadian on 20 August. It resulted in the main 
Nationalist force in Shanbei being annihilated. 
Meanwhile, Albert Coady Wedemeyer as the special 
envoy of American president visited China again, and 
he strongly criticised the military incompetence and 
the political corruption of the Nationalist regime in 
Nanjing on 22 August. 
 
October The Democratic League was outlawed by the 
Nationalist Government on 28 October, and the party 
had no choice but turned to absolutely support the 
Chinese Communist Party. 
 
1948 
March Siping, as a pivot to connect north and south of 
Manchuria, was occupied by the Communist Army on 
13 March. 
 
April Chiang Kai-shek on 19 April was elected as the 
President of the Republic of China in the National 
Assembly. Three days later, Yan’an was recaptured by 
the Communist Army. 
On 2 April, Mao Zedong in talks with the staff of 
Jinsui Daily, a Communist newspaper, pointed out that 
the task of newspapers should serve the Party to 
communicate with the masses, and propaganda the 
policies and principles of the Party. 
June  On 3 June, Mao Zedong required all level of the 
Communist governments to regain control of the 
media. He proposed that all Communist newspapers 
must have someone familiar with all policies of the 
Chinese Communist Party present, so that before 
publication, all contents inconsistent with the Party’s 
propaganda requirement could be censored. 
October Jinzhou was seized by the Communist troops on 15 
October. Thus, the Nationalist troops in Manchuria 
were no longer able to acquire reinforcements from 
North China. 
 
November The Communist Army won Liaoshen Campaign, and 
Manchuria was controlled by the Chinese Communist 
Party. Soong May-ling, Chinese First Lady, urgently 
visited the United States, and in the meeting with 
President Truman on 10 December, she proposed that 
the United States should provide further aid to China 
for helping and supporting Chinese against 
Communists, but this proposal was refused. 
Decision of the Solution towards Foreign news 
agencies in liberated cities was issued by the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 8 
November. 
1949 
January On 10 January, the Communist Army won the 
Huaihai Campaign. It led to the capital city Nanjing 
directly under threat from the Communist Army. On 
21 January, Chiang Kai-shek proclaimed to relinquish 
his president position, and vice-president Li Tsung-
jen assumed all responsibilities and power. 
 
February The Communist Army came into Peiping on 3 
February, and the Pingjin Campaign which aimed at 
controlling North China came to an end. 
 
April Delegates of the Nationalist Party and the Chinese 
Communist Party started the negotiations on the 
content of the Domestic Peace Agreement in Peiping 
on 13 April. On 20 April, the Nationalist Government 
announced the refusal of the Domestic Peace 
Agreement. The next day, Mao Zedong and Zhu De 
issued the order, in which the Communist Army was 
Liu Shaoqi, vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist 
Party, stated on 21 April that journalists must be 
Marxist supporters with relevant knowledge of the 
Communist Party’s strategies, and ability for 
independent hard work. 
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required to cross the Yangtze, and two days later, 
Communist Army occupied the capital city Nanjing 
of the Republic of China. 
May Shanghai on 25 May was occupied by Communist 
troops. 
 
June  The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury ceased 
publication from 15 June. 
July  The Post Mercury Company stopped all business from 
1 July. 
October Mao Zedong declared the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China on 10 October. 
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Appendix 4: Journalist Seminar Supplement 
No. Date Title author Theme 1 Theme 2 Remarks 
(1) 1934.08.31 At the journalist seminar Huai Yun 
Practice of journalism Seminar ‘Huai Yun’ was a 
penname of Yuan Shu 
    Feelings at the seminar Lu Yi Practice of journalism Seminar   
    
Are newspapers really not 
able to use vernacular 
language (one) 
Yi Qun 
Practice of journalism Language 
  
    
Ownership change of Shibao 
is buzzing 
Zu Cheng 
Management Practice of journalism 
  
    
Active Japanese journalists at 
battlefield 
Wu Yi 
Regional China 
journalism 
International 
journalism 
Wu Yi was a friend of 
“Yuan Shu”, and he was 
not a member of the 
seminar. 
(2) 1934.09.07 
Short introduction of 
journalism 
Huai Yun 
Practice of journalism  
  
    
Analysing rhetoric issues in 
news writing 
Zhang 
Xianmei 
Practice of journalism Language 
  
    
Active Japanese journalists at 
battlefields 
Wu Yi 
Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
  
(3) 1934.09.14 Life should be with passion Zu Cheng Practice of journalism    
    
Are newspapers really not 
able to use vernacular 
language (two) 
Yi Qun 
Practice of journalism Language 
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The establishment course and 
activities of the Sichuan press 
corps in Peiping 
Kui Wen 
Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism   
    
Japanese journalists calling at 
Peiping and Tianjin on the day 
before three-year 
commemoration of the 
Mukden Incident 
Huai Yun 
Regional China 
journalism 
International 
journalism 
  
    Newspapers in Guangzhou Dong Nan 
Regional China 
Journalism 
 
  
(4) 1934.09.21 
The beginning of journalism 
studies 
Huai Yun 
Practice of journalism  Journalism education 
and studies 
  
    The press prints of 1934 Xian Mei Technology    
    Seminar last week Yi Qun 
Practice of journalism Seminar This seminar was 
convened in the 
Beautiful Sichuan 
Cuisine Restaurant. It 
was held by Yun Yiqun. 
Shen Songfang, Xu 
Xinqin, Shen Qianli, Lü 
Yiwen, Su Dezheng and 
Lv Kuiwen attended. 
(5) 1934.09.28 
How to seek for a correct 
attitude to engage in 
journalism 
Su Dezheng 
Practice of journalism   
 
    
Research on interview 
practice  
Zu Cheng 
Practice of journalism  
  
    Journalism, film Bao Kui Practice of journalism    
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Situation of the press in 
Kaifeng 
 
Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
  
    
An article about typesetting in 
newspaper offices 
Ye 
Tongsheng 
Technology  
  
    Seminar last week Huai Yun 
Practice of journalism Seminar This seminar was 
convened in the 
Jessfield Park. It was 
held by Yuan Shu. Zhai 
Yicheng, Lu Yi, Xu 
Xinqin and Shen Qianli 
attended. 
(6) 1934.10.05 Some pending questions Zhi Han Practice of journalism  Please explain 
    
journalists falling into 
dilemma 
Yi Qun 
Practice of journalism  
  
    Arguing film journalism Zu Cheng Practice of journalism Technology   
    
Historical material of 
journalism studies (one): 
Guangzhou professional 
journalism school 
 
History of journalism Regional China 
  
    Seminar last week Kui Wen 
Practice of journalism Seminar This seminar was 
convened in the Green 
Apple Garden 
Restaurant. It was held 
by Lv Kuiwen. Yuan 
Shu, Shen Qianli, Zhai 
Yicheng, Mr. ‘Lihua’, 
Shen Jun and Chang 
Shan attended. 
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(7) 1934.10.12 
Propose some points to spur 
myself and journalists 
comrades of the seminar 
Lu Yi 
Practice of journalism  
  
    American journalists’ features Wu Yi 
Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
  
    
Introduce journalism 
education institutes 
(Journalism Department of 
Fudan University) 
Bao Kui 
Journalism education 
and studies 
 
  
    Seminar last week Ban Nong 
Practice of journalism Seminar This seminar was 
convened on 7 
October. It was held by 
Yang Bannong. Yun 
Yiqun, Yuan Shu, Lu Yi 
and Zhai Yicheng 
attended. 
(8) 1934.10.19 
Welcome American journalists 
corps to Shanghai 
Huai Hui 
International 
journalism 
 ‘Huai Hui’ was a 
penname of Yuan Shu. 
    
Imperfect aspects of 
international news 
Yi Qun 
Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
  
    
American journalists’ features 
(continue) 
Wu Yi 
International 
journalism 
 
  
    Journalism and literature Nai Ding Practice of journalism    
(9) 1934.10.26 
News photos and journalistic 
photograph (one) 
Xi Ju 
Practice of journalism Technology 
  
    
Journalism and literature 
(continue) 
Nai Ding 
Practice of journalism  
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The whole course of the 
merger between Rengo and 
Dentsu 
He Fan 
International 
journalism 
 
  
    
Talks by French journalist Mrs. 
Poirot when she visiting 
Peiping  
 
Practice of journalism International 
journalism   
    Seminar last week Lv Shi 
Practice of journalism Seminar This seminar was 
convened on 21 
October at the Green 
Chamber Restaurant. 
Lu Yi, Xu Xinqin, Zhai 
Yicheng, Fu Yuchang, Lü 
Kuiwen, Song Zhefu, Fu 
Yingzhou and Yan 
Pinzao attended. 
(10) 1934.11.02 
Issues about the rationality of 
journalism control 
 
Practice of journalism  
 
    
News photos and journalistic 
photograph (two) 
Xi Ju 
Technology Practice of journalism 
 
    Journalists’ life and integrity 
Huang 
Jingan 
Practice of journalism  
  
    
American education for 
journalists 
Wu Yi 
Journalism education 
and studies 
International 
journalism 
  
    
Comment on the Press 
quarterly 
Da Lin 
  
Please explain 
    
Introduce journalism 
education institutes II 
(journalism major of business 
faculty at the Hujiang 
Commercial School) 
Yi Nong 
Journalism education 
and studies 
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(11) 1934.11.09 
Who the anatomist of the 
era? 
Huai Yun 
Practice of journalism  
Please explain 
    
Introduce journalism 
education institutes III 
(journalism faculty of 
Yenching University) 
Xi Chao 
Journalism studies  
  
    Two mottos Hui ying Practice of journalism  Please explain 
    Studies on using printers 
Crane, 
translated 
by Qiang 
Sheng 
Technology  
  
    Seminar last week Jun Liang 
Practice of journalism Seminar This seminar was 
convened on 4 
November at West Si 
Chuan Restaurant. It 
was held by Zhang 
Junliang. Lu Yi, Lü 
Yiwen, Wang Jiaowo, Lu 
Jingfang, Lei Mingzhe 
and Hu Zhengbing 
attended. 
(12) 1934.11.16 
Mourn Mr. Shi, an 
entrepreneur of journalism 
Huai Hui 
History of journalism  
  
    We need new weapon to fight Hu Zhengbin Practice of journalism   
    
How journalists coping with 
emergencies 
Zu Cheng 
Practice of journalism  
 
    
Readers need to know 
knowledge about the world 
Ren Lin 
International 
journalism 
For readers 
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Studies on using printers 
(continue) 
Crane, 
translated 
by Qiang 
Sheng 
Technology  
  
(13) 1934.11.23 Problems of ‘no problem’ Huai Yun Practice of journalism    
    
Total amount of Japanese 
newspapers 
Huai Hui 
International Japan 
  
    Journalism, drama, film Ban Nong Practice of journalism Technology   
    
Argue the press studies and 
comment on the Press 
quarterly 
Tian Shiyou 
Practice of journalism Journalism studies 
  
15 1934.11.30 
Track back French 
newspapers in China from Le 
Journal de Shanghai  
Shanghai 
News 
agency 
Study of Journalism International 
journalism  
    After attending the seminar Gu Qiuxiang Practice of journalism Seminar   
    
Competition for battlefront 
news 
Morisu 
Shinsaku, 
translated 
by He Fan 
Practice of journalism Regional China 
  
    Seminar last week Xi Mai 
Practice of journalism Seminar This seminar was 
convened on 25 
November at Dafang 
Noodles Restaurant. It 
was held by ‘Xi Mai’. 
16 1934.12.07 Vulgar report of jazzism (one) Xiao Ying 
Practice of journalism  ‘Xiao Ying’ was a 
penname of Yuan Shu. 
    Analyse journalists’ life Zu Cheng Practice of journalism    
    Newspapers in Chengdu Hui Ying Regional China    
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Daily newspapers reaching to 
3 million 
 
Regional China 
journalism 
 
  
  
A successful evening daily: the 
Mercury 
Hu Daojing 
Practice of journalism History of journalism 
 
17 1934.12.14 Represent the press to 
present a petition in the Fifth 
Plenary Session 
   This article was first 
published on Ta Kun 
Pao of Tianjin on 10 
December. 
  Vulgar report of jazzism (two) Xiao Ying Practice of journalism   
  Classification between office 
and field works of journalism 
Lu Yi Practice of journalism   
  Dispatch and correspondence 
(one) 
Yi Qun Practice of journalism   
  Evening news in Paris Lao 
Hongxun 
International 
journalism 
  
  Dialogue Mo Zi International 
journalism 
 ‘Mo Zi’ was Zhai 
Yicheng. 
18 1934.12.21 The transformation and 
transition of the press in 
Shanghai by observing the 
change of management (one)  
Hu Daojing    
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  Dispatch and correspondence 
(continue) 
Yi Qun International 
journalism 
  
  Competitions for battlefront 
news (continue) 
Morisu 
Shinsaka, 
translated 
by He Fan 
Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
 
  Seminar this week: how to 
acquire free speech 
 Practice of journalism Seminar This seminar was 
convened in Kung Tak 
Lam Cuisine. It was held 
by Yun Yiqun, recorded 
by Lv Kuiwen and Yang 
Bannong. Yuan Shu, 
Zhang Xianmei, Shen 
Qianli, Lu Yi, Tang 
Huiping, Xu Xinqin, Hu 
Daojing, Fu Yuchang, Lü 
Yiwen and Wu 
Bannong. 
19 1934.12.28 The story of Arthur Brisbane Yuan Chao History of journalism International 
journalism 
 
  Observe the change and 
transformation of the press in 
Shanghai based on facilities 
(two) 
Hu Daojing Technology History of journalism  
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  Dispatch and correspondence 
(continue) 
Yi Qun Practice of journalism   
  Interview journalist: Mr. Xie 
Liuyi 
Hu 
Zhenghuan 
Practice of journalism   
20 1935.01.04 How newspapers agencies can 
reinforce human resources for 
interview 
Lu Yi Practice of journalism   
  Shishi Xinbao made a large 
number of redundancies 
Yi Qun Practice of journalism   
  Dispatch and correspondence 
(continue) 
Yi Qun Practice of journalism   
  The issues of ‘repeating old 
things’ 
Zhai Yicheng Practice of journalism   
  The story of Arthur Brisbane 
(continue) 
Yuan Chao History of journalism International 
journalism 
 
  The adversity of the press in 
Germany 
Liu Chong International 
journalism 
  
21 1935.01.11 The incident of Shishi Xinbao’s 
redundancies 
 Practice of journalism  A letter of the staff of 
Shishi Xinbao submitted 
to Shanghai Journalist 
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Union on 1 January 
1935.  
  Dispatch and correspondence 
(continue) 
Yi Qun Practice of journalism   
  The story of Arthur Brisbane 
(continue) 
Yuan Chao Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
 
  Newspapers and journalists 
should have the right to keep 
the secret of the sources of 
news (one) 
Liu Chong Practice of journalism   
  Another statistics of the sales 
of newspapers nationwide 
 Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
The data from Chinese 
newspapers and 
magazines Index 
published by Chinese 
Commercial 
Advertisement 
Company 
22 1935.01.18 Newspapers and journalists 
should have the right to keep 
the secret of the sources of 
news (two) 
Liu Chong Practice of journalism   
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  Local newspapers Yang 
Bannong 
Regional China 
journalism 
  
  Dispatch and correspondence 
(complete) 
Yi Qun Practice of journalism   
  The press in Suiyuan  Regional China 
journalism 
  
  Readers’ comments  Practice of journalism  Shi Jidong wrote to 
Journalism Seminar, 
describing the press in 
Guizhou 
23 1935.01.25 Introduction of a Soviet 
Russian authoritative 
journalist 
 Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
 
  Save the failure of journalistic 
policies 
Gong Debai Practice of journalism  It is translated from the 
editorial of Jiuguo 
Ribao of 22 January. 
  Newspapers and journalists 
should have the right to keep 
the secret of the sources of 
news (complete) 
Liu Chong Practice of journalism   
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24 1935.01.31 Seminar this week: moral 
issues of journalistic staff 
 Practice of journalism seminar This seminar was 
convened at Yangtze 
Hotel on 27 January. It 
was hosted by Yun 
Yiqun, recorded by 
Yang Bannong. Lu Yi, Xu 
Xinqin, Huang Jingan, 
Zhu Yajie, Liu Zucheng, 
Hu Zhuoren, Lv Yiwen, 
Shen Songfang, Shen 
Jicang, Lv Kuiwen, Su 
Dengzheng, Zhang Zixi 
and Wu Tianwu 
attended. 
  The moral and discipline 
issues of the press 
Ban Nong Practice of journalism   
  Improve remuneration and 
change life style 
Jing An Practice of journalism   
  Personal cultivation and 
external allure 
 Practice of journalism   
  Local newspapers (two) Yang 
Bannong 
Regional China 
journalism 
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25 1935.02.07 A sarcasm of moral issues of 
journalists 
Yu Fei Practice of journalism  Yu Fei was a penname 
of Yuan Shu 
  Investigation on the 
newspapers in Guangxi 
 Regional China 
journalism 
  
  Journalists in Peiping: 
interviewing Chen Baosheng 
Li Manlin Regional China 
journalism 
  
  Talk about the catalogue of 
newspapers and books about 
journalism 
     
  Local newspapers (three) Yang 
Bannong 
Regional China 
journalism 
  
26 1935.02.14 Understanding the sense of 
humiliation and self-
rethinking 
Li Zhongyao Practice of journalism  Li Zhongyao was a 
friend of Yuan Shu 
  Materials about journalists’ 
moral and discipline issues 
 Practice of journalism   
  The incident of insulting 
journalists in the film ‘new 
women’ 
 Practice of journalism   
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  Journalists in Peiping: 
interviewing Ms. Shaotang 
Xiuhui 
Li Manlin Regional China 
journalism 
  
  Italy issued a new censorship 
order 
 Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
 
27 1935.02.21 Why we should talk about 
moral and discipline issues 
editor Practice of journalism   
  Talk about journalists’ moral 
and discipline issues 
Liu Chong Practice of journalism   
  Military and political 
authorities asked to protect 
public opinion 
 Practice of journalism   
  A compile of newly 
newspaper studies  
 Journalism education 
and studies 
  
  Rationalisation of 
newspapers’ supplements 
Zhang 
Zhizhong 
Practice of journalism   
  British journalistic leader Lord 
Riddell passed away 
 International 
journalism 
  
  Journalists in Peiping: 
interviewing Guan Yixian  
Li Manlin Regional China 
journalism 
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28 1935.02.28 Self-criticising moral and 
discipline issues are our 
regular task 
Zhuo Wei Practice of journalism   
  exaggerated propaganda Du 
Chongyuan 
Practice of journalism  The article was from 
Xinsheng Weekly of 23 
February 1935 
  Journalists in Peiping: 
interviewing Lin Zhongyi 
Li Manlin Regional China 
journalism 
Practice of journalism  
  Journalists in Peiping: 
interviewing Guan Yixian 
(continue) 
Li Manlin Practice of journalism   
29 1935.03.07 Authority and strength of 
character 
Zhi He Practice of journalism   
  We are looking for the 
strength of character 
Zheng 
Shiren 
Practice of journalism   
  Journalists’ cultivation Shi Junbo Practice of journalism Journalism education 
and studies 
 
  The future of literature 
supplement 
Zhi Zhong Practice of journalism   
323 
 
  Thoughts after attending the 
speech of Italian journalist in 
the Pacific Conference 
Si Xi Practice of journalism Journalism education 
and studies 
 
30 1935.03.14 Sparingly resort to the power 
of public opinion 
Bu Lao Practice of journalism   
  A poem for journalist Editor Practice of journalism   
  A material about moral issues 
again 
Hui Ying    
  Journalists’ cultivation 
(continue) 
Shi Junbo Practice of journalism Journalism education 
and studies 
 
  Arrearage issues of news 
telegram  
Zhong Hua Practice of journalism technology The article was from 
Shenbao 
  Newspapers in Macau  Regional China 
journalism 
  
31 1935.03.21 Discuss on the difficulty of the 
interview works based on the 
case of Yao Jinping  
Zhi Han Practice of journalism   
  Visiting French journalism 
schools 
Shen 
Songfang 
International 
journalism 
Journalism education 
and studies 
 
324 
 
  Talk about interview work Mao zhui Practice of journalism   
  Journalists and cultivation Jun Liang Practice of journalism   
  Investigation on the 
newspapers in Gansu 
 Regional China 
journalism 
  
  Newspapers in Japan Da La International 
journalism 
  
32 1935.03.28 The background when 
journalists of the Asahi 
Shimbun visited China 
 Practice of journalism   
  journalists’ cultivation 
(continue) 
Shi Junbo Practice of journalism   
33 1935.04.04 Suggest to issue a ban to the 
Social news titles harmful to 
journalistic moral 
Lin Yun Practice of journalism  Lin Yun was a friend of 
Yuan Shu 
  Newspapers in the Soviet 
Russia 
Zhu Yun International 
journalism 
  
  Realistic issues should be 
focused on in interview 
Mao Zhui Practice of journalism   
325 
 
  The declining German press  Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
Cited from World 
Knowledge 
  The press in Luoyang  Regional China press   
34 1935.04.11 Speech on practical issues of 
interview 
Mao Zhui Practice of journalism   
  Issues of journalists’ 
remuneration 
Liu 
Mengping 
Practice of journalism   
  Rising of the Asahi Shimbun Liu Chong International 
journalism 
History of journalism  
35 1935.04.18 Long standing issues of 
inexact news reporting 
Yi Zheng Practice of journalism   
  The abnormal development of 
correspondence 
Lv 
Chongcheng 
Practice of journalism   
  Adolph Simon Ochs, the 
owner of the New York Times, 
passed away 
 International 
journalism 
  
  Dictatorship and democracy 
of newspapers 
Zhu Ren Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
Translate from an 
editorial of the Chicago 
Daily 
326 
 
  The press in Zhejiang  Regional China press   
  A letter from Mr. Mao Zhui  Practice of journalism   
36 1935.04.25 Journalists need relevant 
health care: call for articles 
about ‘journalists’ health 
issues’  
 Practice of journalism   
  33rd conference of Japan 
Journalism Association 
convened 
Hui Ying International 
journalism 
 Translate from 
Shanghai Mainichi 
Shimbun 
  The press in Zhejiang 
(continue) 
 Regional China 
journalism 
  
  Dictatorship and democracy 
of newspapers (complete) 
Zhu Ren Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
Translate from an 
editorial of the Chicago 
Daily 
  Ink street  Practice of journalism   
  A letter from Mr. Fu  Practice of journalism   
37 1935.05.02 Advertisement and 
journalistic moral 
Yi Qun Practice of journalism   
327 
 
  Rectify the press in Wuhan  Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
 
  Discussion on ‘free journalist’  Mao Zhui Practice of journalism   
  Whether newspapers need 
‘yellow journalism’ 
Qian 
Lanping 
Practice of journalism   
  Ink street  Practice of journalism   
38 1935.05.09 An initiative of ‘ amateur 
journalist’ 
 Practice of journalism   
  Discussion on journalists’ 
healthy issues. 
 Practice of journalism  There are two parts in 
the article. Hui Ying 
completed part one 
and Xue Pu finished 
part two. 
  Ink street  Practice of journalism   
39 1939.05.16 From ‘critique’ and ‘purge’ to 
‘health protection’ and 
‘freedom of occupation’ 
Mao Zhui Practice of journalism   
  Materials of newspaper 
studies (one) 
 Journalism education 
and studies 
  
328 
 
  Compare the press in Japan 
with China 
Hu Hanjun Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
 
  Makers of the Spanish–
American War 
 International 
journalism 
History of journalism  
  The press in Zhejiang 
(complete) 
 Regional China 
journalism 
  
40 1935.05.23 Critical discussion on the 
issues about title 
 Practice of journalism  Translate from an 
editorial published in 
Shijie Xinwen of 
February 
  Operation of local 
newspapers 
Yang 
Bannong 
Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
 
  Investigation on the situation 
of Japanese, British and 
American newspapers in 
China 
Nai Jing Practice of journalism   
  Makers of the Spanish–
American War (continue) 
 International 
journalism 
History of journalism  
  An interesting census  Practice of journalism   
329 
 
41 1935.05.30 Investigation on the situation 
of Japanese, British and 
American newspapers in 
China (continue) 
Nai Jing Practice of journalism   
  A study on British, German 
and Russian journalism 
Gao 
Huaiping 
International 
journalism 
  
  Makers of the Spanish–
American War (continue) 
 International 
journalism 
History of journalism  
  The press in Changsha  Regional China 
journalism 
  
42 1936.06.6 Rising of the small size of 
newspapers 
 Practice of journalism   
  Management of local 
newspapers 
Yang 
Bannong 
Regional China 
journalism 
  
  How to run and manage local 
newspapers 
Han Zi Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
 
  The press in Changsha 
(continue) 
 Regional China 
journalism 
  
43 1935.06.13 After reading Zaobao Yi Qun Practice of journalism   
330 
 
  Discussing public opinion Man Zhi Practice of journalism Journalism theory  
  Newspapers in Guangdong  Regional China 
journalism 
  
  The press in Changsha 
(continue) 
 Regional China 
journalism 
  
  An introduction of the press in 
Kaifeng 
 Regional China 
journalism 
  
44 1935.06.20 Our requirement Si Yi Practice of journalism   
  The prospect of internal 
correspondence 
Xu Xinqin Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
 
  Supplement Zhu Shousan Practice of journalism   
  Newspaper offices which have 
been attacked since the past 
month 
 Practice of journalism   
45 1935.07.04 Our past year Yang 
Bannong 
Practice of journalism seminar  
  The press in Malaya  Huang Jiping International 
journalism 
  
331 
 
  Seminar last week: the 
prospect of the small size of 
newspapers  
 Practice of journalism seminar This seminar was held 
on 27 June in the 
Beautiful Sichuan 
Cuisine Restaurant. The 
meeting was hosted by 
Yun Yiqun. Lu Yi, Liu 
Zucheng, Xu Xinqin, 
Yang Bannong, Zhai 
Yicheng, Shen Qianli, Su 
Dezheng and Wu 
Hancang attended. 
46 1935.07.11 Speak my mind to the 
graduates of journalism major 
students of universities 
Si Yi Practice of journalism   
  About news editorials Hui Ying Practice of journalism   
  Correspondence Zhu Jia Practice of journalism   
  ‘journalism imperialism’: 
Japan intensified its 
international propaganda 
during the war 
Yu Xinnian Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
 
  The press in Malaya 
(continue) 
Huang Jiping International 
journalism 
  
332 
 
47 1935.07.18 Comments of the press 
towards the publication law 
 Practice of journalism   
  How to manage local 
newspapers (continue) 
Han Zi Regional China 
journalism 
Practice of journalism  
  Local newspapers Yang 
Bannong 
Regional China 
journalism 
  
  The duty and vocation and 
duty of the press 
Ji Da Practice of journalism   
48 1935.07.25 The leaflets demagoguery 
should be prohibited 
immediately 
Si Xi Practice of journalism   
  The stories of press 
photographers 
 Practice of journalism   
  The process of the Xuzhou 
News Evening was closed 
down 
 Practice of journalism   
  Japanese journalists co-
operation 
Zu Cheng Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
 
333 
 
  Japanese policies about 
controlling the press 
 Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
It was translated from 
Gaizao published in 
June. 
  The sources of news Yu Xinnian Practice of journalism   
49 1935.08.01 The issue of journalists co-
operation 
 Practice of journalism   
  Japanese journalists co-
operation (continue) 
 International 
journalism 
  
  Feedbacks of Chinese 
journalists about the 
amended publication law 
(continue) 
 Practice of journalism   
  Commemorate Walter 
Williams 
Jian Practice of journalism History of journalism  
  Temporary routes for 
telegram news 
 Practice of journalism   
50 1935.08.08 Review ‘written news’ Yu Zhong Practice of journalism Language   
  Recalling Walter Williams   Practice of journalism History of journalism  
334 
 
  Issues of ameliorating local 
newspapers 
Chen Shuhe Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
 
51 1935.08.15 Journalists in commission and 
academic studies 
Ju Shen Practice of journalism Journalism education 
and studies 
‘Ju Shen’ is a pen name 
of Liu Zucheng. 
  Analyse the network of the 
international communications 
Huai Lun Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
‘Huai Lun’ is a pen 
name of Yuan Shu. 
  Fudan newspapers exhibition 
and its duty 
Shu 
Zongqiao 
Practice of journalism Journalism education 
and studies 
 
  Local newspapers under the 
feudal influence 
Long Practice of journalism Journalism education 
and studies 
 
52 1935.08.22 Our view and anticipation: 
speech on the anniversary 
celebration 
Editor Practice of journalism Seminar  
  Review and anticipation Yi Qun Practice of journalism Seminar  
  Commemorate the one year 
celebration of ‘journalist 
seminar’ 
Yang 
Bannong 
Practice of journalism Seminar  
  ‘Journalism blog’ copy: about 
‘publishing and reading 
newspapers’ 
Huai Yun Practice of journalism For readers  
335 
 
53 1935.08.29 Comments on the publication 
law 
Lun Xun Practice of journalism Journalism 
management 
 
  Jone and Murofuse Koshin Huai Yun Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
 
  Comments on amending the 
Publication Law 
Lun Xun    
  Self-criticism toward the past 
year 
 Practice of journalism   
  Newspapers and feudal force Bai Chang Practice of journalism   
54 1935.09.05 The speech of journalism 
lecture 
editior Practice of journalism Journalism education 
and studies 
 
  Comments on amending the 
publication law (two) 
Lun Xun Practice of journalism Journalism 
management 
 
  How to choose newspapers 
(two) 
Fang Qingru For readers   
  Visit national newspaper 
exhibition in Hangzhou 
 Practice of journalism Journalism education 
and studies 
 
55 1935.09.12 far-sighted views of the 
journalists festival  
Huai Yun Practice of journalism   
336 
 
  A new way of the press in 
China 
Wen Fu Practice of journalism   
  The press in southwest China Lu Yi Regional China 
journalism 
  
  Comments on rectifying 
legislators and justicers on the 
publication law 
 Practice of journalism Journalism 
management 
 
  About journalism lecture and 
commemoration funding 
 Practice of journalism   
57 1935.09.19 Rectification of words in 
newspapers 
Xian He Practice of journalism language  
  Journalism interview and 
writing 
Ju Chen Practice of journalism   
  Talk about radio news  Practice of journalism Technology The author of this 
article should be Yuan 
Shu by comparing with 
his book Jizhedao [the 
way of journalists] 
  About the funding of Jones 
Williams  
 International 
journalism 
  
337 
 
58 1935.09.26 About the small and compact 
size of newspaper 
Yang 
Bannong 
Practice of journalism   
  How to avoid negative effects 
on the mind of journalists 
Bi Nong Practice of journalism   
  Journalists should not be 
frustrated and discouraged 
Jian    
  Journalism interview and 
writing (one) 
Zu Cheng Practice of journalism   
  Suggestions on the principles 
that can improve the press 
Gao Huibi Practice of journalism   
59 1935.10.03 The beginning of journalism 
lectures 
Lu Yi Practice of journalism Journalism education 
and studies 
 
  Journalism interview and 
writing (two) 
Zu Cheng Practice of journalism   
  Talk about radio news 
(continue) 
 Practice of journalism Technology  
  Moral issues of the press Ma Xingye Practice of journalism   
  Japanese publication and 
censorship  
Morgan 
Young, 
Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
 
338 
 
translated 
by Wang 
Jian 
60 1935.10.10 American journalist attempt 
to implement the five hour 
week day policy 
 Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
This article is originally 
from Baoren Shijie 
[Journalists world], no. 
1935. 
  Owners of the newspapers 
and journalists 
Hai Ning Practice of journalism  This article is originally 
from Baoren Shijie 
[Journalists world], no. 
1935. 
  Journalism interview and 
writing(three) 
Zu Cheng Practice of journalism   
  Japanese publication and 
censorship (continued) 
Morgan 
Young, 
translated 
by Wang 
Jian 
International 
journalism 
Practice of journalism  
61 1935.10.17 Special missions of the press 
in China 
Xu Ke Practice of journalism   
  Three developmental routes 
for newspapers (one) 
 Practice of journalism  This was the first 
lecture content of 
journalism tutorial. It 
339 
 
was delivered by Cheng 
Shewo and recorded by 
Liu Zucheng. 
  The Yomiuri Shinbun and early 
Japanese journalism 
Huai Yun History of journalism International 
journalism 
 
  Journalism interview and 
writing (four) 
Zu Cheng Practice of journalism   
62 1935.10.24 In memory of Ge Gongzhen Lu Yi History of journalism   
  A suggestion to establish the 
funding for Ge Gongzhen 
Peng Shixin History of journalism   
  Three developmental routes 
for newspapers (two) 
 Practice of journalism   
  Talk about the development 
direction of newspapers in 
China 
Jun Yan Practice of journalism   
  The letter attached by the 
annual plan of Hu Jiang 
Commercial School 
 Journalism education 
and studies 
  
  Preparation of Hankou for the 
newspaper exhibition 
 Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
 
340 
 
  Japanese publication 
censorship (continued) 
Morgan 
Young, 
translated 
by Wang 
Jian 
Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
 
63 1935.10.31 Solutions for professional 
traditional competition 
Bai Ding Practice of journalism   
  Three developmental routes 
for newspapers (three) 
 Practice of journalism   
64 1935.11.07 Insights to us from the Wang’s 
case  
Han Cang Practice of journalism  It is based on the 
contents of the first 
journalism lecture, 
which was delivered by 
Cheng Shewo and 
recorded by Liu 
Zucheng. 
  Considerations about the 
press 
Shen 
Songfang 
Practice of journalism   
  Safeguard the position of 
professional journalists 
Huai Yun Practice of journalism   
341 
 
65 1935.11.14 Saving our nation by 
intensifying our work 
standards 
Lu Yi Practice of journalism   
  Current European and North 
American trends in journalism 
 Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
It is based on the 
contents of the second 
journalism lecture, 
which delivered by Gu 
Zhizhong and recorded 
by Liu Zucheng. 
  Issues of local newspaper Yang 
Bannong 
Regional China 
journalism  
Practice of journalism  
  Japanese publication 
censorship (continued) 
Morgan 
Young, 
translated 
by Wang 
Jian 
International 
journalism 
  
  About the death of Ge 
Gongzhen 
Xian History of journalism   
66 1935.11.21 Professional organisation of 
journalists 
Huai Yun Practice of journalism   
  Journalism lectures editor Practice of journalism Journalism education 
and studies 
 
342 
 
67 1935.11.28 Journalism perspective Zi Yuan Practice of journalism   
  Overview of international 
journalism co-operation 
movement 
Huai Yun Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
 
  Staff structure of local 
newspaper 
Yang 
Bannong 
Regional China 
journalism 
Journalism 
management 
 
  Issues of journalistic staff 
qualifications 
 Practice of journalism   
68 1935.12.05 Ideas drawn from the 
practical work of interview 
Zhang Yan Practice of journalism   
  Power of correspondence in 
diplomatic warfront (one) 
 Practice of journalism   
  Reuters is being enlarged and 
preparing to move a new 9 
floors building 
 International 
journalism 
  
69 1935.12.12 The press in the front of 
national calamity  
 Practice of journalism  Translate from the 
Central Daily News 
  Power of correspondence in 
diplomatic warfront (two) 
 Practice of journalism   
343 
 
70 1935.12.19 Latinisation and the future of 
newspapers 
Xian Practice of journalism   
  The press in Nanchang  Regional China 
journalism 
  
  The system of local 
newspapers (continue)  
Yang 
Bannong 
Regional China 
journalism 
Practice of journalism  
  Newspapers of the Soviet 
Union 
 International 
journalism 
Practice of journalism  
71 1935.12.26 The declaration of Shanghai 
journalists for the freedom of 
speech  
 Practice of journalism   
  Autumn conference 
convinced by Shanghai 
journalists for the freedom of 
speech 
 Practice of journalism   
  Journalists and public 
movements 
Shen 
Songfang 
Practice of journalism   
  Newspapers and society Liu Huoxuan Practice of journalism   
  Newspapers in Bengbu Bu Shaofu Regional China 
journalism 
  
344 
 
72 1936.01.02 History and journalism Tao Xisheng History of journalism   
  A talented journalist  Practice of journalism History of journalism  
73 1936.01.02 The establishment ceremony 
speech of the Press Institute 
of Peiping and Tianjin  
Tao Xisheng Practice of journalism   
  The Press Institute of Peiping 
and Tianjin 
 Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
 
  Biography of the press (one): 
the wealth and diligence of 
William Hearst 
Ming Yaowu International 
journalism 
Practice of journalism  
74 1936.01.16 Are semi-colonial countries 
able to control journalism? 
Lu Yi Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
 
  Censorship is not what China 
needs today 
Yang 
Bannong 
Practice of journalism   
  Chinese national libration and 
the task of public opinion 
Fu Yuchang Practice of journalism   
  Advocating journalist union to 
implement the proposed law 
of struggling for free speech 
 Practice of journalism   
345 
 
  Appeal a nationwide 
investigation on newspapers 
in China 
 Regional China 
journalism 
  
  The press in Nanjing  Regional China 
journalism 
  
75 1936.01.23 Strive for free speech  Practice of journalism   
  Conversations in streets (one): 
free speech 
 Practice of journalism   
  The press in Nanchang  Regional journalism   
  Perspectives of journalism Zi Yuan Practice of journalism   
76 1936.01.30 Ta Kung Pao’s policy to 
develop to the south 
Liu Zucheng Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
 
  Ideals of tabloids Liu Shi Practice of journalism   
  Japanese policies for 
journalism control 
 International 
journalism 
Practice of journalism  
  Conversations in streets 
(two): censorship 
 Practice of journalism   
346 
 
  Investigation on the press in 
Luzhou 
Ren Min Regional China 
journalism 
  
  The original of Chinese 
newspapers 
Mei Jun History of journalism   
  The amount of Japanese 
newsprints sold to China  
 International 
journalism  
Practice of journalism  
77 1936.02.06 Battlefront of Public opinion 
during the national calamity 
period 
Zhu Cheng Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
 
  The situation of the press in 
Europe during the Second 
Italo-Ethiopian War 
 International 
journalism 
  
  Reading newspaper Yue For readers   
78 1936.02.13 Foreign journalists in China 
arguing the pros and cons of 
Chinese censorship 
 Practice of journalism   
  Integration of journalists in 
Tokyo 
 International 
journalism 
  
79 1936.02.20 The nature of journalism 
cannon 
Xian Practice of journalism   
347 
 
  Elaborate account of Shao 
Piaoping’s death 
You Luan History of journalism   
  New features of the progress 
of the press 
Liu Zhanhua Practice of journalism   
  Overview of the press in Lu 
Country of Sichuan Province 
 Regional China 
journalism 
 Contents are as same 
as the survey of the 
press in Lu Country in 
the volume 76. 
  The press in Shanghai   Regional China 
journalism 
  
80 1936.02.27 Newspapers today Rong Min Practice of journalism   
  Journalists’ moral standards  Practice of journalism   
  ‘readers’ complaint’  Practice of journalism  Speeches of the 
presentation by Zhou 
Zuoren at journalism 
professional school 
  How newspaper 
advertisement create strong 
impact  
 Practice of journalism  Translate from Editor & 
Publisher, vol. 8, no. 25 
348 
 
  Overview of the press in 
Fuzhou 
 Regional China 
journalism 
  
  Supplements of newspapers 
in Qingdao 
Di Rong Regional China 
journalism 
  
82 1936.03.12 Influence of the amended the 
draft of the publication law to 
the press 
 Practice of journalism   
  Five points of the draft of the 
publication law passed 
 Practice of journalism   
  The future of newspapers Vernor Nash Practice of journalism Technology   
  Report of visiting ‘exhibition 
about New Hankou’ 
Huai Yun 
and Kui Wen 
Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
 
83 1936.03.19 About news 
on walls 
 Practice of journalism  Name printed is not 
clear, but it is inferred 
as Yuan Shu by 
conferring with 
Journalists’ Principles 
  The invention of letterpress Huai Yun Technology    
  Visiting the Osaka Asahi 
Shimbun  
Bang Jie International 
journalism 
  
349 
 
84 1936.03.26 Chinese journalism endeavour 
and the press policies 
Chen 
Mingde 
Practice of journalism   
  Conscience and vocation Yun Yiqun Practice of journalism   
  Journalists preparatory 
committee in Wuhan 
appealed to make sufficient 
amendment in the Publication 
Law 
 Practice of journalism   
  The press in Danyang Li Juan Regional China 
journalism 
  
85 1936.04.02 The doom of newspapers in 
Late Qing 
 History of journalism  From Ge Gongzhen’s A 
Newspaper History of 
China  
  Overview of the press in Tai 
Country of Jiangsu Province 
Lu Xiyu Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
 
86 1936.04.09 Track the origin of ‘news’ 
down 
Huai Yun History of jouranlism   
  News vendors in Nanjing  Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
 
350 
 
87 1936.04.16 Japanese news agency 
endeavour after two big news 
agencies merged 
 International 
journalism 
  
  Dickens’ journalist career  Xia Renqi Internationalism 
journalism 
Practice of journalism  
  The press course involved in 
dispute in Suzhou 
Xian Ying Regional China 
journalism 
Practice of journalism  
  Recent situation of foreign 
news agencies in China 
 Practice of journalism   
  Political parties and 
newspapers at the early stage 
of the Republic of China 
 Practice of journalism   
88 1936.04.23 The press course today Wei Sujin Practice of journalism   
  British, American and French 
newspapers 
 International 
journalism 
Practice of journalism  
  The press course and 
journalists’ life in Nantong 
Xia Shi Regional China 
journalism 
Practice of journalism  
89 1936.04.30 Feelings considering European 
journalism course 
Shen 
Songfang 
Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
 
351 
 
  Difference between tabloid 
and small size newspapers  
Half 
journalist 
Practice of journalism   
  Newspapers’ position in the 
Hundred Days’ Reform: one 
higher, and another one lower 
Mo Ming History of journalism   
90 1936.05.07 Speech for the column 
suspending 
Li Biquan Practice of journalism  Li Biquan is an alias of 
Yuan Shu 
  Written down on the eve of 
the column suspending 
Lu Yi Practice of journalism   
  Japanese policies about 
journalism control, and 
backdrop of published 
contents on newspapers 
 Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
 
 
Notes: This table is original translation based on Xu Jizhong’s Masters thesis of Anhui University in 2013, ‘Meijie, Juese Yu Xinren: Jize Zuotan Yanjiu [Media, 
Role and Trust: A Study based on the Journalist Seminar], 87-96. In the very beginning, the issue number of this supplement was not marked until 30 November 
1934 with the number 15, but there were only 13 issues published before the day. Number 55 and 57 was marked in turn on the supplement of 12 and 19 of 
September 1935, therefore number 56 was omitted. Thus, although the last issue of the supplement was marked 90, there were only 88 issues.1  
 
                                                 
1 See Xu Zhongji, ‘Meijie, Juese Yu Xinren: Jize Zuotan Yanjiu [Media, Role and Trust: A Study based on the Journalist Seminar], a Masters’ Thesis, Anhui University, 2013, 17. 
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Appendix 5: Journalist Weekly Supplement 
 
No. Date Page Title Author 
 
Theme 1 
 
Theme 2 
 
1 1938.12.12 7 Prologue editor Practice of journalism History of journalism 
    
The past and today of journalism 
in Hong Kong 
Xian 
Zhang 
History of journalism Regional China 
    Internal news agencies in China Yi Shan Regional China Practice of journalism 
    
Journalism of inland China in 
developing 
  
Regional China Practice of journalism 
2 1938.12.19 8 Sources of warfare news 
Jian 
Sheng 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    
Critic journalism and journalistic 
criticism 
Dong Lv 
Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
    
News about guerrilla warfare in 
Pudong 
Shen 
Chang 
War with Japan Practice of journalism 
    Calamity of newspapers 
Chu 
Chen 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    
Information of the press in inland 
China 
  
Regional China War with Japan 
3 1938.12.26 7 Fault of newspapers in Shanghai Xi Tu Practice of journalism War with Japan 
354 
 
    
About the conflagration in 
thatched shacks in West 
Shanghai 
Yi Shan 
Practice of journalism  
    Interviewer and newspapers 
G. R. 
Bush 
Practice of journalism  
    
Investigation of newspapers in 
Chongqing 
  
Regional China War with Japan 
    
Information of the press in inland 
China 
  
Regional China War with Japan 
4 1939.01.02 8 
Ask each newspaper to think 
over news reports about guerrilla 
carefully 
Yi Shan 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    
Establish local newspapers and 
guerrilla newspapers 
Ma 
Yingzi 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    Several suggestions Shen War with Japan Practice of journalism 
    
Investigation of international 
main news agencies 
  
International 
journalism 
 
5 1939.01.09 7 Wartime journalism Tang Ke Political journalism War with Japan 
    
Solutions of issues of Chinese 
press (one) 
Hu 
Daojing 
Practice of journalism  
    
66 years history of Shenbao 
(one) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
    Several current tasks  
Hua 
Chao 
Political journalism War with Japan 
    Newspaper clipping and sticking 
Chen 
Naikuan 
For readers  
    
Information of the press in inland 
China 
  
Regional China 
journalism 
International 
journalism 
355 
 
6 1939.01.16 8 
Journalists’ new tasks in the new 
period of the War of Resistance 
against Japan 
Hu 
Yuzhi 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    
Chinese modern press: introduce 
a new published book on 
journalism 
Yi Shan 
Practice of journalism History of journalism 
    
66 years history of Shenbao 
(two) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
    Newspaper clipping and sticking 
Chen 
Naikuan 
For readers  
    Information about the press   
Regional China 
journalism 
International 
journalism 
    
Chongqing Xinhua Daily 
established North China version 
  
War with Japan Regional China 
7 1939.01.23 7 
66 years history of Shenbao 
(three) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
    
Reestablish communication 
network 
Yi Shan 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    Newspapers editorials   Practice of journalism  
    
Develop journalism works 
behind the enemy's rear lines 
Chang 
Jiang 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
8 1939.01.30 8 
66 years history of Shenbao 
(four) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
    
Methods for establishing 
correspondence network 
Yi Shan 
Practice of journalism  
    
Newspapers in Japanese 
controlled area 
  
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
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Experiments of getting sources 
through internationally 
interviewing 
Qiu 
Jiang 
Practice of journalism International 
9 1939.02.06 8 
66 years history of Shenbao 
(five) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
    
Journalism education and the 
major of law politics journalism 
Yi Shan 
Journalism education  
    
Experiments of getting sources 
through internationally 
interviewing 
Qiu 
Jiang 
Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
    News about the press   
Regional China 
journalism 
International 
journalism 
10 1939.02.13 8 66 years history of Shenbao (six) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
    The death of Qian Hua 
Lin 
Sheng 
War with Japan  
    
Investigation of tabloids in 
Zhejiang 
  
Practice of journalism Regional China 
11 1939.02.20 7 
66 years history of Shenbao 
(seven) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
    
New ways to establish local 
newspapers 
Yi Shan 
Practice of journalism  
    
Practical experience for News 
Night 
Zhou 
Zhizhen, 
Chen 
Xinde, 
Xie 
Zhangzh
e 
Practice of journalism  
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Nationwide newspaper 
exhibition 
Xing He 
Practice of journalism  
12 1939.02.27 7 
66 years history of Shenbao 
(eight) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
    
Argue again about the 
importance of establishing local 
newspapers 
Yi Shan 
Practice of journalism Regional journalism 
    
The establishment of Yan’an 
branch of the Chinese Youth 
Journalist Association 
Shu 
Ying 
Regional journalism Practice of journalism 
    The press in wartime capital   Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    
Catalogue of terrorist events 
about Shanghai press last year 
  
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
13 1939.03.06 8 
The demand exceeding the 
supply in the interior 
Liu Lin 
Regional journalism War with Japan 
    
Debate supplement and qualified 
people for local newspapers 
Yi Shan 
Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
    Cease of newspapers in Shanghai 
Lin 
Shen 
Practice of journalism Political China 
journalism 
    
66 years history of Shenbao 
(nine) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
    Assume the price of transceivers 
Wen 
Yuanku
n 
Technology Practice of journalism 
14 1939.03.13 8 66 years history of Shenbao (ten) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
    
Theories and practical works of 
local newspapers 
Yi Shan 
Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
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Traitors’ newspapers in south 
Yangtze River  
Lin 
sheng 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    News of the press   
Regional China 
journalism  
War with Japan 
15 1939.03.20 7 
Congratulation on the 
establishment of new radio 
station in Chongqing 
Li 
Xiangfu 
Regional China War with Japan 
    
Important points for journalistic 
interview in the new period (part 
one) 
Chang 
Jiang el 
al 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    
How to do research on Chinese 
journalism history 
Hu 
Daojing 
Journalism history  
    News of the press   
Regional China 
journalism 
War with Japan 
16 1939.03.27 8 
Discover Chinese journalism 
history 
Li 
Xiangfu 
History of journalism  
    
Lore of Chinese journalism 
history: the origin of journalism 
(part one) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
    
Administrative policy of 
Japanese journalism 
Stuart 
Lilico 
International 
journalism 
 
    News of the press   
Regional China 
journalism 
War with Japan 
17 1939.04.03 8 
Lore of Chinese journalism 
history: the origin of journalism 
(part two) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
    
Journalism development in the 
north and west areas of the 
Guangdong Province 
Li Wen 
Practice of journalism Regional China 
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Important points for journalistic 
interview in the new period (part 
two) 
Chang 
Jiang, 
Di 
Jiang, 
Shao 
Zongha
n, et al 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
18 1939.04.10 8 
Shanghai should also hold 
newspaper exhibitions 
Li 
Xiangfu 
Practice of journalism  
    
Lore of Chinese journalism 
history: the origin of journalism 
(part three) 
Hu 
Daoding 
History of journalism  
    
Important points for journalistic 
interview in the new period (part 
three) 
Chang 
Jiang, 
Qiujiang
, 
Zongha
n, el al 
Practice of journalism  
    
Journalism work: necessity of 
frontier propaganda 
Gang 
Guo 
Practice of journalism War with Japan  
19 1939.04.17 8 
Shanghai newspapermen should 
strengthen self-discipline 
Nai 
Sheng 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    
Lore of Chinese journalism 
history: the origin of journalism 
(part four) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
    
Important points for journalistic 
interview in the new period (part 
four) 
Chang 
Jiang, 
Qiu 
Jiang, 
Zong 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
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Han, el 
al 
    
Journalism work: grow up in 
work, and Phoenix Nirvana 
Gang 
Guo 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
20 1939.04.24 8 
Argue about the declaration by 
the local press 
Nai 
Sheng 
Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
    
Lore of Chinese journalism 
history: the origin of journalism 
(part five) 
Hu 
Daojing 
Journalism history  
    Journalism work 
Gang 
Guo 
Practice of journalism  
    
Important points for journalistic 
interview in the new period (part 
five) 
Chang 
Jiang, 
Qiu 
Jiang, 
Zong 
Han, el 
al 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
21 1939.05.01 8 
Short introduction of Russian 
language dailies 
Zhi 
International 
journalism 
 
    
Chinese Youth journalists 
association established Chinese 
journalism college in Hong Kong 
  
Regional China War with Japan 
    
Important points for journalistic 
interview in the new period (part 
six) 
Chang 
Jiang, 
Qiu 
Jiang, 
Zong 
Han, el 
al 
Practice of journalism  
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Lore of Chinese journalism 
history: the origin of journalism 
(part six) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
22 1939.05.08 8 
Qualitative changes of the press 
during the wartime 
Fan 
Changji
ng 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    
Lore of Chinese journalism 
history: the origin of journalism 
(part seven) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
    Interview and understanding 
Nai 
sheng 
Practice of journalism  
    
Fu Jian newspaper and culture: 
developed during the war 
  
Regional China War with Japan 
    
Journalism work: we need 
perseverance on all front 
segregation and monitoring 
Gang 
Guo 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
23 1939.05.15 8 
Trained Soldiers making 
psychological attack: workshops 
of wartime journalistic works in 
Gui Lin 
Hong 
Fei 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    Foreign journalists in Japan 
Translat
ed from 
the 
Snake of 
March 
International  
    
Discuss newspapermen 
organisation 
Nai 
Sheng 
Practice of journalism  
    
A history of central newspapers 
(part one) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
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24 1939.05.22 8 War and newspapermen 
Da 
Gong 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    Re-discuss the press disaster 
Chu 
Chen 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    
Experiments of getting sources 
through internationally 
interviewing 
Meng 
Qiujiang 
Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
    
A history of central newspapers 
(part two) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
25 1939.05.29 8 
Discuss the oppression of 
Chinese newspapers from anti-
British movement 
Translat
ed from 
the 
China 
Weekly 
Review 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    
New Chinese expression and 
newspapers 
Nai 
Sheng 
Practice of journalism  
    A history of local newspapers 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
26 1939.06. 8 
Harrowing and heroic chapter: 
the foreword of the coalition 
newspaper in Chongqing 
  
Regional China 
journalism 
War with Japan 
    A history of local newspapers 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
    
Wartime newspapers’ 
development 
Chu 
Chen 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    
New Chinese expression and 
newspapers 
Nai 
Sheng 
Practice of journalism  
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27 1939.06.12 7 Shu Zongqiao 
Nai 
Sheng 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    Minli Bao and Song Jiaoren   Political journalism History of journalism 
    
Local newspapers’ history 
(three) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
    Jinhua’s newspapers and culture   Regional China  
28 1939.06.19 8 Censorship and propaganda 
Chen 
Xueping 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    Interview skills 
Tian 
Ping 
Practice of journalism  
    
Establish Chinese journalism 
study through the strength of the 
collective 
Dong 
Lan 
Journalism education  
    
Newspaper movement in inland 
China 
Wang 
Ping 
Regional China War with Japan 
29 1939.06.26 7 
Shanghai newspapers and the 
British Publishing Law (one) 
Nei 
Sheng 
Practice of journalism  
    Skills for reading newspapers 
Wei 
Lian 
Practice of journalism  
    
Local newspapers’ history 
(three) 
Hu 
Daojing 
History of journalism  
    
Guomin Ribao: agitate national 
revolution 
  
Regional China  
    
Some new and rising newspapers 
in wartime Hong Kong 
Chen 
Ziqiang 
Regional China War with Japan 
30 1939.07.03 7 Undergoing of Reuters 
Pang 
guan 
Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
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Skills of news edit: compound 
and dividing into page methods 
Jun Yi 
Practice of journalism  
    
Guomin Bao: a revolutionary 
magazine abroad 
  
History of journalism  
    
Shanghai newspapers and the 
British Publishing Law (one) 
Nei 
Sheng 
Practice of journalism International 
journalism 
31 1939.07.10 8 
Establish wartime newspapers’ 
literature supplement 
Chen 
Ziqiang 
War with Japan Practice of journalism 
    Soviet newspapers Huo Qiu 
International 
journalism 
Practice of journalism 
    Discuss advertisement Yang Practice of journalism  
    
Children’s World: a publication 
for revolutionary education 
  
History of journalism  
    
An introduction of Chinese 
Youth journalists association 
Qian 
sheng 
Practice of journalism  
    
Express sincere solicitude for the 
press in Shanghai from the 
Chinese Youth journalists 
association 
  
War with Japan Practice of journalism 
    
Propaganda in Kong Hong for 
registering journalists who lost 
their job in Guangzhou 
  
Practice of journalism Regional China 
32 1939.07.17 7 Journalism and freedom 
Pang 
Guan 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    
Printing workers movement in 
Hong Kong 
Jie Yu, 
Nai De 
Practice of journalism Regional journalism 
    
Journalism development in the 
last two years 
Chang 
Jiang 
Practice of journalism History of journalism 
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   Tabloids in guerrilla area Chu Practice of journalism War with Japan 
33 1939.07.24 7 
From conditions as a journalist to 
discussing non-professional 
journalism movement 
Hong 
Fei 
Practice of journalism  
    
Journalism development in the 
last two years 
Chang 
Jiang 
Practice of journalism History of journalism 
    
Establish a regulation for non-
professional reporters 
Pang 
Guan 
Practice of journalism  
34 1939.07.31 7 
Principles of wartime 
propaganda 
Ye 
Chuchu
ang 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    
Newspaper information in each 
area 
Feng 
Ling 
Regional journalism Practice of journalism 
    
Journalism development in the 
last two years 
Chang 
Jiang 
Practice of journalism History of journalism 
35 1939.08.07 7 
Discuss newspapers in Inner 
Mongolia and their responsibility 
  
Practice of journalism Regional China 
    
The experience of a warfront 
journalist in the European war 
period: a recalling by a British 
warfront journalist 
  
International 
journalism 
Practice of journalism 
    
Jiu Guo Shi Bao (Saving the 
Country Times): a Chinese 
newspaper abroad 
Chu 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
36 1939.08.14 7 
Newspapers and foreign 
exchanges 
Ying 
Chuan 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    
Applying the principle of 
efficient and simple for 
newspapers’ editors 
Pang 
Guan 
Practice of journalism  
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37 1939.08.21 7 
Southwest Chinese journalism 
today 
Lang 
Han 
Practice of journalism Regional China 
    
Warfare Front Daily and 
Resistance Daily 
Jun Yi 
War with Japan  
38 1939.08.28 7 
Southwest Chinese journalism 
today 
Lang 
Han 
Practice of journalism Regional China 
    China hands in Japanese press 
Yuan 
Lang 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    
Termination of the coalition 
newspaper in Chongqing 
  
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    Information for the press   Practice of journalism War with Japan 
39 1939.09.04 7 
A newspaperman’s heroic death: 
mourn for Mr Zhu Xinggong 
Qian 
Sheng 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    News writing structure 
Mei 
Qiquan 
Practice of journalism  
    Wartime Daily   War with Japan  
    Recalling journalism 
Jin 
Taiyan 
Practice of journalism History of journalism 
40 1939.09.18 7 
The war between Germany and 
Poland and being aware of 
reading newspapers 
Nei Yao 
International 
journalism 
 
    
Wall, Wall Journalism, 
journalism literature: develop 
Wall-Shanghai Journalism 
Movement 
Fan 
Quan 
Practice of journalism  
    
Journalism and advertisement 
(one) 
  
Practice of journalism  
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   Newspapers and propaganda 
Chen 
Yili 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
41 1939.09.25 6 
How to write local dispatches   Practice of journalism Regional journalism 
1. Start from fully understanding 
the story 
Pei Zhen 
Practice of journalism  
2. Smash formularism Liu Yi Practice of journalism  
3. About subjects and skills 
Li 
Liangyu 
Practice of journalism  
    Newspapers and propaganda 
Chen 
Yili 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    Voice newspaper   technology  
42 1939.10.02 6 
The position of advertisement in 
commercial society 
Yi Li 
Practice of journalism  
    
A short history of Soviet 
journalism 
Yi 
History of journalism International 
journalism 
    
Paper bullet strategy in the first 
European war 
Ru Ying 
International 
journalism 
 
43 1939.10.09 6 
Issues of raw and semi-finished 
materials for the press 
Zhang 
Zhe 
Practice of journalism  
    A suggestion to local newspapers 
Hu 
Yuzhi 
Practice of journalism Regional journalism 
    
A notification of the Youth 
Journalists Association 
  
Practice of journalism  
    Skills for scrap 
Chen 
Yili 
For readers  
44 1939.10.16 6 Mourn Mr Ge Gongzhe 
Nai 
Sheng 
History of journalism  
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   Discuss public opinion Zhen Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    Skills for scrap 
Chen 
Yili 
For readers  
45 1939.10.23 7 Mr Ge Gongzhen and free speech Yang Ji History of journalism  
    A tall and thin figure 
Zhou 
Shoujua
n 
History of journalism  
46 1939.10.30 6 Recalling Mr Ge Gongzhen’s life 
Ge 
Shaolon
g 
History of journalism  
    Skills for scrap 
Chen 
Yili 
For readers  
47 1939.11.06 7 
Apply Telexing photos and its 
fundamentals 
Yi Ye 
Technology  
48 1939.11.13 6 
From visiting language and 
literature exhibition to discussing 
new literature and journalism 
Shi Ni 
Practice of journalism  
    
Newspaper’s personality and 
appearance 
He 
Practice of journalism Technology 
    News title’s subjectivity Yong fu Practice of journalism  
    Journalism in Guangxi  Jian Pu 
Practice of journalism Regional China 
journalism 
49 1939.11.20 7 Lay hope in the press 
Liang 
Hancao 
War with Japan  
    
The Chinese Youth Journalists 
Association established a branch 
of South Yangtze River guerrilla 
area 
  
Regional China 
journalism 
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   Structure of editorial office Yi Ye Practice of journalism  
    Skills for scrap 
Chen 
Yili 
For readers  
50 1939.11.27 8 
Adjustment and improvement of 
local newspapers 
Gao Jie 
Practice of journalism War with Japan 
    Issues of newspapers collation Yi Ye Practice of journalism  
 
 
 
  
370 
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Appendix 6: List of Selected Translations from SEPM Supplements 
 
No. Supplement Title Author Date 
1 Journalist Seminar Journalists should not be discouraged Author unnamed 26 September 1935 
2  Saving Our Nation by Intensifying Our Work 
Standards 
Lu Yi 14 November 1935  
 
 
3 Journalist Seminar Prologue Editor 12 December, 1938 
 
4  Calamity of the Newspapers Chu Chen 19 December, 1938 
 
5  Information on the press in inland China  12 December, 1938 
 
6  Several Current Tasks Hua Chao 9 January, 1939 
 
7  Wartime Journalism Tang Ke 9 January, 1939 
 
8  Newspapers in Japanese controlled area  30 January, 1939 
 
9  Shanghai newspapermen should strengthen self-
discipline 
 
 17 April, 1939 
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10  Censorship and Propaganda Chen Xueping 19 June, 1939 
 
11  Establish Chinese Journalism by the Strength of the 
Collective 
 
Dong Lan 19 June, 1939 
 
12  Broad Discussion of Interview Skills Tian Ping 19 June, 1939 
 
13  Journalism and Freedom 
 
Pang Guan 7 July, 1939 
14  Express Sincere Solicitude for the Press in Shanghai 
from the Chinese 
Youth Journalists 
Association 
10 July 1939 
 
15  Simple newspapers in Guerrilla Areas 
 
Chu 17 July 1939 
 
16  Propaganda and rumour mongering Jun Y 31 July 1939 
 
17  A newspaperman’s heroic death: mourn for Mr Zhu 
Xinggong 
Qian Sheng 4 September 1939 
 
18 Night Light  
 
Forbearance Zhu Xinggong 18 June 1939 
 
19  Japanese Dream 
 
Cheng Mei 19 June 1939 
20  The Spirit of Su Wun Shen An 18 June 1939 
21  Stories of Chilli 
 
Wei Hua 14 July 1939 
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22  Fable: Story of a Fly 
 
Huai 24 August 1939 
23  Poles: Struggle for Freedom Huang Yingdai 29 August 1939 
 
24  Special Issue for the Commemoration of the 150th 
Anniversary of the French Revolution  
Struggle between light and dark: impressions in terms 
of the commemoration of the French democracy and 
republic  
 
  
374 
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Appendix 7: Translations 
 
The following articles are original English translations of the Chinese articles published in 
Journalist Seminar, Journalist Weekly, and Night Light. They have been selected to reveal 
the practical skills and ideologies of journalistic professionalism, balanced with nationalism 
under the national crisis, and Chinese images towards Western countries, including their 
political systems and culture. These articles record the transformation of the 
professionalisation of Chinese journalism and professionalism ideals in Chinese journalists’ 
mind throughout those years.  
Journalist Seminar 
Translation 1: Journalists should not be discouraged  
Author unnamed, Journalist Seminar, 26 September 1935  
I met some journalists in an occasion. They all talked about some issues in the 
press, which made me depressed. I feel that the journalists are missing their 
heroic mettle, and their position of journalists is being challenged. Journalists 
should take the responsibility to these results. There was one time that 
journalists were endowed with infinite power by the society, but journalists did 
not rationally use the power. Some journalists only treat newspapers as a 
commodity, and others consider newspapers as a stopover in their official 
careers, even some people treat journalist work as political officials. Such 
behaviours have undermined journalists’ moral principles. I am a journalist as 
well, and I feel ashamed of these things. However, I would like to be 
enthusiastic to comfort my colleagues. I want to tell them that journalist after 
all is a glorious profession at the moment.  
We should not fear any threat as long as we can rectify our team, realising what 
I propose to ‘rectify journalists’ behaviours’, and re-establish the authority of 
public opinion. We should not fear any threat.  
I am not willingly to speak with strong heroic style, but relevant facts are 
manifest. In modern society, there are some ‘steely figures’, such as Benito 
Mussolini, Joseph Stalin and Mustafa Kemal. They used to be journalists, but 
all of them have departed from the duty of journalism as they made it as their 
tools. This is damage to the press. Nevertheless, it at least can be proved that 
newspapers are able to contain the spirit of fighters.  
Everyone should not be discouraged!    
Translation 2: Saving Our Nation by Intensifying Our Work Standards  
By Lu Yi, Journalist Seminar, 14 November 1935  
Currently, our journalistic endeavour, as same as our nation, is suffering a 
misery. The development of journalism, to a large degree, is limited by 
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environment. It is undeniable that the press in China has achieved an obvious 
progress these years, but journalists who still have a clear analytical mind will 
not feel fulfilled in the present situation compared with the pace of the epoch 
and the responsibility that we should take. For an endeavour, if we want it to 
make a significant progress, its every single cell needs to be strengthened, and 
the press in China is no exception. With the exception of the corrupted journalist 
with slackness and complacency, and damnable journalists who consider the 
press as their tool for their own personal promotion of official career and fortune, 
journalistic staff should constantly strengthen themselves and optimise their 
team for accelerate the development of the press and taking up the mission of 
the epoch to guide people to achieve the victory of improving Chinese social 
development. This is our vocation! We hope our colleague by their professional 
organisations come together to engage into academic and practical skills studies, 
re-think about relevant theories, rectify the moral and discipline for 
strengthening the force the movement, which aims at immediately changing the 
mentality and behaviours of decadence, pessimism, romance, timidity and 
selfish, so that we can form a strong journalistic fighting group to struggle with 
the sinister environment.  
Colleagues of the Journalist Seminar are all juniors of the press, but we always 
remain our position as a screw in a big machine, and never give up the 
responsibility of being a screw. By our determination to improve the press in 
China at current stage, we started self-education work in Shanghai. We always 
make efforts for our ultimate aim whatever the efficiency or influence of our 
work in the past year. Improving the press in China at the current stage is a 
significant duty, thus it definitely not our small group of people can complete. 
However, we do believe that our wills and beliefs are by no means our group’s 
concern, but a common need in the society. Therefore, we throw ourselves into 
work actively, and hope all our peers nationwide can join together to improve 
the endeavour. We hope we can come tighter to realise a common progress. The 
crisis of the Chinese nation is intensifying day by day. Under the difficult 
circumstance, every journalist should come from behind for saving our nation!  
 
Journalist Weekly  
Translation 3: Prologue 
the editor, Journalist Weekly, 12 December, 1938 
 
Chinese people generally have formed a contradictory and complex consciousness 
of journalists. In a positive perspective, journalists are advisors of the society, help 
people to receive information and express their opinions, and organisers of people. 
They cannot be praise too much even with any great and rhetorical expression. In 
a negative perspective however, some journalists indeed cover up and glamorise 
evil in current society. People who have all done something which is seriously or 
slightly against their conscience, but those bad journalists attributed these bad 
things to the social environment. 
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Cheng Shewo in the year before was invited to deliver a journalism workshop, and 
his first words were in the view of newspapermen of Peiping and Tianjin, most of 
Shanghai journalists like starting rumours when nothing happens and fleecing 
based on a critical condition. I today must point out that this is a serious 
misunderstanding. Shanghai journalists in terms of professional ability and 
courage is much better than those Peiping and Tianjin journalists. This statement 
partly reflects the truth although it sounds slighting exaggerated. 
A celebrity cultural I met on the day before yesterday said it is true that the private 
life of those journalists who have their nightlife is definitely somewhat romantic. 
The criticism which asks to impose a strict discipline for journalists’ private life is 
too unnatural to accept. My friends are well satisfied when they hear such pleading 
for them, but it should not become the reason to have a lower serious and rigorous 
requirement. 
In this epoch, journalists hold a position of great responsibility, and raise people’s 
increasingly aware of their responsibility. It seems that people are willingly to 
remain distant from journalists in their daily life, but hope journalists become a 
reliable compass inside. Therefore, journalists obtain a new lease of life. 
Vitalised journalists shoulder heavy cross of workload, setting off on their long 
journey. They are not lonely, but will encounter great difficulties. They need to 
cooperate with comrades, thus to step into the path of safety. 
Journalists’ lives should not be deified. They must have some knowledge gaps and 
vices in their private life as they are just mortals. It may be difficult to overcome 
all problems and weakness, but if they must make some progress if they try their 
best. 
The Journalists Weekly is journalists’ own field. Although it is neither a college 
nor a church, I still sincerely hope you can give some advices which can help both 
you and me, and as a result, everyone may further do something, from which 
people can benefit.  
 
Translation 4: Calamity of the Newspapers 
Chu Chen, Journalist Weekly, 19 December, 1938  
 
In the past, Shanghai was the journalism centre in southern China. Generally, the 
press in Shanghai was successively improved although the development of 
technology and the scale of journalism did not reach the levels initially anticipated. 
From the outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japan, the situation improved 
and there was a special press boom in Shanghai to serve this need. Whatever the 
newspaper, or whoever the individual journalist, all engaged excitedly and 
enthusiastically with their work and in their roles. The press boom in Shanghai 
during this period is an unprecedented phenomenon in Chinese journalism history. 
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Following the retreat of Chinese troops from Shanghai as the war developed, the 
city became an isolated island and with this change the press in Shanghai fell into 
darkness. Many newspapers that had been publishing for a long time were 
suspended. Under strong pressure created by the occupation forces, many 
intellectuals and journalists accepted new tasks and successively moved into 
hinterland China. There is however a minority of journalists who have decided to 
remain in Shanghai and these have begun a long march in a lonely and dangerous 
environment. This is the so-called ‘period of calamity of newspapers’. Those 
journalists who have stood fast and remained in Shanghai are subject to all manner 
of bloody terrors and coercion. Such coercion spans from soft promises to threats 
and intimidation, bombings, poisoned fruit, and even the delivery to journalists of 
severed human body parts such as arms and heads. In the face of such menace and 
seduction the beliefs of some have been shaken and these collaborate with the 
enemy, engaging in shameful works in betrayal of their homeland. However, the 
majority of these combatants of journalism still remain true to their own positions. 
They use up the last of their strength in the fight to give hope to people in the 
Isolated Island. 
It has been more than one year since the outbreak of the full-scale war against 
Japan, several new newspapers have been established in Shanghai, and some 
newspapers that possess a long history have been re-established. It appears on the 
surface that it is a boom for the press of Shanghai, but if we analyse the situation 
more carefully, we can see that the boom is abnormal. That is to say that the press 
of Shanghai operates in a ‘difficult’ period and the degree of the difficulty is 
growing.   
It is obvious that the press in Shanghai along with the whole city will continue its 
descent into darkness until the balance of the war is fundamentally reversed. To 
consolidate our front, we should enlarge our scale, enrich our contents and unify 
our position, so that our fighting capacity can be intensified.  
In fighting the difficulties in the dark Isolated Island, whether as an individual or 
the entirety, it is manifest that there are many weakness and shortcomings in the 
newspapers. These weakness and shortcomings need to be urgently solved. 
It might be difficult to briefly explain the specific weakness. To be abstract, it can 
be summarised as three points. Firstly, the work to unite the journalism staff 
remaining in the Isolated Island is not proceeding effectively. Secondly, the 
division of focus as well as coordination amongst each newspaper is not performed 
rationally, and the pre-war shortcomings of extravagance and waste of human 
resources and materials continues. Thirdly, in reading the contents of newspapers 
one can feel the tense atmosphere of the war. However, these same newspapers are 
glutted with irrelevant, rash and bombastic elements, while the parts that do have 
relevancy lack strength. The effort to make contact with hinterland China is not 
progressing actively. 
Of course, Shanghai is an isolated island. Everything is constrained by this special 
environment. All facilities and ideals are definitely not attainable at this time, but 
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there are still many things that we can make efforts to improve. The press in 
Shanghai is falling into tribulation, and fighting against tribulation is the only way 
out. 
Translation 5: Information on the press in inland China 
Journalist Weekly, 12 December, 1938 
 
Yishi Bao Re-established in Kunming 
After the preparation by Cardinal Paul Yü Pin and Father Vincent Lebbe, Yishi 
Bao had re-established in Kunming and published its first issue on the 8th of the 
month. It is temporally decided to one large page every day. The general manager 
is Niu Yimo, and the chief journalist, the editor in chief, and the manager are 
assumed in turn by Luo Longji, Zhao Ximeng, Li Shaotie. It has been known that 
professors from each university are invited to be in charge of the supplementaries 
of the paper. Meanwhile, Yishi Sea and Land News Agency was established and 
began distributing news that day.    
Central Daily Published Local Edition 
The Central Daily and the Central News Agency might simultaneously start their 
journalistic business in Kunming. This was discussed in the conversation between 
Long Yun, Chairman of Yunnan Province, and Zhou Fohai, Minister of 
Propaganda Department, after he arrived in Kunming by air. The Central Daily at 
present has been published in Chongqing, Guilin and Guiyang. The paper is 
planned to expand to Chengdu, Xi’an and Lanzhou, and the branch of the Central 
News Agency might be established there as well. 
Saodang Bao published Guilin Edition 
Saodang Bao, which originally published in Wuhan before the city being fallen 
had moved to Chongqing. Some staff of Saodang Bao has been posted to Guangxi 
to prepare publishing Guilin edition this year. 
Current Situation of Jiuwang Ribao 
Whereabouts staff of Jiuwang Ribao had become suspense in intellectual clique 
since Guangzhou fell into enemy. Now, information that we have known about 
them will be released here. 
Guo Moruo is the leader of Jiuwang Ribao. When Guangzhou was in emergency, 
a telegram was sent to him for instructions of further action. He read the telegram, 
saying the newspaper office could retreat to Guilin if it was necessary. As a result, 
staff who worked in Guangdong Province had retreated under the order to west by 
the steamship Zhaoqing two days before the fall of Guangzhou. There were a 
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plethora of intellectuals followed, but they split up after they arrived in Wuzhou. 
As the retreat was processed orderly, they did not suffer a heave loss for materials. 
Workers of the newspaper also retreated with office staff. The order of withdrawal 
was very good. In accordance with their letter, even Ahua, an orphan we found and 
adopted in a street of Guangzhou, who was considered by us as the future Chinese 
Maxim Gorky, followed with the newspaper to retreat to the west with a jacket.  
 
Translation 6 Several Current Tasks 
Hua Chao, Journalist Weekly, 9 January, 1939 
 
The War of Resistance against Japan has stepped into a new and critical stage, 
which marks the division from the past 18-month military resistance to striving 
for the final victory. At this stage, China will struggle for seizing the initiative, 
in which Japanese troops will suffer overwhelming attack anywhere, regardless 
of being in the Japanese occupied areas or guerrilla areas. As a result, Japanese 
troops have to be constantly on the run. When enemies are exhausted, the general 
offensive aimed at annihilating Japanese Army will be launched, and China will 
achieve the success of the resistance cause. This is the strategy and direction of 
the Chinese Army. As the transformation of the direction, the Chinese Army will 
get a U-turn, which wins the initiative of the battlefield from the previous 
disadvantaged position. Chiang Kai-shek, Chinese supreme leader, recently in 
the interview of Da Gong Bao pointed out that: “the Chinese situation now is 
much better than last year. The government will by all means fight to a finish and 
simultaneously hope to acquire more support and effort from Chinese people.” 
Three things have been proved from this concise talk. First: Chinese people have 
strong confidence to win this war. Second: the present situation of the war is 
taking a turn for the better. Third: all Chinese people both domestic and overseas 
should continuingly make joint effort for the country to achieve the final victory. 
At this new and critical stage, Chinese journalists, especially journalists in 
Shanghai, should work hard without exception for strengthening the resistance 
force as the coordination of the development of the War of Resistance against 
Japan. Come together to struggle for the great endeavour which saves and 
liberates the nation. Therefore, I deem that people who engage in journalism on 
the Isolated Island must reach a consensus about the following essential tasks.  
First, it is necessary to promote our works behind enemy lines. At the second 
stage of the War of Resistance against Japan, works on politics, military, 
economy and culture are necessary to be promoted for the advantage that we 
flight against enemies on the battlefield. Although journalistic activities on the 
Isolated Island belong to works behind enemy lines, we should not ignore the 
importance of effort in guerrilla areas of hinterland. On account of the condition 
of their lower education and inconvenient transportation, they need help of the 
Isolated Island journalists as their guide to enlighten and promote their 
consciousness of resistance.  
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Second, our strength needs to be gathered. The spirit of journalists’ hard graft in 
the past 14 months on the Isolated Island is commendable. However, our strength 
has not been strong enough to face the current environment. Everyone should be 
trained with strong will, calm tendency and courage, so that they can 
independently struggle, overcome and conquer the environment. In other words, 
they should have the ability to flight and struggle against evil monsters and have 
the belief of not compromising with them. This is the only way which can make 
us stronger in the War of Resistance against Japan, discharge our duty as sentinels 
of Chinese journalism, and pride of ourselves as Chinese people. 
We are not able to fulfil the journalists’ duty on the Isolated Island facing the 
resistance environment until we gather our strength and promote our works 
behind enemy lines.  
Translation 7: Wartime Journalism 
Tang Ke, Journalist Weekly, 9 January, 1939 
Editor’s note: This article was originally published in Saodang Bao on 19 
November last year. The article is reprinted here because its topic which is about 
the endeavour of wartime journalism and tasks of journalists still applies to the 
current situation.  
Newspapers in peacetime are a weapon for political struggle. During the wartime, 
they are the tool for national defence. Just as a famous journalist said, there are 
three critical components in modern war: money, steel and newspaper. During 
the war in Europe, General Hindenburg said that Germany did not fear the British 
tanks and guns, but dreaded leaflets dispersed from their planes. From these cases, 
we can see that the spiritual weapon is far more effective than soldiers armed 
with bullets and armour. The United States of America is a democratic and 
progressive country. Once Presidential elections start, those newspaper tycoons, 
such as Hearst and Raymond, are always the most noticeable people nationwide. 
This shows the importance of newspapers in political struggle during the 
peacetime. Another case was that after the war had broken out in Europe of 1914, 
the British politician Lloyd George formed a coalition government, and engaged 
journalism baron Lord Northcliffe as the chancellor who was in charge of 
propaganda. This proves the significance of propaganda during the war.  
We should specifically focus on the study of wartime journalism, especially 
analyse the difference of journalism between peacetime and wartime. These will 
be listed in the article as a reference of the principles to reform Chinese 
journalism for the war to resist Japan. 
First, wartime journalism management should be a united rather than permissive. 
The external aim of wartime journalism management and control is to strive for 
strengthening our country and crumbling enemies, and the internal aim is for 
avoiding leakage of military secrets, reinforcing people’s consciousness to fight 
and promoting the civil-military cooperation nationwide. At the early stage of the 
war in Europe, the third bureau of German general staff established wartime 
journalism bureau, which has been the most powerful machinery during the war. 
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Except for censoring newspapers nationwide, the bureau is also in charge of 
issuing German wartime news in their military occupied areas. Japan after the 
Mukden Incident immediately reinforced the journalism bureau of the Army 
Ministry. By re-organising Rengo and Dentsu, Domei News Agency as the core 
of Japanese journalism management and control, was established. Journalism in 
Far East has been generally monopolised by Japanese warlords. These are good 
examples to show the importance of wartime journalism management and control. 
Even in the Britain and America that highly believe in freedom during the 
wartime, such as war in Europe and American Civil War, journalism is strictly 
controlled by government. 
Second, wartime journalism business should be prosperous and resemble military 
industry, rather than decreasing. Newspapers during the war usually need to take 
up more stressful works of propaganda and report than peacetime. This can be 
seen from the sales of newspapers and the creation of famous journalists. In the 
first place, sales of newspapers must be flourishing during wartime. In 
accordance with the statistics by the journalism research division of Tokyo 
Imperial University, newspaper circulation of each day in the United States from 
1910 to 1920 (the First World War) was even one forth higher than present day. 
Japanese Tokyo Asahi Shimbun in 1930, which was before the Mukden Incident 
totally issued 650,000 papers, but up to 1933, it had reached 750,000. Moreover, 
wartime is a good opportunity to train journalists to be mature. There are well-
known ten top journalists in Japanese history of the press, such as Kishida Ginko, 
Yanagawa Shunyo, Fukuchi Genichiro, Narushima Ryuhoku, Fukuzawa Yukichi. 
They raised them above the ruck in the process of the First Sino-Japanese War, 
Russo-Japanese War, and the Second Sino-Japanese War. Tokutomi Iichiro, the 
most respected elder statesman of journalism in Japan, also acquired his honour 
during the wars in past years. A great newspaper is closely and inseparably 
related to some outstanding journalists, and they are all created in special times. 
This just reflects the old sayings that ‘appropriate places can foster elites’ and 
‘great men are products of the times that they live’. War, famous journalists and 
great newspapers are just in a reciprocal relationship. 
Reviewing China, we can find that the Spring and Autumn Annals of the Zhou 
Dynasty and Tipao during the Han and Tang Dynasty have been widely 
recognised as pioneers of newspapers in the world by both Chinese and 
international scholars. Even if we consider the modern newspaper of Shenbao, 
the paper has a history of 65 years since it was established in 1873. Nevertheless, 
how much progress have we achieved so far? We should particularly reflect on 
this situation that since the outbreak of the war against Japan, which is our second 
revolution, there has been a good enthusiastic social atmosphere, and these 
advantages should have promoted our journalistic endeavour to achieve great 
progress to outperform our enemies. But do we have a united institution which 
plans, manages and guides journalistic endeavour, and do we have certain 
journalism policies based on our Outline of Resisting Japan and Nation Building? 
The facts are just in the opposite. As lack of essential preparation in peacetime, 
foundation of large newspapers became unstable when the war broke out. As a 
result, spiritual demand is proliferating under the united wartime journalism 
system, newspaper sales is conversely decreasing. The war against Japan has 
continued for over a year, and where are our outstanding journalists? 
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It is a hard fact that the Chinese journalism situation discussed above is 
incongruous with the mainstream of wartime journalism overseas.  
To sum up, it proves that we need to put in a lot of effort in journalistic endeavour. 
I concisely propose these above suggestions as the general goal of our 
government, especially departments in charge of propaganda, and our people, 
especially journalistic staff, to strive for. 
Translation 8: Newspapers in Japanese controlled area 
Journalist Weekly, 30 January, 1939 
 
In Japanese controlled areas, nearly all newspapers were the local edition of the 
New Shenbao, which was the organ paper of the Japanese in China.  
Newspapers in Shanghai Foreign settlements were totally forbidden to sell in 
Japanese controlled areas. As a result, they were absolutely locked away with the 
place outside the areas. If some people who attempted to secretly transport 
newspapers from Shanghai foreign settlements into Japanese controlled areas 
were found, they would suffer the most severe punishment by the Japanese. 
In Japanese controlled areas, half contents of the newspapers were the 
information from Japanese news agents, and nearly the rest part of the printed 
sheets was the wanted posters of the leaders of Chinese guerrillas.  
Translation 9: Shanghai newspapermen should strengthen self-discipline 
Journalist Weekly, 17 April, 1939 
 
Since the war broke out, nationalism elements began to be implanted into 
journalistic professionalism, thus public services, to a certain degree, were 
replaced by nationalism as the most important duty for Chinese journalism. The 
author proposed that Chinese newspapers in Shanghai should provide the 
emotional anchor for 4 million people. However, the anchor at the moment had 
been nationalism rather than public services. 
As the author said, “Chinese resistance against Japan not only is for Chinese to 
strive self-liberation, but also for justice for the mass. Chinese language 
newspapers owned by foreigners in Shanghai should be in accordance with the 
two points above. Therefore, newspaper staff in Shanghai should specifically 
consolidate their team, and intensify the fort in cultural warfront. Towards the 
invasion activities and the scum who were doubted to engage in collaboration, 
they should on the one hand report their intrigue, and on the other hand give them 
a merciless blow.” 
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Translation 10: Censorship and Propaganda 
Chen Xueping, Journalist Weekly, 19 June, 1939 
 
Censorship and propaganda are the two most powerful forms of social control. 
However, their properties are different. Censorship is passive containment of 
individuals’ freedom to express, ideas and behaviours that clash with the present 
national system. Propaganda is passive creation of information for giving rise to 
a common opinion within the group. 
In peacetime, it is necessary for government to carry out censorship, in the hope 
that social order can be maintained and people’s benefit can be safeguarded. 
Drama and fiction content which is considered filthy will be forbidden regardless 
of its country of origin. However, governors usually utilise censorship to 
establish their personal authority and consolidate their power. As a result, 
censorship will be abused. Take parents’ attention to their children’s acts for 
instance, if parents discipline their children excessively, it may cause two 
possible situations. Children may become hyper timed, dull, subservient and feel 
themselves inferior; or in contrast, children may also tend to be rebellious, 
aggressive, stubborn, and get some other bad habits. In the same way, when a 
government excessively controls their people’s speech, they will receive a similar 
result. Just as an old saying of Confucius, ‘virtuous and law-abiding people 
should have considerable autonomy rather than much restriction, and foolish and 
savage people should be educated and punished for them to understand the fault 
they commit.’ Modern liberal countries are not willing to control people’s speech, 
and even if they want, they are not able to implement measures to do so. However, 
dictatorships, such as Soviet Russia, (Fascist) Germany and Italy, have utilised 
censorship perfectly. As a result, people do not dare to speak out their frustration 
and fury. Finally, when these widespread discontents accumulate to a certain 
level, they will overwhelmingly break out. 
During the wartime period when government has determined its diplomatic 
guiding principal, differences will weaken the force of resistance and be 
advantageous to enemies to blatantly propagandise themselves, and as a result, 
triumphalism will falter. Therefore, censorship should be strictly carried out. 
However, it does not mean we should blindly implement control. During the 
special wartime period, almost everyone is uneasy and anxiously waits for news. 
It means any message is easy to be adopted. This provides a good condition for 
transmitting rumours. Some sudden incidents, such as Wang Ching-wei 
publishing the circular telegram to announce his peaceful plan with Japan, and 
changes of battlefront, like the fall of Guangzhou, should not be printed out 
immediately on newspapers in case of over-stimulating those people who worry 
the sky could fall. However, our government is not able to control foreign news 
agencies. Some senior officials at times are not prudent when they represent 
government to release information. It may lead to wide circulation of erroneous 
messages, which imperceptibly promote people to fabricate details based on their 
imagination. When such situations happen, simply performing censorship may 
backfire. Censorship can block the circulation of some unreasonable messages, 
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but simultaneously may provide more room for personal assumption to create 
more details due to lack of information in the society. Therefore, information 
control can only be implemented effectively when censorship and propaganda 
work co-operatively. 
We are not able to avoid the influence of propaganda in the modern society that 
we are living. To an individual view, advertising exerts a subtle influence on us 
when we buy everyday objects. To a country view, as most of people are lacking 
of the correct understanding of the national policies and principals, as a result, 
we are no longer free to be influenced by the preaching of a party or a faction. If 
propaganda is properly applied, it can become a form of social education. In 
Europe and North America, people usually learn elementary knowledge of 
medicine and hygiene from advertisements. Propaganda during wartime is 
remarkably effective. For instance, the Entente Powers, as the United States’ 
participation finally achieved victory. Most of the American people initially did 
persist in isolationism, not willingly getting entangled in the war. However, their 
disgust with Germany increased as the days passed after large scale propaganda 
was implemented, and the warring public opinion ultimately dominated America 
nationwide. This made U.S. Government dare to formally declare war. George 
Creel, the head of the United States Committee on Public Information, after the 
war based on his experience of propaganda wrote down the book, How We 
Advertised America. It was said by him that propaganda documents were totally 
for 75,000,000. In his opinion, ‘paper bullet’ truly contributed to the victory of 
the Entente Powers. 
Propaganda is hyper effective, but is difficult to practically apply as well. 
Rhetoric of propaganda should be concise and clear, so that audiences are easily 
able to repeat them. However, the contents should include sufficient implications, 
which make readers unwittingly accept the ideas of propaganda. Propagating an 
idea can be realised by various methods, such as newspaper, broadcasting, poster 
and film, and each repeat exposure can deepen the readers’ impression. As 
propaganda in modern society has become a specific subject to study, more 
details about it are not able to be discussed here. However, it should be paid 
attention that propaganda contents cannot be far from the facts. The function of 
propaganda is to appropriately delete or add details based on the facts in the 
published reports. For example, it would be well if heroic deeds on the battlefront 
are magnified and our armies’ failures are made as light as we can. If there are a 
couple of reports which are not based on facts, audiences may not easily believe 
our propaganda afterwards. 
Considering the methods of the propaganda and censorship that our government 
is applying, it seems that there are still many shortcomings. Take war reports for 
instance, the victory of the Battle of Taierzhuang has been propagandised 
appropriately, but some victories achieved in south Shanxi Province in past 
months, and the annihilating Japanese armies in north Jiangxi and Hubei 
Province recently are not systematically reported. To the propaganda about 
warfront fighting in a specific area, being silent after a couple of sensationalising 
will give audiences a clear implication that we have got failure in this area. A 
temporary military failure in a specific area is usual and inevitable. People should 
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know a general situation of the facts about the scale of military failure. Otherwise, 
doubts will be raised and spread among them if they are not able to acquire 
information. Reports about arms and planes transportation and preparation for 
evacuation in air raids in rear areas, should be censored are always published on 
newspapers yet. It has been a puzzle that Guangzhou had fallen in a very short 
time, and this has been a topic leading to manifold vitriolic surmises in foreign 
newspapers, magazines and books even up to today.  
To sum up, all comments contrary to present anti-Japanese policy and 
undermining national unification should be censored strictly, but the public 
opinion which can promote the efficiency of central and local administration is 
important especially during war against Japan. Strict instructions must be issued 
against those prevailing cock and bull rumours at present. We cannot bear empty 
silence. It means we should adeptly exploit propaganda to make people know 
what has happened. Propaganda especially should be widely, technically and 
systematically used to influence foreign public opinions.   
Translation 11: Establish Chinese Journalism by the Strength of the Collective 
Dong Lan, Journalist Weekly, 19 June, 1939 
 
Development of a cause on the one hand depends on successive effort, and on the 
other hand relies on the introspection based on the past achievement. These 
experiences apply to Chinese journalism cause as well. The foundation of 
Japanese modern journalism cause was worse than China, but their journalism 
research institute has been established and run for more than 20 years, and their 
the quantity of their newspaper publication has reached four millions. Such 
achievement is by no means accidental. Works in research institutes should not 
be ignored, and these works usually become the soul to guide practical works.  
Aimed at promoting publication of newspapers in China, Vernon Nash and 
Rudolf Loewenthal from the journalism department of the Yenching University 
spoke out their ideas about the press development in China. There are external 
and internal points. External points include removing illiteracy and bettering 
transportation, and internal points are to train and cultivate qualified people for 
the press. In terms of training qualified people, we firstly need to understand the 
current condition of the press in China, and propose as many issues as we can, so 
that new trained people can solve them by highly individualised approaches. In 
other words, they believe that practicable research works based on ourselves 
(epoch and environment) should be done in journalism departments, so that our 
journalistic practice can be benefited in the future. There are some difficulties for 
doing the relevant research. They pointed out two points. First, the study of the 
press is obviously not an independent subject, but is synthesised with others, such 
as history, economy, sociology, so the press study can only be promoted with the 
development of the progress of research on these subjects. Second, it is difficult 
to search and collect essential academic references. The two said points might 
not be big issues in other countries, but seriously influence the development of 
Chinese journalism. Research in China is performed by each individual, but such 
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works can be done overseas by groups. If such difficulties cannot be overcome, 
academic and professional standards will not be able to be established.  
Difficulties weighed more than scattering of research resources, as a result, those 
difficulties are not able to be overcome successfully. Nash and Loewenthal’s 
observation and examination strike home. We should rely on the strength of the 
collective to research works for establishing Chinese journalism study (rather 
than simply adopt a foreign system), so that the Chinese journalism cause can be 
promoted. 
Translation 12: Broad Discussion of Interview Skills 
Tian Ping, Journalist Weekly, 19 June, 1939 
 
Correspondents need to possess a strong body. Even if they do not go to bed until 
3 o’clock at night, they still need to get up at 6 o’clock if there is a big rally 
somewhere at 7 o’clock in the morning. They need to cheer up to arrive at scene 
with pencil and coated duplex board, writing down what they heard. If they need 
to greet an honoured guest from another province, it is normal that they wait at 
railway station, wharf and airport for three or five hours. They must endure even 
if they work from morning to evening or in a whole night, miss a couple of meals, 
and travel for 50 kilometres in a day.   
They definitely need to possess a comprehending mind. When something just 
happens, after closing their eyes to think about it for a few seconds, they should 
calculate possible consequences. Then they arrange interview works to prove 
these consequences, and published them on newspapers. Although their 
deductions are not able to be as correct as what Zhuge Liang did, these deductions 
at least need to be reasonable, so that they can avoid their interview to be totally 
in vain. If we met a very important person who was difficult to get access to 
interview with, or an incident which was not open to journalists, we would back 
off and give up the interview attempt. As a result, we would be embarrassed the 
next day when we opened the newspapers and did not find such relevant reports. 
For avoiding such situation, we should search our mind for a method. When the 
first method is unsuccessful, the second one comes. If this one is still 
unsuccessful, we should immediately work out the next until we achieve what we 
want. We can finish this work by hook or by crook with the precondition of not 
breaking the law. We may suffer supercilious looks and be met with setbacks. 
When we meet dirty people, we are obliged to compliment them, but these do not 
mean we stand to lose as long as we successfully acquire news through interview. 
We should pay special attention to listening to what other people are chatting 
about in public places, such as the grand building of the Young Men's Christian 
Association, cinema, club, and even streets. How great it is if an unimportant 
chitchat after our extraction finally becomes a piece of news. 
It is essential for us to have the ability of dealing in all sorts of rhetoric on a public 
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occasion with gallantry and popularised smile. In the process of dealing with 
people, when we meet friends from Jiangsu or Zhejiang Province, we may as well 
chat about things of Shanghai or Suzhou. As for friends from Hunan or Hubei 
Province, we should still be able to hook up with them. Sichuan dialect and 
mandarin are indispensable for us to know. As a result, nobody will remain 
distant from you, and this will facilitate your interview. 
If we are involved into a chaotic situation, such an as assassination, we should be 
very careful, and be acutely aware of our position by law at any time. Being 
meticulous is critical for us to understand the cause and result of a thing in the 
interview. I suggest you not start writing, especially editorial comment, before 
you fully understand the networks of the thing with others. Some will be 
unsubstantiated by journalists’ cursory conclusion based on their inaccurate 
observation. Mistakes can be correct, but you will be afflicted psychologically.  
We should keep clam as a bystander when we interview, but facing a disaster, 
such as a place that just suffered Japanese air raid or a conflagration, we still need 
our emotion, and with the emotion to be engaged in relieving the disaster. In this 
way, the news that you write must be much better than the report based on the 
interview of just simply asking and observing. 
Modesty is an essential virtue in our interview. However, you do not need to be 
lavishly modest when ten people are talking an important person. You first try to 
be close to the person that you want to interview, after a bow, you can respectfully 
ask him to pass comments. If there are many journalists there, you should quickly 
write down what the guest is talking about, especially those exciting sentences 
on your coated duplex board with neat handwriting. By such amazing 
handwriting on the beautiful paper, you can openly ask a signature from the 
distinguish guest. When you open the newspaper next day, not only will you read 
a fantastic news report, but also your interview notes with a signature. 
We do not know what we shall interview today when we just open our eyes in 
bed early in the morning. If you want see that newspapers tomorrow are full of 
exclusive interviews and reports from our correspondents, you have to get up 
early, and head for the places where news stands a good chance to be acquired or 
to create. Could it be said that it is impossible of getting news under heaven? The 
key point is whether you actively tramp the streets, gathering information. 
The word ‘Caifang’ (interview) is composed by Cai (pick up) and Fang (visit). 
The first character ‘Cai’ means to choose. If two things simultaneously happen 
or two conferences convened at the same time, we are obliged to make a decision 
to choose one after weighing the importance each other. 
For successfully completing your interview, you may have to master some skills, 
such as translating telegraph codes, swimming, riding bicycle or horse, driving 
cars or boating.   
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Wherever you work, you should give preference to build up friendship with 
members of staff who work for transport institutes or companies. 
Translation 13: Journalism and Freedom 
Pang Guan, Journalist Weekly, 7 July, 1939 
 
Networks of things should be understood in the dialectical view, rather than 
stubborn, dogmatic, and inflexible comprehension.  
Journalists and journalistic agents should have sufficient freedom, and attempts 
to restrict such freedom will be considered an adversary of journalism. This ought 
to be an unalterable principle. Nevertheless, this freedom should be wielded with 
the premise of not prejudiced national interests. There is no doubt that the 
freedom must be restricted once it challenged the national interests. Unifying 
consensus and actions is crucial in the process of social mobilisation for 
completing the aim of struggling for national independence. Otherwise, we shall 
become zombies of liberalism forgetting our nation and country shown by the 
case of Liang Shih-chiu.  
The editorial ‘Resistance and newspapermen’ by Da Gong Bao of Hong Kong 
on 5 April pointed out that “Japanese invasion has exerted a huge influence on 
the press of China. It significantly changed the property of the press and the 
position of newspapermen. Newspapermen initially believed in liberalism, but 
their belief had to be fundamentally changed since the War of Resistance against 
Japan. The existence of newspapers in hinterland China is only for one aim, 
which is striving for propaganda which is advantages of resistance and saving the 
country. Therefore, newspapers at the present should not be a private institute of 
liberalism, but an institute of public propaganda strictly controlled by 
government.” This property change is admirable because it can reflect the needs 
of the reality to journalism. 
The validity of this change is also proved by foreign cases. The United States 
should be considered as the most free and open country. However, deceitful 
people utilised this freedom to create rumour, aimed at undermining the national 
administration. As a result, President Roosevelt had to take unprecedented steps 
of warning. The fact is that the U.S. government has been managing to impel the 
Senate to get back to the amendment of the Neutrality Acts since it was deferred 
to discuss in the Senate. At the moment, an American news agency on 12 July 
abruptly published such information without foundation that “President 
Roosevelt attempts to propose a threatening message to the Congress, but 
Secretary of State Hull thinks it may not be effective. As a result, both sides could 
split over it.” 
This is a venomous lie, which was definitely manufactured elaborately by 
isolated loyalists. In my opinion, things may be more than this. International 
conspirators may even engage in the fabrication and transmission of the rumour. 
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This has not been simply an issue of endangering domestic politics, but a threat 
to the world peace. If this were able to be glossed over by ‘freedom’, treasonable 
acts would become the right for personal ‘freedom’. President Roosevelt did not 
stick to the convention, and turned out to make an announcement endorsed by 
himself through the White House on the 13th to give a stark denial to the rumour 
with warning. “The news agency provided information to all newspapers that 
according to government sources, Secretary of State Hull disagrees with the 
wording of the message on the Neutrality Acts that President Roosevelt is 
preparing to submit to the Congress. The title that the Washington newspaper 
adopted shows the President differs with the Secretary of State on the Neutrality 
Acts. The title and the whole editorial are invalid and not based on the fact. In 
the light of bad influence to American political life, it should be warned. I also 
hope readers of newspapers can understand this warning. According to 
investigation, this news agency used to publish disinformation. Secretaries of the 
White House and I consistently urged them to be careful about the information 
delivered. However, they are getting desperate to fabricate facts. I please for 
attention by the public opinion that the White House is impossible and not 
necessary to deny all disinformation. Based on this case, rational people cannot 
endure such behaviours. I as the President hereby make the announcement, which 
only focuses on this news agency lest other American press and news agencies 
were implicated.” 
The last two sentences show the positive attitude of the statement. President 
Roosevelt did not utilise this chance to attack the freedom of journalism, but just 
warned the rumour mongering, which has exerted dreadful effect on American 
political life. In America, there are always some people who obsess with 
criticising President Roosevelt as a person trying to become a dictator. This event 
may be helpful to them to confirm Roosevelt’s charge. We think we should adopt 
Lu Xun’s comment on some literati who did not revere the feudal ethics during 
the Six Dynasties to think about the American case. Lu Xun said that “in that era, 
people who outwardly revere the feudal ethics in fact were ruining the ethics, and 
in the contrast, those whose behaviours were considered as damaging the ethics 
actually recognised and believed in the ethics.” Today, we should carefully check 
and examine those who support or damage the freedom and democracy of politics; 
otherwise we shall fall right into the trick that crafty devils play. 
Translation 14: Express Sincere Solicitude for the Press in Shanghai from the Chinese 
Youth Journalists Association, Journalist Weekly, 10 July 1939 
 
The Chinese Youth Journalists Association is strongly concerned about the dire 
situation faced by journalists in Shanghai. The Association in the demonstration 
wishes to the journalists in Shanghai to sustain their faith, and keep their efforts 
to maintain internal justice and safeguard the cultural fort in the south of the 
Yangtze River. Nearly half of the total amount of newspapers in Shanghai have 
been suspended, as a result, there must be many journalists who have left their 
jobs. The Chinese Youth Journalists Association has established its branches in 
the main cities of China, and is willing to try the best to help the journalists who 
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are not able to engage in journalism work arrange new jobs in other cities. The 
Association expresses the great indignation towards the terrorist attacks to 
journalists, and the respect and sympathy for the journalists involved into serious 
troubles as they stand in their ground in front of temptation.  
Translation 15: Simple newspapers in Guerrilla Areas 
Chu, Journalist Weekly, 17 July 1939 
 
There have been prominent changes of newspapers in China, not only in quality 
but also format since the outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japan. The 
creation and development of simple newspapers in each guerrilla area as an 
emerging phenomenon is just a distinct case to embody this point. Limited by 
environment and technical tools, the format of these simple newspapers is usually 
shabby and crude, but they have profound effects. Today, we shall hereby 
introduce Huibao, which is one of such simple newspapers. This is a 16 Kai 
(185mm×260mm) size paper mimeographed with blue ink. Although space for 
printing is limited and handwriting replaces types, all types of newspaper articles 
are included, such as dispatches, comments, editorials based on news, and 
supplement. A certain amount of income of the paper is derived from 
advertisement. As an essential part of the War of Resistance against Japan, such 
simple newspapers in guerrilla areas under the harsh environment are developing 
quickly in hinterland China. Although these simple newspapers in guerrilla areas 
cannot hold a candle to newspapers in metropolis as the objective circumstances, 
they will make a crucial contribution to the future development of local 
newspapers. 
Translation 16: Propaganda and rumour mongering 
Jun Yi, Journalist Weekly, 31 July 1939 
 
The development of capitalism gives rise to more and more intense competition 
amongst imperialist countries. For seizing more interest in the interests the ruling 
class, their struggles, open and secret, have never ceased. As a result, besides 
diplomacy, economy and politics, the importance of journalism policy and 
propaganda techniques is increased. All journalist organisations are controlled to 
become the outpost of psychological war. The intense propaganda battle just 
reflects the acute conflicts amongst imperialists.  
As a means of flighting comparable to the military and economy, the utilisation 
of propaganda plays an important role as an indispensable part in a war. After the 
First World War, Wilhelm II, Emperor of Germany, said that German failure is 
attributed to none of the Times by themselves. He clearly explained the function 
of propaganda.   
Propaganda is more important to fascist countries. The nature of fascism is 
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cheating and blackmail. Only propaganda can mask its evil and ugly weakness. 
Exaggerated rhetoric is adopted to daunt timed persons and sensational 
statements are used to fill the stomach of hungry people. 
Nevertheless, propaganda must be based on some facts although the sense and 
meaning of the fact lacks true, so that it can be believed by normal people. Things 
which come out of zero will finally become rumours. Its falsity can be perceived 
even by the lowest educated people, and propaganda will have little effect as time 
passes.  
Fabricating rumour needs to cudgel creators’ brains because they need to think 
up much ‘news’ every evening, such as existing internal disagreement, Chiang 
Kai-shek’s regime is becoming bankrupt, Communist Party means to share wives 
and properties, massacre people, someone forsakes an evil regime, the Soviet 
Union is ambitious. However, in front of the clear facts, even the most foolish 
people will laugh at those rumours as real fantasy.  
Considering the Manchuria-Mongolia border conflict, Japanese propaganda is 
‘beyond all imaging.’ Based on their reporting, tens of Soviet and Mongolian 
planes are shot down every day, and the total quantity of the planes shot down 
has reached for more than 500 planes in a not very long time. By analogy, the 
Soviet Air Force can be annihilated shortly. Is not this grateful for the countries 
who advertise them as anti-Communism? However, the lies were exposed by the 
Soviet Union. On the 18th, the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury reprinted the 
talk of the Associated Press’s correspondent in Far East, who had returned to 
Shanghai from Heilongjiang. Based on this talk, Japanese achievement is actually 
shooting down two machineguns and wreckage of plan with red star. These 
wreckages are generally equal to two planes. Up to now, Japanese propaganda 
has absolutely failed. 
Translation 17: A newspaperman’s heroic death: mourn for Mr Zhu Xionggong 
Qian Sheng, Journalist Weekly, 4 September 1939 
 
Mr Zhu Xionggong, an editor of the Night Light column of the Ta Mei Wan Pao, 
was suddenly assassinated when he walked on the way from his home to the 
newspaper office at approximately 4 o’clock in the afternoon of the 30th August. 
Mr Zhu was an upright, outspoken and rigorous person. Perhaps this is the main 
reason that he fallen a prey to a plot. It is a tragedy that a defenceless literati is 
paid attention by those indecent so-called heroes. 
Citizens felt regret when the grievous news came to Shanghai. On the 1st of 
September, the journalist day, people gathered together in the Universal Funeral 
where Mr Zhu’s body was kept. At 3 o’clock, the memorial meeting began. 
Perhaps most of people who attended the memorial meeting did not meet Zhu 
Xionggong. On this Isolated Island, people live from hand to mouth, uut they still 
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find time to come, and bow with great respect to Zhu Xinggong. Some people 
are frugal in their daily life, however, they donated money in the memorial 
meeting. In the hall of the Universal Funeral Parlour, the majority of people do 
not recognise each other, but they all register profound respect in front of Zhu 
Xionggong’s coffin and photo. What can be reflected from this behaviour? This 
is just the solemn Chinese national spirit. 
Mr Zhu was a journalist and an editor of the column Night Light. He is literati 
who did not attain a high position and gain wide attention in the society. However, 
why so many people were touched by him? Perhaps we can answer the question 
through some eulogies. Shanghai Culture Fellowship’s eulogy is ‘Zhu 
Xionggong was a very talented. He understood important principles, verbally 
laced into traitors, and was a credit to China’. The Commercial Press’s eulogy is 
‘he manipulated a pen like brandishing a sword to beat enemies. He struggled for 
justice, and died for the cause’. Mr Zhu’s body will be interred at the Hongqiao 
cemetery, but his spirit will be alive forever. We may as well here cite the New 
War Readers Association’s eulogy to comfort those martyrs. “To the heroes who 
dare to struggle for justice and humanity, for nation’s liberation and liberty, for 
human being’s fraternity and peace, you silently closed your eyes which should 
not be closed at gunpoint of those hideous ruffians. Sir, may your soul rest in 
peace! You do not die. You will not die forever. The country should be pride of 
you such as youth who loved freedom and seeks for felicity. Following your 
bloodstain, we will march forward, revenging for you and those countless 
martyrs.” 
The press is experiencing a gory time in Shanghai. On the 22nd of April last year, 
a bomb blast was carried out in the newspaper office of the Mercury. Chen 
Tongxuan, a member of the business department of the Mercury, suffered 
wonders, and was finally incurable and dead. Da Wan Bao was attacked on the 
24th of July this year, and two printing workers got shot and fell. They died as 
honourable as Zhu Xiong. Considering newspaperman who died for promoting 
justice, Zhu Xinnggong in journalism field of the Isolated Island is the first. 
People’s real behaviours usually can be revealed in a critical situation. The 
universal truth will not die forever! 
Night Light  
Translation 18: Forbearance 
Zhu Xinggong, Night Light, 18 June 1939 
 
I extremely admire the British forbearance. They can tolerate all persecution, and 
even insult. They exhibit abiding forbearance. 
Considering forbearance, the British is more staid than American, and is better 
than Chinese. Although there is a motto in China that “lack of forbearance in 
small matters will upset great plans”, there is another motto to explain the 
principle of ‘forbearance in small matters’ by an ancient Chinese sage that “when 
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you cannot bear it, you should come forward to resist”. When Confucius met 
something that he cannot bear, he shouted indignantly as well that “if this can be 
tolerated, what cannot?!” 
Translation 19: Japanese Dream 
Cheng Mei, Night Light, 19 June 1939 
 
I was free recently, so I picked up a book called Thought, Scenery and Figure by 
Tsurumi Yūsuke from my bookshelf and browse it. In the book, there is an article 
‘Bumptious’, and it presents this sentence: 
“Japanese are dreaming that there is one day that Japanese will become the 
language of the world. At first glance, it looks like a brave and patriotic idea, but 
it contains too many factors of danger and against humanity. It has been an old 
dream for one nation to conquer the world. Persia, Roma, Mongolia, and 
Napoleon, without exception, were all fallen on the way to this dream.” (It was 
translated into Japanese from a Lu Xun’s article.) 
When I read it, I feel Japanese infinite ambition.  
Tsurumi Yūsuke is not a great talent, and he is just a smart and enlightened 
politician. I remember that in a night three years ago, two Japanese famous 
elocutionists, Tsurumi Yūsuke and Ryutarō, together had their election speech in 
the Hibiya Public Hall for the Good Governance Party. For attending their speech, 
I took a bus with my friends from Asagaya. Definitely, their graceful postures, 
loud voice and emotion filled in every single word did not make me feel dissatisfy, 
but there were full of empty concepts. One of my friend who was studying law 
in an Imperial University said that “most of thinking law students from the 
Imperial University despise them.” We laughed when we heard this. It is not 
difficult to understand that Tsurumi Yūsuke has such sentence in Thought, 
Scenery and Figure, but Japanese military does not understand it at all! 
We definitely know that the Japanese warlords’ ‘crazy’ does not mean they 
should be sent to asylums, but they are clearly acting rashly to create massacres 
and bombings! 
Eight years ago, Tanaka Giichi wrote down that “in order to conquer the world, 
we need to conquer China first; in order to conquer China, we need to conquer 
Manchuria and Mongolia first” in his memorial. This is not just a temporal crazy 
action.  
Education, tradition, the united and controlled ideology make Japanese people, 
especially army men, intoxicated! Even a young girl can understand the simple 
sentence, but the warlords, bureaucrats, politicians and official scholars do not 
understand it. It makes me call to mind that “a handcart of firewood is ignored 
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when the end side of a hair is focused on”. 
I initially did not believe such things can happen, but I have witnessed up to now. 
Not only myself, but also my nation, my country are suffering such things.   
The only way which can awake them is to pick up sticks and hit the heads of 
these dreamers. 
Translation 20: The Spirit of Su Wun 
Shen An, Night Light, 18 June 1939 
 
For some reason, I felt intoxicated a little bit recently.  
Recently, I begin to drink alcohol although I used to be a non-drinker. This is 
definitely not relevant to my desire to poetry because I have had no interests in 
verse for very long time. Some people might suggest me that alcohol can distract 
the mind from grief and unhappiness. I have to say I am also very disappointed, 
and do not have such the generous and leisure mentality like Scholar-officials. 
 I always feel drunk by the superlative, cosy and blood temptation. 
“Everyone is murky, I still maintain myself to be clear; everyone is drunk, I still 
keep sober-minded.” Qu Yuan as a hot-blooded scholar-official must not lose his 
belief from a couple of drinks. However, in the turbid society, the stimulation of 
interests and threats are a hundred times stronger than alcohol, and this is so 
horrible! Even it is known that there are traps behind the interests and threats at 
the time, reason is still not able to overcome lure, and finally some people attempt 
to obtain them at all costs. 
Considering this point, I call Hong Chengchou, who willingly became to be a 
minion of Manchu to mind. Hong used to be unflinching, and wanted to bestir 
himself. Once he faced a life-and-death situation, and simultaneously the lures of 
woman, his reason become absolutely numb. Finally, he was completely drunk, 
and descended to a minion.  
The Person who possesses both wisdom and courage, and strong conviction will 
not be lured to be intoxicated in front of interests and threats at such a critical 
moment. This suggests Su Wu who shepherded by the lakeside of Baikal to me. 
When Su Wu was detained in Xiongnu, Wei Lv volunteered to attempt to 
persuade him to surrender. Let us have a look at what Wei Lv said. “Mr. Su, I, 
Wei Lv, betrayed to Han, and surrendered to Xiongnu. Thanks for the grace by 
Chanyu (chief of the Xiongnu in ancient China) that I was granted a peerage. 
Now, I possess more than ten thousand slaves, and countless horses and other 
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livestock all over the mountain. Such high position and great wealth that I have 
would be rendered to you tomorrow if you surrendered today. Otherwise, who 
will remember you after you died and your body will become fertilizer for the 
grass?” 
Su Wu kept silence after these honeyed words. Wei Lv kept saying that “if you 
adopt my suggestion to surrender, I would like to become a sworn brother of you. 
However, if you refuse me today, do you think you can be lucky to have another 
opportunity to meet me when you want in the future?” 
Besides promises, Wei Lv threatened Su Wu by force, but whether he finally 
achieved his aim? Not only did Su Wu scold him, but even broke up the 
friendship with him since then. 
The spirit of Su Wu is just awakening spirit! 
‘Alcohol does not make people drunk if they do not addict in the intoxicated 
mood.’ This is probably common sense. Although there are luring conditions in 
objective circumstance, we can still overcome them by our subjective reason. We 
can avoid being addicted in decadent fun when we grasp the situation with 
determined will in the empty island and consider Su Wu as our idolater at any 
time. 
Translation 21: Stories of Chilli 
Wei Hua, Night Light, 14 July 1939 
 
It makes me happy recently that I can have a little bit chilli every day. People 
from Jiangsu and Zhejiang might laugh at me, but those who are from Hunan and 
Guangxi must felt empathy for me. 
It is a common sense that chillies are provocative, and that is why People from 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang do not like it. However, people in Hunan, Guangxi and 
Sichuan nearly have it for every meal. They cannot bear any single day without 
chillies, and they enjoy to be dripping with sweat and to make their mouth water 
by chillies. 
I am curious that whether chilli can hearten people up, and become tough and 
gutsy. The fact shows that people from Hunan and Sichuan are the most tough 
and unafraid in China. There are some old sayings, such as ‘tough temperament 
of people in Chu area’ and ‘the Qin Empire must be destroyed by the people of 
Chu even if there were only three households left’. These expressions reflect the 
honour and glory of Hunan people. People from Hunan and Guangxi like chillies, 
and it is rather interesting that people in west Hunan like the spiciest food. 
Therefore they should just be the representative of ‘tough temperament of people 
in Chu area’. If people in Jiangsu and Zhejiang were accustomed to have chillies, 
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would their temperament more tough, and the nickname of ‘tough temperament 
of people’ not apply for Hunan only?  
It might the work for physiologists to find out whether this phenomenon is 
derived from some specific physiological theories.  
I am not for sure the situation of chillies in Guangxi and Sichuan provinces, but 
in Hunan province, people have chilly food in every season of the year. Peasants 
sow chilli seeds on the fertile ground in the in every late spring, and young 
seedlings will grow up for a couple of inches. Then, they will be moved to the 
field beside Ginger or other vegetables. Chillies do not need to feed much 
fertilizers, but need to be irrigated often.  
Fruits of chillies will come out in about May and June. They are green at the time, 
and peasants usually pick up some of them as an ingredient to cook steamed rice. 
Up to the end of autumn, fruits will turn red from green, peasants at the moment 
will pick up all of them to sell in the market with the exception of remaining a 
small amount for themselves. 
Chillies can be fried or soaked with vinegar and salt whatever they are green or 
red. It is called as ‘soak chillies’ peasants. They can also be cut as small curbs to 
mix with salt and curbs of bean and carrot. It makes chillies well preserved, to 
such an extent that they are available to be served at any season in a year. 
I am obviously not able to have chilli for every meal since I have been in 
Shanghai, so I yearn for chilli very much. When I write this article, saliva spurts 
to my lips. However, which day I can come back to my homeland to have chilli?    
Translation 22: Fable: Story of a Fly 
Huai, Night Light, 24 August 1939 
 
A big spider made a beautiful net in a corner of a garden, waiting for desserts to 
be served up. When flies fell on the net, their whole bodies were stuck by the 
threads, and the spider swallowed them unhesitatingly. The criminal evidence 
was thus immediately cleaned up. 
Therefore, when other poor flies come, they will not perceive the net as a pitfall, 
but a paradise. 
One day, a fly who thought it smart flew above and only circled around the net. 
The spider became impatient, and came out to greet it with “Why not come down 
to rest?”   
The fly was too smart, and would not easily be cheated by the spider. The fly said 
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“I do not stay in a place where I cannot see other flies. I just cannot see a single 
fly in your place!” 
The fly fled, and came to a place where lots of flies were gathered. It wanted to 
fall there, but just then, a bee warned “Do not court death, stupid fly! That is fly 
paper, and those flies are stuck!” 
“Do not be stupid. They are dancing”, said the self-righteous fly. 
Finally, it fell and became stuck to the fly paper, and suffered the same fate as 
the others of its kind there. 
This is the story of the fly that the bee tells us. She tells us “It is not 100% safe 
to follow others, and safety may not exist in the world at all”! 
Translation 23: Poles: Struggle for Freedom 
Huang Yingdai, Night Light, 29 August 1939 
 
People know that Poland was divided up between Russia, Austria and Prussia. 
Since then, it continued to perish for a century and a half until 1918 when it 
declared independence after the end of the First World War. Never the less 
Poland’s situation becomes increasingly urgent due to the extinction of Czech 
under Adolf Hitler’s police of claiming back German previous colonies. 
Most of the Poles are Slaves, which means they can be considered blunt and 
straightforward. They love freedom and have strong national identity. They also 
have had many significant contributions to the civilisation of the world in both 
arts and science, such as Marie Curie who discovered radium, the outstanding 
romanticism composer Frédéric Chopin, and the great astronomer Nicolaus 
Copernicus. From these examples, it is not difficult to find the contribution made 
by the Poles to the arts and science.  
The Poles as Slaves have a total population of 25,000,000, and there are 
5,000,000 living in separate places in the world. In America, when Poles meet 
with each other, they still speak Polish, and their children all accept education in 
Polish. Every Pole is able to sing the national anthem ‘Mazurek Dąbrowskiego’ 
(Poland Is Not Yet Lost). Since the new Poland was established, many Poles have 
return to Poland. 
Although the Poles are not very tall, their physiques are wiry and athletic, and 
these features make the Poles distinctly different with other ethnic groups of 
Slaves. The Poles are identifiable due to their florid cheeks and blond hair, 
although the hair colour of the Poles in the Southern areas of the country is darker. 
As for Polish women, they are naturally beautiful, vivacious and attractive. 
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 Considering religion, the Roman Catholic Church is most influential in Poland, 
but there are still many Protestants, the Greek Orthodox Easters, Judaists and a 
small majority identify as Muslim, nationwide. Polish Judaists account for 37% 
of the national population, and they are generally living in urban areas, especially 
in Warsaw. However, anti-Semitism becomes increasingly more and more 
serious in Poland. 
The white eagle on the Polish national flag is the symbol of freedom that the 
Poles enjoy. The Poles irrevocably seek to the sacred freedom, and carefully 
protect it. All people who struggle for freedom are always considered as 
countrymen and brothers in the Poles’ mind. The Poles participated in every war 
for freedom in the last century. Wars stimulated growing nationalism sentiment 
and help many oppressed nations acquire their dream of being independent. The 
Poles in the tumultuous tide restored their glorious motherland, established a free 
and independent new Poland, and wrote a glorious historical page that people 
admire. 
Translation 24: Special Issue for the Commemoration of the 150th Anniversary of the 
French Revolution  
Struggle between light and dark: impressions in terms of the commemoration of the French 
democracy and republic  
 
I doubt whether Chinese and foreigners who are living in Shanghai may not know 
what day today is. In past years, the French Concession was always bustling once 
this festival approached, especially in Gu's Park (current Fuxing Park) where 
there were huge crowds of people enjoying brilliant hangings and multicoloured 
fireworks. French aliens assembled to celebrate this great day as well. Although 
this year’s festival has not been as prosperous as before, the bustling spectacle is 
still maintained. If you would like to get around strolling in the French 
Concession, you will find things above are true.  
Seeing they are jubilant to celebrate this great day: the commemoration of 
democracy and republic, besides expressing sincere congratulations, I am evoked 
with infinite feelings. When we recall the heroic French Revolution, we should 
understand the divine day is effected by numerous uphill struggles, which hard 
wars as dark side’s successive counterattacks. The light and dark could not get 
through a day without fighting against each other in more than eighty years. 
Dark had overlaid France in 1789. The king reinforced his dictatorship and 
threatened the twilight, National Assembly, by force. The Paris masses responded 
with anger and convened demonstrations. However, it did not awake the royals. 
The angry masses stormed into the famous Bastille, and contacted the Gardes 
Françaises to occupy the armoury and simultaneously controlled all military 
posts in Paris. The reactionary court mobilised troops nationwide to besiege Paris. 
However, the court finally yielded and recognised the National Assembly. On 4 
August, the well-known Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was 
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passed, and it laid the groundwork for the democratic republic.  
Soon after, however, French nobility supplicated Prussian and Austrian help, and 
guided their troops into France. French counter reactionary forces seemed being 
gradually on the rise. Facing domestic predicament and foreign invasion, the 
French people raised the Volunteers, annihilating the counterrevolutionaries. 
Prussia relying on its 130,000 troops overwhelmingly captured Verdum fortress. 
When Paris was in danger, the masses bravely defend their country. Under the 
appeal of great patriotic appeal, enemies finally were crushed enemy, and the 
people achieved victory. 
Later, many European countries, such as Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Spain 
and the Netherlands, formed the Coalition to contain France. At the critical 
situation, French army was reformed and new warfare techniques were adopted. 
These efforts effectively increased military capacity. When external crisis was 
successfully solved, pro-king riot broke out. Napoleon defeated them, but he 
proclaimed himself emperor in 1804 relying on military power, and this ruined 
democracy and republic. Napoleon’s failure was followed by the Bourbon 
Restoration in 1815. The increasingly counter reactionary regime provoked the 
French Revolution of 1848, which contributed to the restoration of republic.   
Before long, the dictatorship by Napoleon III temporarily ceased democracy 
again. With his failure of conquering Germany, a revolution broke out in 
September 1870. Since then, it the revolutionary situation was fundamentally 
changed, and democratic republic was finally confirmed in 1875 after the fall of 
the Paris Commune. 
Light relentlessly struggled against dark for more than eighty years. Dark 
sometimes covered light, but ultimately, light can completely exorcise dark, 
brilliantly illuminating the human beings. 
The current Chinese war against Japan is just the striving for light. Light is 
intensely struggling against dark, and the finally result must be the victory as 
same as France. History tells us that it is a self-evident truth that light finally will 
come.  
Utopian Idealism 
Today is the 150th anniversary of the French Revolution. In France, the army, 
navy and air force attended the parade, and it makes the celebration of this year 
quite different than the past years.  
French nationals in Shanghai prepared the celebration as same as the former years. 
Although, because of the current situation, this years’ celebration is not as 
bustling as before, the connotation of this year is still significantly important. 
We hereby extend greetings to those people who received medals. We also extend 
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cordial greetings to the French Concession. We hope the democratic France is 
continuing its prosperity. Long live France! Long live all democratic countries in 
the world! 
 
Commemoration of French Democracy: a lesson for Chinese people by Tie 
Lang 
The French Revolution broke out on 14 July 1789. This great movement features 
prominently in the history of the West. The influence of the French Revolution 
not only liberated the people of France, but also enlightened democratic 
movements in Europe. The importance of the historical contribution of the 
French Revolution can be equated with the Renaissance, and the Protestant 
Reformation. German authoritative historian said:” The French Revolution 
contributed to the generation of legal system, the restoration of human rights and 
the creation of axiom.” In light of the significance of the movement, 17 June was 
set by French People as commemoration day of the French democracy. 
Pre-revolution France was an extreme degenerate country. Politically, the king 
centralised power, and different gradations in the society stood in the opposite to 
each other. Nobilities and clergies had privileges. They did not to pay tax. Being 
exploited, plebeians lived in destitution and unease. Peasants who were living at 
the bottom of the society worded hard years and years. Most of their income had 
to tribute to the king’s family and church, and this made their live into difficulty. 
Financially, the national economy was in a bad way as Louis XVI was militaristic 
and led a voluptuous life.  
 
